DHS Cybersecurity On-the-Job Training Program Act

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Bill ID: 119/hr/1034
Last Updated: November 21, 2025

Sponsored by

Rep. Turner, Sylvester [D-TX-18]

ID: T000489

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Bill Summary

Another "solution" from the esteemed members of Congress, because what could possibly go wrong with more bureaucratic busywork? Let's dissect this trainwreck.

**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The DHS Cybersecurity On-the-Job Training Program Act (HR 1034) claims to establish a training program for Department of Homeland Security (DHS) employees who aren't currently in cybersecurity positions. The supposed goal is to "voluntarily" train them for work in matters related to cybersecurity. Because, you know, the current crop of DHS employees just isn't doing enough to protect our nation's cyber-infrastructure.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill creates a new section (SEC. 2220F) within the Homeland Security Act of 2002, which establishes the training program. The Director of DHS will lead this initiative, in consultation with the Under Secretary for Management. The program's duties include developing a curriculum, setting participation criteria, and providing training to employees. Oh, and there are reports to be submitted every year for seven years because, clearly, that's the most effective way to measure success.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The main beneficiaries of this bill will be DHS employees who participate in the program (if they can stomach the bureaucratic red tape). Other federal employees might also get access to training, but only if it's deemed "appropriate" by the Director. The real stakeholders, however, are the contractors and consultants who'll be hired to develop the curriculum and provide training services.

**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill is a classic case of treating symptoms rather than the underlying disease. Instead of addressing the root causes of cybersecurity vulnerabilities (e.g., inadequate funding, outdated infrastructure, or poor leadership), Congress is opting for a feel-good solution that will likely result in more paperwork and less actual progress.

The real impact will be on taxpayers' wallets, as this program will undoubtedly require significant funding to implement and maintain. Meanwhile, the actual effectiveness of the training program will be measured by meaningless metrics (e.g., number of participants, job placements) rather than tangible improvements in cybersecurity.

In conclusion, HR 1034 is a prime example of legislative theater, designed to make it seem like Congress is doing something about cybersecurity while actually accomplishing very little. It's a Band-Aid on a bullet wound, and we should all be skeptical of its true intentions.

Related Topics

Federal Budget & Appropriations State & Local Government Affairs Congressional Rules & Procedures Civil Rights & Liberties Transportation & Infrastructure Small Business & Entrepreneurship Government Operations & Accountability Criminal Justice & Law Enforcement National Security & Intelligence
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đź’° Campaign Finance Network

Rep. Turner, Sylvester [D-TX-18]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions
$224,505
27 donors
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$0
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$3,000
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1
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ADAMS, MICHAEL MR.
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FOOTE, SCOTT
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HATFIELD, JAY
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Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document. Higher similarity scores indicate stronger thematic connections.

Introduction

Low 55.7%
Pages: 168-170

— 135 — Department of Homeland Security Unfortunately for our nation, the federal government’s newest department became like every other federal agency: bloated, bureaucratic, and expensive. It also lost sight of its mission priorities. DHS has also suffered from the Left’s wokeness and weaponization against Americans whom the Left perceives as its political opponents. To truly secure the homeland, a conservative Administration needs to return the department to the right mission, the right size, and the right budget. This would include reorganizing the department and shifting significant resources away from several supporting components to the essential operational components. Prior- itizing border security and immigration enforcement, including detention and deportation, is critical if we are to regain control of the border, repair the historic damage done by the Biden Administration, return to a lawful and orderly immi- gration system, and protect the homeland from terrorism and public safety threats. This also includes consolidating the pieces of the fragmented immigration system into one agency to fulfill the mission more efficiently. The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) is a DHS com- ponent that the Left has weaponized to censor speech and affect elections at the expense of securing the cyber domain and critical infrastructure, which are threat- ened daily.2 A conservative Administration should return CISA to its statutory and important but narrow mission. The bloated DHS bureaucracy and budget, along with the wrong priorities, provide real opportunities for a conservative Administration to cut billions in spending and limit government’s role in Americans’ lives. These opportunities include privatizing TSA screening and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) National Flood Insurance Program, reforming FEMA emergency spending to shift the majority of preparedness and response costs to states and localities instead of the federal government, eliminating most of DHS’s grant pro- grams, and removing all unions in the department for national security purposes. A successful DHS would: l Secure and control the border; l Thoroughly enforce immigration laws; l Correctly and efficiently adjudicate immigration benefit applications while rejecting fraudulent claims; l Secure the cyber domain and collaborate with critical infrastructure sectors to maintain their security; l Provide states and localities with a limited federal emergency response and preparedness;

Introduction

Low 55.7%
Pages: 168-170

— 135 — Department of Homeland Security Unfortunately for our nation, the federal government’s newest department became like every other federal agency: bloated, bureaucratic, and expensive. It also lost sight of its mission priorities. DHS has also suffered from the Left’s wokeness and weaponization against Americans whom the Left perceives as its political opponents. To truly secure the homeland, a conservative Administration needs to return the department to the right mission, the right size, and the right budget. This would include reorganizing the department and shifting significant resources away from several supporting components to the essential operational components. Prior- itizing border security and immigration enforcement, including detention and deportation, is critical if we are to regain control of the border, repair the historic damage done by the Biden Administration, return to a lawful and orderly immi- gration system, and protect the homeland from terrorism and public safety threats. This also includes consolidating the pieces of the fragmented immigration system into one agency to fulfill the mission more efficiently. The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) is a DHS com- ponent that the Left has weaponized to censor speech and affect elections at the expense of securing the cyber domain and critical infrastructure, which are threat- ened daily.2 A conservative Administration should return CISA to its statutory and important but narrow mission. The bloated DHS bureaucracy and budget, along with the wrong priorities, provide real opportunities for a conservative Administration to cut billions in spending and limit government’s role in Americans’ lives. These opportunities include privatizing TSA screening and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) National Flood Insurance Program, reforming FEMA emergency spending to shift the majority of preparedness and response costs to states and localities instead of the federal government, eliminating most of DHS’s grant pro- grams, and removing all unions in the department for national security purposes. A successful DHS would: l Secure and control the border; l Thoroughly enforce immigration laws; l Correctly and efficiently adjudicate immigration benefit applications while rejecting fraudulent claims; l Secure the cyber domain and collaborate with critical infrastructure sectors to maintain their security; l Provide states and localities with a limited federal emergency response and preparedness; — 136 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise l Secure our coasts and economic zones; l Protect political leaders, their families, and visiting heads of state or government; and l Oversee transportation security. OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY (SEC) In the next Administration, the Office of the Secretary should take on the fol- lowing key issues and challenges to ensure the effective operation of DHS. Expansion of Dedicated Political Personnel. The Secretary of Homeland Security is a presidentially appointed and Senate-confirmed political appointee, but for budgetary reasons, he or she has historically been unable to fund a dedi- cated team of political appointees. A key first step for the Secretary to improve front-office functions is to have his or her own dedicated team of political appoin- tees selected and vetted by the Office of Presidential Personnel, which is not reliant on detailees from other parts of the department, to help ensure the completion of the next President’s agenda. An Aggressive Approach to Senate-Confirmed Leadership Positions. While Senate confirmation is a constitutionally necessary requirement for appointing agency leadership, the next Administration may need to take a novel approach to the confirmations process to ensure an adequate and rapid transition. For example, the next Administration arguably should place its nominees for key positions into similar positions as “actings” (for example, putting in a person to serve as the Senior Official Performing the Duties of the Commissioner of CBP while that person is going through the confirmation process to direct ICE or become the Secretary). This approach would both guarantee implementation of the Day One agenda and equip the department for potential emergency situations while still honoring the confirmation requirement. The department should also look to remove lower-level but nevertheless important positions that currently require Senate confirmation from the confirmation requirement, although this effort would require legislation (and might also be mooted in the event of legisla- tion that closes portions of the department that currently have Senate-confirmed leadership). Clearer, More Durable, and Political-Only Line of Succession. Based on previous experience, the department needs legislation to establish a more durable but politically oriented line of succession for agency decision-making purposes. The ideal sequence for line of succession is certainly debatable, except that in cir- cumstances where a career employee holds a leadership position in the department, that position should be deemed vacant for line-of-succession purposes and the next eligible political appointee in the sequence should assume acting authority. Further,

Introduction

Low 55.2%
Pages: 239-241

— 207 — Intelligence Community l Prioritize security clearance reform. Security clearance reform has made significant progress under Trusted Workforce 2.0, a governmentwide background investigation reform that was implemented beginning in 2018 with the goal of creating one system with reciprocity across organizations. This included allowing movement from periodic reinvestigations toward a Continuous Vetting (CV) program with automated records checks, adjudication of flags, the “mitigat[ion of] personnel security situations before they become a larger problem,” or the suspension or revocation of clearances.15 However, human resources onboarding operations in major agencies such as the CIA, FBI, and NSA remain to be resolved. As executive agent for security clearances, the DNI must require results from agencies that resist implementation, enforce the 48-hour reciprocity guidance, and target human resources operations that fail to attract and expediently onboard qualified personnel. Additional “carrots and sticks” from executive order reform language, including moving the Security Services Directorate from NCSC to ODNI with elevated status, may be necessary. It is unacceptable for agencies to hinder opportunities for cross- agency assignments, use public–private partnerships inefficiently because of constraints on the transferability of security clearances, and lose future talent because of extraordinary delays in backend operations. Proper vetting to speed the onboarding of personnel with much-needed expertise is vital to the IC’s future. l Ensure the DNI’s authority. The DNI’s authority should be similar to an orchestra conductor’s. An incoming conservative President will appoint whomever he chooses as DNI, but there should be agreement between the incoming DNI and President with advice and counsel from the Presidential Personnel Office on selecting positions overseen by the DNI throughout subordinate agencies, as well as concurrence by relevant Cabinet officials and the CIA. This exists by executive order, but many Presidents, PPOs, and Cabinet agency heads do not follow executive order guidance and necessary norms. The importance of trust, character, and the ability to work together to achieve a joint set of intelligence goals established by the President cannot be overstated: It is a mission that can be accomplished only with the conductor and his orchestra playing in sync. l Provide additional support for such economic and supply chain– focused agencies as the Department of Commerce. Information sharing and feedback can help subagencies like the Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security to improve their understanding of the — 208 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise threat from China and thereby counter it more effectively. They can also aid the development of export control mechanisms and potential outbound investment screening where necessary. Brief, specific governance language should be considered that would apply counterterrorist authority models to the broader functions of the U.S. government insofar as they are needed to counter 21st century nation-state threats. The success of any DNI rests with support from the President. Any revised Executive Order 12333 must serve to express unequivocal support for the DNI in executing the mandates that an amended order would provide. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA) The CIA is a foreign intelligence collection service tasked with collecting human intelligence (HUMINT), providing all-source intelligence analysis and report- ing, and conducting covert action when required to do so by the President. The CIA has its roots in the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), which the United States established during World War II as a paramilitary and intelligence collection orga- nization. After World War II, President Harry Truman disbanded the OSS, and the CIA was established in law by the National Security Act of 1947. As with every agency in government, the President's election sets a new agenda for the country. Public servants must be mindful that they are required to help the President implement that agenda while remaining apolitical, upholding the Constitution and laws of the United States, and earning the public trust. The Pres- ident requires a CIA that provides unbiased and apolitical foreign intelligence information and, when necessary, can act capably and effectively on any covert action findings. Executing the Mission. The CIA’s success depends on firm direction from the President and solid internal CIA Director–appointed leadership. Decisive senior leaders must commit to carrying out the President’s agenda and be willing to take calculated risks. Therefore: l The next President-Elect and incoming Presidential Personnel Office should identify a Director nominee who can foster a mission-driven culture by making necessary personnel and structural changes. l The President-Elect should choose a Deputy Director who, without needing Senate confirmation, can immediately begin to implement the President’s agenda. This includes halting all current hiring to prevent the “burrowing in” of outgoing political personnel. Additional appointees should be placed within the agency as needed to assist the Director in supervising its functioning.

Showing 3 of 5 policy matches

About These Correlations

Policy matches are calculated using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text. A score of 60% or higher indicates meaningful thematic overlap. This does not imply direct causation or intent, but highlights areas where legislation aligns with Project 2025 policy objectives.