The bill
National Strategy for School Security Act of 2025
HR. 2259, 119th Congress — read as touching Law Enforcement & Surveillance Tech.
Sponsored by
Rep. Gonzales, Tony [R-TX-23]
ID: G000594
Follow the money
The bill
HR. 2259, 119th Congress — read as touching Law Enforcement & Surveillance Tech.
The sponsor
Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.
The money
29 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.
The alignment
This bill's text tracks the "Department of Homeland Security" section, p. 168-170 of the Mandate for Leadership.
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Received in the Senate and Read twice and referred to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs.
November 19, 2025
📍 Current Status
Next: Both chambers must agree on the same version of the bill.
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Another "solution" to a problem that's been festering for decades, courtesy of the esteemed members of Congress. The National Strategy for School Security Act of 2025 is a masterclass in bureaucratic doublespeak and empty promises.
**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The bill's primary objective is to create a national strategy to secure elementary and secondary schools from acts of terrorism. Because, you know, that's exactly what we need – another layer of bureaucracy to "coordinate" efforts and "streamline" existing programs. The real purpose? To make it seem like Congress is doing something about the perpetual problem of school violence.
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill amends the Homeland Security Act of 2002, adding a new section that requires the Secretary of Homeland Security to develop and submit a national school security strategy within one year. This strategy must account for all federal programs related to securing schools from terrorism, identify vulnerabilities, and outline goals for closing those gaps. Oh, and it has to be updated annually until 2033. Because five-year plans are so last century.
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The usual suspects: the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Education, various federal agencies, and – of course – the schools themselves. But let's not forget the real stakeholders: the politicians who get to tout this bill as a "solution" during their re-election campaigns.
**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill is a classic case of treating the symptoms rather than the disease. It's a Band-Aid on a bullet wound, a PR stunt masquerading as meaningful action. The real impact will be minimal, but it'll provide plenty of opportunities for politicians to grandstand and claim they're "doing something" about school violence.
In reality, this bill is likely to:
* Create more bureaucratic red tape * Waste taxpayer dollars on redundant programs and initiatives * Fail to address the root causes of school violence (hint: it's not just terrorism) * Provide a false sense of security for parents and students
But hey, at least Congress can say they "tried." Now, if you'll excuse me, I have better things to do than watch this farce unfold.
Rep. Gonzales, Tony [R-TX-23]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
No PAC contributions found
No committee contributions found
This bill has 9 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.
ID: G000583
Top Contributors
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ID: L000599
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ID: M001217
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ID: E000300
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ID: D000230
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ID: B001298
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ID: P000048
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ID: V000138
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Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Showing 81 nodes and 44 connections (70 secondary connections hidden)
Total contributions: $240,149
Showing top 25 donors by contribution amount
Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 1 helped.
Section 2(a) requires the Secretary of Homeland Security to develop a national school security strategy, which will likely involve surveillance technology, threat assessments, and coordination with law enforcement agencies, benefiting firms in law enforcement and surveillance tech.
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.
AI Analysis:
"The bill focuses on school security strategy development, which aligns broadly with DHS's mission to protect against terrorism, but does not directly address the specific Project 2025 DHS priorities such as political personnel expansion, leadership succession, grant compliance, or office restructuring."
— 136 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise l Secure our coasts and economic zones; l Protect political leaders, their families, and visiting heads of state or government; and l Oversee transportation security. OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY (SEC) In the next Administration, the Office of the Secretary should take on the fol- lowing key issues and challenges to ensure the effective operation of DHS. Expansion of Dedicated Political Personnel. The Secretary of Homeland Security is a presidentially appointed and Senate-confirmed political appointee, but for budgetary reasons, he or she has historically been unable to fund a dedi- cated team of political appointees. A key first step for the Secretary to improve front-office functions is to have his or her own dedicated team of political appoin- tees selected and vetted by the Office of Presidential Personnel, which is not reliant on detailees from other parts of the department, to help ensure the completion of the next President’s agenda. An Aggressive Approach to Senate-Confirmed Leadership Positions. While Senate confirmation is a constitutionally necessary requirement for appointing agency leadership, the next Administration may need to take a novel approach to the confirmations process to ensure an adequate and rapid transition. For example, the next Administration arguably should place its nominees for key positions into similar positions as “actings” (for example, putting in a person to serve as the Senior Official Performing the Duties of the Commissioner of CBP while that person is going through the confirmation process to direct ICE or become the Secretary). This approach would both guarantee implementation of the Day One agenda and equip the department for potential emergency situations while still honoring the confirmation requirement. The department should also look to remove lower-level but nevertheless important positions that currently require Senate confirmation from the confirmation requirement, although this effort would require legislation (and might also be mooted in the event of legisla- tion that closes portions of the department that currently have Senate-confirmed leadership). Clearer, More Durable, and Political-Only Line of Succession. Based on previous experience, the department needs legislation to establish a more durable but politically oriented line of succession for agency decision-making purposes. The ideal sequence for line of succession is certainly debatable, except that in cir- cumstances where a career employee holds a leadership position in the department, that position should be deemed vacant for line-of-succession purposes and the next eligible political appointee in the sequence should assume acting authority. Further, — 137 — Department of Homeland Security individuals wielding acting Secretary authority should have explicit authority to finalize agency actions, including regulations, to ensure that the department’s homeland security mission is fulfilled. Soft Closure of Unnecessary Offices. Pending a possible presidential deci- sion to shrink or eliminate DHS itself, the next Administration will still have the obligation to protect the homeland as required by law. The Secretary therefore can and should use his or her inherent, discretionary leadership authority to “soft close” ineffective and problematic corners of the department. While those corners are to be determined, the Secretary could shift personnel, funding, and opera- tional responsibility to mission-essential components of the department, including the Office of the Secretary itself. This effort not only would make the department more efficient, but also would support a legislative move to shrink or dismantle the department by showing that the agency can fulfill national security–critical functions without its current bloated bureaucracy. Restructuring and Redistribution of Career Personnel. To strengthen political decision-making and ensure that taxpayer dollars are being used legally and efficiently, the Secretary should make major changes in the distribution of career personnel throughout the department. For example, personnel from parts of the department undergoing soft closure could be redistributed to what will be workload-intensive corners of the department, including national security–critical and transparency functions. All personnel with law enforcement capacity should be removed immediately from office billets and deployed to field billets to maxi- mize law enforcement capacity. Compliance for Grants and Other Federal Funding. The next Adminis- tration should take steps to restore lawfulness and integrity to the department’s massive regimen of federal grant programs, most of which are managed and dis- tributed by the Federal Emergency Management Agency. The Secretary should direct FEMA to ensure that all FEMA-issued grant funding for states, localities, and private organizations is going to recipients who are lawful actors, can demon- strate that they are in compliance with federal law, and can show that their mission and actions support the broader homeland security mission. All applicants and potential recipients of such grant funding should be required to meet certain pre- conditions for eligibility (except for receipt of post-disaster or nonhumanitarian funding) or should simply be considered ineligible for funding. Such preconditions should include at least the following: l Certification by applicants that they comply with all aspects of federal immigration laws, including the honoring of all immigration detainers. l Certification by applicants that they are both registered with E-Verify and using E-Verify in a transparent and nonevasive manner. For states
AI Analysis:
"The bill focuses on school security against terrorism, while the Project 2025 policy emphasizes school safety reports, budget cuts, and ideological reviews—there is minimal thematic overlap beyond a general concern for school environments."
— 359 — Department of Education l The reissuing of the report on school safety from 2018 with updated information, l The release of a report to Congress on how to consolidate the department and trim nonessential employees, l A report on the negative influence of action civics on students’ understanding of history and civics and their disposition toward the United States, l An update of the Coleman report to show the impact of family structure on student achievement, l A full accounting of CARES Act education expenditures, and l A report on how many dollars make their way to the classroom in every federal education grant and program. Pursue Antitrust Against Accreditors l The President should issue an executive order pursuing antitrust against college accreditors, especially the American Bar Association (ABA). NEW POLICIES/REGULATIONS THAT REQUIRE COORDINATION WITH OTHER AGENCIES AND/OR THE WHITE HOUSE The department must coordinate any rulemaking with the White House, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), DOJ, and other agencies that share responsibility with the department in the administration or enforcement of stat- ute, such as Titles VI and IX. Moreover, regarding regulations arising under civil rights laws administered by the department, Executive Order 12550 requires the Attorney General to approve final regulations; the Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights must approve notices of proposed rulemaking. Organizational Issues Historical Budget Information. Congressional appropriations for the U.S. Department of Education have risen from $14 billion in 1980 to $95.5 billion in 2021, an astounding increase, especially in light of the lack of improvements in student outcomes. Recommend Budget Cuts, Shifts, and Augmentations, If Any. Transferring most of the programs at the U.S. Department of Education to other agencies and eliminating duplicative and ineffective programs would yield significant taxpayer — 360 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise CHART 4 U.S. Department of Education, Total Appropriations IN BILLIONS OF DOLLARS $120 $100 $95.5 $80 $60 $40 $20 $14 $0 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 NOTE: Totals include mandatory and discretionary appropriations. SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, “Budget History Tables,” Education Department Budget History Table, https://www2.ed.gov/about/overview/budget/history/index.html (accessed March 17, 2023). A heritage.org savings. The proposal would immediately save more than $17 billion annually in various programs. Savings over a decade would be far more robust, as the revenue responsibility for many formula grant programs would be returned to the states. Some highlights include: l Eliminate competitive grant programs and reduce spending on formula grant programs. Competitive grant programs operated by the Department of Education should be eliminated, and federal spending should be reduced to reflect remaining formula grant programs authorized under Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) and the handful of other programs that do not fall under the competitive/ project grant category. Remaining programs managed by the Department
AI Analysis:
"The bill focuses on domestic school security against terrorism, while the Project 2025 policy emphasizes nuclear deterrence, modernization, and countering hostile state actors abroad—resulting in only tangential thematic overlap related to counterterrorism."
— 123 — Department of Defense 3. Employ a “name and shame” approach by making information regarding the names of entities that target democratic processes and international norms available in a transparent manner. 4. Work with the Interagency to employ economic warfare, lawfare, and diplomatic pressure against hostile state and nonstate actors. 5. Maintain the authorities necessary for an aggressive counterterrorism posture against threats to the homeland. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE Nuclear deterrence is one of the most critical elements of U.S. national security, as it forms a backstop to U.S. military forces. Every operational plan relies on the assumption that nuclear deterrence holds. Ever since the U.S. first acquired nuclear weapons, Administrations of both parties have pursued a strategy designed to deter nuclear and non-nuclear attack; assure allies; and, in the event of nuclear employ- ment, restore deterrence at the lowest possible cost to the U.S. Today, however, America’s ability to meet these goals is increasingly challenged by the growing nuclear threats posed by our adversaries. l China is pursuing a strategic breakout of its nuclear forces, significantly shifting the nuclear balance and forcing the U.S. to learn how to deter two nuclear peer competitors (China and Russia) simultaneously for the first time in its history. l Russia is expanding its nuclear arsenal and using the threat of nuclear employment as a coercive tactic in its war on Ukraine. l North Korea is advancing its nuclear capabilities. l Iran is inching closer to nuclear capability. Meanwhile, all U.S. nuclear capabilities and the infrastructure on which they rely date from the Cold War and are in dire need of replacement. The next Admin- istration will need to focus on continuing the effort to modernize the nuclear triad while updating our strategy and capabilities to meet the challenges presented by a more threatening nuclear environment. Needed Reforms l Prioritize nuclear modernization. All components of the nuclear triad are far beyond their intended lifetimes and will need to be replaced over the next — 124 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise decade. This effort is required for the U.S. to maintain its nuclear triad—and will be the bare minimum needed to maintain U.S. strategic nuclear deterrence. 1. Accelerate the timelines of critical modernization programs including the Sentinel missile, Long Range Standoff Weapon (LRSO), Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine, B-21 bomber, and F-35 Dual Capable Aircraft. 2. Reject any congressional proposals that would further extend the service lives of U.S. capabilities such as the Minuteman III ICBM. 3. Ensure sufficient funding for warhead life extension programs (LEP), including the B61-12, W80-4, W87-1 Mod, and W88 Alt 370. l Develop the Sea-Launched Cruise Missile-Nuclear (SLCM-N). In 2018, the Trump Administration proposed restoring the SLCM-N to help fill a growing gap in U.S. nonstrategic capabilities and improve deterrence against limited nuclear attack.39 The Biden Administration canceled this program in its 2022 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR).40 The next President should support and accelerate funding for development of the SLCM-N with the goal of deployment by the end of the decade. l Account for China’s nuclear expansion. To ensure its ability to deter both Russia and the growing Chinese nuclear threat, the U.S. will need more than the bare minimum of nuclear modernization. President Biden’s 2022 NPR described the problem but proposed no recommendations to restore or maintain nuclear deterrence. 1. Consider procuring more modernized nuclear systems (such as the Sentinel missile or LRSO) than currently planned. 2. Improve the ability of the U.S. to utilize the triad’s upload capacity in case of a crisis. 3. Review what capabilities in addition to the SLCM-N (for example, nonstrategic weapons or new warhead designs) are needed to deter the unique Chinese threat. l Restore the nuclear infrastructure. The United States must restore its necessary nuclear infrastructure so that it is capable of producing and maintaining nuclear weapons.
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.