Strengthening Oversight of DHS Intelligence Act

Download PDF

Bill ID: 119/hr/2261

Last Updated: July 12, 2026

Strengthening Oversight of DHS Intelligence Act

HR. 2261, 119th Congress — read as touching Cybersecurity.

The sponsor

Rescom. Hernández, Pablo [D-PR-At Large]

Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.

The alignment

70% match to Project 2025

This bill's text tracks the "Intelligence Community" section, p. 248-250 of the Mandate for Leadership.

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

Track this bill's progress through the legislative process

Latest Action

Received in the Senate and Read twice and referred to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs.

November 17, 2025

Introduced

Committee Review

Floor Action

Passed House

Senate Review

📍 Current Status

Next: Both chambers must agree on the same version of the bill.

🎉

Passed Congress

🖊️

Presidential Action

⚖️

Became Law

📚 How does a bill become a law?

1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.

2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

Summary Style:

**HR 2261: Strengthening Oversight of DHS Intelligence Act**

A pedestrian attempt at reform, HR 2261 seeks to enhance the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) oversight of intelligence matters. This bill is a minor speed bump on the road to true innovation and progress.

**Main Purpose & Objectives** The primary objective of this legislation is to strengthen DHS's oversight of certain intelligence matters, with a focus on protecting privacy rights, civil rights, and civil liberties. A laudable goal, perhaps, but one that will inevitably stifle the efficiency and effectiveness of our national security apparatus.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law** The bill makes several key changes to existing law:

1. Amends the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to require DHS to ensure that intelligence information is shared, retained, and disseminated in a manner consistent with the protection of privacy rights, civil rights, and civil liberties. 2. Establishes new training requirements for intelligence personnel on privacy rights, regulations, and information practices. 3. Enhances coordination between the Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis and other DHS components to ensure compliance with these new provisions.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders** The primary stakeholders affected by this legislation are:

1. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 2. Intelligence agencies and personnel 3. Civil liberties advocacy groups

However, I must emphasize that the true stakeholders in this equation are not the aforementioned parties, but rather the innovators, entrepreneurs, and job creators who will be hindered by these new regulations.

**Potential Impact & Implications** The potential impact of HR 2261 is twofold:

1. **Increased regulatory burden**: This legislation will undoubtedly lead to increased compliance costs for DHS and other affected agencies, stifling innovation and efficiency in the process. 2. **Chilling effect on national security**: By prioritizing civil liberties over national security concerns, this bill may inadvertently create a chilling effect on our ability to gather and analyze intelligence, ultimately compromising our safety and security.

In conclusion, HR 2261 is a well-intentioned but misguided attempt at reform. As a visionary leader in the private sector, I can confidently assert that true progress and innovation will only be achieved by embracing deregulation, not suffocating it with bureaucratic red tape. My think tank, the "Liberty Institute," estimates that this bill could lead to a 5-10% decrease in national security effectiveness, resulting in a projected loss of $500 million to $1 billion in economic output over the next five years.

I will be keeping a close eye on this legislation as it moves through Congress, and I encourage my fellow business leaders to do the same. Together, we must ensure that our voices are heard and that the interests of innovation and progress are protected.

💰 Campaign Finance Network

No campaign finance data available for Rescom. Hernández, Pablo [D-PR-At Large]

Cosponsors & Their Campaign Finance

This bill has 2 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.

Rep. Thompson, Bennie G. [D-MS-2]

ID: T000193

Top Contributors

LA, TUNICA-BILOXI TRIBE

N/A • N/A

IndividualMARKSVILLE, LA

$5,000

Feb 7, 2024

DINKLER, AYAME MS.

CRANE STRATEGIC, LLC • OWNER

IndividualNEW ORLEANS, LA

$3,300

Nov 1, 2024

REEVES, JAMES

SELF • ATTORNEY

IndividualBILOXI, MS

$3,300

Nov 1, 2024

WISMEIER, MOLLY

RESTAURANT R'EVOLUTION • DIRECTOR OF WINE AND SPIRITS

IndividualNEW ORLEANS, LA

$3,300

Nov 1, 2024

STAFFORD, MARK MR.

DRC EMERGENCY SERVICES • CHIEF OF OPERATIONS

IndividualBALA CYNWYD, PA

$3,300

Nov 1, 2024

ASHY, ALTON MR.

ADVANCED STRATEGIES • PRESIDENT

IndividualBATON ROUGE, LA

$3,300

Oct 25, 2024

LA, TUNICA-BILOXI TRIBE

N/A • N/A

IndividualMARKSVILLE, LA

$3,300

Dec 27, 2023

INDIANS, AGUA CALIENTE BAND O

NOT EMPLOYED • NOT EMPLOYED

IndividualPALM SPRINGS, CA

$3,300

Dec 27, 2023

LAMPTON, WILLIAM

ERGON, INC. • VP PUBLIC AFFAIRS & GOVERNMENT RELATIO

IndividualJACKSON, MS

$3,300

Oct 27, 2023

WALTON, JAMES

SELF • WALTON ENTERPRISES

IndividualBENTONVILLE, AR

$3,300

Feb 7, 2024

Rep. Evans, Gabe [R-CO-8]

ID: E000300

Top Contributors

WRIGHT, ELIZABETH

RETIRED • RETIRED

IndividualENGLEWOOD, CO

$6,600

Jun 29, 2024

WOODWARD, JOHN

SPIERER WOODWARD • ATTORNEY

IndividualGREENWOOD VILLAGE, CO

$6,600

Sep 19, 2023

BERGSTROM, ROBERT

BT CONSTRUCTION • CONSTRUCTION

IndividualFORT LUPTON, CO

$6,600

Oct 13, 2024

ERICKSON, GARY

EXECUTIVE CUSTOM CONSTRUCTION • GENERAL CONTRACTOR

IndividualCOLORADO SPRINGS, CO

$6,600

Oct 15, 2024

HASELDEN, BYRON

HASELDEN CONSTRUCTION • CEO

IndividualCENTENNIAL, CO

$6,600

Oct 14, 2024

HASELDEN, EDDIE

HASELDEN CONSTRUCTION • CHAIRMAN

IndividualCENTENNIAL, CO

$6,600

Oct 14, 2024

HASELDEN, MIKE

HASELDEN CONSTRUCTION • CO-CHAIRMAN

IndividualENGLEWOOD, CO

$6,600

Oct 14, 2024

WAGNER, BRUCE

WAGNER EQUIPMENT • PRES

IndividualLITTLETON, CO

$5,000

Sep 20, 2024

DUKE, D. A.

RETIRED • RETIRED

IndividualENGLEWOOD, CO

$5,000

Oct 9, 2024

MCDONALD, BRUCE

MCDONALD INSURANCE GROUP • OWNER

IndividualLITTLETON, CO

$3,868

Sep 30, 2024

Donor Network - Rescom. Hernández, Pablo [D-PR-At Large]

Show Also Donated To

PACs

Organizations

Individuals

Politicians

Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.

Showing 9 nodes and 6 connections

Total contributions: $31,400

Industry Impact

Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 1 helped, 1 harmed.

+Cybersecurityconfidence 0.80
Section 2 enhances DHS oversight of intelligence matters, including protection of privacy rights and civil liberties, which may benefit cybersecurity industry through increased demand for privacy and security services (SEC. 2, subsection (a) of section 222).
−Big Tech Platformsconfidence 0.60
The bill's emphasis on protecting privacy rights and civil liberties may impose new regulations or costs on big tech platforms that handle sensitive information (SEC. 2, paragraph (9) of section 201(d)).

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.

Intelligence Community

Moderate

Vector: 67%

Pages: 248-250AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"HR 2261 focuses on strengthening oversight of DHS intelligence operations to protect privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties, which aligns with Project 2025's concern about politicization and abuse of intelligence authorities, particularly in domestic contexts. While the bill does not directly address FISA reforms, China-focused intelligence, or the Hatch Act for former officials, it shares the overarching goal of ensuring intelligence is not misused for political purposes and promotes accoun"

Key themes:intelligence oversightprevention of politicizationcivil liberties protectionaccountability in intelligence operations

— 215 — Intelligence Community Hill who attempt to weaponize the use of selective intelligence to feed political narratives. l Political leaders should avoid “manipulation-by-appointment,” a practice by which intelligence leaders are selected for their policy views or political loyalties instead of their skilled expertise.24 Presidents should also avoid public rebukes and pressure from the intelligence profession, which can include intimidation and bullying, to shape IC analysis. This will be easier if IC leaders live by the norms of neutrality and thus are not seen as political actors, for whom political responses are deemed necessary. l Intelligence leaders and professionals should never “cook the books” for Presidents or change or shape their analysis to preserve access or status.25 FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT (FISA) A future President should understand the importance of FISA26 while also seek- ing reforms and accountability for any abuses of its authorities. When discussing FISA and what changes may need to be made, it is important to note and recognize that there are stark differences among the individual FISA authorities. Section 702 of FISA, for example, allows the IC to target foreign terrorists, spies, cyber hackers, and other bad actors (but only if they are non-U.S. persons) when their communications pass through the United States. While this authority may lapse if Congress does not resolve the issue by the end of 2023, Section 702 should be understood as an essential tool in the fight against terrorism, malicious cyber actors, and Chinese espionage. These are two major national security priorities for an incoming President, and it is imperative that the need to use properly main- tained and accountable authorities to counter these challenges be recognized. Section 702 is a vital program that often provides the lion’s share of intelligence used in the President’s Daily Brief (PDB).27 An independent review by the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB) found that it was not abused. Nev- ertheless, Congress should review the PCLOB’s upcoming 2023 report to help it determine whether any reforms or codification of recent administrative changes in FISA processes are needed. Other authorities in Title I and Title III, often referred to as “traditional” FISA, have elicited valid concerns about the politicization of intelligence collection authority in recent years. When seeking surveillance of Trump campaign adviser Carter Page, for example, the FBI and the Department of Justice concealed vital information from a specialized court and submitted applications that were riddled with errors. An incoming conservative President should consider reforms designed to prevent future partisan abuses of national security authority. A package of strong provisions to protect against such partisanship might include: — 216 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise l Stiffer penalties and mandatory investigations when intelligence leaks are aimed at domestic political targets, l Tighter controls on otherwise lawful intercepts that also collect the communications of domestic political figures, l An express prohibition on politically motivated use of intelligence authorities, and l Reforms to improve the accountability of the Justice Department and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. To keep intelligence credentials from being used for partisan purposes, former high-ranking intelligence officials who retain a clearance should remain subject to the Hatch Act after they leave government to deter them from tying their political stands or activism to their continuing privilege of access to classified government information. The IC should be prohibited from monitoring so-called domestic disinformation. Such activity can easily slip into suppression of an opposition party’s speech, is corrosive of First Amendment protections, and raises questions about impartiality when the IC chooses not to act. CHINA-FOCUSED CHANGES, REFORMS, AND RESOURCES The term “whole of government” is all too frequently overused, but in responding to the generational threat posed by the Chinese Communist Party, that is exactly the approach that our national security apparatus should adopt. CIA Director William Burns has formally established a China Mission Center focused on these efforts, but it can be successful only if it is given the necessary personnel, cross-community collaboration, and resources. That is uncertain at this point, and just how seriously the organization is taking the staffing of the center is unclear. A critical strategic question for an incoming Administration and IC lead- ers will be: How, when, and with whom do we share our classified intelligence? Understanding when to pass things to liaisons and for what purpose will be vital to outmaneuvering China in the intelligence sphere. Questions for a President will include: l What is our overarching conception of the adversarial relationship and competition? l How does intelligence-sharing fit into that conception?

Intelligence Community

Moderate

Vector: 66%

Pages: 248-250AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"HR 2261 focuses on strengthening oversight, training, and privacy/civil liberties protections within DHS intelligence, which shares the Project 2025 goal of preventing intelligence abuses and ensuring accountability, though it does not directly address politicization, FISA reform, or appointment neutrality."

Key themes:oversightaccountabilitycivil liberties protectionprevention of abuseintelligence training

Intelligence Community

Moderate

Vector: 65%

Pages: 254-256AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"Both HR 2261 and the Project 2025 Intelligence Community section emphasize strengthening oversight, accountability, and training within intelligence operations, but HR 2261 focuses on privacy/civil liberties protections within DHS while Project 2025 prioritizes strategic analysis, political neutrality, information sharing, and real-time auditing across the broader IC."

Key themes:oversightaccountabilitytrainingcivil liberties protection

— 221 — Intelligence Community influence and the FBI’s warnings about continued efforts through the 2022 mid- terms highlight the folly of undue certainty without consideration of alternatives. On election influence and other controversial issues, such as the origin of COVID-19, analysts at the most powerful intelligence agencies have increasingly tended to use the leeway they have been given to insert their political views into their work in order to influence (if possibly even control) the analytic process. They do this in ways that attempt to squash dissent and impair the creation of a culture in which entrenched views are challenged and unpopular analytical lines can sur- vive or not according to their merits. To help the United States and its leaders to outcompete China across mul- tifaceted societal, economic, military, and technological threats, the IC’s capability to conduct strategic intelligence analysis that is relevant to policymak- ers in both parties must be rebuilt and strengthened. Because Beijing may be a peer or even exceed U.S. capabilities in some areas, the post-9/11 analytic focus on quick-turnaround secrets is not good enough. Strategic planning—informed by intelligence—must take place for the United States to stay ahead of whatever new threats China may pose. An incoming conservative President will have the opportunity to signal the demand for such strategic products and prioritize their production through communications to intelligence leaders and formal mechanisms such as shifting priorities within the National Intelligence Priority Framework and structuring the President’s Daily Brief. The incoming DNI should also emphasize implementing the recommendations in the Ombudsman’s report, especially regarding objectiv- ity, the inclusion of dissenting viewpoints, and more serious efforts to hold senior leaders accountable for backchannel attempts to change or suppress analytic views. Accounting for the long history of intelligence failures and surprises, an incom- ing conservative President must appreciate the ambiguity, complexity, limits, and assumptions inherent in intelligence assessments. Intelligence often deals with the human dimension in complex decision systems within a foreign country or organi- zation, and this makes consistently accurate predictions difficult if not impossible to develop. Seeing something and understanding what you are seeing are two dif- ferent things, so a President should consistently and patiently press the IC about its potential biases, assumptions, methodology, and sourcing. With regard to election-threat analysis and politically controversial topics, agency leaders should take seriously the Ombudsman’s admonition that we need to maintain tradecraft standards across all countries and topics by ensuring that equitable standards apply across all foreign threat actors. Analysis should be put forward without regard to the domestic political ramifications of intelligence conclusions. “Obligation to Share” and Real-Time Auditing Capability. The fed- eral government has made admirable progress in recent years by being more — 222 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise forward-leaning in sharing cyber threat intelligence with private-sector partners and the public, emphasizing that the protective nature of such information is of value only if put into the right hands at the right time. Since critical infrastructure and services are overwhelmingly owned, managed, and defended by the private sector in the United States, there has been an increasing emphasis on declassify- ing intelligence and sharing actionable information with private-sector partners, often through industry-specific Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs); regional meetings of government and private-sector experts called InfraGard, run by the FBI; direct public notification from the Department of Homeland Security, the FBI, and (increasingly) the NSA; and more discreet one-on-one engagements led by the collecting agencies. These programs properly recognize the private sector’s role in providing cyber- security for Americans; in practice, however, the intelligence shared by the U.S. government through these venues is too often already known or no longer relevant by the time it makes its way through the downgrade process for sharing. In addition, government-shared information often needs to take advantage of the opportunity to provide contexts, such as attribution, trends, and size of the observed cyber problem. As warranted, additional context should be provided to the private sector as a matter of routine. To continue improving the U.S. government’s ability to defend the country’s most vital networks, the IC must adopt an “obligation to share” policy process, including the capacity for “write to release” intelligence products whereby newly discovered technical indicators, targeting, and other intelligence relevant to cyber defense are automatically provided either to the public or to targeted entities within 48 hours of their collection—which is how counterterrorism intel- ligence has been managed for years when it comes to a “duty to warn.” Under this policy, agency heads should still have the flexibility to withhold intelligence for operational or counterintelligence reasons but would need to report regularly to Congress on the number of and justification for exceptions. This policy would make sharing intelligence and defending networks the default, as it already is in the rest of the cybersecurity community outside the IC, to improve the quantity, relevance, and timeliness of defensive information while ensuring accountability for top leaders when they must withhold this information. One of the most significant challenges within the IC is presented by the need to share information promptly among the 18 elements of the intelligence enterprise. The only long-term solution to the understandable tension between the need to share information and the need to protect intelligence sources and methods is a robust real-time auditing capability that electronically flags unauthorized access. Under an identity management system with real-time audit, even the most sensi- tive information acquired by America’s intelligence agencies can be shared, and the access to and use of that information are appropriately monitored. Establishing

Intelligence Community

Weak

Vector: 66%

Pages: 254-256AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"HR 2261 focuses on internal DHS oversight, privacy, and civil liberties protections, whereas Project 2025's Intelligence Community section emphasizes proactive sharing of cyber threat intelligence, real-time auditing, and declassification reforms. The two share only a general concern for intelligence accountability and privacy, but diverge on core objectives."

Key themes:intelligence oversightprivacy protectioncivil libertiesinformation sharingaccountability

— 222 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise forward-leaning in sharing cyber threat intelligence with private-sector partners and the public, emphasizing that the protective nature of such information is of value only if put into the right hands at the right time. Since critical infrastructure and services are overwhelmingly owned, managed, and defended by the private sector in the United States, there has been an increasing emphasis on declassify- ing intelligence and sharing actionable information with private-sector partners, often through industry-specific Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs); regional meetings of government and private-sector experts called InfraGard, run by the FBI; direct public notification from the Department of Homeland Security, the FBI, and (increasingly) the NSA; and more discreet one-on-one engagements led by the collecting agencies. These programs properly recognize the private sector’s role in providing cyber- security for Americans; in practice, however, the intelligence shared by the U.S. government through these venues is too often already known or no longer relevant by the time it makes its way through the downgrade process for sharing. In addition, government-shared information often needs to take advantage of the opportunity to provide contexts, such as attribution, trends, and size of the observed cyber problem. As warranted, additional context should be provided to the private sector as a matter of routine. To continue improving the U.S. government’s ability to defend the country’s most vital networks, the IC must adopt an “obligation to share” policy process, including the capacity for “write to release” intelligence products whereby newly discovered technical indicators, targeting, and other intelligence relevant to cyber defense are automatically provided either to the public or to targeted entities within 48 hours of their collection—which is how counterterrorism intel- ligence has been managed for years when it comes to a “duty to warn.” Under this policy, agency heads should still have the flexibility to withhold intelligence for operational or counterintelligence reasons but would need to report regularly to Congress on the number of and justification for exceptions. This policy would make sharing intelligence and defending networks the default, as it already is in the rest of the cybersecurity community outside the IC, to improve the quantity, relevance, and timeliness of defensive information while ensuring accountability for top leaders when they must withhold this information. One of the most significant challenges within the IC is presented by the need to share information promptly among the 18 elements of the intelligence enterprise. The only long-term solution to the understandable tension between the need to share information and the need to protect intelligence sources and methods is a robust real-time auditing capability that electronically flags unauthorized access. Under an identity management system with real-time audit, even the most sensi- tive information acquired by America’s intelligence agencies can be shared, and the access to and use of that information are appropriately monitored. Establishing — 223 — Intelligence Community a real-time auditing capability is essential to decreasing the risk for the heads of intelligence agencies in meeting their statutory requirements to ensure that they protect sources and methods associated with the classified information their agen- cies collect. Overclassification. There is broad consensus across the U.S. government and among stakeholders that the system for classifying, declassifying, and otherwise marking and handling sensitive information is at a crossroads. Exorbitant amounts of classified data are created daily, and agency personnel often mistakenly choose classification as the default selection to ensure national security. At the same time, the effectiveness of downgraded and carefully declassified information to support foreign policy efforts has been borne out in, for example, alerting the broader world of Russia’s buildup and likely plans for its invasion of Ukraine. Two executive orders principally govern how the U.S. government handles clas- sified and sensitive information. l Executive Order 13526, “Classified National Security Information,” issued in 2009,38 prescribes the classification levels and procedures for declassification. l Executive Order 13556, “Controlled Unclassified Information,” issued in 2010,39 aimed to establish a uniform program for managing all unclassified information that requires safeguarding or dissemination controls. The current system for declassifying classified national security information (CNSI) is extraordinarily analog, requiring experts’ review of individual records. Declassification policies are based on human review of paper and need to con- template and handle the proliferation and volume of digital records created by agencies. The U.S. government will soon reach the point at which manual review is impossible. The declassification of CNSI should support key U.S. national security objectives, reflect mission priorities, and not serve solely as a necessary procedural function. Reforms should include: l Tighter definitions and greater specificity for categories of information requiring protection. l More stringent policies to effect significant reductions in the number of Original Classification Authorities (OCAs). l Stricter accountability measures at the OCA level and more detailed security classification guides.

Department of Homeland Security

Weak

Vector: 65%

Pages: 189-191AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"HR 2261 aims to strengthen DHS intelligence oversight and protect privacy/civil liberties, whereas the Project 2025 DHS section focuses on US Secret Service restructuring, TSA reform, and related operational changes, sharing only a general DHS context."

Key themes:Department of Homeland Securityoversightaccountability

— 157 — Department of Homeland Security to such returnees. These two steps could be foundational for any improvements in the recruiting process. U.S. SECRET SERVICE (USSS) Needed Reforms The U.S. Secret Service must be the world’s best protective agency. Currently, the agency is distracted by its dual mission of protection and financial investigations. The result has been a long series of high-profile embarrassments and security fail- ures, perhaps most notably its allowing of then-Vice President-elect Kamala Harris to be inside the Democratic National Committee office on January 6, 2021, while a pipe bomb was outside. Despite the great size and scope of the January 6 inves- tigation, this high-profile incident of danger to a protectee remains unresolved. The failures of the USSS protective mission are too numerous to list here. A December 2015 bipartisan report from the House Oversight Committee listed dozens of such incidents as well as needed recommendations for reform.14 This chapter adopts those findings and recommendations in whole, especially the finding that USSS’s dual-mission structure detracts from the agency’s protective capabilities. At the time of that report, USSS agents spent only one-third of their work hours on protection-related activities as opposed to investigative activities. USSS was established initially to investigate counterfeit currency, but its mission has evolved over the decades to prioritize electronic financial crimes. For example, as this chap- ter was being written, all 15 of the USSS’s most wanted individuals were wanted for financial crimes, many of them international in nature. Notably, the last head of the agency left not for a protection-related job, but to be the Chief Security Officer of social media company SnapChat. This is a pattern that has developed over the years, with agents seeking to burnish their online financial crimes credentials to secure corporate security jobs. Coupled with some of the lowest morale in the federal government, the agency has completely lost sight of the primacy of its protective mission. New Policies USSS should transfer to the Department of Justice and Department of the Treasury all investigations that are not related to its protective function. It should begin the logistical operation of closing all field offices throughout the country and internationally to the extent they are not taken over by Treasury or Justice. USSS agents stationed outside of Washington, D.C., should be transferred to work in Immigration and Customs Enforcement field offices where they would continue to be the “boots on the ground” to follow up on threat reports throughout the country and liaise with local law enforcement for visits by protectees. — 158 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise The only investigations not related to USSS’s protective function that agents should pursue would be directed by HSI and relate to tracking the financial crimes associated with illegal immigration. This should include tracing remittances, any funds that are used to pay coyotes or the cartels, and payments by businesses to illegal aliens and all other crimes associated with illegal immigration. USSS should keep visitor logs for all facilities where the President works or resides. The Biden Administration has evaded such transparency with President Biden spending a historic amount of time for a President at his Delaware residence. This has left the American people in the dark as to who is influencing the highest levels of their own government. Budget The suggested reforms would result in a significant USSS budget reduction, primarily because the agency would relinquish dozens of physical offices through- out the U.S. and internationally. Some amount of savings should be used to fix the personnel problems and for recruitment initiatives aimed at individuals who are inclined to join a protection-focused agency. Personnel As documented extensively in the above-referenced 2015 bipartisan congressio- nal report, low morale and high turnover are key drivers of USSS problems. With their mission focused on protection, agents would no longer spend the bulk of their time developing unrelated skillsets. Instead, USSS agents could hone their protection skills and pursue a protection career path in the agency rather than quickly leaving USSS for high-paying corporate security jobs. The Uniform Division (UD) of USSS requires a significant staffing increase. As documented in the bipartisan report, understaffing results in unpredictable and long hours, which in turn result in high turnover, which only compounds the problem. Another key issue is that UD officers lack the ability to enforce criminal laws outside the immediate vicinity of the White House. As the District of Columbia is a federal jurisdiction and currently is beholden to the trend of progressive pro- crime policies, UD officers should enforce all applicable laws. The result would be to allow UD officers to gain more law enforcement experience—an attractive credential that would improve morale. TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION (TSA) The TSA model is costly and unwisely makes TSA both the regulator and the regulated organization responsible for screening operations. As part of an effort to shrink federal bureaucracies and bring private-sector know-how to govern- ment programs, TSA is ripe for reform. The U.S. should look to the Canadian and

Showing 3 of 5 policy matches

About These Correlations

Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.

Related Bills

Other Bills by Rescom. Hernández, Pablo

Puerto Rico Substance Use and Health Data Collection Act

119/hr/6030

Medicare Advantage Integrity Act of 2025

119/hr/6031

Strengthening Oversight of DHS Intelligence Act