Stop Secret Spending Act of 2025

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Bill ID: 119/hr/2069
Last Updated: September 13, 2026

Sponsored by

Rep. Moore, Barry [R-AL-1]

ID: M001212

Follow the money

The bill

Stop Secret Spending Act of 2025

HR. 2069, 119th Congress — read as touching Private Equity & Hedge Funds.

The sponsor

Rep. Moore, Barry [R-AL-1]

Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.

The money

$62,136 raised

30 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.

The alignment

70% match to Project 2025

This bill's text tracks the "Department of the Treasury" section, p. 739-741 of the Mandate for Leadership.

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

Track this bill's progress through the legislative process

Latest Action

Signed by President.

September 10, 2026

Introduced

Committee Review

Floor Action

Passed House

Senate Review

Passed Congress

Presidential Action

📍 Current Status

Next: If the President signs the bill, it becomes law.

⚖️

Became Law

📚 How does a bill become a law?

1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.

2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

**HR 2069: Stop Secret Spending Act of 2025 – A Transparency Placebo for a Patient Who Refuses to Admit They’re Sick**

Let’s be clear: this bill doesn’t *stop* secret spending. It doesn’t even *slow* it. It merely forces the government to eventually admit, after years of bureaucratic foot-dragging, that it *might* have spent money on things it didn’t want you to know about—like a toddler finally confessing to eating the cookies *after* you’ve already found the crumbs in their pajamas.

HR 2069 amends the Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act of 2006 (FFATA) to drag “other transaction agreements” (OTAs) into the harsh light of USAspending.gov. OTAs are the government’s backdoor contracting mechanism—used by agencies like DARPA, DOE, and the intelligence community to bypass pesky rules like competition, oversight, and accountability. They’re favored for “innovative” projects, which is bureaucratese for “we don’t want Congress or the GAO poking around.”

So what does this bill actually do? It mandates that, within three years, OTAs must be automatically reported to USAspending.gov. Within one year, agencies must publish a report on *unreported* spending—including whether it was national security-related (read: classified), a grant to a legislative/judicial branch agency (read: more secrecy loopholes), or a subaward buried so deep it’s practically in the Earth’s mantle. There’s also a requirement for inspector general reports every two years for up to ten years—because apparently, we need a decade of oversight theater to confirm what we already suspect: the government hides money when it can.

**Funding? Budget allocations?** Ha. This bill appropriates exactly $0. It’s a pure policy rider disguised as an appropriations vehicle—because why fund oversight when you can just *mandate* it and hope someone else pays for the compliance? The fiscal impact is negligible—unless you count the millions agencies will waste on consultants, IT upgrades, and lawyers to delay, obfuscate, and technically comply while changing nothing substantive.

**Notable increases/decreases?** None. This isn’t a spending bill—it’s a transparency placebo. It treats the symptom (secret spending) with a bandaid made of press releases and delayed deadlines, while ignoring the disease: a contracting system designed to evade accountability, fueled by classified budgets, black programs, and the bipartisan belief that if you don’t see it, it didn’t happen.

**Riders?** The bill itself *is* the rider—tacked onto the FFATA corpse like a poorly forged signature on a consent form. It doesn’t fund a single program, but it does force agencies to eventually admit they’ve been spending money in the shadows—assuming they don’t reclassify OTAs as “cooperative research initiatives” or move them to a new, even darker corner of the budget by the time the three-year deadline rolls around.

**Diagnosis:** This bill is legislative methadone for a transparency addict. It gives the appearance of reform while doing nothing to curb the underlying compulsion to spend in secret. It’s not about stopping secret spending—it’s about managing the optics of it. The real illness? A government that trusts itself more than it trusts the public—and a Congress that prefers the illusion of oversight to the inconvenience of actual accountability. Pass the placebo. The patient’s not getting better, but at least now we can pretend we’re trying.

Related Topics

Federal Budget & AppropriationsGovernment Operations & Accountability
Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (Dr. Haus personality)

💰 Campaign Finance Network

Rep. Moore, Barry [R-AL-1]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions
$62,136
18 donors
PACs
$0
Organizations
$42,236
Committees
$0
Individuals
$19,900

No PAC contributions found

1
WINRED TECHNICAL SERVICES
12 transactions
$15,686
2
WATSON GLASS
2 transactions
$6,600
3
ENTERPRISE TARPAULIN PRODUCTS, INC.
1 transaction
$3,300
4
NORTH MONTGOMERY MATERIALS LLC
1 transaction
$3,300
5
PROFESSIONAL MEDICAL ASSOCIATES, P.C.
1 transaction
$3,300
6
SOUTHLAND STRUCTURAL LLC
1 transaction
$3,300
7
ARGUTA RESOURCES, LLC
1 transaction
$2,500
8
DOBBS EYE CLINIC, P.A.
1 transaction
$1,000
9
TRIPLE T FARMS
1 transaction
$1,000
10
PATRICK COLLINS, LLC
1 transaction
$1,000
11
DELONEY BROTHERS, L.L.C.
1 transaction
$500
12
FILLINGIM FARMS INC.
1 transaction
$500
13
STOKES HOMPLACE TRUST
1 transaction
$250

No committee contributions found

1
GUESS, CHRIS
1 transaction
$5,000
2
TRICK, W.F.
1 transaction
$5,000
3
ALMODOVAR, ANGEL
1 transaction
$3,300
4
CHEN, DEREK
1 transaction
$3,300
5
CORTELYOU, ALYCIA
1 transaction
$3,300

Cosponsors & Their Campaign Finance

This bill has 3 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.

Rep. Panetta, Jimmy [D-CA-19]

ID: P000613

Top Contributors

28

1
ACROSS THE AISLE PAC
PACWASHINGTON, DC
$1,000
Jan 12, 2023
2
ACROSS THE AISLE PAC
PACWASHINGTON, DC
$500
Mar 23, 2023
3
FEDERATED INDIANS OF GRATON RANCHERIA
OrganizationROHNERT PARK, CA
$3,300
Apr 12, 2023
4
FEDERATED INDIANS OF GRATON RANCHERIA
OrganizationROHNERT PARK, CA
$3,300
Apr 12, 2023
5
MORONGO BAND OF MISSION INDIANS
OrganizationBANNING, CA
$3,300
Apr 12, 2023
6
EASTERN BAND OF CHEROKEE INDIANS
OrganizationCHEROKEE, NC
$3,300
Oct 16, 2024
7
SYCUAN BAND OF THE KUMEYAAY NATION
OrganizationEL CAJON, CA
$2,500
Nov 9, 2023
8
MORONGO BAND OF MISSION INDIANS
OrganizationBANNING, CA
$1,700
Apr 12, 2023
9
CROWN, LESTER
NOT EMPLOYED • NOT EMPLOYED
IndividualCHICAGO, IL
$6,600
Aug 9, 2024
10
KIM, SOON
IndividualSANTA CRUZ, CA
$4,300
Sep 30, 2024

Rep. Goodlander, Maggie [D-NH-2]

ID: G000604

Top Contributors

20

1
MCLAUGHLIN, JANE
NOT EMPLOYED • NOT EMPLOYED
IndividualLYME, NH
$4,500
Aug 24, 2024
2
FLORY, ROBERT H. JR
FLORY INVESTMENTS, INC. • PRESIDENT
IndividualDAMARISCOTTA, ME
$4,100
Sep 30, 2024
3
FLORY, ROBERT H. JR
FLORY INVESTMENTS, INC. • PRESIDENT
IndividualDAMARISCOTTA, ME
$4,100
Sep 30, 2024
4
KRAUSZ, STEVEN
US VENTURE PARTNERS • VENTURE CAPITAL
IndividualPORTOLA VALLEY, CA
$3,300
Oct 23, 2024
5
HIRSHBERG, GARY
STONYFIELD FARM INC. • SENIOR ADVISOR
IndividualCONCORD, NH
$3,300
Oct 22, 2024
6
DRAKE, LAWRENCE C JR
NOT EMPLOYED • NOT EMPLOYED
IndividualPORTSMOUTH, NH
$3,300
Oct 19, 2024
7
CUTLER, DOULGAS
CUTLER MANAGEMENT CORP • MANAGEMENT
IndividualDANIA, FL
$3,300
Oct 17, 2024
8
JAMES, AMABEL
NOT EMPLOYED • NOT EMPLOYED
IndividualNEW YORK, NY
$3,300
Oct 24, 2024
9
NUNNELLY, MARK
NOT EMPLOYED • NOT EMPLOYED
IndividualDOVER, MA
$3,300
Oct 21, 2024
10
ROBY, DAVID M.
NOT EMPLOYED • NOT EMPLOYED
IndividualLYME, NH
$3,300
Oct 28, 2024

Rep. Hageman, Harriet M. [R-WY-At Large]

ID: H001096

Top Contributors

70

1
COW CREEK BAND OF UMPQUA TRIBE OF INDIANS
OrganizationROSEBURG, OR
$5,000
Aug 6, 2024
2
PUYALLUP TRIBE OF INDIANS
OrganizationTACOMA, WA
$3,700
Mar 4, 2024
3
CHEROKEE NATION
OrganizationTAHLEQUAH, OK
$3,300
Dec 22, 2023
4
PECHANGA BAND OF INDIANS
OrganizationTEMECULA, CA
$3,300
Dec 22, 2023
5
SHAKOPEE MDEWAKANTON SIOUX COMMUNITY
OrganizationPRIOR LAKE, MN
$3,300
Nov 6, 2023
6
SHINGLE SPRINGS BAND MIWOK INDIANS
OrganizationSHINGLE SPRINGS, CA
$3,300
Dec 22, 2023
7
MORONGO BAND OF MISSION INDIANS
OrganizationBANNING, CA
$3,300
Mar 29, 2024
8
HPUL PROJECT OPERATIONS
OrganizationUPPER LAKE, CA
$3,300
Sep 6, 2024
9
MUCKLESHOOT INDIAN TRIBE
OrganizationAUBURN, WA
$3,300
Sep 6, 2024
10
AK-CHIN INDIAN COMMUNITY OPERATIONS ACCOUNT
OrganizationMARICOPA, AZ
$3,300
Sep 13, 2024

Donor Network - Rep. Moore, Barry [R-AL-1]

PACs
Organizations
Individuals
Politicians

Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.

Loading...

Showing 21 nodes and 32 connections

Total contributions: $32

Top Donors - Rep. Moore, Barry [R-AL-1]

Showing top 18 donors by contribution amount

13 Orgs5 Individuals

Industry Impact

Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 3 harmed.

  • Section 2(a) and (d) imply increased transparency requirements for other transaction agreements, which may affect private equity firms involved in such agreements

  • −Defense Contractorsconfidence 0.70

    Section 2(d)(2) mentions relevant agencies that have the authority to enter into other transaction agreements, which could include defense contractors, implying increased reporting requirements

  • −Cybersecurityconfidence 0.60

    Section 3(b)(1)(A) and (c) discuss data quality and verification, potentially affecting cybersecurity firms that handle sensitive information

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.

Department of the Treasury

Moderate
Vector: 62%
Pages: 739-741AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"Both the bill and the Project 2025 Treasury section emphasize increasing transparency and accountability through mandatory reporting, though the bill targets federal spending data while Project 2025 focuses on anti‑money laundering, beneficial ownership, and GSE reforms."

Key themes:transparencyreporting requirementsaccountabilityfinancial oversight

— 706 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise liquidation authority (OLA), the law’s alternative to bankruptcy for large financial firms. OLA was based on the faulty premise that large financial institutions cannot fail in a judicial bankruptcy proceeding without causing a financial crisis. It gives such companies access to subsidized funding and creates incentives for manage- ment to overleverage and expand high-risk investments.55 Congress should repeal each of these provisions to guard against bailouts and too-big-to-fail problems.56 Treasury plays a role in funding the conservatorships of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. It should work to end the conservatorships and move toward privatization of these massive housing finance agencies. This would restore a sustainable housing finance market with a robust private mortgage market that does not rely on explicit or implicit taxpayer guarantees. Direct government ownership has worsened the risks that government-spon- sored enterprises (GSEs) pose to the mortgage market, and stock sales and other reforms should be pursued. Treasury should take the lead in the next President’s legislative vision guided by the following principles: l Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (both GSEs) must he wound down in an orderly manner. l The Common Securitization Platform57 should be privatized and broadly available. l Barriers to private investment must be removed to pave the way for a robust private market. l The missions of the Federal Housing Administration and the Government National Mortgage Association (“Ginnie Mae“) must he right-sized to serve a defined mission. ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING AND BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP REPORTING REFORM The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network is a relatively small bureau within the Treasury Department with approximately 285 employees and a FY 2022 budget of $173 million.58 Although FinCEN makes a significant contribution to law enforce- ment efforts, it also does demonstrable, substantial and widespread economic harm because it: (1) is largely oblivious to those adverse economic effects; (2) conducts almost no meaningful cost-benefit analysis or retrospective review of regulations; (3) has been subject to extraordinarily lax oversight by both Congress and the Trea- sury Department; and (4) demands total transparency by those it regulates but is itself disturbingly and purposefully opaque. For example, FinCEN no longer issues an annual report59 and no longer publishes cash transaction report (CTR) data. — 707 — Department of the Treasury There were 2 .7 million suspicious activity reports (SARs) filed in 2021.60 The number of CTRs filed were approximately 10 times that number.61 In 2014, FinCEN anti-money laundering/countering the financing of terrorism (AML-CFT) rules cost an estimated $5 billion to $8 billion per year.62 Undoubtedly, this cost is now substantially higher both because of inflation and because the rules have become more onerous.63 Yet there is little evidence that this massive expenditure of resources is doing much good,64 and there is no evidence regarding which aspects of the AML-CFT regime are effective and which are not. The AML-CFT regime is a major contributing factor causing the decline in the number of small broker-deal- ers and the decline in the competitiveness of community banks. Congress must require FinCEN to annually publish data regarding: l The number of SARs filed; l The number of CTRs filed;65 l The number of AML-CFT prosecutions, disaggregating those in which the AML-CFT prosecution is stand-alone and in which the prosecution is an add-on count connected to other predicate crime;66 l The number of AML-CFT convictions (similarly disaggregated); l The number and aggregate amount of AML-CFT fines imposed and the type of institution upon which the fine was imposed; and l Annual estimates of the aggregate costs imposed on private entities by the AML-CFT regime.67 Without this data, it is impossible for policymakers to make an informed judg- ment about the effectiveness of the AML-CFT regime. Congress should also require both FinCEN and the Government Accountability Office to undertake separate evaluations regarding which aspects of the AML-CFT regime are effective and which are not. FinCEN should be required to undertake a thorough retrospec- tive review of its regulations and various statutory requirements and report to Congress on its findings in a publicly available report. Anecdotes and assurances from FinCEN staff that all is well—but that even more onerous requirements are needed—are not enough. Congress should repeal the Corporate Transparency Act, and FinCEN should withdraw its poorly written and overbroad beneficial ownership reporting rule. Both are targeted at the smallest businesses in the U.S. (those with 20 or fewer employees) and will do nothing material to impede criminal finance.68 The FinCEN

Department of Energy and Related Commissions

Weak
Vector: 63%
Pages: 443-445AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill focuses on transparency in federal spending reporting, particularly for other transaction agreements, while the Project 2025 policy section centers on Department of Energy initiatives, grid security, nuclear energy, and fossil energy programs. There is no direct thematic overlap, though both involve federal accountability and spending oversight in a broad sense."

Key themes:federal spending oversightgovernment accountabilityDepartment of Energy

— 411 — Department of Energy and Related Commissions 19. President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13920, “Securing the United States Bulk-Power System,” May 1, 2020, in Federal Register, Vol. 85, No. 86 (May 4, 2020), pp. 26595–26599, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/ pkg/FR-2020-05-04/pdf/2020-09695.pdf (accessed February 13, 2023). 20. 18 U.S. Code § 824a(c), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/16/824a (accessed February 27, 2023). 21. Report No. 117-98, Energy and Water Development and Related Agencies Appropriations Bill, 2022, Committee on Appropriations, U.S. House of Representatives, 117th Cong. 1st Sess., July 20, 2021, p. 6, https:// www.congress.gov/117/crpt/hrpt98/CRPT-117hrpt98.pdf (accessed February 13, 2023). 22. H.R. 3684, Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, Public Law No. 11-58, 117th Congress, November 15, 2021, Division J, Title III. 23. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2023 Congressional Budget Request, Budget in Brief, p. 7. 24. Timothy Gardner, “White House Asks Congress for $500 mln to Modernize Oil Reserve,” Reuters, November 16, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/article/usa-oil-spr-idAFL1N32C36I (accessed February 13, 2023). 25. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Electricity, “Our History,” https://www.energy.gov/oe/about-us/our- history (accessed February 13, 2023). 26. Press release, “Secretary of Energy Signs Order to Mitigate Security Risks to the Nation’s Electric Grid,” U.S. Department of Energy, December 17, 2021, https://www.energy.gov/articles/secretary-energy-signs-order- mitigate-security-risks-nations-electric-grid (accessed February 13, 2023). 27. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Electricity, “Revocation of Prohibition Order Securing Critical Defense Facilities,” Federal Register, Vol. 86, No. 76 (April 22, 2021), pp. 21308–21309, https://www.govinfo.gov/ content/pkg/FR-2021-04-22/pdf/2021-08483.pdf (accessed February 13, 2023). 28. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2023 Congressional Budget Request, Budget in Brief, pp. 19 and 61. 29. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Nuclear Energy, “About Us,” https://www.energy.gov/ne/about-us (accessed February 13, 2023). 30. H.R. 3809, Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, Public Law No. 97-425, 97th Congress, January 7, 1983, https:// www.congress.gov/97/statute/STATUTE-96/STATUTE-96-Pg2201.pdf (accessed February 24, 2023). 31. The Heritage Foundation, “Budget Blueprint for Fiscal Year 2023: Reduce the DOE Office of Nuclear Energy,” https://www.heritage.org/budget/pages/recommendations/1.270.127.html. 32. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2023 Congressional Budget Request, Budget in Brief, pp. 23 and 58. 33. 42 USC § 16291, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/16291 (accessed February 27, 2023). 34. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Fossil Energy and Carbon Management, “About Us: Mission,” https:// www.energy.gov/fecm/mission (accessed February 13, 2023). 35. U.S. Government Accountability Office, Carbon Capture and Storage: Actions Needed to Improve DOE Management of Demonstration Projects, GAO-22-105111, December2021, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-22- 105111.pdf (accessed February 13, 2023). 36. International Energy Agency, The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions, World Energy Outlook Special Report, revised March 2022, https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/ffd2a83b-8c30-4e9d-980a- 52b6d9a86fdc/TheRoleofCriticalMineralsinCleanEnergyTransitions.pdf (accessed February 13, 2023). 37. See 42 U.S. Code § 16291. 38. 42 U.S. Code Ch. 55, §§ 4321–4347, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/chapter-55 (accessed February 27, 2023). 39. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “Categorical Exclusions from Environmental Review,” Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking; Request for Comment, Federal Register, Vol. 86, No. 87 (May 7, 2021), pp. 24514–24516, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2021-05-07/pdf/2021-09675.pdf (accessed February 27, 2023), and Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “Categorical Exclusions from Environmental Review,” Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking; Reopening of Comment Period, Federal Register, Vol. 86, No. 160 (August 23, 2021), pp. 47032–47033, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2021-08-23/pdf/2021-18058.pdf (accessed February 27, 2023). 40. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2023 Congressional Budget Request, Budget in Brief, pp. 19, 21, 23, and 52. — 412 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise 41. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2023 Congressional Budget Request, Budget in Brief, pp. 3, 6, 12, 19, 21, and 23. 42. S. 622, Energy Policy and Conservation Act, Public Law 94-163, 94th Congress, December 22, 1975, https:// www.congress.gov/94/statute/STATUTE-89/STATUTE-89-Pg871.pdf (accessed February 27, 2023). 43. H.R. 6, Energy Policy Act of 2005, Public Law No. 109-58, 109th Congress, August 8, 2005, https://www. congress.gov/109/plaws/publ58/PLAW-109publ58.pdf (accessed February 27, 2023). 44. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy, “About the Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy,” https://www.energy.gov/eere/about-office-energy-efficiency-and- renewable-energy (accessed February 28, 2023). 45. Ibid. 46. See note 41, supra. 47. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2023 Congressional Budget Request, Budget in Brief, pp. 19, 23, 43, and 49. 48. See U.S. Department of Energy, Grid Deployment Office, “About Us,” https://www.energy.gov/gdo/about-us (accessed February 13, 2023). 49. U.S. Department of Energy, Grid Deployment Office, “Building a Better Grid Initiative,” https://www.energy. gov/gdo/building-better-grid-initiative (accessed February 13, 2023). 50. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2023 Congressional Budget Request, Budget in Brief, pp. 2, 19, 21, 23, and 84. “The FY 2023 Budget Request to Congress proposes to split the Electricity appropriation account into two accounts: Electricity and Grid Deployment Office (GDO). Had the proposed FY 2023 structure been in place in FY 2021 and FY 2022, the $7,000,000 shown under the Electricity account’s Transmission Permitting and Technical Assistance (TPTA) program would have appeared under Grid Technical Assistance in GDO and the $3,000,000 shown under Program Direction in the Electricity account represents the estimated share of Electricity PD funding associated with TPTA and would have appeared under Program Direction in GDO.” Ibid., p. 84, note. 51. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Clean Energy Demonstrations, “About Us: Our Mission,” https://www. energy.gov/oced/about-us (accessed February 13, 2023). 52. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2023 Congressional Budget Request, Budget in Brief, p. 6. 53. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Clean Energy Demonstrations, “About Us: Our Story,” https://www. energy.gov/oced/about-us (accessed February 28, 2023). 54. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Clean Energy Demonstrations, “OCED Project Portfolio,” https://www. energy.gov/oced/office-clean-energy-demonstrations (accessed February 28, 2023). 55. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2023 Congressional Budget Request, Volume 3, Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response, Federal Energy Management Program, Grid Deployment Office, Indian Energy Policy & Programs, Loan Programs, Manufacturing & Energy Supply Chains, Office of Clean Energy Demonstrations, Petroleum Reserves, Power Marketing Administrations, State and Community Energy Programs, April 2022, p. 104, https://www.energy. gov/sites/default/files/2022-09/doe-fy2023-budget-volume-3-v2.pdf (accessed February 13, 2023). 56. See, for example, ibid., pp. 104 and 107. 57. U.S. Department of Energy, Loan Program Office, “LPO Year in Review 2022: New Legislation,” January 5, 2023, https://www.energy.gov/lpo/articles/lpo-year-review-2022 (accessed February 28, 2023). Emphases in original. 58. H.R. 6256, To Ensure That Goods Made with Forced Labor in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of the People’s Republic of China Do Not Enter the United States Market, and for Other Purposes, Public Law No. 117-78, 117th Congress, December 23, 2021, https://www.congress.gov/117/plaws/publ78/PLAW-117publ78.pdf (accessed February 28, 2023). 59. H.R. 2272, America COMPETES Act, Public Law 110–69, 110th Congress, August 9, 2007, § 5012, https://www. congress.gov/110/plaws/publ69/PLAW-110publ69.pdf (accessed February 13, 2023). 60. Ibid., § 5012(c)(1). 61. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2023 Congressional Budget Request, Budget in Brief, March 2022, p. 103.

Environmental Protection Agency

Weak
Vector: 62%
Pages: 470-472AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"Both the bill and the Project 2025 EPA section emphasize transparency and accountability in government operations, but the bill addresses broad federal spending reporting while the EPA policy focuses on specific agency reforms, advisory bodies, and science activities, resulting only tangential overlap."

Key themes:transparencyaccountabilitygovernment oversightspending reporting

— 437 — Environmental Protection Agency l Suspend and review the activities of EPA advisory bodies, many of which have not been authorized by Congress or lack independence, balance, and geographic and viewpoint diversity. l Retract delegations for key science and risk-assessment decisions from Assistant Administrators, regional offices, and career officials. l Eliminate the use of Title 42 hiring authority that allows ORD to spend millions in taxpayer dollars for salaries of certain employees above the civil service scale. l Announce plans to streamline and reform EPA’s poorly coordinated and managed laboratory structure. Budget: Back-to-Basics Rejection of Unauthorized or Expired Science Activities A top priority should be the immediate and consistent rejection of all EPA ORD and science activities that have not been authorized by Congress. In FY 2022, according to EPA’s opaque budgeting efforts, science and technology activ- ities totaled nearly $730 million. EPA’s FY 2023 budget request for the Office of Research and Development seeks funds for more than 1,850 employees—a dramatic increase for what is already the largest EPA office with well above 10 percent of the agency’s workforce.44 ORD conducts a wide-ranging series of science and peer review activities, some in support of regulatory programs established by our envi- ronmental laws, but often lacks authority for these specific endeavors. Several ORD offices and programs, many of which constitute unaccountable efforts to use scientific determinations to drive regulatory, enforcement, and legal decisions, should be eliminated. The Integrated Risk Information System, for example, was ostensibly designed by EPA to evaluate hazard and dose-response for certain chemicals. Despite operating since the 1980s, the program has never been authorized by Congress and often sets “safe levels” based on questionable science and below background levels, resulting in billions in economic costs. The program has been criticized by a wide variety of stakeholders: states; Congress; the National Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine (NASEM); and the U.S. Govern- ment Accountability Office (GAO), among others. EPA has failed to implement meaningful reforms, and this unaccountable program threatens key regulatory processes as well as the integrity of Clean Air Act and TSCA implementation. Needed EPA Advisory Body Reforms EPA currently operates 21 federal advisory committees.45 These committees often play an outsized role in determining agency scientific and regulatory policy, — 438 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise and their membership has too often been handpicked to achieve certain politi- cal positions. In the Biden Administration, key EPA advisory committees were purged of balanced perspectives, geographic diversity, important regulatory and private-sector experience, and state, local, and tribal expertise. Contrary to con- gressional directives and recommendations from the GAO and intergovernmental associations, these moves eviscerated historic levels of participation on key com- mittees by state, local, and tribal members from 2017 to 2020. As a result, a variety of EPA regulations lack relevant scientific perspectives, increasing the risks of economic fallout and a failure of cooperative federalism. EPA also has repeatedly disregarded legal requirements regarding the role of these advisory committees and the scope of scientific advice on key regulations.46 Needed Science Policy Reforms Instead of allowing these efforts to be misused for scaremongering risk com- munications and enforcement activities, EPA should embrace so-called citizen science and deputize the public to subject the agency’s science to greater scrutiny, especially in areas of data analysis, identification of scientific flaws, and research misconduct. In addition, EPA should: l Shift responsibility for evaluating misconduct away from its Office of Scientific Integrity, which has been overseen by environmental activists, and toward an independent body. l Work (including with Congress) to provide incentives similar to those under the False Claims Act47 for the public to identify scientific flaws and research misconduct, thereby saving taxpayers from having to bear the costs involved in expending unnecessary resources. l Avoid proprietary, black box models for key regulations. Nearly all major EPA regulations are based on nontransparent models for which the public lacks access or for which significant costs prevent the public from understanding agency analysis. l Reject precautionary default models and uncertainty factors. In the face of uncertainty around associations between certain pollutants and health or welfare endpoints, EPA’s heavy reliance on default assumptions like its low-dose, linear non-threshold model bake orders of magnitude of risk into key regulatory inputs and drive flawed and opaque decisions. Given the disproportionate economic impacts of top-down solutions, EPA should implement an approach that defaults to less restrictive regulatory outcomes.

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