NTIA Policy and Cybersecurity Coordination Act

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Bill ID: 119/hr/1766
Last Updated: September 7, 2026

Sponsored by

Rep. Obernolte, Jay [R-CA-23]

ID: O000019

Follow the money

The bill

NTIA Policy and Cybersecurity Coordination Act

HR. 1766, 119th Congress — read as touching Cybersecurity.

The sponsor

Rep. Obernolte, Jay [R-CA-23]

Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.

The money

$99,800 raised

30 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.

The alignment

85% match to Project 2025

This bill's text tracks the "Department of Commerce" section, p. 720-722 of the Mandate for Leadership.

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

Track this bill's progress through the legislative process

Latest Action

Received in the Senate and Read twice and referred to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation.

July 14, 2025

Introduced

Committee Review

Floor Action

Passed House

Senate Review

📍 Current Status

Next: Both chambers must agree on the same version of the bill.

🎉

Passed Congress

🖊️

Presidential Action

⚖️

Became Law

📚 How does a bill become a law?

1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.

2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

Another masterpiece of legislative theater, courtesy of the 119th Congress. Let's dissect this farce and expose the underlying disease.

**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The NTIA Policy and Cybersecurity Coordination Act (HR 1766) claims to establish an Office of Policy Development and Cybersecurity within the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA). The stated goal is to promote innovation, competition, consumer access, digital inclusion, workforce development, and economic growth in the communications, media, and technology markets. How quaint.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill creates a new office with an Associate Administrator for Policy Development and Cybersecurity, who will oversee national communications and information policy analysis and development. The office's duties include:

* Developing market-based policies (read: corporate-friendly regulations) * Conducting studies on internet access and usage (because we don't already have enough data collection) * Coordinating multistakeholder processes for cybersecurity and privacy policies (a euphemism for "industry-dominated roundtables") * Promoting collaboration between security researchers and service providers (because that's not already happening)

The bill also redesignates an existing position, the Associate Administrator for Policy Analysis and Development, to this new role. How convenient.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The usual suspects:

* The NTIA, which will now have a shiny new office with a fancy title * Telecommunications companies, who will likely benefit from the "market-based policies" and "industry-dominated roundtables" * Cybersecurity firms, which might see increased collaboration opportunities (and profits) * Consumers, who will be told they're getting better protection and innovation, but in reality, will just get more of the same old corporate-friendly regulations

**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill is a classic case of " regulatory capture" – where industry interests hijack the policymaking process to serve their own needs. The creation of this new office will likely lead to:

* More watered-down regulations that benefit corporations, not consumers * Increased data collection and surveillance under the guise of "cybersecurity" * Further consolidation of power within the NTIA, making it even more difficult for smaller players to compete

In short, HR 1766 is a Trojan horse for corporate interests, masquerading as a bill that promotes innovation and consumer protection. Don't be fooled – this is just another example of the revolving door between government and industry, where politicians and bureaucrats serve their true masters: the corporations that line their pockets.

Diagnosis: Terminal case of Regulatory Capture-itis, with symptoms including corporate-friendly regulations, data collection, and a complete disregard for consumer welfare. Prognosis: Poor, unless we can somehow manage to excise this tumor from our legislative system.

Related Topics

Cybersecurity & Data PrivacyResearch & Innovation Policy
Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (Dr. Haus personality)

💰 Campaign Finance Network

Rep. Obernolte, Jay [R-CA-23]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions
$99,800
21 donors
PACs
$0
Organizations
$38,700
Committees
$0
Individuals
$61,100

No PAC contributions found

1
AGUA CALIENTE BAND OF CAHUILLA INDIANS
2 transactions
$6,600
2
MORONGO BAND OF MISSION INDIANS
2 transactions
$6,600
3
SYCUAN BAND OF THE KUMEYAAY NATION
2 transactions
$6,600
4
SAN MANUEL BAND OF MISSION INDIANS
3 transactions
$6,300
5
SHINGLE SPRINGS BAND OF MIWOK INDIANS
2 transactions
$4,000
6
PECHANGA BAND OF LUISENO INDIANS
1 transaction
$3,300
7
SANTA YNEZ BAND OF MISSION INDIANS
1 transaction
$3,300
8
AK-CHIN INDIAN COMMUNITY
1 transaction
$2,000

No committee contributions found

1
CUSACK, LARRY A. MR.
2 transactions
$13,200
2
OSTERLOCH, RICK
2 transactions
$6,600
3
BERDAKIN, DANIEL MR.
2 transactions
$6,600
4
WILEY, LAWRENCE MR.
1 transaction
$5,000
5
DAYTON, SKY
1 transaction
$3,300
6
RAGHAVAN, PRABHAKAR
1 transaction
$3,300
7
REDDY, PREM DR. MD
1 transaction
$3,300
8
REDDY, VENKAMMA DR. MD
1 transaction
$3,300
9
ALTMAN, SAM
1 transaction
$3,300
10
ZAKOWSKI, JAN
1 transaction
$3,300
11
WALKER, KENT MR.
1 transaction
$3,300
12
BROWN, REGINALD MR.
1 transaction
$3,300
13
FARDAD, FARSHAD MR.
1 transaction
$3,300

Cosponsors & Their Campaign Finance

This bill has 1 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.

Rep. McClellan, Jennifer L. [D-VA-4]

ID: M001227

Top Contributors

26

1
BARONA BAND OF MISSION INDIANS
OrganizationLAKESIDE, CA
$1,500
May 24, 2023
2
BARONA BAND OF MISSION INDIANS
OrganizationLAKESIDE, CA
$1,500
May 24, 2023
3
CHEROKEE NATION
OrganizationTAHLEQUAH, OK
$1,000
Dec 21, 2023
4
CHEROKEE NATION
OrganizationTAHLEQUAH, OK
$1,000
Dec 21, 2023
5
STARLEY LLC
OrganizationNORTH CHESTERFIELD, VA
$250
Oct 13, 2024
6
STARLEY LLC
OrganizationNORTH CHESTERFIELD, VA
$250
Oct 13, 2024
7
RICE, NANCY
LITTLE DIFFICULT RUN • CONSULTANT
IndividualVIENNA, VA
$6,600
Sep 23, 2024
8
RICE, NANCY
LITTLE DIFFICULT RUN • CONSULTANT
IndividualVIENNA, VA
$6,600
Sep 23, 2024
9
ABRAMSON, RONALD D
BUCHANAN INGERSOLL & ROONEY • ATTORNEY
IndividualWASHINGTON, DC
$3,300
Nov 15, 2023
10
FRIED, BARBARA J.
FRIED COMPANIES INC. • REAL ESTATE DEVELOPMENT
IndividualCROZET, VA
$3,300
Dec 19, 2023

Donor Network - Rep. Obernolte, Jay [R-CA-23]

PACs
Organizations
Individuals
Politicians

Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.

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Showing 45 nodes and 66 connections

Total contributions: $66

Top Donors - Rep. Obernolte, Jay [R-CA-23]

Showing top 21 donors by contribution amount

8 Orgs13 Individuals

Industry Impact

Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 3 helped.

  • +Cybersecurityconfidence 0.95

    Section 2(a) creates an Office focused on cybersecurity policy, including duties to coordinate transparent multistakeholder processes for cybersecurity and privacy policies (subsection (c)(2)(C)), promote security and resilience of communications networks (subsection (c)(2)(F)), and evaluate cybersecurity matters pending before agencies (subsection (c)(2)(H)). This directly benefits cybersecurity firms through policy development and coordination.

  • +Telecommunicationsconfidence 0.90

    Section 2(a) establishes the Office of Policy Development and Cybersecurity within NTIA, with duties including developing market-based policies to promote innovation, competition, consumer access, and economic growth in communications, media, and technology markets (subsection (c)(2)(A)), and coordinating cybersecurity and privacy policies (subsection (c)(2)(C)). This benefits telecommunications industry by fostering policy environment supportive of innovation and security.

  • Section 2(a)(c)(2)(J) includes duty to develop policies to accelerate innovation and commercialization with respect to advances in technological understanding of communications technologies, which encompasses AI and cloud infrastructure as part of communications technology innovation.

Who funds the sponsor on these industries

For each industry this bill affects, here's what the sponsor (Rep. Obernolte, Jay [R-CA-23])received from donors associated with that industry during the 2022–present cycles. Donations are not proof of intent — they are a record of who funds the people writing the law.

Industries this bill HELPS

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.

Department of Commerce

Strong
Vector: 70%
Pages: 720-722AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill aligns strongly with Project 2025's focus on strengthening NTIA's leadership in telecommunications and information policy, enhancing cybersecurity capabilities, and promoting secure communications networks—key objectives outlined for NTIA in the policy document."

Key themes:NTIA leadershipcybersecurity coordinationsecure communicationspolicy developmentmarket-based innovation

— 687 — Department of Commerce that do not allow open access to their markets should not be setting the standards for markets that do allow open access. The incoming Administration should consider increased government-sponsored participation by private companies and government employees with relevant expertise. NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION SERVICE The independent National Telecommunications and Information Service (NTIS) is charged with ensuring that federally funded research and data are accessible to the public. NTIS operates through user fees but is largely obsolete due to modern usage of the internet by federal agencies and researchers. NTIS’s functions should be moved to NIST and consolidated with the Tech Transfer and ROI initiatives. NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION The National Telecommunications and Information Agency (NTIA) is the exec- utive branch’s statutory lead on telecommunications and information policy. It focuses on broadband access, spectrum utilization, and other issues that are crucial to the high-tech economy. For decades, NTIA has suffered from organizational malaise and will require strong and energetic leadership by political appointees to implement conservative policies. The next Administration will face the primary challenge of rapidly deploying 5G without compromising other priorities. Further recommendations include: l Support free speech and hold big tech accountable. Immediately conduct a thorough review of federal policy regarding free speech online and provide policy solutions to address big tech’s censorship of speech. l Utilize new tools to eliminate threats to national security. Fully implement the Trump Administration’s Information and Communications Technology and Services (ICTS) Executive Order authorities in a way that ensures long-term success and the legal viability of this new national security tool.9 l Expand utilization of federal spectrum. Begin short term, temporary leasing of government allocated spectrum to ensure optimum utilization while preserving federal agency use rights. l Support the commercial space industry. Advocate for licensing decisions at the Federal Communications Commission that continue to enable U.S. dominance in the commercial space industry.

Department of Commerce

Strong
Vector: 69%
Pages: 720-722AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill aligns strongly with Project 2025's emphasis on strengthening NTIA's leadership, enhancing cybersecurity capabilities, promoting market-based policies, and supporting secure communications infrastructure—all key priorities outlined for NTIA in the policy document."

Key themes:NTIA leadership and policy developmentcybersecurity and secure communicationsmarket-based innovation policiesstakeholder collaboration in tech policybroadband and spectrum utilization

— 687 — Department of Commerce that do not allow open access to their markets should not be setting the standards for markets that do allow open access. The incoming Administration should consider increased government-sponsored participation by private companies and government employees with relevant expertise. NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION SERVICE The independent National Telecommunications and Information Service (NTIS) is charged with ensuring that federally funded research and data are accessible to the public. NTIS operates through user fees but is largely obsolete due to modern usage of the internet by federal agencies and researchers. NTIS’s functions should be moved to NIST and consolidated with the Tech Transfer and ROI initiatives. NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION The National Telecommunications and Information Agency (NTIA) is the exec- utive branch’s statutory lead on telecommunications and information policy. It focuses on broadband access, spectrum utilization, and other issues that are crucial to the high-tech economy. For decades, NTIA has suffered from organizational malaise and will require strong and energetic leadership by political appointees to implement conservative policies. The next Administration will face the primary challenge of rapidly deploying 5G without compromising other priorities. Further recommendations include: l Support free speech and hold big tech accountable. Immediately conduct a thorough review of federal policy regarding free speech online and provide policy solutions to address big tech’s censorship of speech. l Utilize new tools to eliminate threats to national security. Fully implement the Trump Administration’s Information and Communications Technology and Services (ICTS) Executive Order authorities in a way that ensures long-term success and the legal viability of this new national security tool.9 l Expand utilization of federal spectrum. Begin short term, temporary leasing of government allocated spectrum to ensure optimum utilization while preserving federal agency use rights. l Support the commercial space industry. Advocate for licensing decisions at the Federal Communications Commission that continue to enable U.S. dominance in the commercial space industry. — 688 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise l Defend U.S. interests in international bodies. Strong representation at the International Telecommunication Union should protect the interests of both private and government users of spectrum. The U.S. has differing needs from many other countries, for instance, because of U.S. government satellites and commercial space industry. NTIA should work with the U.S. delegation to ensure maximum adoption of the U.S. position. l Set fresh priorities in broadband grant programs. Reevaluate broadband grant programs and, when possible, establish Administration priorities in how each grant is structured. First and foremost, widespread deployment of infrastructure is needed for 5G adoption in rural and exurban areas, which will be a key factor in future economic competitiveness for these under-served communities. l Review FirstNet. Evaluate the performance and long-term value proposition of FirstNet in view of modern technologies that will render it obsolete. CONCLUSION The above policies, strategies, and tactics will set a new Administration on firm footing that allows the Department of Commerce to assist the President in implementing a bold agenda that delivers economic prosperity and strong national security to the American people. While many of the department’s functions fall outside the remit of the federal government, its unique authorities in diverse areas provide critical tools that can and should be brought to bear in implementing a conservative governing philosophy that keeps Americans safe and provides oppor- tunity for all. AUTHOR’S NOTE: This chapter includes invaluable input from over a dozen alumni of the Department of Commerce and numerous other members of the 2025 Presidential Transition Project. All contributors to this chapter are listed at the front of this volume, but James Rockas, Nazak Nikakhtar, Louis Heinzer, Robert Burkett, Iain Murray, Michael Gonzalez, David Legates, and Kristen Eichamer deserve special recognition. The author alone assumes responsibility for the content of this chapter, and no views expressed herein should be attributed to any other individual.

Intelligence Community

Moderate
Vector: 65%
Pages: 251-253AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill focuses on enhancing NTIA's cybersecurity and policy coordination capabilities, which aligns with Project 2025's emphasis on strengthening counterintelligence efforts against cyber threats and protecting intellectual property from foreign adversaries, particularly in the private sector and academia."

Key themes:cybersecurityintellectual property protectionprivate sector collaborationsupply chain securitycounterintelligence

— 218 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise NATIONAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY CENTER (NCSC) The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) has taken a keen inter- est in possibly updating the codified language underpinning much of the nation’s counterintelligence apparatus. “Spy vs. spy” threats continue to exist, but the rise of China and (to an extent) Russia’s machinations move beyond the governmental sphere to technological, economic, supply chain, cyber, academic, state, and local espionage threats at a level our country has never seen. The asymmetric threat includes cyber, nontraditional collection, and issues involving legitimate busi- nesses serving as collection platforms. Barring statutory changes that could occur before 2025, a future conserva- tive President should further empower and resource the IC by executive order or through suggested changes in the Counterintelligence Enhancement Act (CEA) of 2002.32 NCSC was given some authority for outreach efforts on behalf of the IC for counterintelligence education, insider threats, and broader U.S. government best practices, but there remain significant deltas between Title 50 and non–Title 50 entities’ protections. Primary operational elements should remain at the FBI and CIA, with the Bureau and NCSC collaborating on nongovernmental outreach. While there is no need to create a separate agency, a future President and DNI should amplify NCSC’s authorities and roles with respect to counterintelligence strategy, policy, outreach, and governance, including supporting necessary Joint Duty Assignments (JDA) for FBI and CIA personnel. At the same time, the FBI requires significant additional resources and legal authorities to fulfill its statu- tory role as the lead operational counterintelligence agency in dealing with the ever-growing threats posed by our adversaries. The CEA should be updated to include foreign espionage efforts aimed at universities. Corporate America, technology companies, research institutions, and academia must be willing, educated partners in this generational fight to protect our national security interests, economic interests, national sovereignty, and intellectual prop- erty as well as the broader rules-based order—all while avoiding the tendency to cave to the left-wing activists and investors who ignore the China threat and increasingly dominate the corporate world. Reinstitution of the National Security Higher Education Advisory Board and the National Security Business Alliance Council should be prioritized with leadership from the NCSC, the FBI, or a com- bination of both entities. When the CCP steals at least $400 billion–$600 billion in intellectual prop- erty each year, it is time to devote some strategic thinking to exactly how and to what degree counterintelligence efforts can help to protect America’s commercial endeavors. If Chinese strategic technology gains are happening almost entirely in transnational commercial space, for example, and the private sector is also gath- ering and analyzing some critical intelligence, these essential data points should assist in national-level counterintelligence efforts. — 219 — Intelligence Community The NCSC was created in the aftermath of 9/11 as the Terrorist Threat Integra- tion Center (TTIC), which later became the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) pursuant to President George W. Bush’s Executive Order 13354.33 The NCTC was an organization of approximately three dozen detainees from across the U.S. government with a mandate to integrate counterterrorism intelligence and missions, including terrorist screening. Eventually: In November 2014 the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) established NCSC by combining [the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive] with the Center for Security Evaluation, the Special Security Center and the National Insider Threat Task Force, to effectively integrate and align counterintelligence and security mission areas under a single organizational construct. The Director of NCSC serves in support of the DNI’s role as Security Executive Agent (SecEA) to develop, implement, oversee and integrate personnel security initiatives throughout the U.S. Government.34 NCSC has added value in such areas as fusing cross-community intelligence for terrorism watchlisting purposes and improving information sharing while carrying roughly half of the overall cadre for the ODNI. An incoming Administration should focus NCTC on integrative tasks, many of which cannot be carried out elsewhere in the IC, but should not use personnel and resources for redundant analyses that duplicate the work of such other IC entities as the FBI and CIA. ADDITIONAL AREAS FOR REFORM Analytical Integrity. The “tradecraft” of intelligence analysis is mostly a col- lection of lessons learned over decades about what works and does not work in a profession whose high-stakes work is performed by thousands but that also bears little outside scrutiny and provides few metrics by which to gauge success or failure on a regular basis. These lessons have accumulated from: l The perceived misuse of intelligence by consumers as was the case with respect to war-related assessments in the Johnson and Bush Administrations; l Failures such as the failures to warn of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the specific threat of 9/11; l Successes in piecing together tactical and often technical puzzles such as estimates of Iranian nuclear program maturation; and l Strategic victories such as anticipating critical geopolitical developments that have been years in the making.

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About These Correlations

Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.

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