The bill
Protect America’s Innovation and Economic Security from CCP Act
HR. 1468, 119th Congress — read as touching Big Tech Platforms.
Sponsored by
Rep. Gooden, Lance [R-TX-5]
ID: G000589
Follow the money
The bill
HR. 1468, 119th Congress — read as touching Big Tech Platforms.
The sponsor
Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.
The money
23 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.
The alignment
This bill's text tracks the "Intelligence Community" section, p. 251-253 of the Mandate for Leadership.
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Placed on the Union Calendar, Calendar No. 607.
June 14, 2026
📍 Current Status
Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Another masterpiece of legislative theater, courtesy of the geniuses in Congress. Let's dissect this farce, shall we?
**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The "Protect America's Innovation and Economic Security from CCP Act" (because who doesn't love a good acronym?) claims to establish a program to counter Chinese espionage and protect American intellectual property. How quaint. In reality, it's just another attempt to grandstand on national security while lining the pockets of defense contractors and tech lobbyists.
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill creates a new initiative within the Department of Justice, because what we really need is more bureaucracy. It also mandates annual reports on the program's progress, which will undoubtedly be filled with platitudes and vague statistics to justify further funding. Oh, and let's not forget the obligatory mentions of "artificial intelligence" and "unmanned aircraft" to sound hip and relevant.
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The usual suspects: defense contractors, tech companies, and anyone who can claim a stake in the "national security" gravy train. The Chinese government will also be affected, but let's be real, they'll just laugh all the way to the bank as they continue to exploit our naive trade policies.
**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill will accomplish precisely what it's designed to do: nothing. It's a placebo for the gullible public, a way to pretend we're doing something about Chinese espionage while actually just throwing more money at the problem. The real impact will be on the bottom line of defense contractors and tech companies, who will reap the benefits of this legislative boondoggle.
In conclusion, HR 1468 is a textbook example of legislative malpractice. It's a cynical attempt to exploit public fears about national security while serving the interests of wealthy donors and lobbyists. The fact that our elected representatives can't even be bothered to come up with something more original is a testament to their contempt for the public's intelligence. Bravo, Congress. You've managed to create a bill that's both pointless and profitable. Now, if you'll excuse me, I have better things to do than watch this farce unfold.
Rep. Gooden, Lance [R-TX-5]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
No committee contributions found
This bill has 10 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.
ID: T000165
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ID: B000825
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ID: R000609
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Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Showing 50 nodes and 38 connections (31 secondary connections hidden)
Total contributions: $196,226
Showing top 19 donors by contribution amount
Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 4 harmed.
Section 2(a)(2) and (a)(6)(A) target CCP spying on US intellectual property and academic institutions, and prioritize prosecuting trade secret theft, hacking, and economic espionage, which could increase regulatory scrutiny and enforcement actions against tech firms suspected of facilitating or being victims of such activities, imposing compliance costs and legal risks.
Section 2(a)(3) focuses on nontraditional collectors in the defense industrial base being used to transfer technology contrary to US interests, likely increasing oversight and compliance burdens on defense contractors regarding foreign influence and technology transfer, imposing costs.
Section 2(a)(6)(B) aims to protect critical infrastructure against supply chain compromises via foreign direct investment, which could lead to stricter vetting of semiconductor supply chains linked to Chinese entities, increasing compliance costs for chipmakers.
Section 2(a)(2) and (a)(6)(A) target theft of intellectual property and trade secrets, which are highly relevant to AI and cloud providers holding valuable proprietary models and data, likely increasing their exposure to investigations and security obligations.
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.
AI Analysis:
"HR 1468 directly addresses the Project 2025 emphasis on countering Chinese economic espionage, protecting intellectual property and academia, enhancing counterintelligence capabilities, and improving interagency coordination, though it focuses on a DOJ initiative rather than explicitly expanding NCSC authorities."
— 218 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise NATIONAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY CENTER (NCSC) The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) has taken a keen inter- est in possibly updating the codified language underpinning much of the nation’s counterintelligence apparatus. “Spy vs. spy” threats continue to exist, but the rise of China and (to an extent) Russia’s machinations move beyond the governmental sphere to technological, economic, supply chain, cyber, academic, state, and local espionage threats at a level our country has never seen. The asymmetric threat includes cyber, nontraditional collection, and issues involving legitimate busi- nesses serving as collection platforms. Barring statutory changes that could occur before 2025, a future conserva- tive President should further empower and resource the IC by executive order or through suggested changes in the Counterintelligence Enhancement Act (CEA) of 2002.32 NCSC was given some authority for outreach efforts on behalf of the IC for counterintelligence education, insider threats, and broader U.S. government best practices, but there remain significant deltas between Title 50 and non–Title 50 entities’ protections. Primary operational elements should remain at the FBI and CIA, with the Bureau and NCSC collaborating on nongovernmental outreach. While there is no need to create a separate agency, a future President and DNI should amplify NCSC’s authorities and roles with respect to counterintelligence strategy, policy, outreach, and governance, including supporting necessary Joint Duty Assignments (JDA) for FBI and CIA personnel. At the same time, the FBI requires significant additional resources and legal authorities to fulfill its statu- tory role as the lead operational counterintelligence agency in dealing with the ever-growing threats posed by our adversaries. The CEA should be updated to include foreign espionage efforts aimed at universities. Corporate America, technology companies, research institutions, and academia must be willing, educated partners in this generational fight to protect our national security interests, economic interests, national sovereignty, and intellectual prop- erty as well as the broader rules-based order—all while avoiding the tendency to cave to the left-wing activists and investors who ignore the China threat and increasingly dominate the corporate world. Reinstitution of the National Security Higher Education Advisory Board and the National Security Business Alliance Council should be prioritized with leadership from the NCSC, the FBI, or a com- bination of both entities. When the CCP steals at least $400 billion–$600 billion in intellectual prop- erty each year, it is time to devote some strategic thinking to exactly how and to what degree counterintelligence efforts can help to protect America’s commercial endeavors. If Chinese strategic technology gains are happening almost entirely in transnational commercial space, for example, and the private sector is also gath- ering and analyzing some critical intelligence, these essential data points should assist in national-level counterintelligence efforts.
AI Analysis:
"HR 1468 and the Project 2025 Intelligence Community section both focus on countering Chinese Communist Party espionage, protecting U.S. intellectual property and academic institutions, and enhancing interagency counterintelligence coordination, showing significant thematic overlap."
— 218 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise NATIONAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY CENTER (NCSC) The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) has taken a keen inter- est in possibly updating the codified language underpinning much of the nation’s counterintelligence apparatus. “Spy vs. spy” threats continue to exist, but the rise of China and (to an extent) Russia’s machinations move beyond the governmental sphere to technological, economic, supply chain, cyber, academic, state, and local espionage threats at a level our country has never seen. The asymmetric threat includes cyber, nontraditional collection, and issues involving legitimate busi- nesses serving as collection platforms. Barring statutory changes that could occur before 2025, a future conserva- tive President should further empower and resource the IC by executive order or through suggested changes in the Counterintelligence Enhancement Act (CEA) of 2002.32 NCSC was given some authority for outreach efforts on behalf of the IC for counterintelligence education, insider threats, and broader U.S. government best practices, but there remain significant deltas between Title 50 and non–Title 50 entities’ protections. Primary operational elements should remain at the FBI and CIA, with the Bureau and NCSC collaborating on nongovernmental outreach. While there is no need to create a separate agency, a future President and DNI should amplify NCSC’s authorities and roles with respect to counterintelligence strategy, policy, outreach, and governance, including supporting necessary Joint Duty Assignments (JDA) for FBI and CIA personnel. At the same time, the FBI requires significant additional resources and legal authorities to fulfill its statu- tory role as the lead operational counterintelligence agency in dealing with the ever-growing threats posed by our adversaries. The CEA should be updated to include foreign espionage efforts aimed at universities. Corporate America, technology companies, research institutions, and academia must be willing, educated partners in this generational fight to protect our national security interests, economic interests, national sovereignty, and intellectual prop- erty as well as the broader rules-based order—all while avoiding the tendency to cave to the left-wing activists and investors who ignore the China threat and increasingly dominate the corporate world. Reinstitution of the National Security Higher Education Advisory Board and the National Security Business Alliance Council should be prioritized with leadership from the NCSC, the FBI, or a com- bination of both entities. When the CCP steals at least $400 billion–$600 billion in intellectual prop- erty each year, it is time to devote some strategic thinking to exactly how and to what degree counterintelligence efforts can help to protect America’s commercial endeavors. If Chinese strategic technology gains are happening almost entirely in transnational commercial space, for example, and the private sector is also gath- ering and analyzing some critical intelligence, these essential data points should assist in national-level counterintelligence efforts. — 219 — Intelligence Community The NCSC was created in the aftermath of 9/11 as the Terrorist Threat Integra- tion Center (TTIC), which later became the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) pursuant to President George W. Bush’s Executive Order 13354.33 The NCTC was an organization of approximately three dozen detainees from across the U.S. government with a mandate to integrate counterterrorism intelligence and missions, including terrorist screening. Eventually: In November 2014 the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) established NCSC by combining [the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive] with the Center for Security Evaluation, the Special Security Center and the National Insider Threat Task Force, to effectively integrate and align counterintelligence and security mission areas under a single organizational construct. The Director of NCSC serves in support of the DNI’s role as Security Executive Agent (SecEA) to develop, implement, oversee and integrate personnel security initiatives throughout the U.S. Government.34 NCSC has added value in such areas as fusing cross-community intelligence for terrorism watchlisting purposes and improving information sharing while carrying roughly half of the overall cadre for the ODNI. An incoming Administration should focus NCTC on integrative tasks, many of which cannot be carried out elsewhere in the IC, but should not use personnel and resources for redundant analyses that duplicate the work of such other IC entities as the FBI and CIA. ADDITIONAL AREAS FOR REFORM Analytical Integrity. The “tradecraft” of intelligence analysis is mostly a col- lection of lessons learned over decades about what works and does not work in a profession whose high-stakes work is performed by thousands but that also bears little outside scrutiny and provides few metrics by which to gauge success or failure on a regular basis. These lessons have accumulated from: l The perceived misuse of intelligence by consumers as was the case with respect to war-related assessments in the Johnson and Bush Administrations; l Failures such as the failures to warn of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the specific threat of 9/11; l Successes in piecing together tactical and often technical puzzles such as estimates of Iranian nuclear program maturation; and l Strategic victories such as anticipating critical geopolitical developments that have been years in the making.
AI Analysis:
"HR 1468 aligns strongly with Project 2025's trade and national security objectives by targeting CCP economic espionage, protecting U.S. intellectual property, and enhancing scrutiny of foreign investments—particularly through CFIUS and DOJ-led enforcement—mirroring several Project 2025 proposals to counter Communist China's influence."
— 789 — Trade The following policy options were on the drawing board or in discussion as preparations for a potential Trump second term were being made. These options span the spectrum from purely trade-related like increasing tariffs to cutting off Communist China’s access to American financial markets, research institutions, and consumers. The next American President should strongly consider adopting all of them as a package: l Strategically expand tariffs to all Chinese products and increase tariff rates to levels that will block out “Made in China” products, and execute this strategy in a manner and at a pace that will not expose the U.S. to lack of access to essential products like key pharmaceuticals. l Provide significant financial and tax incentives to American companies that are seeking to onshore production from Communist China to U.S. soil. l Stop Communist China’s abuse of the so-called de minimis exemption, which allows it to evade the tariffs for products valued at less than $800. l Prohibit Communist Chinese state-owned enterprises from bidding on U.S. government procurement contracts (for example, contracts for subway and other transportation systems). l Prohibit the use of Communist Chinese–made drones in American airspace. l Ban all Chinese social media apps such as TikTok and WeChat, which pose significant national security risks and expose American consumers to data and identity theft. l Prohibit all Communist Chinese investment in high-technology industries. l Prohibit U.S. pension funds from investing in Communist Chinese stocks. l Delist any Communist Chinese stocks that do not meet Public Company Accounting Oversight Board standards or, alternatively, close off the Chinese “A shares” stock market to U.S. investment and deregister U.S.- sanctioned Communist Chinese companies. l Prohibit the use of Hong Kong clearinghouses as transit points for American capital investing in the Chinese mainland. l Prohibit the inclusion of Chinese sovereign bonds in U.S. investors’ portfolios. — 790 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise l Systematically reduce and eventually eliminate any U.S. dependence on Communist Chinese supply chains that may be used to threaten national security such as medicines, silicon chips, rare earth minerals, computer motherboards, flatscreen displays, and military components. l Sanction any companies, including American companies like Apple, that facilitate Communist China’s use of its Great Firewall surveillance and censorship capabilities. l Order the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Department of Justice to contract with U.S.-owned and U.S.-operated artificial intelligence companies that are capable of detecting, identifying, and disrupting both the domestic groups’ and CCP influencers’ social media operations and funding streams using public information as a rapidly available offensive measure. l Reinvigorate and expand the DHS crackdown on the CCP’s use of e-sellers (including third-party sellers) and the shippers and operators of major warehouses such as Amazon, eBay, and Alibaba to flood U.S. markets with counterfeit and pirated goods. l Compel the closure of all Confucius Institutes in the U.S., which serve as propaganda arms of the CCP. l Significantly reduce or eliminate the issuance of visas to Chinese students or researchers to prevent espionage and information harvesting. l Hold the CCP accountable for the COVID-19 virus, which almost certainly originated as a genetically engineered virus from the Wuhan Institute of Virology, and do so through the establishment of a presidential commission or select congressional committee that would investigate the origins of the virus; its various costs, both economically and in human life; and the possible means of collecting damages from the CCP, which are likely to rise to the trillions of dollars. If the new U.S. President wishes to defend this country against the serious exis- tential threat posed by Communist China, that President will adopt all of these proposals through the requisite presidential executive orders or memoranda. Effective Trade Policy in the Real World. To conclude this analysis, it is useful to offer brief reflections on a number of key obstacles to implementing the policy initiatives recommended in this chapter. These obstacles include:
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.