Unauthorized Spending Accountability Act

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Bill ID: 119/hr/143
Last Updated: September 7, 2026

Sponsored by

Rep. Cammack, Kat [R-FL-3]

ID: C001039

Follow the money

The bill

Unauthorized Spending Accountability Act

HR. 143, 119th Congress — read as touching Private Prisons & Immigration Detention.

The sponsor

Rep. Cammack, Kat [R-FL-3]

Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.

The money

$91,928 raised

25 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.

The alignment

95% match to Project 2025

This bill's text tracks the "Foreword" section, p. 40-42 of the Mandate for Leadership.

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

Track this bill's progress through the legislative process

Latest Action

Ordered to be Reported (Amended) by the Yeas and Nays: 25 - 19.

December 1, 2025

Introduced

📍 Current Status

Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.

🏛️

Committee Review

🗳️

Floor Action

✅

Passed House

🏛️

Senate Review

🎉

Passed Congress

🖊️

Presidential Action

⚖️

Became Law

📚 How does a bill become a law?

1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.

2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

Another masterpiece of legislative theater, courtesy of the esteemed members of Congress. The "Unauthorized Spending Accountability Act" - a title that screams "we're trying to sound responsible while doing nothing." Let's dissect this farce.

**Diagnosis:** This bill is suffering from a severe case of "Fiscal Fantasy Syndrome," where lawmakers pretend to address budgetary issues while actually perpetuating the status quo.

**Symptoms:**

1. **Total funding amounts and budget allocations:** The bill establishes a three-year reduction cycle for unauthorized programs, but conveniently omits any actual numbers or specifics on how much will be cut. It's like writing a prescription without specifying the dosage. 2. **Key programs and agencies receiving funds:** The bill doesn't mention which programs or agencies will be affected by these reductions. Transparency is clearly not their strong suit. 3. **Notable increases or decreases from previous years:** There are no notable changes mentioned, only vague promises of future reductions. It's like promising to start a diet next Monday. 4. **Riders or policy provisions attached to funding:** Section 5 provides an exemption for programs that are reauthorized with sunset provisions. This is essentially a get-out-of-jail-free card for favored programs, allowing them to bypass the reduction cycle. 5. **Fiscal impact and deficit implications:** The bill claims to reduce budgetary levels by 10% in the first year and 15% in subsequent years, but without actual numbers or context, this means nothing. It's like claiming a new exercise routine will make you lose weight without specifying how many calories you'll burn.

**Underlying disease:** This bill is a classic case of "Congressional Cowardice Syndrome." Lawmakers are too afraid to make real cuts or reforms, so they create a shell game with vague promises and exemptions. The result is a bill that sounds good on paper but accomplishes nothing meaningful.

**Prognosis:** This bill will likely pass with bipartisan support, as both parties can claim to be "fiscally responsible" without actually doing anything. Meanwhile, the national debt will continue to balloon, and the American people will remain none the wiser.

In conclusion, this bill is a masterclass in legislative doublespeak, designed to fool voters into thinking something meaningful is being done about the budget. But don't be fooled - it's just another case of "same old, same old" from our esteemed leaders in Washington.

Related Topics

Federal Budget & AppropriationsHealthcare & Insurance Reform
Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (Dr. Haus personality)

💰 Campaign Finance Network

Rep. Cammack, Kat [R-FL-3]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions
$91,928
22 donors
PACs
$0
Organizations
$8,043
Committees
$0
Individuals
$83,885

No PAC contributions found

1
PASS THE HAT
1 transaction
$3,610
2
SEMINOLE TRIBE OF FLORIDA
1 transaction
$3,300
3
S & K BARRINGTON FARMS
1 transaction
$600
4
83 FARMS, LLC
1 transaction
$283
5
RADIANT CREDIT UNION
1 transaction
$250

No committee contributions found

1
ASSEMI, KEVIN
2 transactions
$6,870
2
STREETER, JACKSON
2 transactions
$6,870
3
ADOLFSSON, MARCUS
1 transaction
$6,600
4
KEMMERER, JOHN
1 transaction
$6,600
5
KEMMERER, KAREN
1 transaction
$6,600
6
HOROWITZ, BEN
1 transaction
$6,600
7
ZUCKER, ANITA G.
2 transactions
$6,600
8
GASTON, BILL FAYE
1 transaction
$5,205
9
WEINGART, BRECK ALLEN
1 transaction
$5,000
10
FREY, HARLEY
1 transaction
$3,435
11
FREY, JOHN
1 transaction
$3,435
12
FREY, LEONARD
1 transaction
$3,435
13
MCCOY, GARY
1 transaction
$3,435
14
BOLCH, SUSAN
1 transaction
$3,300
15
DUNN MD, WILLIAM J.
1 transaction
$3,300
16
HIMSCHOOT, ROBERT
1 transaction
$3,300
17
VECELLIO, LEO
1 transaction
$3,300

Cosponsors & Their Campaign Finance

This bill has 2 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.

Rep. Schmidt, Derek [R-KS-2]

ID: S001228

Top Contributors

22

1
HABEMATOLEL POMO OF UPPER LAKE TRIBE OF CALIFORNIA
OrganizationUPPER LAKE, CA
$3,300
Jul 26, 2024
2
A-OK ENTERPRISES, LLC
OrganizationWICHITA, KS
$500
Jul 10, 2024
3
ROSE, DIANA
ASPIRE65 • OWNER
IndividualOLATHE, KS
$6,600
Jul 19, 2024
4
ROSE, GARY
ASPIRE HEALTH PLANS, LLC • INSURANCE SALES
IndividualOLATHE, KS
$6,600
Jul 19, 2024
5
PROCHNOW, JOSEPH
FOCUS WORKFORCES • EXECUTIVE
IndividualOVERLAND PARK, KS
$6,600
Jul 25, 2024
6
NELSON, NORMAN T
SELF • AGRICULTURE
IndividualLONG ISLAND, KS
$6,600
Sep 3, 2024
7
CUTLER, ROBERT S.
C3 • CEO
IndividualOVERLAND PARK, KS
$6,600
Dec 9, 2024
8
BONAVIA, NICHOLAS J.
BONAVIA PROPERTIES • PRESIDENT
IndividualWICHITA, KS
$6,600
May 3, 2024
9
MILLER, RICHARD
MILLER'S PROFESSIONAL IMAGING • CEO
IndividualPITTSBURG, KS
$6,600
Jun 25, 2024
10
PATTERSON, ROB
RMJK ENTERPRISES INC • CEO
IndividualKANSAS CITY, KS
$6,600
Jun 30, 2024

Rep. Barrett, Tom [R-MI-7]

ID: B001321

Top Contributors

21

1
MICHIGAN AGGREGATES ASSOCIATION PAC
OrganizationOKEMOS, MI
$300
Feb 27, 2024
2
DEMKOWICZ, BRIAN MR.
HURON CAPITAL • INVESTOR
IndividualGROSSE POINTE, MI
$13,200
Jan 8, 2024
3
STADLER, BRIAN
WOLGAST CORPORATION • MANAGER
IndividualSAGINAW, MI
$6,870
Sep 28, 2023
4
UIHLEIN, RICHARD
ULINE • CHAIRMAN
IndividualLAKE FOREST, IL
$6,870
Sep 26, 2023
5
COURTNEY, JOHN
RETIRED • RETIRED
IndividualOKEMOS, MI
$6,870
Dec 8, 2023
6
BAKER, JEFFREY
MUSKEGON CAR CREDIT • EXECUTIVE
IndividualGRAND RAPIDS, MI
$6,600
Jul 25, 2023
7
BANCROFT, NICHOLAS
AGROLIQUID • CEO
IndividualSAINT JOHNS, MI
$6,600
Sep 19, 2023
8
HAWORTH, MATTHEW
HAWORTH, INC. • CHAIRMAN
IndividualHOLLAND, MI
$6,600
Sep 18, 2023
9
HAWORTH, RICHARD
HAWORTH, INC. • CHAIRMAN EMERITUS
IndividualSAUGATUCK, MI
$6,600
Sep 18, 2023
10
O'NEIL, WILLIAM
W J O'NEIL COMPANY • EXECUTIVE
IndividualCOMMERCE TOWNSHIP, MI
$6,600
Sep 11, 2023

Donor Network - Rep. Cammack, Kat [R-FL-3]

PACs
Organizations
Individuals
Politicians

Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.

Loading...

Showing 48 nodes and 59 connections

Total contributions: $59

Top Donors - Rep. Cammack, Kat [R-FL-3]

Showing top 22 donors by contribution amount

5 Orgs17 Individuals

Industry Impact

Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 4 harmed.

  • Section 4(a) provides for the termination of unauthorized programs after three years, which could include private prison contracts, thereby potentially reducing funding for such programs.

  • −Defense Contractorsconfidence 0.70

    Section 3(a) and (b) provide for budgetary level reductions for unauthorized programs, which could include defense contracts, potentially reducing funding for such programs.

  • −Labor Unionsconfidence 0.60

    Section 4(b) prohibits obligation of funds for terminated programs without reauthorization, which may impact labor unions representing workers in affected industries.

  • −Commercial Banksconfidence 0.50

    Section 4(a) provides for the termination of unauthorized programs, which could include banking and financial services contracts, thereby potentially reducing funding for such programs.

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.

Foreword

Very Strong
Vector: 62%
Pages: 40-42AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"HR 143 directly targets unaccountable federal spending by imposing budgetary cuts on unauthorized programs and increasing congressional oversight, which mirrors Project 2025’s goal of dismantling the Administrative State, restoring fiscal limits, and enhancing accountability to elected representatives."

Key themes:fiscal responsibilitycongressional oversightlimiting Administrative Statereducing unauthorized spendingtransparency and accountability

— 7 — Foreword Instead, party leaders negotiate one multitrillion-dollar spending bill—several thousand pages long—and then vote on it before anyone, literally, has had a chance to read it. Debate time is restricted. Amendments are prohibited. And all of this is backed up against a midnight deadline when the previous “omnibus” spending bill will run out and the federal government “shuts down.” This process is not designed to empower 330 million American citizens and their elected representatives, but rather to empower the party elites secretly nego- tiating without any public scrutiny or oversight. In the end, congressional leaders’ behavior and incentives here are no differ- ent from those of global elites insulating policy decisions—over the climate, trade, public health, you name it—from the sovereignty of national electorates. Public scrutiny and democratic accountability make life harder for policymakers—so they skirt it. It’s not dysfunction; it’s corruption. And despite its gaudy price tag, the federal budget is not even close to the worst example of this corruption. That distinction belongs to the “Administrative State,” the dismantling of which must a top priority for the next conservative President. The term Administrative State refers to the policymaking work done by the bureaucracies of all the federal government’s departments, agencies, and millions of employees. Under Article I of the Constitution, “All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.” That is, federal law is enacted only by elected legislators in both houses of Congress. This exclusive authority was part of the Framers’ doctrine of “separated powers.” They not only split the federal government’s legislative, executive, and judicial powers into different branches. They also gave each branch checks over the others. Under our Constitution, the legislative branch—Congress—is far and away the most powerful and, correspondingly, the most accountable to the people. In recent decades, members of the House and Senate discovered that if they give away that power to the Article II branch of government, they can also deny responsi- bility for its actions. So today in Washington, most policy is no longer set by Congress at all, but by the Administrative State. Given the choice between being powerful but vulnerable or irrelevant but famous, most Members of Congress have chosen the latter. Congress passes intentionally vague laws that delegate decision-making over a given issue to a federal agency. That agency’s bureaucrats—not just unelected but seemingly un-fireable—then leap at the chance to fill the vacuum created by Congress’s preening cowardice. The federal government is growing larger and less constitutionally accountable—even to the President—every year. l A combination of elected and unelected bureaucrats at the Environmental Protection Agency quietly strangles domestic energy production through difficult-to-understand rulemaking processes; — 8 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise l Bureaucrats at the Department of Homeland Security, following the lead of a feckless Administration, order border and immigration enforcement agencies to help migrants criminally enter our country with impunity; l Bureaucrats at the Department of Education inject racist, anti-American, ahistorical propaganda into America’s classrooms; l Bureaucrats at the Department of Justice force school districts to undermine girls’ sports and parents’ rights to satisfy transgender extremists; l Woke bureaucrats at the Pentagon force troops to attend “training” seminars about “white privilege”; and l Bureaucrats at the State Department infuse U.S. foreign aid programs with woke extremism about “intersectionality” and abortion.3 Unaccountable federal spending is the secret lifeblood of the Great Awokening. Nearly every power center held by the Left is funded or supported, one way or another, through the bureaucracy by Congress. Colleges and school districts are funded by tax dollars. The Administrative State holds 100 percent of its power at the sufferance of Congress, and its insulation from presidential discipline is an unconstitutional fairy tale spun by the Washington Establishment to protect its turf. Members of Congress shield themselves from constitutional accountability often when the White House allows them to get away with it. Cultural institutions like public libraries and public health agencies are only as “independent” from public accountability as elected officials and voters permit. Let’s be clear: The most egregious regulations promulgated by the current Administration come from one place: the Oval Office. The President cannot hide behind the agencies; as his many executive orders make clear, his is the respon- sibility for the regulations that threaten American communities, schools, and families. A conservative President must move swiftly to do away with these vast abuses of presidential power and remove the career and political bureaucrats who fuel it. Properly considered, restoring fiscal limits and constitutional accountability to the federal government is a continuation of restoring national sovereignty to the American people. In foreign affairs, global strategy, federal budgeting and pol- icymaking, the same pattern emerges again and again. Ruling elites slash and tear at restrictions and accountability placed on them. They centralize power up and away from the American people: to supra-national treaties and organizations, to left-wing “experts,” to sight-unseen all-or-nothing legislating, to the unelected career bureaucrats of the Administrative State.

Department of Housing and Urban Development

Strong
Vector: 63%
Pages: 545-547AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"Both HR 143 and the Project 2025 HUD section emphasize fiscal responsibility, accountability, and eliminating wasteful or unauthorized spending; HR 143 provides a concrete mechanism for reducing funding and terminating unauthorized programs that aligns with Project 2025’s goals of improving HUD’s financial oversight and streamlining ineffective initiatives."

Key themes:fiscal responsibilityprogram accountabilityspending reductionsprogram termination/evaluationcongressional oversight

— 512 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise housing model. At best, any new public investments will provide maintenance funds to bring substandard housing units and properties up to livability standards but will still fail to address larger aims of upward mobility and dynamism for local housing markets where land can be sold by PHAs and put to greater economic use, thereby benefiting entire local economies through greater private investment, productivity and employment opportunities, and increased tax revenue. Any long-term view of HUD’s future must include maintaining the strong financial operations and reliable reporting that are needed to run a $50 billion- per-year agency. Before the Trump Administration, HUD effectively did not have a Chief Financial Officer (CFO) for eight years, and HUD’s financial infrastructure inevitably deteriorated. The department’s auditors were unable to conclude that HUD’s internal operations were producing accurate financial reporting. The audi- tors had identified multiple material weaknesses and significant deficiencies in the department’s internal financial controls. Overall, the deterioration of HUD’s financial infrastructure led to a lack of accountability with respect to the use of taxpayer funds as well as to pervasive difficulties with operations and program implementation. However, by hiring a new CFO from the private sector with a proven track record of visionary leadership, HUD was able to implement an agencywide governance structure that improved its financial processes and internal controls and harnessed the power of innovative new technologies to bring a modernized business mindset to the agency’s financial infrastructure. By the end of the Trump Administration, for the first time in nearly a decade, HUD was able to address all of its previously identified material weaknesses, and the auditors were able to issue their first clean audit report on HUD’s financial statements and internal controls. Finally, and more fundamentally, Congress could consider a wholesale overhaul of HUD that contemplates devolving many HUD functions to states and localities with any remaining federal functions consolidated to other federal agencies (for example, by transferring loan guarantee programs to SBA; moving Indian housing programs to the Department of the Interior; moving rental assistance, mortgage insurance programs, and GNMA to a redesignated Housing and Home Finance Agency). Generally, this reform path could consolidate some programs, elimi- nate others that have failed to produce meaningful long-run results, and narrow the scope of many programs so that they are closer to what they were when they were created. — 513 — Department of Housing and Urban Development ENDNOTES 1. At a 1998 Senate hearing, then-HUD Secretary Andrew Cuomo acknowledged that the department “faced a competence gap” and had “the dubious distinction of being the only federal agency designated as ‘high risk’ by the General Accounting [now Government Accountability] Office (GAO),” even referencing the Section 8 rental subsidy as “on the brink of becoming the next savings and loan scandal,” and explained how the department was stepping up enforcement efforts “focused on closing the competence gap by eliminating waste, fraud, and abuse.” See “Testimony of Secretary Andrew Cuomo before the House Appropriations Subcommittee on VA, HUD, and Independent Agencies,” March 25, 1998, https://archives.hud.gov/ testimony/1998/tst32598.cfm (accessed March 4, 2023). 2. H.R. 7984, Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965, Public Law No. 89-117, 89th Congress, August 10, 1965, https://www.congress.gov/89/statute/STATUTE-79/STATUTE-79-Pg451.pdf (accessed March 4, 2023). 3. U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2023 Budget in Brief, pp. 2 and 7, https://www.hud.gov/ sites/dfiles/CFO/documents/2023_BudgetInBriefFINAL.pdf (accessed March 4, 2023). 4. For example, the Special Applications Center (SAC) located in Chicago, Illinois, was established in 1998 as a division of the Office of Public and Indian Housing to accept, review, and approve all nonfunded, noncompetitive applications and plans for demolition, disposition, and conversion of land subject to an annual contributions contract (ACC) in public housing. 5. The Secretary has delegated full authority for the Administration and enforcement of the Fair Housing Act to the Assistant Secretary of the Office of Fair Housing and Equal Opportunity but also has delegated limited assignment and decision-making authority to the General Counsel. 6. Effectively the HUD Chief Operating Officer and appointed by the President with Senate advice and consent. 7. The Office of Hearings and Appeals (OHA) is an independent adjudicatory office within the Office of the Secretary. Led by a Director who is appointed by the Secretary, it supervises the Administrative Judges of the Office of Appeals, the administrative law judges of the Office of Administrative Law Judges, and the OHA support staff. The HUD Secretary appoints administrative judges and administrative law judges in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. Chapter 5, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/part-I/ chapter-5 (accessed March 4, 2023). 8. HUD currently has a Departmental Equity Assessment Working Group, supported with five FTEs funded by the OSDBU, “as part of the President’s Executive Order 13985, Executive Order On Advancing Racial Equity and Support for Underserved Communities Through the Federal Government.” See U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2023 Congressional Justifications, p. 35-15, https://www.hud.gov/sites/ dfiles/CFO/documents/2023HUDCongressionalJustificationsFINALelectronicversion.pdf (accessed March 4, 2023), and President Joseph R. Biden Jr., Executive Order 13985, “Advancing Racial Equity and Support for Underserved Communities Through the Federal Government,” January 20, 2021, in Federal Register, Vol. 86, No. 14 (January 25, 2021), pp. 7009–7013, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2021-01-25/pdf/2021- 01753.pdf (accessed March 4, 2023). 9. Interestingly, “[t]he 2023 President’s Budget requests $748 thousand for CFBNP, which is $436 thousand less than the 2022 Annualized CR level. The Budget reflects total funding (carryover and new authority) of $1.2 million, $448 thousand less than 2022 total funding.” U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2023 Congressional Justifications, p. 35-16. 10. See H.R. 558, Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Act, Public Law No. 100-77, 100th Congress, July 22, 1987, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-101/pdf/STATUTE-101-Pg482.pdf (accessed March 5, 2023). Later renamed the McKinney–Vento Homeless Assistance Act. 11. Established under the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5301 et seq., https:// www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42 (accessed March 4, 2023). 12. S. 566, Cranston–Gonzalez National Affordable Housing Act, Public Law No. 101-625, 101st Congress, November 28, 1990, Title II, https://www.congress.gov/101/statute/STATUTE-104/STATUTE-104-Pg4079.pdf (accessed March 5, 2023). 13. S. 1, Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970, Public Law No. 91-646, 91st Congress, January 2, 1971, https://www.congress.gov/91/statute/STATUTE-84/STATUTE-84-Pg1894.pdf (accessed March 4, 2023). “The URA establishes the minimum Federal requirements for the acquisition of real property for Federally-funded programs and projects, and for the relocation of persons who must move from

Department of Housing and Urban Development

Moderate
Vector: 64%
Pages: 545-547AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"Both HR 143 and the Project 2025 HUD section emphasize fiscal responsibility, reducing waste, fraud, and abuse, and enhancing oversight of government programs, though HR 143 applies broadly while the Project 2025 text is HUD‑specific."

Key themes:fiscal responsibilityaccountabilitywaste reductionprogram oversightunauthorized spending

— 513 — Department of Housing and Urban Development ENDNOTES 1. At a 1998 Senate hearing, then-HUD Secretary Andrew Cuomo acknowledged that the department “faced a competence gap” and had “the dubious distinction of being the only federal agency designated as ‘high risk’ by the General Accounting [now Government Accountability] Office (GAO),” even referencing the Section 8 rental subsidy as “on the brink of becoming the next savings and loan scandal,” and explained how the department was stepping up enforcement efforts “focused on closing the competence gap by eliminating waste, fraud, and abuse.” See “Testimony of Secretary Andrew Cuomo before the House Appropriations Subcommittee on VA, HUD, and Independent Agencies,” March 25, 1998, https://archives.hud.gov/ testimony/1998/tst32598.cfm (accessed March 4, 2023). 2. H.R. 7984, Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965, Public Law No. 89-117, 89th Congress, August 10, 1965, https://www.congress.gov/89/statute/STATUTE-79/STATUTE-79-Pg451.pdf (accessed March 4, 2023). 3. U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2023 Budget in Brief, pp. 2 and 7, https://www.hud.gov/ sites/dfiles/CFO/documents/2023_BudgetInBriefFINAL.pdf (accessed March 4, 2023). 4. For example, the Special Applications Center (SAC) located in Chicago, Illinois, was established in 1998 as a division of the Office of Public and Indian Housing to accept, review, and approve all nonfunded, noncompetitive applications and plans for demolition, disposition, and conversion of land subject to an annual contributions contract (ACC) in public housing. 5. The Secretary has delegated full authority for the Administration and enforcement of the Fair Housing Act to the Assistant Secretary of the Office of Fair Housing and Equal Opportunity but also has delegated limited assignment and decision-making authority to the General Counsel. 6. Effectively the HUD Chief Operating Officer and appointed by the President with Senate advice and consent. 7. The Office of Hearings and Appeals (OHA) is an independent adjudicatory office within the Office of the Secretary. Led by a Director who is appointed by the Secretary, it supervises the Administrative Judges of the Office of Appeals, the administrative law judges of the Office of Administrative Law Judges, and the OHA support staff. The HUD Secretary appoints administrative judges and administrative law judges in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. Chapter 5, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/part-I/ chapter-5 (accessed March 4, 2023). 8. HUD currently has a Departmental Equity Assessment Working Group, supported with five FTEs funded by the OSDBU, “as part of the President’s Executive Order 13985, Executive Order On Advancing Racial Equity and Support for Underserved Communities Through the Federal Government.” See U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2023 Congressional Justifications, p. 35-15, https://www.hud.gov/sites/ dfiles/CFO/documents/2023HUDCongressionalJustificationsFINALelectronicversion.pdf (accessed March 4, 2023), and President Joseph R. Biden Jr., Executive Order 13985, “Advancing Racial Equity and Support for Underserved Communities Through the Federal Government,” January 20, 2021, in Federal Register, Vol. 86, No. 14 (January 25, 2021), pp. 7009–7013, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2021-01-25/pdf/2021- 01753.pdf (accessed March 4, 2023). 9. Interestingly, “[t]he 2023 President’s Budget requests $748 thousand for CFBNP, which is $436 thousand less than the 2022 Annualized CR level. The Budget reflects total funding (carryover and new authority) of $1.2 million, $448 thousand less than 2022 total funding.” U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2023 Congressional Justifications, p. 35-16. 10. See H.R. 558, Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Act, Public Law No. 100-77, 100th Congress, July 22, 1987, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-101/pdf/STATUTE-101-Pg482.pdf (accessed March 5, 2023). Later renamed the McKinney–Vento Homeless Assistance Act. 11. Established under the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5301 et seq., https:// www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42 (accessed March 4, 2023). 12. S. 566, Cranston–Gonzalez National Affordable Housing Act, Public Law No. 101-625, 101st Congress, November 28, 1990, Title II, https://www.congress.gov/101/statute/STATUTE-104/STATUTE-104-Pg4079.pdf (accessed March 5, 2023). 13. S. 1, Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970, Public Law No. 91-646, 91st Congress, January 2, 1971, https://www.congress.gov/91/statute/STATUTE-84/STATUTE-84-Pg1894.pdf (accessed March 4, 2023). “The URA establishes the minimum Federal requirements for the acquisition of real property for Federally-funded programs and projects, and for the relocation of persons who must move from — 514 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise their homes, businesses, or farms as a direct result of acquisition, rehabilitation, or demolition for a Federally- funded program or project.” U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, HUD Exchange, “49 CFR Part 24–URA Regulations,” published February 2005, https://www.hudexchange.info/resource/804/ura-and- real-property-acquisition-policies-act-49-cfr-part-24/ (accessed March 4, 2023). HUD is one of the 18 federal departments and agencies that “are subject to the Uniform Act.” U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration, “Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition for Federal and Federally Assisted Programs,” Federal Register, Vol. 84, No. 243 (December 18, 2019), pp. 69466–69521, esp. p. 69484, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2019-12-18/pdf/2019-25558.pdf (accessed March 4, 2023). 14. H.R. 3219, Native American Housing Assistance and Self-Determination Act of 1996, Public Law No. 104-330, 104th Congress, October 26, 1996, https://www.congress.gov/104/plaws/publ330/PLAW-104publ330.pdf (accessed March 4, 2023). 15. U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2023 Congressional Justifications, p. 6-1. The U.S. Housing Act of 1937 (Wagner–Steagall Act) established the origins of locally chartered housing agencies that administer federal funding for various rental assistance programs—a quintessentially progressive New Deal–era policy that expanded the administrative state’s powers to the housing market—with the primary legislative intent of eradicating slum housing in urban areas, boosting jobs, and providing housing for the working poor. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437 et seq., https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42 (accessed March 4, 2023). A decade later, the Housing Act of 1949 codified federal standards for housing livability—a rationale that HUD and federal legislators have continued to use to justify federal intervention in housing—establishing as a national policy objective the provision of a minimum standard of housing quality for all Americans. This legislation also statutorily established many of the rural housing programs that are administered at USDA and expanded programs facilitating the removal of slum housing in urban areas. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1441 et seq., https:// www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42 (accessed March 4, 2023). 16. U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2023 Congressional Justifications, pp. 1-2 and 2-2. 17. The National Housing Act of 1934 established the FHA and the statutory authority for the secondary market. The main stated premise was to stimulate jobs and facilitate the housing and construction sector during the Great Depression. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1701 et seq., https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/12 (accessed March 4, 2023). 18. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d et seq., https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42 (accessed March 4, 2023). 19. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq., https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/29 (accessed March 4, 2023). 20. HUD’s Departmental Enforcement Center (DEC) is led by a Director. It was established in 1998 as part of a broader effort to streamline and consolidate functions at HUD and was later merged with the Office of General Counsel. The DEC “is comprised of the Office of the Director, the Compliance Division, the Operations Division and five Satellite Offices” and describes its mission as “assuring the highest standards of ethics, management and accountability in the resolution of HUD's troubled properties.” U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Departmental Enforcement Center, “Program Offices: Departmental Enforcement Center,” https://www.hud.gov/program_offices/enforcement (accessed March 4, 2023). 21. H.R. 5334, Housing and Community Development Act of 1992, Public Law No. 102-1017, 102nd Congress, October 28, 1992, Title X, https://www.congress.gov/102/statute/STATUTE-106/STATUTE-106-Pg3672.pdf (accessed March 4, 2023). 22. H.R. 8588, Inspector General Act of 1978, Public Law No. 95-452, 95th Congress, October 12, 1978, https://www. congress.gov/95/statute/STATUTE-92/STATUTE-92-Pg1101.pdf (accessed March 4, 2023). 23. Guiding questions: What immediate administrative reforms of HUD and its programs can be made with high probability of success? What short-term legislative reforms can be proposed that, in tandem with administrative reforms, would achieve the HUD vision/mission objective? What HUD offices should be eliminated and/or realigned to reduce any redundancy that may persist in programmatic functions? 24. Wholly aside from reforms that would require legislation, the next Administration must ensure that key political appointees are able to acquit themselves as change agents to execute administrative reforms. Otherwise, whether because of a sheer lack of skill and expertise or simply a lack of will and philosophical alignment with reforms, staff may frustrate the efforts of committed political appointee staff and leadership to execute substantive administrative reforms. To achieve the policy and regulatory reforms outlined in this chapter, political appointees must be carefully placed in positions that reflect not only technical, market/ industry, and operational expertise, but also a shared will and commitment.

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