Keep Your Coins Act of 2025
Download PDFSponsored by
Rep. Davidson, Warren [R-OH-8]
ID: D000626
Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Referred to the House Committee on Financial Services.
January 3, 2025
Introduced
Committee Review
📍 Current Status
Next: The bill moves to the floor for full chamber debate and voting.
Floor Action
Passed House
Senate Review
Passed Congress
Presidential Action
Became Law
📚 How does a bill become a law?
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Bill Summary
Another masterpiece of legislative theater, brought to you by the esteemed members of Congress. The "Keep Your Coins Act of 2025" - a bill so transparent in its intentions, it's like they're trying to insult our intelligence.
**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The main purpose of this bill is to pretend to protect individual freedoms while actually serving the interests of cryptocurrency lobbyists and their Congressional puppets. The objective? To create a regulatory vacuum that allows for unbridled speculation, tax evasion, and money laundering - all under the guise of "protecting" individuals' rights to use virtual currencies.
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill prohibits federal agencies from restricting the use of convertible virtual currency (CVC) by individuals, allowing them to self-custody digital assets using self-hosted wallets. Sounds innocuous? Think again. This provision effectively creates a loophole for CVC users to avoid anti-money laundering and know-your-customer regulations. It's like giving a get-out-of-jail-free card to cryptocurrency enthusiasts who want to launder their ill-gotten gains.
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The affected parties include:
* Cryptocurrency lobbyists, who will reap the benefits of this regulatory free-for-all. * Congressional sponsors, who will receive generous campaign contributions from said lobbyists. * Individual users, who will be duped into thinking they're "free" to use CVCs without restrictions (while actually being exposed to increased risk of scams and financial losses). * Law enforcement agencies, which will have a harder time tracking down illicit activities facilitated by CVCs.
**Potential Impact & Implications:** The potential impact of this bill is staggering. By creating a regulatory black hole, it will:
* Enable widespread tax evasion and money laundering. * Increase the risk of scams and financial losses for individual users. * Undermine efforts to combat terrorist financing and other illicit activities. * Give cryptocurrency enthusiasts a false sense of security, leading them to take unnecessary risks.
In short, this bill is a symptom of a deeper disease - the corruption and cowardice that pervades our legislative system. It's a classic case of " regulatory capture," where special interests hijack the policymaking process to serve their own agendas.
As I always say, "Everyone lies." And in this case, it's clear that the sponsors of this bill are lying about its true intentions. But hey, who needs honesty when you can just create a legislative smokescreen and hope no one notices?
Related Topics
💰 Campaign Finance Network
Rep. Davidson, Warren [R-OH-8]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
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Cosponsors & Their Campaign Finance
This bill has 2 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.
Rep. Begich, Nicholas J. [R-AK-At Large]
ID: B001323
Top Contributors
10
Rep. Greene, Marjorie Taylor [R-GA-14]
ID: G000596
Top Contributors
10
Donor Network - Rep. Davidson, Warren [R-OH-8]
Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Showing 26 nodes and 26 connections
Total contributions: $127,350
Top Donors - Rep. Davidson, Warren [R-OH-8]
Showing top 19 donors by contribution amount
Project 2025 Policy Matches
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document. Higher similarity scores indicate stronger thematic connections.
Introduction
— 738 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise vaults. This creates a powerful self-policing mechanism: If the federal govern- ment creates dollars too quickly, more people will doubt the peg and turn in their gold to banks, which then will turn in their gold and drain the government’s gold. This forces governments to rein in spending and inflation lest their gold reserves become depleted. One concern raised against commodity backing is that there is not enough gold in the federal government for all the dollars in existence. This is solved by making sure that the initial peg on gold is correct. Also, in reality, a very small number of users trade for gold as long as they believe the government will stick to the price peg. The mere fact that people could exchange dollars for gold is what acts as the enforcer. After all, if one is confident that a dollar will still be worth 1/2000 ounce of gold in a year, it is much easier to walk about with paper dollars and use credit cards than it is to mail tiny $80 coins. People would redeem en masse only if they feared the government would not be able control itself, for which the only solution is for the government to control itself. Beyond full backing, alternate paths to gold backing might involve gold-con- vertible Treasury instruments29 or allowing a parallel gold standard to operate temporarily alongside the current fiat dollar.30 These could ease adoption while minimizing disruption, but they should be temporary so that we can quickly enjoy the benefits of gold’s ability to police government spending. In addition, Congress could simply allow individuals to use commodity-backed money without fully replacing the current system. Among downsides to a commodity standard, there is no guarantee that the gov- ernment will stick to the price peg. Also, allowing a commodity standard to operate along with a fiat dollar opens both up for a speculative attack. Another downside is that even under a commodity standard, the Federal Reserve can still influence the economy via interest rate or other interventions. Therefore, at best, a commodity standard is not a full solution to returning to free banking. We have good reasons to worry that central banks and the gold standard are fundamentally incompati- ble—as the disastrous experience of the Western nations on their “managed gold standards” between World War I and World War II showed. K-Percent Rule. Under this rule, proposed by Milton Friedman in 1960,31 the Federal Reserve would create money at a fixed rate—say 3 percent per year. By offering the inflation benefits of gold without the potential disruption to the finan- cial system, a K-Percent Rule could be a more politically viable alternative to gold. The principal flaw is that unlike commodities, a K-Percent Rule is not fixed by physical costs: It could change according to political pressures or random economic fluctuations. Importantly, financial innovation could destabilize the market’s demand for liquidity, as happened with changes in consumer credit pat- terns in the 1970s. When this happens, a given K-Percent Rule that previously delivered stability could become destabilizing. In addition, monetary policy when — 739 — Federal Reserve Friedman proposed the K-Percent Rule was very different from monetary policy today. Adopting a K-Percent Rule would require considering what transitions need to take place. Inflation-Targeting Rules. Inflation targeting is the current de facto Federal Reserve rule.32 Under inflation targeting, the Federal Reserve chooses a target infla- tion rate—essentially the highest it thinks the public will accept—and then tries to engineer the money supply to achieve that goal. Chairman Jerome Powell and others before him have used 2 percent as their target inflation rate, although some are now floating 3 percent or 4 percent.33 The result can be boom-and-bust cycles of inflation and recession driven by disruptive policy manipulations both because the Federal Reserve is liable to political pressure and because making economic predictions is very difficult if not impossible. Inflation and Growth–Targeting Rules. Inflation and growth targeting is a popular proposal for reforming the Federal Reserve. Two of the most prominent versions of inflation and growth targeting are a Taylor Rule and Nominal GDP (NGDP) Targeting. Both offer similar costs and benefits. Economists generally believe that the economy’s long-term real growth trend is determined by non-monetary factors. The Fed’s job is to minimize fluctuations around that trend nominal growth rate. Speculative booms and destructive busts caused by swings in total spending should be avoided. NGDP targeting stabilizes total nominal spending directly. The Taylor Rule does so indirectly, operating through the federal funds rate. NGDP targeting keeps total nominal spending growth on a steady path. If the demand for money (liquidity) rises, the Fed meets it by increasing the money supply; if the demand for money falls, the Fed responds by reducing the money supply. This minimizes the effects of demand shocks on the economy. For example, if the long-run growth rate of the U.S. economy is 3 percent and the Fed has a 5 per- cent NGDP growth target, it expands the money supply enough to boost nominal income by 5 percent each year, which translates into 3 percent real growth and 2 percent inflation. How much money must be created each year depends on how fast money demand is growing. The Taylor Rule works similarly. It says the Fed should raise its policy rate when inflation and real output growth are above trend and lower its policy rate when inflation and real output growth are below trend. Whereas NGDP targeting focuses directly on stable demand as an outcome, the Taylor Rule focuses on the Fed’s more reliable policy levers. The problem with both rules is the knowledge burden they place on central bankers. These rules state that the Fed should neutralize demand shocks but not respond to supply shocks, which means that it should “see through” demand shocks by tolerating higher (or lower) inflation. In theory, this has much to recom- mend it. In practice, it can be very difficult to distinguish between demand-side
Introduction
— 741 — Federal Reserve l Appoint a commission to explore the mission of the Federal Reserve, alternatives to the Federal Reserve system, and the nation’s financial regulatory apparatus. l Prevent the institution of a central bank digital currency (CBDC). A CBDC would provide unprecedented surveillance and potential control of financial transactions without providing added benefits available through existing technologies.34 AUTHOR’S NOTE: The preparation of this chapter was a collective enterprise of individuals involved in the 2025 Presidential Transition Project. All contributors to this chapter are listed at the front of this volume, but Alexander Salter, Judy Shelton, and Peter St Onge, deserve special mention. The chapter reflects input from all the contributors, however, no views expressed herein should be attributed to any specific individual. — 742 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise ENDNOTES 1. U.S. Constitution, Article 1, Section 8, https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution (accessed January 23, 2023). 2. For example, Alexander Salter and Daniel Smith (2019) show that Federal Reserve Chairs become more favorable toward monetary discretion once they are confirmed compared to previous stances. Alexander William Salter and Daniel J. Smith, “Political Economists or Political Economists? The Role of Political Environments in the Formation of Fed Policy Under Burns, Greenspan, and Bernanke,” Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Vol. 71 (February 2019), pp. 1–13. 3. Sarah Binder, “The Federal Reserve as a ‘Political’ Institution,” American Academy of Arts and Sciences Bulletin, Vol. LXIX, No. 3 (Spring 2016), pp. 47–49, https://www.amacad.org/sites/default/files/bulletin/ downloads/bulletin_Spring2016.pdf (accessed January 23, 2023). See also Charles L. Weise, “Political Pressures on Monetary Policy During the US Great Inflation,” American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, Vol. 4, No. 2 (April 2012), pp. 33–64, https://www.haverford.edu/sites/default/files/Department/Economics/ Weise_Political_Pressures_on%20Monetary_Policy.pdf (accessed January 23, 2023). 4. The Federal Reserve’s financial stability mandate is poorly defined. The Fed has taken advantage of the statutory vagueness and proceeded as if it has the authority to engage in these activities, although it is highly questionable whether this is permissible. 5. 12 U.S.C. § 225a, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/12/225a (accessed January 23, 2023). 6. See Peter J. Boettke, Alexander William Salter, and Daniel J. Smith, Money and the Rule of Law: Generality and Predictability in Monetary Institutions (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2021). 7. George Selgin, William D. Lastrapes, and Lawrence H. White, “Has the Fed Been a Failure?” Journal of Macroeconomics, Vol. 34, No. 3 (September 2012), pp. 569–596, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/ article/abs/pii/S0164070412000304 (accessed January 24, 2023). 8. This includes federal programs that automatically provide for adjustments as the economy contracts (for example, unemployment insurance or the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program). 9. Mark Segal, “Fed to Launch Climate Risk Resilience Tests with Big Banks,” ESG Today, September 30, 2022, https://www.esgtoday.com/fed-to-launch-climate-risk-resilience-tests-with-big-banks/ (accessed January 23, 2023). 10. Kenneth J. Robinson, “Savings and Loan Crisis 1980–1989,” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Federal Reserve History, November 22, 2013, https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/savings-and-loan-crisis (accessed January 23, 2023). 11. Russell Roberts, “Gambling with Other People’s Money: How Perverted Incentives Caused the Financial Crisis,” Mercatus Center at George Mason University, May 2010, https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/RUSS-final. pdf (accessed January 24, 2023). 12. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Credit and Liquidity Programs Balance Sheet Data Series, 2007–2022, https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/bst_recenttrends.htm (accessed January 24, 2023). 13. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, U.S. Treasury Securities Data Series (TREAST), 2004–2022, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/TREAST (accessed January 24, 2023). 14. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Mortgage-Backed Securities Data Series (WSHOMCB), 2004–2022, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/WSHOMCB (accessed January 24, 2023). 15. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Total Assets (Less Eliminations from Consolidation) Data Series (WALCL), 2004–2022, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/WALCL (accessed January 24, 2023). 16. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, “S&P Dow Jones Indices LLC, S&P/Case–Shiller U.S. National Home Price Index (CSUSHPINSA),” https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CSUSHPINSA (accessed January 24, 2023). The Case–Shiller Home Price Index tracks home prices given a constant level of quality. See S&P Dow Jones Indices, “Real Estate: S&P CoreLogic Case–Shiller Home Price Indices,” https://www.spglobal.com/spdji/en/index-family/indicators/sp- corelogic-case-shiller/sp-corelogic-case-shiller-composite/#overview (accessed January 24, 2023). 17. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, “Real Residential Property Prices for United States (QUSR628BIS),” https:// fred.stlouisfed.org/series/QUSR368BIS (accessed January 24, 2023). 18. Longterm Trends, “Home Price to Income Ratio (US & UK): Home Price to Median Household Income Ratio (US),” https://www.longtermtrends.net/home-price-median-annual-income-ratio/ (accessed January 24, 2023).
Introduction
— 734 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise to influence monetary policy.12 Since then, these assets have exploded, and the Federal Reserve now owns nearly $9 trillion of mainly federal debt ($5.5 trillion)13 and mortgage-backed securities ($2.6 trillion).14 There is currently no government oversight of the types of assets that the Federal Reserve purchases. These purchases have two main effects: They encourage federal deficits and support politically favored markets, which include housing and even corporate debt. Over half of COVID-era deficits were monetized in this way by the Federal Reserve’s purchase of Treasuries, and housing costs were driven to historic highs by the Federal Reserve’s purchase of mortgage securities. Together, this policy subsidizes government debt, starving business borrowing, while rewarding those who buy homes and certain corporations at the expense of the wider public. Federal Reserve balance sheet purchases should be limited by Congress, and the Federal Reserve’s existing balance sheet should be wound down as quickly as is prudent to levels similar to what existed historically before the 2008 global financial crisis.15 l Limit future balance sheet expansions to U.S. Treasuries. The Federal Reserve should be prohibited from picking winners and losers among asset classes. Above all, this means limiting Federal Reserve interventions in the mortgage-backed securities market. It also means eliminating Fed interventions in corporate and municipal debt markets. Restricting the Fed’s open market operations to Treasuries has strong economic support. The goal of monetary policy is to provide markets with needed liquidity without inducing resource misallocations caused by interfering with relative prices, including rates of return to securities. However, Fed intervention in longer-term government debt, mortgage- backed securities, and corporate and municipal debt can distort the pricing process. This more closely resembles credit allocation than liquidity provision. The Fed’s mortgage-related activities are a paradigmatic case of what monetary policy should not do. Consider the effects of monetary policy on the housing market. Between February 2020 and August 2022, home prices increased 42 percent.16 Residential property prices in the United States adjusted for inflation are now 5.8 percent above the prior all-time record levels of 2006.17 The home-price-to-median-income ratio is now 7.68, far
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
About These Correlations
Policy matches are calculated using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text. A score of 60% or higher indicates meaningful thematic overlap. This does not imply direct causation or intent, but highlights areas where legislation aligns with Project 2025 policy objectives.