Memory Chip Competitiveness Assessment Act of 2026

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Bill ID: 119/hr/10170
Last Updated: September 15, 2026

Sponsored by

Rep. Miller-Meeks, Mariannette [R-IA-1]

ID: M001215

Follow the money

The bill

Memory Chip Competitiveness Assessment Act of 2026

HR. 10170, 119th Congress — read as touching Semiconductors & Hardware.

The sponsor

Rep. Miller-Meeks, Mariannette [R-IA-1]

Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.

The money

$166,100 raised

25 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.

The alignment

95% match to Project 2025

This bill's text tracks the "Department of Commerce" section, p. 702-704 of the Mandate for Leadership.

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

Track this bill's progress through the legislative process

Latest Action

Forwarded by Subcommittee to Full Committee by Voice Vote.

August 31, 2026

Introduced

Committee Review

📍 Current Status

Next: The bill moves to the floor for full chamber debate and voting.

🗳️

Floor Action

✅

Passed House

🏛️

Senate Review

🎉

Passed Congress

🖊️

Presidential Action

⚖️

Became Law

📚 How does a bill become a law?

1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.

2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

**Summary of HR 10170: Memory Chip Competitiveness Assessment Act of 2026**

**1. Main Purpose & Objectives** The stated purpose of HR 10170 is to mandate a federal study on the marketplace for advanced memory technology—essentially, to have the Secretary of Commerce spend taxpayer money producing a 270-day PowerPoint presentation on why we can’t make enough DDR5 chips without relying on Taiwan or South Korea. The bill frames this as a matter of national competitiveness and supply chain resilience. In reality, it’s a performative gesture: Congress pretending to address a critical vulnerability in the semiconductor supply chain while doing nothing substantive to fix it. The objective isn’t to reshore production or subsidize domestic fabs—it’s to generate a report that will gather dust while lobbyists continue to write the real policy.

**2. Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law** This bill creates no new regulations, taxes, or subsidies. It does not alter existing law in any meaningful way. Instead, it adds a one-time reporting requirement: the Secretary of Commerce must conduct a study assessing demand, supply constraints, end-user cost impacts, capital intensity, supply chains (especially avoiding “countries of concern”—read: China), and potential policy solutions to boost domestic or allied-source advanced memory production. The study must include public comment and be submitted to the House Energy and Commerce and Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation committees. The only “change” is the creation of a bureaucratic checkbox: *Study Done. Problem Solved. Move Along.*

**3. Affected Parties & Stakeholders** - **Semiconductor manufacturers** (e.g., Micron, Samsung, SK Hynix): Will be consulted, likely to reiterate that building fabs in the U.S. is prohibitively expensive without massive subsidies—subsidies this bill does not provide. - **Equipment suppliers** (e.g., Applied Materials, ASML, Tokyo Electron): Will be asked about capital intensity and tooling delays, then ignored when they say the same thing they’ve said for years. - **End-users** (auto manufacturers, data center operators, consumer electronics makers): Will be surveyed about how memory shortages raise their costs—information they already complain about quarterly. - **Taxpayers**: Will fund a study that confirms what everyone already knows: we outsourced critical memory production to Asia for cheap labor and now panic when geopolitics sneezes. - **Congress**: Gets to appear tough on China and proactive on tech sovereignty without risking a single vote on actual industrial policy.

**4. Potential Impact & Implications** The impact will be negligible. The study will likely conclude that advanced memory production is capital-intensive, geographically concentrated, and vulnerable to disruption—insights available in any Semiconductor Industry Association report from 2020. It may vaguely suggest “incentivizing domestic investment” or “diversifying supply chains,” but without funding, tax credits, or streamlined permitting, these are just words. The real implication is that Congress prefers the illusion of oversight to the discomfort of action. This bill is a placebo for legislative impotence: a costly, time-consuming ritual that treats the symptom (our ignorance) while ignoring the disease (our refusal to pay for resilience). In medical terms: it’s like ordering an MRI for a patient with a broken leg, then refusing to set the bone because surgery is “too expensive.” The scan confirms the fracture. The patient still limps. And the bill? It’s just another expensive bandage on a gangrenous system.

Related Topics

Research & Innovation PolicyHealthcare & Insurance Reform
Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (Dr. Haus personality)

💰 Campaign Finance Network

Rep. Miller-Meeks, Mariannette [R-IA-1]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions
$166,100
24 donors
PACs
$500
Organizations
$3,900
Committees
$0
Individuals
$160,200
1
POLITICAL COMMITTEE, NWF ACTION FUND
1 transaction
$500
1
US MARSHALS SERVICES
1 transaction
$2,900
2
HUNTON ANDREWS KURTH LLP
1 transaction
$1,000

No committee contributions found

1
SMITH, DYAN
2 transactions
$16,600
2
HOGAN, PATRICK F
1 transaction
$13,200
3
HOLDEN, RONALD
1 transaction
$13,200
4
VANDEWALLE, LOLA L
1 transaction
$13,200
5
GLEESON, JOHN W
1 transaction
$11,600
6
RICHARDS, DANIEL
1 transaction
$6,600
7
WILLOX, NORMAN
1 transaction
$6,600
8
PFAUTCH, ROY
1 transaction
$6,600
9
BRADLEY, JACQUELINE
1 transaction
$6,600
10
BROIN, JEFF MR.
1 transaction
$6,600
11
JAY, JEFFREY
1 transaction
$6,600
12
RICKETTS, J. JOE
1 transaction
$6,600
13
MCCOY, JUDITH
1 transaction
$6,600
14
SINGER, PAUL
1 transaction
$6,600
15
SABIN, ANDREW
1 transaction
$6,600
16
GILLIAM, RICHARD
1 transaction
$6,600
17
BELTRAME, MARC
1 transaction
$6,600
18
WOLL, MARGO
1 transaction
$6,600
19
SCHWARZMAN, CHRISTINE
1 transaction
$6,600

Cosponsors & Their Campaign Finance

This bill has 1 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.

Rep. Soto, Darren [D-FL-9]

ID: S001200

Top Contributors

29

1
ACROSS THE AISLE PAC
PACWASHINGTON, DC
$1,000
Jan 12, 2023
2
TED LIEU FOR CONGRESS
CCMLOS ANGELES, CA
$1,000
Mar 30, 2023
3
ACROSS THE AISLE PAC
PACWASHINGTON, DC
$500
Mar 23, 2023
4
EASTERN BAND OF CHEROKEE INDIANS
OrganizationCHEROKEE, NC
$3,300
Oct 24, 2024
5
POARCH BAND OF CREEK INDIANS
OrganizationATMORE, AL
$3,300
Mar 28, 2023
6
POARCH BAND OF CREEK INDIANS
OrganizationATMORE, AL
$3,300
Jun 7, 2024
7
SEMINOLE TRIBE OF FLORIDA
OrganizationHOLLYWOOD, FL
$3,300
Jul 31, 2024
8
SEMINOLE TRIBE OF FLORIDA
OrganizationHOLLYWOOD, FL
$3,300
Aug 18, 2023
9
CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF GRAND RONDE
OrganizationGRAND RONDE, OR
$1,000
Mar 3, 2023
10
COOPER, MILTON
KIMCO • CHAIRMAN
IndividualOLD WESTBURY, NY
$3,300
Nov 1, 2024

Donor Network - Rep. Miller-Meeks, Mariannette [R-IA-1]

PACs
Organizations
Individuals
Politicians

Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.

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Showing 64 nodes and 57 connections

Total contributions: $57

Top Donors - Rep. Miller-Meeks, Mariannette [R-IA-1]

Showing top 24 donors by contribution amount

1 PAC2 Orgs2 Committees19 Individuals

Industry Impact

Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 1 helped.

  • The bill requires a study on the marketplace for advanced memory technology, which could lead to increased investment and support for the semiconductor industry, as seen in Section 2, subsection (a) and (b).

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.

Department of Commerce

Very Strong
Vector: 64%
Pages: 702-704AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill directly supports Project 2025's goals of strategic decoupling from China, strengthening critical supply chains, and advancing emerging technologies by mandating a study to assess and reduce U.S. reliance on foreign sources of advanced memory semiconductors, particularly from countries of concern."

Key themes:strategic decoupling from Chinacritical supply chainsemerging technologiessemiconductor competitivenesssupply chain resilience

— 670 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise l Strategic decoupling from China; l Defense industrial base strength; l Critical supply chains (e.g., pharmaceuticals, medical devices, food); and l Emerging technologies (e.g., rare earth minerals, semiconductors, batteries, artificial intelligence, quantum computing). Global Markets and the U.S. and Foreign Commercial Service. For more than a decade, strategic planning at Global Markets (GM) and the U.S. and For- eign Commercial Service (CS) has been consistently undermined by increased costs associated with overseas staff and flat or reduced budgets. The Trump Administration introduced crucial, long-overdue business practices such as the implementation of software to manage and track workflow, but a further strategic overhaul of resource allocation is needed to set GM and the CS on a firm footing. Currently, CS manages staff spread over 106 domestic offices in 77 countries around the world. Abroad, several “partner posts” utilize interagency staff and regionally located CS officials to offer services without a permanent physical in-country CS presence. Given the rapidly rising costs imposed by the State Depart- ment on CS posts overseas, a drastic expansion of this model is likely needed. CS resources should be distributed according to the following set of priorities: l Value in countering the malign influence of adversaries, particularly China; l Value in fostering U.S. innovation; l Value in maintaining access to critical supply chains and technology; l Difficulty for U.S. companies in gaining market access without CS involvement; and l Potential untapped export market size and likelihood of expansion. Ultimately, difficult decisions must be made about the value of CS posts and whether individual posts can be justified given current resources and the above criteria. If the State Department deems the diplomatic value of a permanent in-country CS post to be vital to the national interest, then State should bear more of the cost of maintaining that post. Global Markets should also consolidate and elevate the Advocacy Center and SelectUSA as relatively low-cost tools to drive large-scale export transactions — 671 — Department of Commerce and foreign direct investment (FDI). SelectUSA is a low-cost and effective tool in attracting FDI to the U.S. and to re-shore manufacturing and research and devel- opment. In a world in which corruption is rampant, these are among the most effective tools in leveling the playing field for U.S. communities and companies seeking to engage with governments and potential overseas investors. Given the value placed on senior-level engagement by many governments and companies, this consolidated Office of Trade and Investment Advocacy should be headed by a Deputy Assistant Secretary. The new office should also seek congres- sional authorization to utilize its FDI-promotion tools to encourage reshoring by U.S. businesses. BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY During the past two decades, technology transfer from America and its allies has helped accelerate adversaries’ technological and weapons capabilities. This tech- nology transfer on a massive scale has occurred because of adversaries’ exploitation of the U.S.’s open economy and education system through both commercial trans- actions and university and government research programs. Examples include the People’s Republic of China’s dramatic leaps forward in semiconductor design and fabrication, battery energy storage, nuclear weapons capabilities, artificial intel- ligence, space and aerospace engineering, and hypersonic weapons deployment. At the same time, the U.S. has systematically failed to protect critical assets. Rather than promulgate policies to better prevent technology transfer, the U.S. government has either ignored the problem or, worse, from 2008 through 2016 instituted a government-wide “Export Control Reform” process to loosen the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) governing exports of dual-use items to facilitate technology transfer to adversaries, either directly or indirectly through third-country transfers. Those reforms still present in the Department of Commerce’s EAR must be reversed. The United States needs stronger rules to protect technology transfer to adversaries while promoting technology integration and interoperability with allies. Further, U.S. export control regulations should be utilized to prevent theft of personally identifiable information and to encourage U.S. companies to shift production out of China and further diversify their supply chains to better advance U.S. national security interests. For all the below recommendations, BIS needs to move unilaterally while it works with allies to implement complementary export control policies. Waiting to act until allies are ready to move in lockstep is not an option while America’s national security is at risk. Emerging and Foundational Technologies. The Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA) gave BIS permanent statutory authority to regulate exports of dual-use items (goods, software, and technology). ECRA also mandated that BIS

Department of Commerce

Strong
Vector: 65%
Pages: 702-704AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill aligns strongly with Project 2025's focus on strengthening critical supply chains, particularly semiconductors, and reducing reliance on China through strategic analysis and supply chain vulnerability assessments. It directly supports the mandate for Industry and Analysis (I&A) to conduct ongoing supply-chain analysis in emerging technologies like semiconductors to inform national security and trade policy."

Key themes:semiconductor supply chainsstrategic decoupling from Chinasupply chain vulnerability analysiscritical emerging technologiesIndustry and Analysis (I&A) mandate

— 669 — Department of Commerce l Develop a new methodology to determine normal values in Chinese anti- dumping cases because—given China’s size, economic might, and state intervention in the economy—there is no comparable surrogate country to use as a proxy for production costs. In addition to these changes, continued support for steel and aluminum market analysis and import monitoring remains crucial to the U.S. defense industrial base and the health of global manufacturing. Without these functions, it is difficult to address massive subsidization, overcapacity, and dumping by China. Industry and Analysis. Industry and Analysis (I&A) consists of a team of econ- omists and industry experts that provides important analysis to partners across the government, including the White House and USTR, as well as the public. As the Department of Commerce’s Committee on Foreign Investments in the United States (CFIUS) lead, I&A performs crucial work to ensure that the proper economic impact/supply chain analysis is brought to national security risk assess- ments. This analysis is needed for CFIUS to be an effective tool in preventing China and other adversaries from exploiting the U.S.’s open investment climate. I&A also provides impact assessments and economic modeling for policy options under Administration consideration; plays a critical role in identifying trade barriers and providing industry-specific expertise for USTR during free trade agreement (FTA) negotiations; and does indispensable work ensuring cross-bor- der data flows, particularly with Europe, remain open and relatively unrestricted. However, outside of these functions, implementation of I&A’s mission as an intellectual engine for U.S. trade and investment policy can often lack energy and focus. For instance, the Top Market Reports that represent a large volume of I&A work do not serve a specific strategic function and could be better replaced by industry competitiveness assessments in critical sectors of the economy. Strong and capable leadership is needed in I&A to ensure Administration pri- orities permeate the organization and that staff support Administration priorities. I&A produces a mandatory report to Congress regarding the Miscellaneous Tariff Bill, which focuses solely on U.S. capacity in the goods being considered for tariff exclusions and does not include highly relevant information on capacity among FTA partners and close allies. The resulting final report has thus been used to lobby for tariff reductions on thousands of imports from China without concern for any other factors. This lack of priority given to FTA partners is troubling. Going forward, I&A should be permanently restructured to perform supply-chain analysis on an ongoing basis for the U.S. government, identifying potential vulner- abilities like those exposed by the pandemic and resulting shortages in everything from semiconductors to baby formula. Furthermore, permanent standing teams should be established and staffed by properly aligned political appointees and trusted career staff to analyze and spur action on the following priority policy issues: — 670 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise l Strategic decoupling from China; l Defense industrial base strength; l Critical supply chains (e.g., pharmaceuticals, medical devices, food); and l Emerging technologies (e.g., rare earth minerals, semiconductors, batteries, artificial intelligence, quantum computing). Global Markets and the U.S. and Foreign Commercial Service. For more than a decade, strategic planning at Global Markets (GM) and the U.S. and For- eign Commercial Service (CS) has been consistently undermined by increased costs associated with overseas staff and flat or reduced budgets. The Trump Administration introduced crucial, long-overdue business practices such as the implementation of software to manage and track workflow, but a further strategic overhaul of resource allocation is needed to set GM and the CS on a firm footing. Currently, CS manages staff spread over 106 domestic offices in 77 countries around the world. Abroad, several “partner posts” utilize interagency staff and regionally located CS officials to offer services without a permanent physical in-country CS presence. Given the rapidly rising costs imposed by the State Depart- ment on CS posts overseas, a drastic expansion of this model is likely needed. CS resources should be distributed according to the following set of priorities: l Value in countering the malign influence of adversaries, particularly China; l Value in fostering U.S. innovation; l Value in maintaining access to critical supply chains and technology; l Difficulty for U.S. companies in gaining market access without CS involvement; and l Potential untapped export market size and likelihood of expansion. Ultimately, difficult decisions must be made about the value of CS posts and whether individual posts can be justified given current resources and the above criteria. If the State Department deems the diplomatic value of a permanent in-country CS post to be vital to the national interest, then State should bear more of the cost of maintaining that post. Global Markets should also consolidate and elevate the Advocacy Center and SelectUSA as relatively low-cost tools to drive large-scale export transactions

Department of Commerce

Strong
Vector: 64%
Pages: 705-707AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill aligns strongly with Project 2025's focus on strengthening export controls and supply chain resilience for critical technologies, particularly by assessing vulnerabilities in advanced memory semiconductors and reducing reliance on countries of concern like China and Russia."

Key themes:supply chain resiliencecountries of concernadvanced memory technologyexport controlstechnological competitiveness

— 672 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise regulate exports of emerging and foundational technologies. Although the scope of such technologies is vast, to date BIS has only controlled just over 40 of these technologies. This does not meet the clear statutory intent of Congress that ECRA be leveraged to ensure that the United States maintains a technological advantage in technologies bearing upon national security interests. Currently, BIS self-identifies technologies that merit control under the EAR with minimal input from other federal agencies. This mechanism should be improved. BIS should create an open, transparent rulemaking process by which any industry participant, private entity, or branch of the government may, at any time, submit nominations for emerging/foundational technologies for control. Then, on a quarterly basis, BIS should make public such recommendations (while holding the identity of the submitter confidential) for public input, followed by an explanation about its ultimate decision to control or not control the items, its reasons, the level of controls applied (stringent or permissive), and the relevant Export Control Classification Number (ECCN) under the Commerce Control List. Commerce should also institute a mechanism whereby its decisions can be challenged, including on a confidential basis. Licensing Procedures: Adjudication and Transparency. Currently, if the Departments of Defense, State, Commerce, and Energy disagree on an export license decision, the disagreement may be escalated to the Operating Commit- tee—and subsequently to the Advisory Committee on Export Policy led by BIS’s Assistant Secretary for Export Administration. The Assistant Secretary does not need to lead the dispute resolution, and this process should be revised by giving lead authority to BIS’s Under Secretary, who is better able to account for diverging views. Moreover, BIS’s authority to overrule other agency votes should be changed. Each agency should have one equal vote and, if a licensing dispute remains unre- solved, the final decision should be elevated to the National Security Advisor and the Secretaries of Defense, State, Commerce, and Energy. Additionally, to improve congressional oversight of BIS’s license adjudication process, BIS should provide specific congressional committees with data from the Automated Export System on a quarterly basis. Electronic files should contain U.S. exporter by name; product description (e.g., harmonized system code and ECCN/U. S. Munitions List designation); end user and destination country; and when a license was required, whether the license was granted or denied. BIS cur- rently denies just 1.2 percent of export licenses. These data reporting requirements can help Congress better determine whether BIS is adequately protecting national security through appropriate use of export controls or whether additional direction from Congress is required. Improve End-Use Checks. The integrity of the export control system may be validated only through adequate end-use checks. BIS must deny export licenses to countries that do not permit adequate end-use checks (e.g., China/Russia) by U.S. authorities. BIS should also strengthen the forensic audit capabilities of its — 673 — Department of Commerce Export Enforcement officers through improved and frequent training so they are able to detect export-control violations. EAR Revisions. The U.S. Government needs a new export control moderniza- tion effort to tighten the EAR policies governing licenses to countries of concern, including China and Russia (specifically, revise and/or reverse the 2008 through 2016 policies). When authoritarian governments explain what they plan to do, believe them unless hard evidence demonstrates otherwise. Case in point: China’s and Russia’s stated civil–military fusion policies demand central government command-and-control style systems in which every private entity serves the interests of the state and is forced to provide technology, services, capacity, and data to the central govern- ment and the military. Through this structure, commercial activities are routinely weaponized by authoritarian regimes that repeatedly identify the U.S. as an enemy. Accordingly, U.S. export control policies must be updated to reflect these realities and the associated threats to national security. Key priorities for EAR modernization for countries of concern should be: l Eliminating the “specially designed” licensing loophole; l Redesignating China and Russia to more highly prohibitive export licensing groups (country groups D or E); l Eliminating license exceptions; l Broadening foreign direct product rules; l Reducing the de minimis threshold from 25 percent to 10 percent—or 0 percent for critical technologies; l Tightening the deemed export rules to prevent technology transfer to foreign nationals from countries of concern; l Tightening the definition of “fundamental research” to address exploitation of the open U.S. university system by authoritarian governments through funding, students and researchers, and recruitment; l Eliminating license exceptions for sharing technology with controlled entities/countries through standards-setting “activities” and bodies; and l Improving regulations regarding published information for technology transfers.

Showing 3 of 5 policy matches

About These Correlations

Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.

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