The bill
ANCHOR Act
HR. 1223, 119th Congress — read as touching Cybersecurity.
Sponsored by
Rep. Fong, Vince [R-CA-20]
ID: F000480
Follow the money
The bill
HR. 1223, 119th Congress — read as touching Cybersecurity.
The sponsor
Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.
The money
21 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.
The alignment
This bill's text tracks the "Introduction" section, p. 888-890 of the Mandate for Leadership.
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Received in the Senate and Read twice and referred to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation.
May 20, 2025
📍 Current Status
Next: Both chambers must agree on the same version of the bill.
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Another bill, another exercise in futility. Let's dissect this mess.
**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The ANCHOR Act (Accelerating Networking, Cyberinfrastructure, and Hardware for Oceanic Research Act) claims to improve the cybersecurity and telecommunications of the U.S. Academic Research Fleet. How noble. In reality, it's just a vehicle for pork-barrel spending and bureaucratic empire-building.
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill requires the Director (whoever that is) to submit a plan to improve cybersecurity and telecommunications within 18 months. This plan must include an assessment of needs, costs, and implementation timelines. Oh, and it also mandates consideration of "network capabilities" for various purposes, including telemedicine, data uploading, and video communications.
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The usual suspects: the National Science Foundation, the Office of Naval Research, non-Federal owners of vessels, users of the U.S. Academic Research Fleet, and anyone else who can get their hands on some of that sweet, sweet taxpayer money.
**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill is a classic case of "throwing money at a problem" without actually addressing the underlying issues. It's a Band-Aid solution to a festering wound. The real impact will be:
* Increased spending on cybersecurity and telecommunications infrastructure, which will likely benefit contractors and vendors more than actual researchers. * More bureaucratic red tape and paperwork for researchers to navigate. * A false sense of security among lawmakers, who can now claim they're "doing something" about cybersecurity.
The diagnosis? This bill is suffering from a bad case of "Legislative Attention Deficit Disorder" (LADD). Symptoms include:
* Lack of focus on actual problems * Excessive use of buzzwords and jargon * Overemphasis on bureaucratic process over real-world impact
Treatment? A healthy dose of skepticism, followed by a strong prescription of critical thinking. Unfortunately, this bill will likely pass with flying colors, as our esteemed lawmakers are too busy grandstanding to actually read the fine print.
In conclusion, the ANCHOR Act is just another example of legislative malpractice. It's a feel-good measure that accomplishes nothing meaningful while wasting taxpayer dollars on bureaucratic nonsense. But hey, at least it sounds good in a press release.
Rep. Fong, Vince [R-CA-20]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
No PAC contributions found
No committee contributions found
This bill has 5 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.
ID: S001215
Top Contributors
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ID: O000019
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ID: M001238
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ID: R000622
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ID: B001323
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Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Showing 55 nodes and 36 connections (43 secondary connections hidden)
Total contributions: $113,500
Showing top 17 donors by contribution amount
Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 4 helped.
Section 2(b)(2) requires assessment of cybersecurity needs per CISA and NIST guidance, Section 2(b)(3)(A) includes software and enterprise hardware as equipment costs, and Section 2(c)(2) references cybersecurity recommendations and training, indicating clear benefit to cybersecurity industry.
Section 2(b)(1) requires assessment of telecommunications and networking needs of the U.S. Academic Research Fleet, and Section 2(b)(3)(A) includes satellite communications equipment as necessary equipment costs, indicating potential market expansion for telecom providers.
Section 2(b)(3)(A) includes high-performance computing infrastructure shipboard and shoreside, and Section 2(c)(1)(C) mentions uploading scientific data to cloud-based servers, indicating potential benefit to cloud and AI infrastructure providers.
Section 2(d)(1) allows support for upgrades to cyberinfrastructure and cybersecurity, which may involve physical installation and engineering work, suggesting potential benefit to construction and engineering firms involved in such upgrades.
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.
— 856 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise Administration gave the green light for recipients to spend those funds to overbuild existing high-speed networks in communities that already have multiple broadband providers. A new Administration should eliminate government-funded overbuilding of existing networks. l Adopt a national coordinating strategy. Hundreds of billions of infrastructure dollars have been appropriated by Congress or budgeted by agencies over the past couple of years that can be used to end the digital divide. Yet, according to the U.S. Government Accountability Office, “U.S. broadband efforts are not guided by a national strategy”; instead, “[f]ederal broadband efforts are fragmented and overlapping, with more than 100 programs administered by 15 agencies,” risking overbuilding as well as wasteful duplication.26 Many of these programs remain plagued by inefficiency, further contributing to waste of limited taxpayer dollars. Moreover, the federal government is failing to put appropriate guardrails in place to govern the expenditure of billions in broadband funds. This is the regulatory equivalent of turning the spigot on full blast and then walking away from the hose. There is a worrisome lack of adequate tracking, measurement, and accountability standards governing all of this broadband spending. As a result, we are likely to see headline levels of waste, fraud, and abuse. A new Administration needs to bring fresh oversight to this spending and put a national strategy in place to ensure that the federal government adopts a coordinated approach to its various broadband initiatives. Similarly, the next Administration should ask the FCC to launch a review of its existing broadband programs, including the different components of the USF, with the goal of avoiding duplication, improving efficiency of existing programs, and saving taxpayer money. l Correct the FCC’s regulatory trajectory and encourage competition to improve connectivity. The FCC is a New Deal–era agency. Its history of regulation tends to reflect the view that the federal government should impose heavy-handed regulation rather than relying on competition and market forces to produce optimal outcomes. President Franklin D. Roosevelt recommended that Congress create the FCC in February 1934 for the purposes of establishing “a single Government agency charged with broad authority” over the field of communications.27 Congress subsequently established the FCC through the Communications Act of 1934. Congress has passed a number of additional statutes—some broad, some — 857 — Federal Communications Commission narrow—that pertain to the FCC’s authority, including most significantly the Telecommunications Act of 1996,28 which opened up markets for greater competition and largely deregulated industry segments. Technological change in the connectivity sector is occurring rapidly. We are now seeing an unprecedented level of convergence, innovation, and competition in the market for connectivity. On the one hand, traditional cable providers like Charter are now offering mobile wireless services to consumers in direct competition with traditional wireless companies like Verizon. On the other hand, a new generation of low-earth orbit satellite services like StarLink and Amazon’s Project Kuiper stand to offer high- speed home broadband in competition with legacy providers. Furthermore, broadcasters are offering high-speed downloads directly to consumers over spectrum that previously provided only TV service. These rapidly evolving market conditions counsel in favor of eliminating many of the heavy-handed FCC regulations that were adopted in an era when every technology operated in a silo. These include many of the FCC’s media ownership rules, which can have the effect of restricting investment and competition because those regulations assume a far more limited set of competitors for advertising dollars than exist today, as well as its universal service requirements. Ultimately, FCC reliance on competition and innovation is vital if the agency is to deliver optimal outcomes for the American public. The FCC should engage in a serious top-to-bottom review of its regulations and take steps to rescind any that are overly cumbersome or outdated. The Commission should focus its efforts on creating a market-friendly regulatory environment that fosters innovation and competition from a wide range of actors, including cable-based, broadband-based, and satellite- based Internet providers. AUTHOR’S NOTE: The preparation of this chapter was a collective enterprise of individuals involved in the 2025 Presidential Transition Project. All contributors to this chapter are listed at the front of this volume. While this chapter identifies certain issues on which the contributors did not all agree, the author alone assumes responsibility for the content of this chapter, and no views expressed herein should be attributed to any other individual.
— 850 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise It should be noted at this point that the views expressed here are not shared uniformly by all conservatives. There are some, including contributors to this chapter, who do not think that the FCC or Congress should act in a way that regulates the content-moderation decisions of private platforms. One of the main arguments that this group offers is that doing so would intrude— unlawfully in their view—on the First Amendment rights of corporations to exclude content from their private platforms. l Require that Big Tech begin to contribute a fair share. Big Tech has avoided accountability in several additional ways as well. One of them concerns the FCC’s roughly $9 billion Universal Service Fund. This initiative provides the support necessary to subsidize the agency’s affordable Internet and rural connectivity programs. The FCC obtains this funding through a line-item charge that carriers add to consumers’ monthly bills for traditional telecommunications service. While Big Tech derives tremendous value from the federal government’s universal service investments—using those federally supported networks to deliver their products and realize significant profits—these large corporations have avoided paying a fair share into the program. On top of that, the FCC’s current funding mechanism has been on an unsustainable path.21 By requiring traditional telephone customers to contribute to a fund that is being used increasingly to support broadband networks, the FCC’s current approach is the regulatory equivalent of taxing horseshoes to pay for highways. To put the FCC’s universal service program on a stable footing, Congress should require Big Tech companies to start contributing an appropriate amount. Conservatives are not unanimous in agreeing that the FCC should expand the USF contribution base. Instead, some argue that Congress should revisit the program’s entire funding structure and determine whether to continue subsidizing the provision of service. Future funding decisions, the argument goes, should be made by Congress through the normal appropriation process through which the USF program can compete for funding with other national initiatives. These decisions should be made with an eye to right-sizing the federal government’s existing broadband initiatives in light of both technological advances and the recent influx of billions of dollars in new appropriations that can be used to support efforts to end the digital divide. Protecting America’s National Security. During the Trump Administra- tion, the FCC ushered in a new and appropriately strong approach to the national — 851 — Federal Communications Commission security threats posed by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). During that time, the FCC eliminated federal subsidies for telecommunications equipment from Huawei and ZTE, thereby greatly reducing the chances of that equipment finding a way into our nation’s communications networks. The FCC also stood up a program to rip and replace insecure network gear to ensure that it did not remain a threat lurking inside our systems. The FCC revoked or denied the licenses of carriers like China Mobile, China Telecom, and China Unicom, which presented unacceptable national security risks. There are, however, additional strong actions that the FCC can and should take to address the CCP’s malign campaign. Specifically: l Address TikTok’s threat to U.S. national security. As law enforcement officials have made clear, TikTok poses a serious and unacceptable risk to America’s national security.22 It also provides Beijing with an opportunity to run a foreign influence campaign by determining the news and information that the app feeds to millions of Americans. As of this writing, the Biden Administration’s Treasury Department has not announced a final decision concerning its long-pending review of TikTok. If that inaction persists, or if the Administration allows TikTok to continue to operate in the U.S., a new Administration should ban the application on national security grounds. l Expand the FCC’s Covered List. The FCC maintains a list of communications equipment and services that pose an unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States. It is known as the Covered List.23 Huawei is one of the companies on the Covered List, and its inclusion means that the FCC will no longer review or approve new applications from Huawei. Without FCC approval, new Huawei gear cannot be lawfully sold or used in the U.S. However, the FCC must do a better job of ensuring that its Covered List stays up to date and accounts for changes in corporate names and forms. Therefore, a new Administration should create a more regular and timely process for reviewing entities with ties to the CCP’s surveillance state. l End the unregulated end run. As noted above, China Telecom and similar entities have been banned from operating in the U.S. in a manner that would require an FCC license or authorization because of the national security risks that those entities pose. However, many of these same entities are still operating in the U.S. and offering services very similar to the ones that they are prohibited from providing. China Telecom, for instance, continues to provide services to data centers by offering the services on a private or “unregulated” basis. A new Administration should work with the FCC to close this loophole. One way to do so would be for the FCC to prohibit any regulated carrier from interconnecting with an insecure provider.
— 847 — Federal Communications Commission The FCC has facilitated the transition from 3G to 4G and now 5G offerings in two ways. First, it has freed spectrum—the airwaves needed to deliver wireless ser- vices. Second, it has preempted state and local siting and permitting laws that could otherwise slow down the buildout of next-generation infrastructure. One of the FCC’s great success stories from 2017 to 2020 was securing U.S. leadership in 5G. The FCC also administers an approximately roughly $9 billion-a-year program called the Universal Service Fund (USF), which has been funded by a line-item charge that traditional telephone companies add to consumers’ monthly bills. Expenditures from this fund subsidize rural broadband networks and low-income programs as well as connections for schools, libraries, and rural health care facil- ities. Through various COVID-era laws, Congress has also provided the FCC with a one-time $24 billion appropriation for various low-income initiatives. POLICY PRIORITIES The FCC needs to change course and bring new urgency to achieving four main goals: l Reining in Big Tech, l Promoting national security, l Unleashing economic prosperity, and l Ensuring FCC accountability and good governance.15 Reining in Big Tech. The FCC has an important role to play in addressing the threats to individual liberty posed by corporations that are abusing dominant positions in the market. Nowhere is that clearer than when it comes to Big Tech and its attempts to drive diverse political viewpoints from the digital town square. Today, a handful of corporations can shape everything from the information we consume to the places we shop. These corporate behemoths are not merely exercising market power; they are abusing dominant positions. They are not simply prevailing in the free market; they are taking advantage of a landscape that has been skewed—in many cases by the government—to favor their business models over those of their competitors. It is hard to imagine another industry in which a greater gap exists between power and accountability. That is why a new Adminis- tration should support FCC action on several fronts. Specifically, the FFC should: l Eliminate immunities that courts added to Section 230. The FCC should issue an order that interprets Section 230 in a way that eliminates the expansive, non-textual immunities that courts have read into the statute. — 848 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise As one of the FCC’s previous General Counsels noted, the FCC has authority to take this action because Section 230 is codified in the Communications Act.16 The FCC’s Section 230 reforms should track the positions outlined in a July 2020 Petition for Rulemaking filed at the FCC near the end of the Trump Administration.17 Any new presidential Administration should consider filing a similar or new petition. As Justice Clarence Thomas has made clear, courts have construed Section 230 broadly to confer on some of the world’s largest companies a sweeping immunity that is found nowhere in the text of the statute.18 They have done so in a way that nullifies the limits Congress placed on the types of actions that Internet companies can take while continuing to benefit from Section 230. One way to start correcting this error is for the FCC to remind courts how the various portions of Section 230 operate. At the outset, the FCC can clarify that Section 230(c)(1) does not apply broadly to every decision that a platform makes. Rather, its protections apply only when a platform does not remove information provided by someone else. In contrast, the FCC should clarify that the more limited Section 230(c)(2) protections apply to any covered platform’s decision to restrict access to material provided by someone else. Combined, these actions will appropriately limit the number of cases in which a platform can censor with the benefit of Section 230’s protections. Such clarifications might also include drawing out the traditional legal distinction between distributor and publisher liability; Section 230 did not do away with the former, nor does it collapse into the latter. l Impose transparency rules on Big Tech. Today, Big Tech offers a black box. After Google manipulates search results, a small business can see its web traffic drop precipitously overnight for no apparent reason, potentially flipping its outlook from black to red. On Facebook, social media posts are left up or taken down, accounts suspended or permanently banned, without any apparent consistency. Out of the blue, YouTube can demonetize individuals who have risked their capital and invested their labor to build online businesses. At present, the FCC requires broadband providers to comply with a transparency rule that can provide a good baseline for Big Tech. Under the FCC’s rule, broadband providers must provide detailed disclosures about practices that would shape Internet traffic—from blocking to prioritizing or discriminating against content. The FCC could take a similar approach to
Policy matches are calculated using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text. A score of 60% or higher indicates meaningful thematic overlap. This does not imply direct causation or intent, but highlights areas where legislation aligns with Project 2025 policy objectives.