The bill
American Quantum Competitiveness Act
HR. 10163, 119th Congress — read as touching AI & Cloud Infrastructure.
Sponsored by
Rep. Langworthy, Nicholas A. [R-NY-23]
ID: L000600
Follow the money
The bill
HR. 10163, 119th Congress — read as touching AI & Cloud Infrastructure.
The sponsor
Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.
The money
30 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.
The alignment
This bill's text tracks the "Department of Commerce" section, p. 702-704 of the Mandate for Leadership.
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Forwarded by Subcommittee to Full Committee by Voice Vote.
August 31, 2026
📍 Current Status
Next: The bill moves to the floor for full chamber debate and voting.
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
**American Quantum Competitiveness Act (HR 10163) – A Cynical Analysis**
**Main Purpose & Objectives:** On the surface, this bill aims to bolster U.S. leadership in quantum technology by directing the Secretary of Commerce to promote “trusted” quantum supply chains and commercial competitiveness. In reality, it’s another performative gesture in the endless theater of “strategic competition” with China—dressed up in technobabble to make it sound like we’re doing something proactive, when in fact we’re just reacting to our own industrial atrophy. The stated goal? Prevent critical quantum components from being sourced from “covered nations” (read: China, Russia, Iran, North Korea—though the bill hides behind a reference to 10 U.S.C. § 4872(f) to avoid saying it outright). The real objective? Give the Commerce Department a shiny new mandate to hand out subsidies, forge sweetheart deals with allied nations, and pretend we’re rebuilding a supply chain we let atrophy for decades while chasing short-term profits and offshore manufacturing.
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill doesn’t create new funding or regulatory authority—it just reassigns existing Commerce Department functions under a new banner. Section 3 makes the Secretary of Commerce the President’s “principal advisor” on quantum tech policy, a role that likely duplicates existing efforts by OSTP, NSC, and the National Quantum Initiative. Section 4 mandates the identification of “critical components,” assessment of supply chain risks from covered nations, and the creation of a national strategy every three years—essentially a bureaucratic full-employment program for consultants and think tanks. The definition of “trusted foreign partner” is a laughably narrow club: NATO, EU, or OECD members that aren’t covered nations—so basically, our usual allies, plus Switzerland and Japan, excluding anyone who might actually compete with us economically. It’s supply chain nationalism with a veneer of multilateralism.
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** - **Big Tech & Defense Contractors** (IBM, Google, Lockheed, Raytheon): Stand to gain from subsidies, preferential treatment, and de-risked supply chains—all funded by taxpayers. - **Commerce Department Bureaucrats**: Get a new empire to build, complete with strategy documents, working groups, and pointless interagency meetings. - **Universities & National Labs**: May see trickle-down funding for quantum R&D, but only if they play nice with industry partners approved by the Secretary. - **Covered Nations (China)**: Will be publicly blamed for supply chain risks, even as American companies continue to rely on Chinese-made components due to cost and availability—creating a hypocrisy gap wide enough to drive a quantum truck through. - **American Taxpayers**: Foot the bill for a solution to a problem we created by offshoring our manufacturing base in pursuit of quarterly earnings.
**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill is less about quantum technology and more about the ritual of pretending we can restore technological sovereignty through paperwork and alliances. It will likely result in: - A proliferation of “trusted supplier” certifications that add cost without improving security. - Increased reliance on allied nations (like Taiwan or South Korea) for critical components—just shifting the dependency, not eliminating it. - More political photo ops where officials solemnly warn about “quantum winter” while doing nothing to fix the underlying rot in American industrial policy. In short: it’s a placebo for a nation addicted to the illusion of control. The real quantum leap we need isn’t in computing—it’s in the courage to make things at home again. But that would require sacrificing shareholder value, and we can’t have that. So instead, we get a bill that treats supply chain resilience like a public relations campaign—because why fix the disease when you can just rename the symptoms?
Rep. Langworthy, Nicholas A. [R-NY-23]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
No committee contributions found
This bill has 2 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.
ID: L000599
Top Contributors
21
ID: T000469
Top Contributors
20
Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
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Total contributions: $72
Showing top 24 donors by contribution amount
Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 2 helped.
Section 3 promotes the commercial leadership of the United States with respect to quantum technology, which is likely to benefit the AI and cloud infrastructure industry, as quantum technology is closely related to AI and cloud computing. Specifically, subsection 3(2) supports the commercial manufacturing, establishment, deployment, use, or scaling of quantum technology, which could lead to increased investment and innovation in the AI and cloud infrastructure sector.
Section 2 defines critical components as including hardware necessary for the commercial manufacturing, establishment, deployment, use, or scaling of quantum technology. Section 3(2) promotes investment in the commercial manufacturing of quantum technology, which could benefit the semiconductors and hardware industry, as quantum technology relies on advanced hardware and semiconductor components.
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.
AI Analysis:
"The American Quantum Competitiveness Act directly implements Project 2025's objectives by mandating strategic decoupling from adversarial nations (especially China) in quantum supply chains, strengthening the defense industrial base through trusted partnerships, and advancing emerging technologies like quantum computing via domestic reshoring and export controls."
— 670 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise l Strategic decoupling from China; l Defense industrial base strength; l Critical supply chains (e.g., pharmaceuticals, medical devices, food); and l Emerging technologies (e.g., rare earth minerals, semiconductors, batteries, artificial intelligence, quantum computing). Global Markets and the U.S. and Foreign Commercial Service. For more than a decade, strategic planning at Global Markets (GM) and the U.S. and For- eign Commercial Service (CS) has been consistently undermined by increased costs associated with overseas staff and flat or reduced budgets. The Trump Administration introduced crucial, long-overdue business practices such as the implementation of software to manage and track workflow, but a further strategic overhaul of resource allocation is needed to set GM and the CS on a firm footing. Currently, CS manages staff spread over 106 domestic offices in 77 countries around the world. Abroad, several “partner posts” utilize interagency staff and regionally located CS officials to offer services without a permanent physical in-country CS presence. Given the rapidly rising costs imposed by the State Depart- ment on CS posts overseas, a drastic expansion of this model is likely needed. CS resources should be distributed according to the following set of priorities: l Value in countering the malign influence of adversaries, particularly China; l Value in fostering U.S. innovation; l Value in maintaining access to critical supply chains and technology; l Difficulty for U.S. companies in gaining market access without CS involvement; and l Potential untapped export market size and likelihood of expansion. Ultimately, difficult decisions must be made about the value of CS posts and whether individual posts can be justified given current resources and the above criteria. If the State Department deems the diplomatic value of a permanent in-country CS post to be vital to the national interest, then State should bear more of the cost of maintaining that post. Global Markets should also consolidate and elevate the Advocacy Center and SelectUSA as relatively low-cost tools to drive large-scale export transactions — 671 — Department of Commerce and foreign direct investment (FDI). SelectUSA is a low-cost and effective tool in attracting FDI to the U.S. and to re-shore manufacturing and research and devel- opment. In a world in which corruption is rampant, these are among the most effective tools in leveling the playing field for U.S. communities and companies seeking to engage with governments and potential overseas investors. Given the value placed on senior-level engagement by many governments and companies, this consolidated Office of Trade and Investment Advocacy should be headed by a Deputy Assistant Secretary. The new office should also seek congres- sional authorization to utilize its FDI-promotion tools to encourage reshoring by U.S. businesses. BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY During the past two decades, technology transfer from America and its allies has helped accelerate adversaries’ technological and weapons capabilities. This tech- nology transfer on a massive scale has occurred because of adversaries’ exploitation of the U.S.’s open economy and education system through both commercial trans- actions and university and government research programs. Examples include the People’s Republic of China’s dramatic leaps forward in semiconductor design and fabrication, battery energy storage, nuclear weapons capabilities, artificial intel- ligence, space and aerospace engineering, and hypersonic weapons deployment. At the same time, the U.S. has systematically failed to protect critical assets. Rather than promulgate policies to better prevent technology transfer, the U.S. government has either ignored the problem or, worse, from 2008 through 2016 instituted a government-wide “Export Control Reform” process to loosen the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) governing exports of dual-use items to facilitate technology transfer to adversaries, either directly or indirectly through third-country transfers. Those reforms still present in the Department of Commerce’s EAR must be reversed. The United States needs stronger rules to protect technology transfer to adversaries while promoting technology integration and interoperability with allies. Further, U.S. export control regulations should be utilized to prevent theft of personally identifiable information and to encourage U.S. companies to shift production out of China and further diversify their supply chains to better advance U.S. national security interests. For all the below recommendations, BIS needs to move unilaterally while it works with allies to implement complementary export control policies. Waiting to act until allies are ready to move in lockstep is not an option while America’s national security is at risk. Emerging and Foundational Technologies. The Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA) gave BIS permanent statutory authority to regulate exports of dual-use items (goods, software, and technology). ECRA also mandated that BIS
AI Analysis:
"The bill strongly aligns with Project 2025's emphasis on securing U.S. technological leadership, protecting taxpayer-funded R&D, and ensuring that advances in critical fields like quantum information science are swiftly transferred to American private-sector interests while safeguarding national security. Both prioritize supply chain resilience, domestic commercialization, and reducing reliance on adversarial nations in strategic technologies."
— 393 — Department of Energy and Related Commissions l Ensure that R&D funds are used for projects that protect and advance that edge. l Ensure that successful advances, with a focus on new natural resource development technologies, artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, and space, are transferred swiftly to American interests in the private sector. New Policies l Focus on benefits to Americans. OTT’s operations should be based on the recognition that the new technologies generated by American taxpayers’ investment in DOE are a significant national security asset rather than some neutral scientific gift to humanity. l Increase oversight and coordination. OTT needs to be vigilant in overseeing and coordinating OTT offices associated with each National Lab. For security and economic espionage reasons, the work funded by the American people needs to be protected, and when commercialized, it needs to go to American businesses. OFFICE OF SCIENCE (SC) Mission/Overview The Office of Science (SC) supports and oversees research facilities and pro- grams that cover basic science through its application to the demonstration and deployment of energy technologies. SC oversees 10 of the 17 DOE National Labs and 28 major federal research user facilities. Its mission is to preserve U.S. leader- ship in science, fund and perform basic research, and provide the scientific facilities that the private sector is unable or unwilling to provide. New initiatives include quantum information sciences and artificial intelligence. SC is led by a Senate-con- firmed Director at the Assistant Secretary level and has eight program offices.82 Needed Reforms The next conservative President should commit the United States to scientific dominance to support national and economic security, especially in light of similar efforts by China. To aid in this effort, the Office of Science should: l Return to its primary mission: nonpartisan and basic science. SC’s mission should be international leadership in basic and early applied science and provision of world-leading facilities for this work. The Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act and Inflation Reduction Act mark the major — 394 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise reorientation of DOE primarily from defense applications in the NNSA and basic and early applied science across SC and the applied offices to a massive federal research, development, demonstration, and commercialization body.83 Distraction from SC’s basic science mission should be prevented. l Increase the level of accountability. The National Laboratories need to be more directly accountable to the Secretary of Energy and Congress for their work and management. New Policies l Commit to U.S. science dominance. The United States is losing its dominance in scientific discoveries and technological development. China and other adversaries have been stealing American science and technology for years and are now on the verge of dominating science—a development that is fraught with negative strategic and economic implications for the United States. The next Administration must commit itself to ensuring that the U.S. continues to dominate scientific discovery and technological advancement. l Refocus on mission and eliminate duplication and waste. The Administration should work with Congress to rationalize the National Lab network to meet specific national objectives (such as the NNSA laboratories’ role in national defense) and conduct basic research that the private sector would not otherwise conduct. Activities that duplicate those of other government agencies or the private sector should be eliminated. l Properly manage the National Labs’ contributions to the private sector. SC should improve private-sector access to the National Labs, through programs like the GAIN voucher program and consistent with national security considerations, while ensuring that the economic benefits of taxpayer-funded technologies flow back to taxpayers through patent- review sharing or a revolving fund. Budget The Office of Science was appropriated slightly more than $7 billion in FY 2021, and DOE requested slightly less than $7.8 billion for FY 2023.84 OFFICE OF ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT (EM) Mission/Overview The Office of Environmental Management’s mission is to “complete the safe cleanup of [the] environmental legacy resulting from decades of nuclear
AI Analysis:
"The bill aligns strongly with Project 2025's focus on strengthening the defense industrial base through supply chain resilience, domestic production, and trusted partnerships, particularly in emerging technologies like quantum computing. Both emphasize reducing reliance on adversarial nations and enhancing security via friendshoring and domestic sourcing of critical components."
— 96 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise relevant. This allows the acquisition community to focus on portfolio management and move money around more easily instead of being locked into inflexible, multiyear procurement cycles. 2. The President should examine the recommendations of the congressionally mandated Commission on Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution Reform4 and develop a strategy for implementing those that the Administration considers to be in the best interests of the American people. The commission’s final report is due on September 1, 2023. 3. Develop legislation or other means of providing funding outside the traditional PPBE process for the prototyping and experimentation of emerging technologies that are deemed essential to modernization and future conflict. Consider creating a “fast track” for projects that satisfy the most pressing national security needs. 4. Require the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, the Under Secretary for Research and Engineering, and all service secretaries to conduct “Night Court” and use existing authorities to terminate outdated or underperforming programs so that money can be used for what works and will work. Require the Under Secretaries and service secretaries to brief the Secretary annually on the results. 5. Require the Office of the Secretary of Defense to research and report on the acquisition processes used by America’s adversaries to improve our understanding of how they are often able to innovate and field new technologies on a faster timeline. l Strengthen America’s defense industrial base. 1. Replenish and maintain U.S. stockpiles of ammunition and other equipment that have been depleted as a result of U.S. support to Ukraine. This will strengthen the defense industry supply chain and ensure that adequate inventory exists if it is needed for a future conflict. 2. Collaborate with industry to develop a prioritized list of reforms that the DOD and Congress can enact and implement to incentivize industry to help America’s military innovate and field needed capabilities. — 97 — Department of Defense 3. Strengthen the ability of acquisition authorities to engage in multiyear procurements and block buys. This will improve private-sector rates of return, thereby incentivizing defense contractors to partner with the government. It will also reduce government overhead by reducing the number of procurement competitions. 4. Prioritize the U.S. and allies under the “domestic end product” and “domestic components” requirements of the Build America, Buy America Act.5 Currently, defense companies are required to manufacture defense items for the U.S. government that are 100 percent domestically produced and at least 50 percent composed of domestically produced components. However, there are loopholes that allow companies to manufacture these items overseas. This can create supply chain and other issues, especially in wartime. Manufacturing components and end products domestically and with allies spurs factory development, increases American jobs, and builds resilience in America’s defense industrial base. 5. Review the sectors currently prioritized for onshoring or “friendshoring” of manufacturing (kinetic capabilities, castings and forgings, critical materials, microelectronics, space, and electric vehicle batteries); evaluate them according to the strategic landscape; and expand or reprioritize the list as appropriate. 6. Help small businesses to become medium-size and large vendors, which encourages a more resilient industrial base and fosters competition. Encourage and plan for durable supply chains for small businesses so they also have commercial/private-sector customers and are not solely dependent on defense orders, which can be highly specialized, expensive, and irregular. 7. Increase external engagement among small businesses to inform them of DOD’s needs and how they could work with DOD to meet national security priorities. l Optimize the DOD acquisition community. 1. Create incentives to emphasize speed and agility in decision-making for prototyping and program-of-record starts and terminations. Most bureaucrats would rather follow a checklist and fail than go outside the procedures and win because failure means negative
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.