The bill
Taiwan Conflict Deterrence Act of 2025
HR. 1716, 119th Congress — read as touching Commercial Banks.
Taiwan Conflict Deterrence Act of 2025
Download PDFBill ID: 119/hr/1716
Last Updated: July 17, 2026
Sponsored by
Rep. McClain, Lisa C. [R-MI-9]
ID: M001136
Follow the money
The sponsor
Rep. McClain, Lisa C. [R-MI-9]
Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.
The money
$97,000 raised
26 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.
The alignment
62% match to Project 2025
This bill's text tracks the "Introduction" section, p. 736-738 of the Mandate for Leadership.
Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Received in the Senate and Read twice and referred to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs.
July 21, 2025
Introduced
Committee Review
Floor Action
Passed House
Senate Review
📍 Current Status
Next: Both chambers must agree on the same version of the bill.
🎉
Passed Congress
🖊️
Presidential Action
⚖️
Became Law
📚 How does a bill become a law?
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Bill Summary
Another masterclass in legislative theater, courtesy of the 119th Congress. Let's dissect this farce, shall we?
**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The Taiwan Conflict Deterrence Act of 2025 is a laughable attempt to deter Chinese aggression towards Taiwan by... wait for it... requiring the Secretary of the Treasury to publish a report on financial institutions and accounts connected to senior Chinese officials. Because, clearly, the key to deterring a global superpower lies in a few well-placed spreadsheets.
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill requires the Secretary of the Treasury to submit reports on:
1. Estimated funds held by at least 10 natural persons (read: Chinese officials) in financial institutions. 2. A list of financial institutions that maintain accounts or provide services to these individuals. 3. Briefings for Congress on the funds, including their acquisition and any illicit means used.
Oh, and let's not forget the pièce de résistance: prohibiting US financial institutions from engaging in significant transactions with these individuals and their immediate family members. Because nothing says "deterrence" like a few targeted sanctions.
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:**
1. Chinese officials: The ones who will allegedly be deterred by this bill. 2. Financial institutions: Those that will have to comply with the reporting requirements and potential sanctions. 3. US Congress: The ones who get to pretend they're doing something meaningful about China's aggression.
**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill is a joke, folks. It's a weak attempt to appear tough on China while actually accomplishing nothing. The real impact will be:
1. More bureaucratic red tape for financial institutions. 2. A minor inconvenience for Chinese officials who can easily find ways to circumvent the sanctions. 3. A nice PR boost for Congress, which gets to claim it's "doing something" about China.
In reality, this bill is a symptom of a deeper disease: the inability of US policymakers to develop a coherent strategy to address China's rise. Instead, they resort to token gestures like this bill, which will only serve to further erode trust in the US government's ability to effectively manage global affairs.
Diagnosis: Legislative Theater-itis, characterized by symptoms of grandstanding, bureaucratic bloat, and a complete lack of meaningful action. Treatment: A healthy dose of skepticism and a strong stomach for the inevitable disappointment that follows.
Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (Dr. Haus personality)
💰 Campaign Finance Network
Rep. McClain, Lisa C. [R-MI-9]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
Total Contributions
$97,000
22 donors
PACs
$0
Organizations
$6,000
Committees
$0
Individuals
$91,000
No PAC contributions found
1
THE CHICKASAW NATION
$2,000
2
A & ALL WASTE LLC
$1,000
3
MORONGO BAND OF MISSION INDIANS
$1,000
4
SALT RIVER PIMA MARICOPA INDIAN COMMUNITY
$1,000
5
SANTA YNEZ BAND OF MISSION INDIANS
$1,000
No committee contributions found
1
BANKE, BARBARA R.
$9,900
2
SAMONA, MAZIN
$6,600
3
ALKHAFAJI, AMMAR
$6,600
4
YALDO, RUDI
$6,600
5
WENZEL, TODD
$6,600
6
DEVOS, BETSY
$6,600
7
DEVOS, DANIEL G.
$6,600
8
MAKI, BRETT
$5,000
9
MCCAUSLAND, PETER
$5,000
10
KELLO, LEILA
$5,000
11
MANNA, MARTIN MR.
$5,000
12
TIGNANELLI, JOSEPH R.
$5,000
13
SEIDEL, DAVID
$3,300
14
T, TODD
$3,300
15
STAMPER, PAULINE MS.
$3,300
16
WENZEL, TRACY
$3,300
17
BROWNELL, STEPHEN
$3,300
Cosponsors & Their Campaign Finance
This bill has 1 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.
Rep. Sherman, Brad [D-CA-32]
ID: S000344
Top Contributors
10
1
MORONGO BAND OF MISSION INDIANS NATIVE AMERICAN RIGHTS FUND
OrganizationBANNING, CA
$2,000
Oct 30, 2023
2
MS BAND OF CHOCTAW INDIANS
OrganizationCHOCTAW, MS
$2,000
Oct 5, 2023
3
SANTA YNEZ BAND OF MISSION INDIANS
OrganizationSANTA YNEZ, CA
$2,000
Sep 30, 2024
4
SANTA YNEZ BAND OF MISSION INDIANS
OrganizationSANTA YNEZ, CA
$1,300
Oct 21, 2024
5
BARONA BAND OF MISSION INDIANS
OrganizationLAKESIDE, CA
$1,000
Oct 28, 2024
6
SANTA YNEZ BAND OF MISSION INDIANS
OrganizationSANTA YNEZ, CA
$700
Oct 21, 2024
7
AHMED, TAIMOOR
MARKHOR LOGISTICS • CEO
IndividualSACRAMENTO, CA
$3,300
Mar 30, 2023
8
GARHWAL, HARI
GARHWAL, CHAN & WILLIAMS • CPA
IndividualSAN FRANCISCO, CA
$3,300
Mar 23, 2023
9
GARHWAL, HARI
GARHWAL, CHAN & WILLIAMS • CPA
IndividualSAN FRANCISCO, CA
$3,300
Mar 23, 2023
10
GARHWAL, SANJEEV
WWMG • PHYSICIAN
IndividualSEATTLE, WA
$3,300
Mar 29, 2023
Donor Network - Rep. McClain, Lisa C. [R-MI-9]
PACs
Organizations
Individuals
Politicians
Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Loading...
Showing 52 nodes and 29 connections (54 secondary connections hidden)
Total contributions: $103,000
Top Donors - Rep. McClain, Lisa C. [R-MI-9]
Showing top 22 donors by contribution amount
5 Orgs17 Individuals
Industry Impact
Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 2 harmed.
- −Commercial Banksconfidence 0.90
Section 3(a) prohibits U.S. financial institutions from engaging in significant transactions with certain Chinese officials and their immediate family, directly impacting commercial banks' ability to serve those clients.
- −Private Equity & Hedge Fundsconfidence 0.85
Section 3(a) applies to any person owned or controlled by a U.S. financial institution, which includes private equity and hedge fund affiliates of banks, restricting their transactions with covered individuals.
Who funds the sponsor on these industries
For each industry this bill affects, here's what the sponsor (Rep. McClain, Lisa C. [R-MI-9])received from donors associated with that industry during the 2022–present cycles. Donations are not proof of intent — they are a record of who funds the people writing the law.
Industries this bill HARMS
- Commercial Banks$5,000from 4 contributions
- NOVAK, JON MR.$5,000
Project 2025 Policy Matches
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.
Introduction
Moderate62.3%
Pages: 736-738
— 703 — Department of the Treasury l The U.S. should also examine increasing or decreasing its ownership levels in these institutions in order to achieve maximum leverage. CHINA AND OTHER GEOPOLITICAL THREATS Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States. The interagency Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States should realign its priorities to meet the United States’ current foreign policy threats, especially from China. On October 20, 2022, the Treasury Department, which chairs CFIUS, adopted the first-ever CFIUS Enforcement and Penalty Guidelines50 on the committee’s national security risk mitigation requirements. However, there are no clear rules that guide CFIUS on mitigation monitoring, nor is there a published penalty sched- ule to standardize accountability when CFIUS pursues a civil money penalty for violators. In addition, Treasury—as chair of the committee—runs an opaque pro- cess that biases committee procedure toward corporate interests and away from national security interests. Finally, the committee’s jurisdiction does not extend over greenfield investments that Chinese state-owned enterprises have historically pursued in the United States, which leaves America vulnerable to an instrument of Chinese economic statecraft. Given these issues, the next steps for CFIUS should be to develop a more coherent—and transparent—mitigation monitoring program to complement the enforcement guidelines, give CFIUS agencies in charge of national security con- cerns an equal voice at the table, and petition Congress to amend the law to cover Chinese greenfield investments. CFIUS should publish a penalty schedule for violations of CFIUS reporting and mitigation requirements. Publishing a penalty schedule for CFIUS violations will reduce the discretion of the committee to waive penalties or impose mere “wrist slap” costs on violators of the law. Additionally, a standardized penalty schedule would likely increase the deterrence of CFIUS enforcement by reducing the per- ception among parties to covered transactions that they can avoid enforcement by the committee or secure special exceptions based on appeals to the commit- tee’s discretion. As a legal matter—and in application by CFIUS—mitigation monitoring has developed as the Wild West. There are no clear rules that guide the entire com- mittee on mitigation monitoring, nor is there the same level of oversight or accountability within and among the agencies as applies when CFIUS reviews a transaction or when it pursues a civil money penalty. Indeed, it is a credit to transaction parties and the professionalism of the governmental officials and con- tractors who conduct mitigation monitoring on behalf of the government that, by and large, mitigation monitoring has worked adequately during the last several decades. But dependency on the personality and capabilities of individuals creates unnecessary risk both for CFIUS and for transaction parties. — 704 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise Congress should make the Department of Defense (DOD) a CFIUS co-chair with the Department of Treasury. Making DOD an official CFIUS co-chair along with Treasury will establish a balanced committee process by elevating national security interests to an equal stature. The committee is currently imbalanced toward the interests of corporate America because Treasury is the sole chair of CFIUS and, in practice, runs a process that is not fully transparent and which biases it from the national security interests represented by DOD and the Intelligence Community (IC). For example, Treasury representatives will consult with the Commerce Depart- ment and the United States Trade Representative—which tend to favor permitting covered transactions to occur with little to no mitigation requirements—and these representatives will then obscure the results and purposes of such sidebar meet- ings from DOD and IC representatives. This hampers DOD, IC, and sometimes even State Department representatives from full participation in the process or from advocating national security interests as well as they should. Greenfield Investments. Congress should close the loophole on greenfield investments and require CFIUS review of investments in U.S.-based greenfield assets by Chinese-controlled entities to assess any potential harm to U.S. national and economic security. In the 2018 Foreign Risk and Review Modernization Act (FIRRMA),51 one important category of foreign transactions left out of the bill was greenfield investments, particularly by Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Greenfield investments by Chinese SOEs pose a unique threat, and they should be met with the highest scrutiny by all levels of government. Greenfield investments result in the control of newly built facilities in the U.S., and they were not addressed in FIRRMA primarily because governors and state governments embrace them. That is understandable; they typically bring the promise of creating American jobs. However, the goal of such Chinese SOEs is to siphon assets, technological innovation, and influence away from U.S. businesses in order to expand the global presence of the Chinese Communist Party. While the Chinese government keeps its domestic markets largely insulated from foreign influence, it regularly invests in the U.S. and other countries under the “green- field” model. Firms fully owned by China’s Communist regime are increasingly buying land, building factories, and taking advantage of state and local tax breaks on American soil. Treasury should examine creating a school of financial warfare jointly with DOD. If the U.S. is to rely on financial weapons, tools, and strategies to prosecute international defensive and offensive objectives, it must create a specially trained group of experts dedicated to the study, training, testing, and preparedness of these deterrents. Recent experience has demonstrated that the U.S. cannot depend on the rapid development and deployment of untested, academically developed finan- cial actions, stratagems, and weapons on an ad hoc basis.
Introduction
Moderate62.3%
Pages: 736-738
— 703 — Department of the Treasury l The U.S. should also examine increasing or decreasing its ownership levels in these institutions in order to achieve maximum leverage. CHINA AND OTHER GEOPOLITICAL THREATS Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States. The interagency Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States should realign its priorities to meet the United States’ current foreign policy threats, especially from China. On October 20, 2022, the Treasury Department, which chairs CFIUS, adopted the first-ever CFIUS Enforcement and Penalty Guidelines50 on the committee’s national security risk mitigation requirements. However, there are no clear rules that guide CFIUS on mitigation monitoring, nor is there a published penalty sched- ule to standardize accountability when CFIUS pursues a civil money penalty for violators. In addition, Treasury—as chair of the committee—runs an opaque pro- cess that biases committee procedure toward corporate interests and away from national security interests. Finally, the committee’s jurisdiction does not extend over greenfield investments that Chinese state-owned enterprises have historically pursued in the United States, which leaves America vulnerable to an instrument of Chinese economic statecraft. Given these issues, the next steps for CFIUS should be to develop a more coherent—and transparent—mitigation monitoring program to complement the enforcement guidelines, give CFIUS agencies in charge of national security con- cerns an equal voice at the table, and petition Congress to amend the law to cover Chinese greenfield investments. CFIUS should publish a penalty schedule for violations of CFIUS reporting and mitigation requirements. Publishing a penalty schedule for CFIUS violations will reduce the discretion of the committee to waive penalties or impose mere “wrist slap” costs on violators of the law. Additionally, a standardized penalty schedule would likely increase the deterrence of CFIUS enforcement by reducing the per- ception among parties to covered transactions that they can avoid enforcement by the committee or secure special exceptions based on appeals to the commit- tee’s discretion. As a legal matter—and in application by CFIUS—mitigation monitoring has developed as the Wild West. There are no clear rules that guide the entire com- mittee on mitigation monitoring, nor is there the same level of oversight or accountability within and among the agencies as applies when CFIUS reviews a transaction or when it pursues a civil money penalty. Indeed, it is a credit to transaction parties and the professionalism of the governmental officials and con- tractors who conduct mitigation monitoring on behalf of the government that, by and large, mitigation monitoring has worked adequately during the last several decades. But dependency on the personality and capabilities of individuals creates unnecessary risk both for CFIUS and for transaction parties.
About These Correlations
Policy matches are calculated using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text. A score of 60% or higher indicates meaningful thematic overlap. This does not imply direct causation or intent, but highlights areas where legislation aligns with Project 2025 policy objectives.