The bill
Pandemic Unemployment Fraud Enforcement Act
HR. 1156, 119th Congress — read as touching Private Prisons & Immigration Detention.
Sponsored by
Rep. Smith, Jason [R-MO-8]
ID: S001195
Follow the money
The bill
HR. 1156, 119th Congress — read as touching Private Prisons & Immigration Detention.
The sponsor
Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.
The money
21 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.
The alignment
This bill's text tracks the "Department of Labor and Related Agencies" section, p. 630-632 of the Mandate for Leadership.
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Read the second time. Placed on Senate Legislative Calendar under General Orders. Calendar No. 29.
March 12, 2025
📍 Current Status
Next: Both chambers must agree on the same version of the bill.
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Another brilliant example of congressional theater, where our esteemed lawmakers pretend to care about the little people while actually serving their true masters – the ones with deep pockets and a vested interest in maintaining the status quo.
**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The Pandemic Unemployment Fraud Enforcement Act (HR 1156) claims to address the "urgent" issue of unemployment fraud during the pandemic. Its primary objective is to extend the statute of limitations for prosecuting and enforcing civil actions related to unemployment compensation claims funded by various pandemic-related programs.
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill amends sections of the CARES Act, extending the statute of limitations from 3-5 years to 10 years for certain crimes related to unemployment fraud. This change applies to three specific programs: Pandemic Unemployment Assistance, Federal Pandemic Unemployment Compensation, and Mixed Earner Unemployment Compensation.
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The bill's proponents claim it will help protect taxpayers from rampant unemployment fraud. In reality, the main beneficiaries are likely to be:
1. Government agencies seeking to justify their existence by prosecuting more cases. 2. Private companies contracted to manage unemployment programs, which can now breathe a sigh of relief as they're less likely to face consequences for their own incompetence or malfeasance.
**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill is a classic case of "legislative lip service." By extending the statute of limitations, lawmakers create the illusion of taking action against unemployment fraud while actually doing little to address its root causes. The real impact will be:
1. More bureaucratic red tape and paperwork for already overburdened government agencies. 2. Increased opportunities for private companies to profit from managing unemployment programs, with less accountability for their actions. 3. A negligible effect on actual unemployment fraud, as the underlying issues driving it – such as inadequate program design and lack of oversight – remain unaddressed.
In short, HR 1156 is a Band-Aid on a bullet wound, designed to placate the public while maintaining the status quo. It's a perfect example of how our lawmakers excel at creating the illusion of action while avoiding meaningful reform. Bravo, Congress!
Rep. Smith, Jason [R-MO-8]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
No PAC contributions found
No committee contributions found
This bill has 10 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.
ID: L000585
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ID: Y000067
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ID: B001314
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ID: M001224
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ID: V000134
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ID: F000446
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ID: C001126
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ID: M001222
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ID: S001214
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ID: B001260
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Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Showing 64 nodes and 36 connections (39 secondary connections hidden)
Total contributions: $919,225
Showing top 18 donors by contribution amount
Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 1 helped, 3 harmed.
Section 2 extends the statute of limitations for fraud under certain unemployment programs, which may lead to increased enforcement and penalties for private prisons that have been involved in fraudulent activities, such as exploiting pandemic-related unemployment benefits for their own gain.
Section 2 provides an extended statute of limitations for fraud under certain unemployment programs, which may aid law enforcement in investigating and prosecuting fraudulent activities related to pandemic unemployment benefits, potentially increasing their effectiveness and resources.
Section 2's extension of the statute of limitations for fraud under certain unemployment programs may lead to increased scrutiny and potential penalties for labor unions that have been involved in fraudulent activities related to pandemic unemployment benefits.
Section 3 rescinds $5,000,000 from unobligated balances of amounts made available by previous laws, which may have a minor negative impact on commercial banks that had been expecting to utilize these funds for lending or other purposes.
For each industry this bill affects, here's what the sponsor (Rep. Smith, Jason [R-MO-8])received from donors associated with that industry during the 2022–present cycles. Donations are not proof of intent — they are a record of who funds the people writing the law.
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.
AI Analysis:
"The bill directly addresses the Project 2025 concern about widespread fraud in pandemic unemployment programs by extending the statute of limitations for investigations and prosecutions, thereby strengthening enforcement tools and supporting accountability efforts that the policy calls for."
— 598 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise unemployment programs were defrauded of hundreds of billions of dollars, includ- ing by state-sponsored hacking groups. Not all state agencies are yet through their backlogs of appeals and fraud cases; the recovery of lost funds has been minimal; and fraud has now spilled into the traditional UI programs. The CARES Act era drastically altered the entire UI ecosystem: The federal–state partnership shifted toward federal programs and funding, and the social insurance purpose of the program was disconnected as benefits were extended, expanded to more typically uncovered populations, and made exponentially larger. l Congress should enact bipartisan commonsense UI program reforms, including statutory authority for the Labor Office of Inspector General (OIG) to access all state UI records for the purposes of investigation and requiring state agencies to crossmatch applicants with the National Directory of New Hires. l Congress should also develop a framework (through commission of a congressional report to serve as a blueprint) of technical standards on broader tech topics like usability, state agency cybersecurity postures, data taxonomy standardization, and/or identity verification standards. l Congress should provide DOL with more reasonable enforcement tools for the UI system. Currently, DOL can either send a strongly worded letter or revoke the entire Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA)16 tax credit, which would place an immediate 6 percent to 7 percent tax on all covered employers. l DOL should review all actual or planned procurements against the $2 billion (under the American Rescue Plan Act)17 for UI fraud detection, accessibility, and equity investments. These funds do not have appropriations timelines and have very minimal statutory descriptions of the intended purpose. DOL should also review and propose changes to improve state monitoring programs including developing evidence-based frameworks for evaluating the technical readiness and security postures of the state agencies; strengthen its relationship with the OIG and Government Accountability Office (GAO), and support continued development of fraud prosecution with DOJ, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the financial services community; ensure administrative and IT funding is outcome-based; and gather and publish best practices from state officials, industry partners, and other vendors who deliver UI services. — 599 — Department of Labor and Related Agencies WORKER VOICE AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING Non-Union Worker Voice and Representation. American workers lack a meaningful voice in today’s workplace. Between 50 percent and 60 percent of workers have less influence than they want on critical workplaces issues beyond pay and benefits. Even managers are twice as likely to say their employees have too little influence rather than too much. But America’s one-size-fits-all approach undermines worker representation. Federal labor law offers no alternatives to labor unions whose politicking and adversarial approach appeals to few, whereas most workers report that they prefer a more cooperative model run jointly with management that focuses solely on workplace issues. The next Administration should make new options available to workers and push Congress to pass labor reforms that create non-union “employee involvement organizations” as well as a mechanism for worker representation on corporate boards. l Congress should reintroduce and pass the Teamwork for Employees and Managers (TEAM) Act of 2022.18 The TEAM Act: 1. Reforms the National Labor Relations Act’s (NLRA) Section 8(a)(2) prohibition on formal worker–management cooperative organizations like works councils. 2. Creates an “Employee Involvement Organization” (EIO) to facilitate voluntary cooperation on critical issues like working conditions, benefits, and productivity. 3. Amends labor law to allow EIOs at large, publicly traded corporations to elect a non-voting, supervisory member of their company’s board of directors. Alternative View. While some conservatives lament that workers lack sufficient voice in today’s workplace, others interpret the rise in independent and flexible work opportunities, significant expansion in family-friendly policies like paid family leave, and the decline in private sector unionization as indicators of workers’ increasing competency and control. Another way to help expand workers’ freedom and voices in traditional workplaces is by allowing them to choose who represents them in negotiations with their employer. The Worker’s Choice Act19 would accom- plish this by ending exclusive representation so that unions in right-to-work states are no longer forced to represent workers who do not want to join them. Union Transparency. Private-sector unions must file detailed financial infor- mation with DOL—on matters including union spending, income, loans, assets, membership information, and employee salary—but unions composed entirely
AI Analysis:
"The bill’s focus on extending fraud prosecution timelines for pandemic unemployment programs directly supports Project 2025’s goal of restoring UI program integrity and accountability through stronger enforcement tools and fraud deterrence."
— 597 — Department of Labor and Related Agencies Alternative View. While the federal government has a duty to promote economy and efficiency in federal hiring and contracting, and thus should base decisions on skills as opposed to degrees, it is not the federal government’s role to determine whether private employers may or may not include degree requirements in job descriptions and in their hiring decisions. The inappropriate reverence given to degree requirements is a byproduct of the federal government’s heavy subsidi- zation of BA degrees. Phasing down federal subsidies would be a better way to eliminate barriers to jobs for individuals without BA degrees. Federal Workforce Development Programs. Existing federally funded work- force development and training programs should be reassessed to ensure they are outcome-based and truly deliver value to taxpayers and job seekers. As of 2019, the federal government spent approximately $17 billion annually on 43 federal employment and training programs administered across nine federal agencies, many of which overlap with at least one other program. Many of these programs track only inputs or individuals served, not outcomes or outputs, and do not swiftly identify bad-actor grantees. The federal government should identify underperforming programs and eliminate or redirect that funding to programs with strong outcome-based metrics. l Evaluate and streamline workforce development programs, ensuring evidence-based outcomes. In its reauthorization of the Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act (WIOA),14 Congress should evaluate and streamline the existing workforce development programs to ensure there is no overlap or fragmentation between programs. Congress should also ensure strong evidence-based outcomes for each program and tie federal funding for those programs to the outcomes achieved. l Review employment and training programs to ensure outcome- based metrics. DOL and other federal agencies with jurisdiction over employment and training programs should review their programs and utilize all available tools and authority to ensure these programs contain strong outcome-based metrics. To the extent that agencies have this authority, they should reevaluate funding for programs that do not meet those evidence-based and outcomes-based requirements. Finally, strong internal policies should be implemented to ensure bad-actor grantees are identified and sanctioned expeditiously. Federal Unemployment Insurance Program. In the post-pandemic land- scape, the federal government should restore the Unemployment Insurance (UI) program’s purpose with a particular focus on reestablishing program integrity and accountability. The Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act15 — 598 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise unemployment programs were defrauded of hundreds of billions of dollars, includ- ing by state-sponsored hacking groups. Not all state agencies are yet through their backlogs of appeals and fraud cases; the recovery of lost funds has been minimal; and fraud has now spilled into the traditional UI programs. The CARES Act era drastically altered the entire UI ecosystem: The federal–state partnership shifted toward federal programs and funding, and the social insurance purpose of the program was disconnected as benefits were extended, expanded to more typically uncovered populations, and made exponentially larger. l Congress should enact bipartisan commonsense UI program reforms, including statutory authority for the Labor Office of Inspector General (OIG) to access all state UI records for the purposes of investigation and requiring state agencies to crossmatch applicants with the National Directory of New Hires. l Congress should also develop a framework (through commission of a congressional report to serve as a blueprint) of technical standards on broader tech topics like usability, state agency cybersecurity postures, data taxonomy standardization, and/or identity verification standards. l Congress should provide DOL with more reasonable enforcement tools for the UI system. Currently, DOL can either send a strongly worded letter or revoke the entire Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA)16 tax credit, which would place an immediate 6 percent to 7 percent tax on all covered employers. l DOL should review all actual or planned procurements against the $2 billion (under the American Rescue Plan Act)17 for UI fraud detection, accessibility, and equity investments. These funds do not have appropriations timelines and have very minimal statutory descriptions of the intended purpose. DOL should also review and propose changes to improve state monitoring programs including developing evidence-based frameworks for evaluating the technical readiness and security postures of the state agencies; strengthen its relationship with the OIG and Government Accountability Office (GAO), and support continued development of fraud prosecution with DOJ, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the financial services community; ensure administrative and IT funding is outcome-based; and gather and publish best practices from state officials, industry partners, and other vendors who deliver UI services.
AI Analysis:
"Both the bill and the Project 2025 SBA section aim to increase accountability and address fraud in pandemic‑era relief programs, though the bill targets unemployment insurance while the policy focuses on SBA loan programs."
— 753 — Small Business Administration COVID-19 Lending Program Accountability and Cleanup. A major immediate priority for the next Administration should be a final accounting and accelerated cleanup of fraudulent COVID-19 loan and grant activity. As noted by the SBA IG, “managing COVID-19 stimulus lending is the greatest overall challenge facing SBA, and it may likely continue to be for many years as the agency grapples with fraud in the programs….”40 The next Administration should: l Consider bringing in private-sector support and expertise to close out these programs. Forgiveness and fraud must be dealt with as swiftly as possible, and law enforcement officials must pursue fraud vigorously. Entities receiving PPP loans that did not meet eligibility for forgiveness must be required to pay back the money. For example, under the CARES Act,41 PPP loan applicants generally were eligible only if, together with all their affiliates, they had no more than 500 employees. Numerous Planned Parenthood affiliates self-certified eligibility for PPP loans during the initial wave of loans that were governed by the CARES Act’s size requirement. Many Senators and Representatives asserted that these Planned Parenthood organizations were ineligible because— considered together with their affiliates—they exceeded the maximum eligible size.42 The Trump Administration SBA notified several Planned Parenthood PPP recipients of its preliminary determination of their ineligibility and of SBA’s authority to take various actions against applicants that falsely certified their eligibility.43 To date, despite continued oversight attempts by Members of Congress,44 the SBA has taken no action on the Planned Parenthood loans other than to forgive them, and in 2021, it approved new PPP loans to Planned Parenthood affiliates.45 l Cooperate with ongoing congressional oversight efforts and determine whether SBA has authority to reverse the forgiveness decisions. If it does have that authority, the SBA should reverse the forgiveness decisions for the subject loans, reiterate its preliminary determinations of ineligibility, investigate the matter more thoroughly, and take all appropriate action when its investigation concludes. Regardless of whether it reverses its forgiveness, if its investigation uncovers evidence that Planned Parenthood affiliates or any other loan recipients knowingly misrepresented their eligibility in their applications, the SBA should make appropriate referrals to the Department of Justice. — 754 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise Disaster Loan Program and Direct Lending. The SBA’s disaster loan pro- gram provides low-interest loans to personal, business, and nonprofit borrowers following a federally declared disaster. The program suffers from problems of coordination with Federal Emergency Management Administration (FEMA) disas- ter assistance. For example, disaster relief applicants have an incentive to avoid being approved for SBA disaster loans in order to increase the amount of FEMA assistance for which they are eligible. Moreover, the availability of disaster loans reduces individuals’ incentives to purchase disaster-related insurance. More than 90 percent of SBA disaster loans are loans to individuals such as homeowners, not to small businesses. In view of the challenges the SBA has experienced in its administration of this program, as well as the fraud and abuse in the EIDL COVID-19–related program and the IG’s concern that the systemic problems within this lending program undermine the SBA’s work, the next Administration should: l Work with Congress to assess the extent to which disaster loans should be offered by another agency rather than the SBA and explore private-sector channels for administering the loans. l Specify clearly that no new direct lending programs will be developed at the SBA. Eligibility of Religious Entities for SBA Loans. Current SBA regulations46 and SBA Form 197147 make certain religious entities ineligible to participate in several SBA loan programs. The Trump Administration proposed a rule that would remove the provisions on the ground that they violate the First Amendment.48 Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have made their unconstitutionality clearer.49 In an April 3, 2020, letter to Congress pursuant to 28 U.S. Code § 530D,50 the Trump Administration SBA advised that two such provisions violate the Free Exer- cise Clause of the First Amendment and that it therefore would not enforce them. On January 19, 2021, the Trump Administration SBA proposed a rule to remove all of the unconstitutional religious exclusions from its regulations.51 The SBA has not acted on the proposed rule. A similar religious exclusion once appeared in the regulation governing eligibil- ity for SBA Business Loan Programs,52 but it was removed in a June 2022 final rule that noted tension with the First Amendment and Supreme Court precedent.53 That final rule announced that the SBA would nonetheless continue to make religious eligibility determinations for business loan applicants to comply with putative Establishment Clause requirements,54 but Supreme Court precedent and Office of Legal Counsel memoranda refute the notion that large government-backed loan programs raise any Establishment Clause concerns.55
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.