High Rise Fire Sprinkler Incentive Act of 2025
Download PDFSponsored by
Rep. Malliotakis, Nicole [R-NY-11]
ID: M000317
Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Referred to the House Committee on Ways and Means.
January 3, 2025
Introduced
Committee Review
đź“Ť Current Status
Next: The bill moves to the floor for full chamber debate and voting.
Floor Action
Passed House
Senate Review
Passed Congress
Presidential Action
Became Law
đź“š How does a bill become a law?
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Bill Summary
Another bill, another opportunity for our esteemed lawmakers to demonstrate their boundless ignorance and craven self-interest.
**Main Purpose & Objectives**
The High Rise Fire Sprinkler Incentive Act of 2025 is a laughable attempt to masquerade as a public safety measure while actually serving the interests of wealthy property owners and the fire sprinkler industry. The bill's primary objective is to reclassify certain automatic fire sprinkler system retrofits as 15-year property for depreciation purposes, thereby providing a juicy tax break to building owners who install these systems.
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law**
The bill amends the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 by adding a new category of "automatic fire sprinkler system retrofit property" that qualifies for accelerated depreciation. This means that building owners can write off the cost of installing these systems over a shorter period, reducing their tax liability and increasing their profits.
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders**
The main beneficiaries of this bill are wealthy property owners, particularly those with high-rise buildings in urban areas. The fire sprinkler industry will also reap significant benefits from increased demand for their products. Meanwhile, the general public will be left to foot the bill through reduced tax revenues and potentially higher insurance premiums.
**Potential Impact & Implications**
The impact of this bill will be negligible on public safety, as it only applies to buildings with occupiable floors above 75 feet – a tiny fraction of all buildings in the United States. However, it will have a significant impact on the bottom line of wealthy property owners and the fire sprinkler industry.
In reality, this bill is nothing more than a cynical attempt to buy votes from powerful special interest groups while pretending to care about public safety. It's a classic case of "legislative theater," where politicians engage in empty posturing to distract from their true motives: lining the pockets of their wealthy donors and cronies.
Diagnosis: This bill is suffering from a severe case of "Tax Break-itis," a disease characterized by an excessive desire for short-term gains at the expense of long-term public interests. Treatment involves a healthy dose of skepticism, a strong stomach for bureaucratic nonsense, and a willingness to call out politicians on their blatant hypocrisy.
Prognosis: Poor. This bill will likely pass with minimal scrutiny, as most lawmakers are too busy genuflecting to special interest groups to bother with actual policy analysis. The public will be left to suffer the consequences of yet another ill-conceived piece of legislation designed to benefit the wealthy at the expense of everyone else.
Related Topics
đź’° Campaign Finance Network
Rep. Malliotakis, Nicole [R-NY-11]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
No PAC contributions found
No committee contributions found
Cosponsors & Their Campaign Finance
This bill has 6 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.
Rep. Landsman, Greg [D-OH-1]
ID: L000601
Top Contributors
10
Rep. Larson, John B. [D-CT-1]
ID: L000557
Top Contributors
10
Rep. Suozzi, Thomas R. [D-NY-3]
ID: S001201
Top Contributors
10
Rep. Neguse, Joe [D-CO-2]
ID: N000191
Top Contributors
10
Rep. Fitzpatrick, Brian K. [R-PA-1]
ID: F000466
Top Contributors
10
Rep. Vindman, Eugene Simon [D-VA-7]
ID: V000138
Top Contributors
10
Donor Network - Rep. Malliotakis, Nicole [R-NY-11]
Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Showing 37 nodes and 37 connections
Total contributions: $111,269
Top Donors - Rep. Malliotakis, Nicole [R-NY-11]
Showing top 18 donors by contribution amount
Project 2025 Policy Matches
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document. Higher similarity scores indicate stronger thematic connections.
Introduction
— 154 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise insurance at prices lower than the actuarially fair rate, thereby subsidizing flood insurance. Then, when flood costs exceed NFIP’s revenue, FEMA seeks taxpay- er-funded bailouts. Current NFIP debt is $20.5 billion, and in 2017, Congress canceled $16 billion in debt when FEMA reached its borrowing authority limit. These subsidies and bailouts only encourage more development in flood zones, increasing the potential losses to both NFIP and the taxpayer. The NFIP should be wound down and replaced with private insurance starting with the least risky areas currently identified by the program. Budget Issues FEMA manages all grants for DHS, and these grants have become pork for states, localities, and special-interest groups. Since 2002, DHS/FEMA have provided more than $56 billion in preparedness grants for state, local, tribal, and territorial governments. For FY 2023, President Biden requested more than $3.5 billion for federal assistance grants.13 Funds provided under these programs do not provide measurable gains for preparedness or resiliency. Rather, more than any objective needs, political interests appear to direct the flow of nondisaster funds. The principles of federalism should be upheld; these indicate that states better understand their unique needs and should bear the costs of their particularized programs. FEMA employees in Washington, D.C., should not determine how bil- lions of federal tax dollars should be awarded to train local law enforcement officers in Texas, harden cybersecurity infrastructure in Utah, or supplement migrant shelters in Arizona. DHS should not be in the business of handing out federal tax dollars: These grants should be terminated. Accomplishing this, however, will require action by Members of Congress who repeatedly vote to fund grants for political reasons. The transition should focus on building resilience and return on investment in line with real threats. Personnel FEMA currently has four Senate-confirmed positions. Only the Administrator should be confirmed by the Senate; other political leadership need not be con- firmed by the Senate. Additionally, FEMA’s “springing Cabinet position” should be eliminated, as this creates significant unnecessary challenges to the functioning of the whole of DHS at points in time when coordinated responses are most needed. CYBERSECURITY AND INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY AGENCY (CISA) Needed Reforms CISA is supposed to have two key roles: (1) protection of the federal civilian government networks (.gov) while coordinating the execution of national cyber defense and sharing information with non-federal and private-sector partners — 155 — Department of Homeland Security and (2) national coordination of critical infrastructure security and resilience. Yet CISA has rapidly expanded its scope into lanes where it does not belong, the most recent and most glaring example being censorship of so-called misinformation and disinformation. CISA’s funding and resources should align narrowly with the foregoing two mission requirements. The component’s emergency communications and Chem- ical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) roles should be moved to FEMA; its school security functions should be transferred to state homeland security offices; and CISA should refrain from duplicating cybersecurity functions done elsewhere at the Department of Defense, FBI, National Security Agency, and U.S. Secret Service. Of the utmost urgency is immediately ending CISA’s counter-mis/disinforma- tion efforts. The federal government cannot be the arbiter of truth. CISA began this work because of alleged Russian misinformation in the 2016 election, which in fact turned out to be a Clinton campaign “dirty trick.” The Intelligence Commu- nity, including the NSA or DOD, should counter foreign actors. At the time of this writing, release of the Twitter Files has demonstrated that CISA has devolved into an unconstitutional censoring and election engineering apparatus of the political Left. In any event, the entirety of the CISA Cybersecurity Advisory Committee should be dismissed on Day One. For election security, CISA should help states and localities assess whether they have good cyber hygiene in their hardware and software in preparation for an election—but nothing more. This is of value to smaller localities, particularly by flagging who is attacking their websites. CISA should not be significantly involved closer to an election. Nor should it participate in messaging or propaganda. U.S. COAST GUARD (USCG) Needed Reforms The U.S. Coast Guard fleet should be sized to the needs of great-power compe- tition, specifically focusing efforts and investment on protecting U.S. waters, all while seeking to find (where feasible) more economical ways to perform USCG missions. The scope of the Coast Guard’s mission needs to be focused on protecting U.S. resources and interests in its home waters, specifically its Exclusive Economic Zone (200 miles from shore). USCG’s budget should address the growing demand for it to address the increasing threat from the Chinese fishing fleet in home waters as well as narcotics and migrant flows in the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific. Doing this will require reversing years of shortfalls in shipbuilding, maintenance, and upgrades of shore facilities as well as seeking more cost-effective ship and facility designs. In wartime, the USCG supports the Navy, but it has limited capability and capacity to support wartime missions outside home waters.
Introduction
— 413 — Department of Energy and Related Commissions 62. U.S. Department of Energy, Federal Energy Management Program, “About the Federal Energy Management Program: Mission and Stakeholders,” https://www.energy.gov/eere/femp/about-federal-energy- management-program (accessed February 13, 2023). 63. See, for example, 42 U.S. Code § 8252, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/8252 (accessed February 13, 2023); § 8253, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/8253 (accessed February 13, 2023); § 8254, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/8254 (accessed February 13, 2023); § 8255, https://www.law. cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/8255 (accessed February 13, 2023); § 8256, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/ text/42/8256 (accessed February 13, 2023); § 8257, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/8257 (accessed February 13, 2023); § 8258, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/8258 (accessed February 13, 2023); § 8259b, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/8258b (accessed February 13, 2023); § 15852, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/15852 (accessed February 13, 2023); and § 17143, https://www. law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/17143 (accessed February 13, 2023). 64. President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13834, “Efficient Federal Operations,” May 17, 2018, Federal Register, Vol. 83, No. 99 (May 22, 2018), pp. 23771–23774, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2018-05- 22/pdf/2018-11101.pdf (accessed February 28, 2023). 65. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy, “FY 2022 Request Overview Briefing,” June 2021, p. 11, https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2021-06/FY2022-EERE-budget-request- energy-efficiency.pdf (accessed February 28, 2023). 66. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2023 Congressional Budget Request, Budget in Brief, pp. 19 and 21. 67. U.S. Department of Energy, Clean Energy Corps, “Careers,” https://www.energy.gov/CleanEnergyCorps (accessed March 13, 2023). 68. Ibid. 69. U.S. Department of Energy, “DOE Kicks Off Recruitment to Support Implementation of Bipartisan Infrastructure Law,” January 13, 2022, https://www.energy.gov/articles/doe-kicks-recruitment-support- implementation-bipartisan-infrastructure-law (accessed March 13, 2023). 70. U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, “About EIA,” https://www.eia.gov/about/ (accessed February 13, 2023). 71. U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, “Levelized Costs of New Generation Resources in the Annual Energy Outlook 2022,” March 2022, p. 1, https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/aeo/pdf/electricity_ generation.pdf (accessed March 13, 2023). 72. U.S. Department of Energy, U.S. Energy Information Administration, Direct Federal Financial Interventions and Subsidies in Energy in Fiscal Year 2016, April 2018, https://www.eia.gov/analysis/requests/subsidy/pdf/subsidy. pdf (accessed March 1, 2023). 73. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2023 Congressional Budget Request, Budget in Brief, pp. 19, 24, and 105. 74. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of International Affairs, “Mission: Our Mission,” https://www.energy.gov/ia/ our-mission (accessed February 13, 2023). 75. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of International Affairs, “Priorities: Our Objectives,” https://www.energy. gov/ia/priorities (accessed February 13, 2023). 76. Editorial Board, “Biden Signs Up for Climate Reparations,” The Wall Street Journal, November 20, 2022, https://www.wsj.com/articles/biden-signs-up-for-climate-change-reparations-europe-fund-un-john-kerry- poor-countries-bank-capitalism-11668974219 (accessed February 13, 2023). 77. U.S. Department of Energy, Arctic Energy Office, “About the Arctic Energy Office,” https://www.energy.gov/ arctic/about-arctic-energy-office (accessed March 1, 2023). 78. National Strategy for the Arctic Region, The White House, October 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp- content/uploads/2022/10/National-Strategy-for-the-Arctic-Region.pdf (accessed March 13, 2023). 79. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence website, https://www.energy.gov/ intelligence/office-intelligence-and-counterintelligence (accessed February 13, 2023). 80. See U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Policy, “Publications,” https://www.energy.gov/policy/office-policy (accessed February 13, 2023). — 414 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise 81. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Technology Transitions, “About Us: Mission,” https://www.energy.gov/ technologytransitions/mission-0 (accessed February 13, 2023). 82. Advanced Scientific Computing Research (ASCR); Basic Energy Sciences (BES); Biological and Environmental Research (BER); Fusion Energy Sciences (FES); High-Energy Physics (HEP); Nuclear Physics (NP); Isotope R&D and Production (IRP); and Accelerator R&D and Production (ARDAP). U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2023 Congressional Budget Request, Volume 5, Science, April 2022, pp. 10–14, https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2022-05/doe-fy2023-budget-volume-5- science-v2.pdf (accessed March 1, 2023). 83. For example, the CHIPS and Science Act authorizes $50 billion for the Office of Science. U.S. Department of Energy, “Statement by Secretary Granholm on Congressional Passage of the CHIPS and Science Act,” July 28, 2022, https://www.energy.gov/articles/statement-secretary-granholm-congressional-passage-chips-and- science-act (accessed February 13, 2023). 84. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2023 Congressional Budget Request, Volume 5, Science, April 2022, p. 7, https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2022-05/doe- fy2023-budget-volume-5-science-v2.pdf (accessed March 2, 2023). 85. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Environmental Management, “Mission,” https://www.energy.gov/em/ mission (accessed March 1, 2023). 86. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Environmental Management, “Cleanup Sites,” https://www.energy.gov/ em/cleanup-sites (accessed March 1, 2023). 87. U.S. Government Accountability Office, “DOE’s Environmental Liability,” GAO-21-585R, June 2021, p. 2, https:// www.gao.gov/assets/gao-21-585r.pdf (accessed March 13, 2023). 88. Chart, “EM’s Annual Spending and Estimated Environmental Liability (Fiscal Years 2011–2020),” in ibid., p. 1. 89. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2023 Congressional Budget Request, Volume 6, Environmental Management, April 2022, p. 53, https://www.energy.gov/sites/ default/files/2022-09/doe-fy2023-budget-volume-6-em-v3.pdf (accessed March 1, 2023). 90. Ibid. 91. U.S. Government Accountability Office, Nuclear Waste: DOE Needs Greater Leadership Stability and Commitment to Accomplish Cleanup Mission, GAO-22-104805, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-22-104805. pdf#:~:text=DOE%20Needs%20Greater%20Leadership%20Stability%20and%20Commitment%20to,May%20 2022%20GAO-22-104805%20United%20States%20Government%20Accountability%20Office May 2022, (accessed February 14, 2023). 92. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2023 Congressional Budget Request, Budget in Brief, pp. 23 and 93. 93. H.R. 3809, Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, Public Law No. 97-425, Title I, Subtitle B. 94. Ibid., Title III, § 304. 95. See, for example, Chapter 4, “The Need for Geologic Disposal,” in Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future, Report to the Secretary of Energy, January 2012, pp. 27–31, https://www.energy.gov/sites/ default/files/2013/04/f0/brc_finalreport_jan2012.pdf (accessed February 14, 2023). 96. Press release, “DOE Announces $16 Million to Support Consent-Based Siting for Spent Nuclear Fuel,” U.S. Department of Energy, September 20, 2022, https://www.energy.gov/articles/doe-announces-16-million- support-consent-based-siting-spent-nuclear-fuel (accessed February 14, 2023). 97. U.S. Department of Energy, Agency Financial Report, Fiscal Year 2022, DOE/CF-0191, p. 58, https://www. energy.gov/sites/default/files/2022-11/fy-2022-doe-agency-financial-report.pdf (accessed March 13, 2023). 98. H.R. 3809, Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, Public Law No. 97-425, Title III, § 302. 99. Ibid., p. 57. 100. Table, “Department of Energy Comparative Organization by Congressional Control, FY 2023,” p. 5, in U.S. Department of Energy, Office of the Chief Financial Officer, “FY 2023 Budget Justification: Summary Budget Documents,” https://www.energy.gov/cfo/articles/fy-2023-budget-justification (accessed March 13, 2023). 101. U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration, “Missions,” https://www.energy.gov/ nnsa/missions#:~:text=NNSA%20ensures%20the%20United%20States%20maintains%20a%20safe%2C,of%20 nuclear%20and%20radiological%20terrorism%20around%20the%20world (accessed March 2, 2023).
Introduction
— 413 — Department of Energy and Related Commissions 62. U.S. Department of Energy, Federal Energy Management Program, “About the Federal Energy Management Program: Mission and Stakeholders,” https://www.energy.gov/eere/femp/about-federal-energy- management-program (accessed February 13, 2023). 63. See, for example, 42 U.S. Code § 8252, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/8252 (accessed February 13, 2023); § 8253, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/8253 (accessed February 13, 2023); § 8254, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/8254 (accessed February 13, 2023); § 8255, https://www.law. cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/8255 (accessed February 13, 2023); § 8256, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/ text/42/8256 (accessed February 13, 2023); § 8257, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/8257 (accessed February 13, 2023); § 8258, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/8258 (accessed February 13, 2023); § 8259b, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/8258b (accessed February 13, 2023); § 15852, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/15852 (accessed February 13, 2023); and § 17143, https://www. law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/17143 (accessed February 13, 2023). 64. President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13834, “Efficient Federal Operations,” May 17, 2018, Federal Register, Vol. 83, No. 99 (May 22, 2018), pp. 23771–23774, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2018-05- 22/pdf/2018-11101.pdf (accessed February 28, 2023). 65. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy, “FY 2022 Request Overview Briefing,” June 2021, p. 11, https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2021-06/FY2022-EERE-budget-request- energy-efficiency.pdf (accessed February 28, 2023). 66. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2023 Congressional Budget Request, Budget in Brief, pp. 19 and 21. 67. U.S. Department of Energy, Clean Energy Corps, “Careers,” https://www.energy.gov/CleanEnergyCorps (accessed March 13, 2023). 68. Ibid. 69. U.S. Department of Energy, “DOE Kicks Off Recruitment to Support Implementation of Bipartisan Infrastructure Law,” January 13, 2022, https://www.energy.gov/articles/doe-kicks-recruitment-support- implementation-bipartisan-infrastructure-law (accessed March 13, 2023). 70. U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, “About EIA,” https://www.eia.gov/about/ (accessed February 13, 2023). 71. U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, “Levelized Costs of New Generation Resources in the Annual Energy Outlook 2022,” March 2022, p. 1, https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/aeo/pdf/electricity_ generation.pdf (accessed March 13, 2023). 72. U.S. Department of Energy, U.S. Energy Information Administration, Direct Federal Financial Interventions and Subsidies in Energy in Fiscal Year 2016, April 2018, https://www.eia.gov/analysis/requests/subsidy/pdf/subsidy. pdf (accessed March 1, 2023). 73. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2023 Congressional Budget Request, Budget in Brief, pp. 19, 24, and 105. 74. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of International Affairs, “Mission: Our Mission,” https://www.energy.gov/ia/ our-mission (accessed February 13, 2023). 75. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of International Affairs, “Priorities: Our Objectives,” https://www.energy. gov/ia/priorities (accessed February 13, 2023). 76. Editorial Board, “Biden Signs Up for Climate Reparations,” The Wall Street Journal, November 20, 2022, https://www.wsj.com/articles/biden-signs-up-for-climate-change-reparations-europe-fund-un-john-kerry- poor-countries-bank-capitalism-11668974219 (accessed February 13, 2023). 77. U.S. Department of Energy, Arctic Energy Office, “About the Arctic Energy Office,” https://www.energy.gov/ arctic/about-arctic-energy-office (accessed March 1, 2023). 78. National Strategy for the Arctic Region, The White House, October 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp- content/uploads/2022/10/National-Strategy-for-the-Arctic-Region.pdf (accessed March 13, 2023). 79. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence website, https://www.energy.gov/ intelligence/office-intelligence-and-counterintelligence (accessed February 13, 2023). 80. See U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Policy, “Publications,” https://www.energy.gov/policy/office-policy (accessed February 13, 2023).
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
About These Correlations
Policy matches are calculated using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text. A score of 60% or higher indicates meaningful thematic overlap. This does not imply direct causation or intent, but highlights areas where legislation aligns with Project 2025 policy objectives.