The bill
China Financial Threat Mitigation Act of 2025
HR. 1549, 119th Congress — read as touching Commercial Banks.
China Financial Threat Mitigation Act of 2025
Download PDFBill ID: 119/hr/1549
Last Updated: July 17, 2026
Sponsored by
Rep. Williams, Roger [R-TX-25]
ID: W000816
Follow the money
The sponsor
Rep. Williams, Roger [R-TX-25]
Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.
The money
$98,700 raised
21 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.
The alignment
85% match to Project 2025
This bill's text tracks the "Department of State" section, p. 211-213 of the Mandate for Leadership.
Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Received in the Senate and Read twice and referred to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs.
July 23, 2025
Introduced
Committee Review
Floor Action
Passed House
Senate Review
📍 Current Status
Next: Both chambers must agree on the same version of the bill.
🎉
Passed Congress
🖊️
Presidential Action
⚖️
Became Law
📚 How does a bill become a law?
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Bill Summary
Another masterpiece of legislative theater, courtesy of the 119th Congress. Let's dissect this farce and expose the underlying disease.
**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The China Financial Threat Mitigation Act of 2025 is a cleverly crafted exercise in bureaucratic hand-wringing. The bill's primary objective is to create the illusion of action against perceived Chinese financial threats while doing absolutely nothing to address them. It's a classic case of "study-itis," where lawmakers commission a report to avoid actual decision-making.
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill requires the Secretary of the Treasury to conduct a study and issue a report on the exposure of the United States to China's financial sector within one year. This report will include an assessment of risks, policies to mitigate those risks, and recommendations for international cooperation. Oh, and it'll be unclassified, except for a classified annex that will likely contain the only interesting information.
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The usual suspects are involved: the Treasury Secretary, Federal Reserve Chairman, SEC Chairman, CFTC Chairman, and the Secretary of State. These individuals will engage in a delightful game of bureaucratic musical chairs, each trying to shift responsibility while appearing concerned about Chinese financial threats. Meanwhile, voters will be treated to a soothing narrative of "we're doing something" without any actual substance.
**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill is a prime example of legislative placebo effect. It's designed to make lawmakers and their constituents feel like they're addressing a pressing issue while accomplishing nothing tangible. The report will likely gather dust on some shelf, and the classified annex will be used as a convenient excuse for inaction.
In reality, this bill serves several purposes:
1. **Election-year posturing**: Lawmakers can now claim they're "tough on China" without actually doing anything. 2. **Bureaucratic CYA**: The report will provide a convenient shield against criticism, allowing lawmakers to say, "We studied the issue and took action." 3. **Lobbyist appeasement**: This bill will likely satisfy various special interest groups who want to appear concerned about Chinese financial threats without actually disrupting their lucrative relationships.
In conclusion, HR 1549 is a masterclass in legislative obfuscation, designed to create the illusion of action while maintaining the status quo. It's a testament to the boundless creativity of lawmakers in crafting bills that accomplish nothing while making everyone feel good. Now, if you'll excuse me, I have better things to do than analyze this drivel.
Related Topics
Federal Budget & Appropriations
Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (Dr. Haus personality)
💰 Campaign Finance Network
Rep. Williams, Roger [R-TX-25]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
Total Contributions
$98,700
19 donors
PACs
$0
Organizations
$3,300
Committees
$0
Individuals
$95,400
No PAC contributions found
1
POARCH BANK OF CREEK INDIANS
$3,300
No committee contributions found
1
FORD, GERALD J. MR.
$9,900
2
ZELTER, JAMES
$7,800
3
PRINCE, ZAN MRS.
$6,600
4
WOODARD, DONALD M. MR. JR.
$6,600
5
CARVALHO, ANNE MARIE MRS.
$6,600
6
ROWAN, CAROLYN
$6,600
7
ROWAN, MARC
$6,600
8
DUNIGAN, MIKE MR.
$6,000
9
LOWRANCE, DAN E. MR.
$5,000
10
NICHOLS, THOMAS B. MR.
$5,000
11
KLEINHEINZ, JOHN B. MR.
$5,000
12
KLEINMAN, SCOTT
$3,900
13
PATTERSON, DAN
$3,300
14
WEEKLEY, RICHARD W. MR.
$3,300
15
RODMAN, LANCE MR.
$3,300
16
REILLY, BEVERLY MRS.
$3,300
17
MCCLELLAND, MARK
$3,300
18
VINSON, JOHNNY H. MR. II
$3,300
Cosponsors & Their Campaign Finance
This bill has 2 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.
Rep. Gottheimer, Josh [D-NJ-5]
ID: G000583
Top Contributors
10
1
AMERICAN EXPRESS
OrganizationNEWARK, NJ
$22,941
Apr 12, 2024
2
AMERICAN EXPRESS
OrganizationNEWARK, NJ
$10,621
May 10, 2024
3
PAYROLL DATA PROCESSING
OrganizationTAMPA, FL
$6,337
May 15, 2024
4
PAYROLL DATA PROCESSING
OrganizationTAMPA, FL
$6,337
Apr 15, 2024
5
PAYROLL DATA PROCESSING
OrganizationTAMPA, FL
$6,337
Apr 30, 2024
6
PAYROLL DATA PROCESSING
OrganizationTAMPA, FL
$5,751
Apr 1, 2024
7
EASTERN BAND OF CHEROKEE INDIANS
OrganizationCHEROKEE, NC
$3,300
Oct 22, 2024
8
SEKAS LAW GROUP LLC
OrganizationENGLEWOOD CLIFFS, NJ
$1,500
Apr 12, 2024
9
SANDOR F. GENET & ASSOCIATES, P.A.
OrganizationNORTH MIAMI BEACH, FL
$250
Apr 12, 2024
10
FIRESTONE MILKEN, SARAH
NOT EMPLOYED • NOT EMPLOYED
IndividualPACIFIC PALISADES, CA
$13,200
Jul 2, 2024
Rep. Lawler, Michael [R-NY-17]
ID: L000599
Top Contributors
10
1
MURTAGH, COSSU, VENDITTI & CASTRO-BLANCO, LLP
OrganizationWHITE PLAINS, NY
$1,000
Feb 24, 2024
2
BATMASIAN, JAMES
INVESTMENTS LIMITED • OWNER
IndividualBOCA RATON, FL
$6,600
Sep 27, 2023
3
BATMASIAN, JAMES
IndividualBOCA RATON, FL
$6,600
Sep 29, 2023
4
AUSTIN, ROBERT
UNAKA CO., INC. • BUSINESSMAN
IndividualDALLAS, TX
$6,600
Jul 18, 2024
5
SILVERMAN, JEFFREY
RETIRED • RETIRED
IndividualSURFSIDE, FL
$6,534
Feb 15, 2024
6
SILVERMAN, JEFFREY
IndividualSURFSIDE, FL
$6,534
Feb 22, 2024
7
SCALA, MARY ELLEN
RETIRED • RETIRED
IndividualPORT CHESTER, NY
$5,300
Aug 27, 2023
8
DEUTSCH, SHMULEY
SELF • PRESIDENT
IndividualSPRING VALLEY, NY
$3,900
Jun 24, 2024
9
DEUTSCH, SHMULEY
IndividualSPRING VALLEY, NY
$3,900
Jun 25, 2024
10
PERLMUTTER, RAFUEL
GOLDEN TASTE • CEO
IndividualSPRING VALLEY, NY
$3,400
Jun 24, 2024
Donor Network - Rep. Williams, Roger [R-TX-25]
PACs
Organizations
Individuals
Politicians
Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Loading...
Showing 45 nodes and 27 connections (39 secondary connections hidden)
Total contributions: $152,799
Top Donors - Rep. Williams, Roger [R-TX-25]
Showing top 19 donors by contribution amount
1 Org18 Individuals
Industry Impact
Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 3 helped.
- +Commercial Banksconfidence 0.80
Section 2(a) requires the Secretary of the Treasury to conduct a study on exposure to China's financial sector, which could inform policies affecting commercial banks' operations and risk management, potentially benefiting them through enhanced regulatory clarity.
- +Investment Banking & Securitiesconfidence 0.80
Section 2(a) mandates a study on China's financial sector exposure, which may lead to policy recommendations impacting investment banks' cross-border activities and risk assessments, possibly benefiting them via improved market stability.
- +Insurance (P&C and Life)confidence 0.70
Section 2(a) includes assessment of risks to global financial systems, which could affect insurers' investment portfolios and underwriting risks; the resulting report may inform protective measures benefiting the industry.
Project 2025 Policy Matches
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.
Department of State
Strong
Vector: 65%Pages: 211-213AI Enhanced
AI Analysis:
"The bill directly supports Project 2025's call for an honest assessment of China as a threat by mandating a comprehensive study of PRC financial sector risks and recommending actions to mitigate them, aligning with the policy's emphasis on evaluating China's designs and strengthening U.S. posture."
Key themes:China threat assessmentfinancial stability riskhonest evaluationinternational cooperationtransparency of economic data
— 179 — Department of State priority. That said, the next President must significantly reorient the U.S. govern- ment’s posture toward friends and adversaries alike—which will include much more honest assessments about who are friends and who are not. This reorien- tation could represent the most significant shift in core foreign policy principles and corresponding action since the end of the Cold War. Although not every country or issue area can be discussed in this chapter, below are examples of several areas in which a shift in U. S. foreign policy is not only import- ant, but arguably existential. The point is not to assert that everyone in the evolving conservative movement, or, in some cases, the growing bipartisan consensus, will agree with the details of this assessment. Rather, what is presented below demon- strates the urgency of these issues and provides a general roadmap for analysis. In a world on fire, a handful of nations require heightened attention. Some rep- resent existential threats to the safety and security of the American people; others threaten to hurt the U.S. economy; and others are wild cards, whose full threat scope is unknown but nevertheless unsettling. The five countries on which the next Administration should focus its attention and energy are China, Iran, Venezuela, Russia, and North Korea. The People’s Republic of China The designs of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Chinese Com- munist Party, which runs the PRC, are serious and dangerous.9 This tyrannical country with a population of more than 1 billion people has the vision, resources, and patience to achieve its objectives. Protecting the United States from the PRC’s designs requires an unambiguous offensive-defensive mix, including protecting American citizens and their interests, as well as U.S. allies, from PRC attacks and abuse that undermine U.S. competitiveness, security, and prosperity. The United States must have a cost-imposing strategic response to make Bei- jing’s aggression unaffordable, even as the American economy and U.S. power grow. This stance will require real, sustained, near-unprecedented U.S. growth; stronger partnerships; synchronized economic and security policies; and American energy independence—but above all, it will require a very honest perspective about the nature and designs of the PRC as more of a threat than a competitor.10 The next President should use the State Department and its array of resources to reassess and lead this effort, just as it did during the Cold War. The U.S. government needs an Article X for China,11 and it should be a presidential mandate. Along with the National Security Council, the State Department should draft an Article X, which should be a deeply philosophical look at the China challenge. Many foreign policy professionals and national leaders, both in government and the private sector, are reluctant to take decisive action regarding China. Many are vested in an unshakable faith in the international system and global norms. They are so enamored with them they cannot brook any criticisms or reforms, let alone — 180 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise acknowledge their potential for being abused by the PRC. Others refuse to acknowl- edge Beijing’s malign activities and often pass off criticism as conspiracy theories. For instance, many were quick to dismiss even the possibility that COVID-19 escaped from a Chinese research laboratory. The reality, however, is that the PRC’s actions often do sound like conspiracy theories—because they are conspiracies. In addition, some knowingly or not parrot the Communist line: Global leaders includ- ing President Joe Biden, have tried to normalize or even laud Chinese behavior. In some cases, these voices, like the global corporate giants BlackRock and Disney, directly benefit from doing business with Beijing. On the other hand, others acknowledge the dangers posed by the PRC, but believe in a moderating approach to accommodate its rise, a policy of “compete where we must, but cooperate where we can,” including on issues like climate change. This strategy has demonstrably failed. As with all global struggles with Communist and other tyrannical regimes, the issue should never be with the Chinese people but with the Communist dictator- ship that oppresses them and threatens the well-being of nations across the globe.12 That said, the nature of Chinese power today is the product of history, ideology, and the institutions that have governed China during the course of five millennia, inherited by the present Chinese leaders from the preceding generations of the CCP.13 In short, the PRC challenge is rooted in China’s strategic culture and not just the Marxism–Leninism of the CCP, meaning that internal culture and civil society will never deliver a more normative nation. The PRC’s aggressive behavior can only be curbed through external pressure. The Islamic Republic of Iran The ongoing protests in the Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran), which are widely viewed as a new revolution, have shown that the Islamic regime, which has been in power since 1979 when Ayatollah Khomeini became the leader, is at its weakest state in its history and is at odds not only with its own people but also its regional neighbors. Iran is home to a proud and ancient culture, yet its people have strug- gled to achieve democracy and have had to endure a hostile theocratic regime that vehemently opposes freedom. The time may be right to press harder on the Iranian theocracy, support the Iranian people, and take other steps to draw Iran into the community of free and modern nations. Unfortunately, the Obama and Biden Administrations have propped up the brutal Islamist theocracy that has hurt the Iranian people and threatened nuclear war. For example, the Obama Administration’s 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, commonly referred to as the Iran nuclear deal, gave the Islamic regime a crucial monetary lifeline after the Green Movement protests in 2009, which, while ultimately unsuccessful, did succeed in weakening the regime and showing the world that younger Iranians want freedom.
Department of the Treasury
Moderate
Vector: 70%Pages: 736-738AI Enhanced
AI Analysis:
"The bill focuses on assessing financial stability risks from China's financial sector and enhancing international cooperation, which aligns with Project 2025's concern about Chinese economic statecraft and the need to strengthen oversight mechanisms like CFIUS. However, the bill does not directly address CFIUS reform, penalty schedules, or greenfield investment coverage as specified in the policy."
Key themes:China financial risksfinancial stabilityinternational cooperationeconomic statecraftoversight mechanisms
— 703 — Department of the Treasury l The U.S. should also examine increasing or decreasing its ownership levels in these institutions in order to achieve maximum leverage. CHINA AND OTHER GEOPOLITICAL THREATS Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States. The interagency Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States should realign its priorities to meet the United States’ current foreign policy threats, especially from China. On October 20, 2022, the Treasury Department, which chairs CFIUS, adopted the first-ever CFIUS Enforcement and Penalty Guidelines50 on the committee’s national security risk mitigation requirements. However, there are no clear rules that guide CFIUS on mitigation monitoring, nor is there a published penalty sched- ule to standardize accountability when CFIUS pursues a civil money penalty for violators. In addition, Treasury—as chair of the committee—runs an opaque pro- cess that biases committee procedure toward corporate interests and away from national security interests. Finally, the committee’s jurisdiction does not extend over greenfield investments that Chinese state-owned enterprises have historically pursued in the United States, which leaves America vulnerable to an instrument of Chinese economic statecraft. Given these issues, the next steps for CFIUS should be to develop a more coherent—and transparent—mitigation monitoring program to complement the enforcement guidelines, give CFIUS agencies in charge of national security con- cerns an equal voice at the table, and petition Congress to amend the law to cover Chinese greenfield investments. CFIUS should publish a penalty schedule for violations of CFIUS reporting and mitigation requirements. Publishing a penalty schedule for CFIUS violations will reduce the discretion of the committee to waive penalties or impose mere “wrist slap” costs on violators of the law. Additionally, a standardized penalty schedule would likely increase the deterrence of CFIUS enforcement by reducing the per- ception among parties to covered transactions that they can avoid enforcement by the committee or secure special exceptions based on appeals to the commit- tee’s discretion. As a legal matter—and in application by CFIUS—mitigation monitoring has developed as the Wild West. There are no clear rules that guide the entire com- mittee on mitigation monitoring, nor is there the same level of oversight or accountability within and among the agencies as applies when CFIUS reviews a transaction or when it pursues a civil money penalty. Indeed, it is a credit to transaction parties and the professionalism of the governmental officials and con- tractors who conduct mitigation monitoring on behalf of the government that, by and large, mitigation monitoring has worked adequately during the last several decades. But dependency on the personality and capabilities of individuals creates unnecessary risk both for CFIUS and for transaction parties.
Department of the Treasury
Moderate
Vector: 66%Pages: 736-738AI Enhanced
AI Analysis:
"Both the bill and the Project 2025 Treasury section aim to address China‑related financial threats and enhance Treasury oversight, but the bill focuses on a study and reporting requirement while Project 2025 calls for specific CFIUS reforms, penalty schedules, DOD co‑chair, and financial warfare initiatives that the bill does not implement."
Key themes:China financial threat assessmentTreasury leadershipInternational cooperationTransparency of Chinese economic dataFinancial stability risk mitigation
— 703 — Department of the Treasury l The U.S. should also examine increasing or decreasing its ownership levels in these institutions in order to achieve maximum leverage. CHINA AND OTHER GEOPOLITICAL THREATS Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States. The interagency Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States should realign its priorities to meet the United States’ current foreign policy threats, especially from China. On October 20, 2022, the Treasury Department, which chairs CFIUS, adopted the first-ever CFIUS Enforcement and Penalty Guidelines50 on the committee’s national security risk mitigation requirements. However, there are no clear rules that guide CFIUS on mitigation monitoring, nor is there a published penalty sched- ule to standardize accountability when CFIUS pursues a civil money penalty for violators. In addition, Treasury—as chair of the committee—runs an opaque pro- cess that biases committee procedure toward corporate interests and away from national security interests. Finally, the committee’s jurisdiction does not extend over greenfield investments that Chinese state-owned enterprises have historically pursued in the United States, which leaves America vulnerable to an instrument of Chinese economic statecraft. Given these issues, the next steps for CFIUS should be to develop a more coherent—and transparent—mitigation monitoring program to complement the enforcement guidelines, give CFIUS agencies in charge of national security con- cerns an equal voice at the table, and petition Congress to amend the law to cover Chinese greenfield investments. CFIUS should publish a penalty schedule for violations of CFIUS reporting and mitigation requirements. Publishing a penalty schedule for CFIUS violations will reduce the discretion of the committee to waive penalties or impose mere “wrist slap” costs on violators of the law. Additionally, a standardized penalty schedule would likely increase the deterrence of CFIUS enforcement by reducing the per- ception among parties to covered transactions that they can avoid enforcement by the committee or secure special exceptions based on appeals to the commit- tee’s discretion. As a legal matter—and in application by CFIUS—mitigation monitoring has developed as the Wild West. There are no clear rules that guide the entire com- mittee on mitigation monitoring, nor is there the same level of oversight or accountability within and among the agencies as applies when CFIUS reviews a transaction or when it pursues a civil money penalty. Indeed, it is a credit to transaction parties and the professionalism of the governmental officials and con- tractors who conduct mitigation monitoring on behalf of the government that, by and large, mitigation monitoring has worked adequately during the last several decades. But dependency on the personality and capabilities of individuals creates unnecessary risk both for CFIUS and for transaction parties. — 704 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise Congress should make the Department of Defense (DOD) a CFIUS co-chair with the Department of Treasury. Making DOD an official CFIUS co-chair along with Treasury will establish a balanced committee process by elevating national security interests to an equal stature. The committee is currently imbalanced toward the interests of corporate America because Treasury is the sole chair of CFIUS and, in practice, runs a process that is not fully transparent and which biases it from the national security interests represented by DOD and the Intelligence Community (IC). For example, Treasury representatives will consult with the Commerce Depart- ment and the United States Trade Representative—which tend to favor permitting covered transactions to occur with little to no mitigation requirements—and these representatives will then obscure the results and purposes of such sidebar meet- ings from DOD and IC representatives. This hampers DOD, IC, and sometimes even State Department representatives from full participation in the process or from advocating national security interests as well as they should. Greenfield Investments. Congress should close the loophole on greenfield investments and require CFIUS review of investments in U.S.-based greenfield assets by Chinese-controlled entities to assess any potential harm to U.S. national and economic security. In the 2018 Foreign Risk and Review Modernization Act (FIRRMA),51 one important category of foreign transactions left out of the bill was greenfield investments, particularly by Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Greenfield investments by Chinese SOEs pose a unique threat, and they should be met with the highest scrutiny by all levels of government. Greenfield investments result in the control of newly built facilities in the U.S., and they were not addressed in FIRRMA primarily because governors and state governments embrace them. That is understandable; they typically bring the promise of creating American jobs. However, the goal of such Chinese SOEs is to siphon assets, technological innovation, and influence away from U.S. businesses in order to expand the global presence of the Chinese Communist Party. While the Chinese government keeps its domestic markets largely insulated from foreign influence, it regularly invests in the U.S. and other countries under the “green- field” model. Firms fully owned by China’s Communist regime are increasingly buying land, building factories, and taking advantage of state and local tax breaks on American soil. Treasury should examine creating a school of financial warfare jointly with DOD. If the U.S. is to rely on financial weapons, tools, and strategies to prosecute international defensive and offensive objectives, it must create a specially trained group of experts dedicated to the study, training, testing, and preparedness of these deterrents. Recent experience has demonstrated that the U.S. cannot depend on the rapid development and deployment of untested, academically developed finan- cial actions, stratagems, and weapons on an ad hoc basis.
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
About These Correlations
Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.