Safer Skies Act of 2025
Download PDFSponsored by
Rep. Langworthy, Nicholas A. [R-NY-23]
ID: L000600
Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Introduced
đź“Ť Current Status
Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.
Committee Review
Floor Action
Passed Senate
House Review
Passed Congress
Presidential Action
Became Law
đź“š How does a bill become a law?
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Bill Summary
Another "Safer Skies" bill, because what's a few more layers of bureaucratic red tape when it comes to air travel? Let me put on my surgical gloves and dissect this legislative abomination.
**Diagnosis:** This bill is suffering from a bad case of "Security Theater-itis," where politicians try to create the illusion of safety without actually addressing any real security concerns. The symptoms are clear: vague language, unnecessary regulations, and a healthy dose of pandering to special interests.
**New Regulations:** The bill updates security screening requirements for certain air carrier operations, because apparently, the current system isn't bloated enough. It's like trying to cure a headache by adding more aspirin to an already overflowing bottle.
**Affected Industries:** Air carriers operating under parts 135 and 380 of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations, will be impacted. That means small charter airlines, private jet operators, and other niche players will have to comply with these new regulations. I'm sure they'll just love the added costs and paperwork.
**Compliance Requirements:** The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has 360 days to revise its rules and guidance to comply with this bill. Because what's a few more months of bureaucratic delay when it comes to "safety"? The TSA will also have to define what constitutes "covered air carrier operations," which I'm sure will be a thrilling exercise in regulatory hair-splitting.
**Enforcement Mechanisms:** Ah, the fun part! The bill doesn't specify any new penalties or enforcement mechanisms, but we can assume that the usual suspects – fines, audits, and bureaucratic harassment – will be employed to ensure compliance. After all, what's a little more government overreach when it comes to "safety"?
**Economic and Operational Impacts:** This bill will undoubtedly increase costs for affected air carriers, which will likely pass them on to consumers in the form of higher ticket prices or reduced services. But hey, who needs affordable air travel when you can have the illusion of safety?
In conclusion, this bill is a classic case of "legislative placebo effect," where politicians create the appearance of action without actually addressing any real problems. It's a waste of time, money, and resources, but hey, at least it'll make some bureaucrats feel important.
**Prognosis:** This bill will likely pass with flying colors (pun intended), because who doesn't love a good dose of security theater? But mark my words: this will do nothing to actually improve air travel safety. It's just another example of politicians playing doctor, prescribing unnecessary regulations and bureaucratic red tape to cure a disease that doesn't exist.
Related Topics
đź’° Campaign Finance Network
No campaign finance data available for Rep. Langworthy, Nicholas A. [R-NY-23]
Project 2025 Policy Matches
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document. Higher similarity scores indicate stronger thematic connections.
Introduction
— 159 — Department of Homeland Security European private models of providing aviation screening manpower to lower TSA costs while maintaining security. Until it is privatized, TSA should be treated as a national security provider, and its workforce should be deunionized immediately. TSA could privatize the screening function by expanding the current Screening Partnership Program (SPP) to all airports. TSA would turn screening operations over to airports that would choose security contractors that meet TSA regulations and would oversee and test airports for compliance. Alternatively, it could adopt a Canadian-style system, turning over screening operations to a new government corporation that contracts screening service to private contractors. Contractors would bid to provide their services to a set of airports in a particular region, likely with around 10 regions nationally. TSA would continue to set security regulations and test airports for compliance, and the new corporation would establish any oper- ating procedures or customer service standards. With either model, the intelligence function for domestic travel patterns should remain with the U.S. government. The federal government could expect to save 15 percent–20 percent from the existing aviation screening budget, but savings could be significantly larger. Service to travelers should also improve. MANAGEMENT DIRECTORATE (MGMT) The Management Directorate is unnecessarily large because each individual component also maintains its own respective management office. Too much over- lap and red tape exist between headquarters (HQ) and components with regard to such functions as hiring, information technology, and procurement. Finance is unique given that HQ needs to address reprogramming, and component bud- gets need to roll up into all-department budgets. The Directorate requires intense reform, the specifics of which should be further assessed given its expansive nature. Front Office (FO). Immediately place a small team of advisers with a deep understanding of operational management—but who have some experience in government because they will need to understand the nuance of Reduction in Force (RIF), appropriations hurdles when dealing with U.S. government reorganization, etc.—to sit in the MGMT FO (reporting to the Secretary, ultimately either S1 or S2). One of these advisers should understand U.S. government employment law and be prepared to relocate personnel and downsize offices accordingly. This includes reverting to the original understanding of the function of individuals appointed to the Senior Executive Service: competent managers who can work capably with any subject matter and in any location. Over the first few months of the Administration, the advisers’ role should be to assess what structural and procedural changes are appropriate. They should dissect the current standing Management Directives and the approval processes in place to implement and/or change them; Office of the Chief Human Capital Officer’s processes and procedures; hurdles to the Office of Chief Procurement
Introduction
— 159 — Department of Homeland Security European private models of providing aviation screening manpower to lower TSA costs while maintaining security. Until it is privatized, TSA should be treated as a national security provider, and its workforce should be deunionized immediately. TSA could privatize the screening function by expanding the current Screening Partnership Program (SPP) to all airports. TSA would turn screening operations over to airports that would choose security contractors that meet TSA regulations and would oversee and test airports for compliance. Alternatively, it could adopt a Canadian-style system, turning over screening operations to a new government corporation that contracts screening service to private contractors. Contractors would bid to provide their services to a set of airports in a particular region, likely with around 10 regions nationally. TSA would continue to set security regulations and test airports for compliance, and the new corporation would establish any oper- ating procedures or customer service standards. With either model, the intelligence function for domestic travel patterns should remain with the U.S. government. The federal government could expect to save 15 percent–20 percent from the existing aviation screening budget, but savings could be significantly larger. Service to travelers should also improve. MANAGEMENT DIRECTORATE (MGMT) The Management Directorate is unnecessarily large because each individual component also maintains its own respective management office. Too much over- lap and red tape exist between headquarters (HQ) and components with regard to such functions as hiring, information technology, and procurement. Finance is unique given that HQ needs to address reprogramming, and component bud- gets need to roll up into all-department budgets. The Directorate requires intense reform, the specifics of which should be further assessed given its expansive nature. Front Office (FO). Immediately place a small team of advisers with a deep understanding of operational management—but who have some experience in government because they will need to understand the nuance of Reduction in Force (RIF), appropriations hurdles when dealing with U.S. government reorganization, etc.—to sit in the MGMT FO (reporting to the Secretary, ultimately either S1 or S2). One of these advisers should understand U.S. government employment law and be prepared to relocate personnel and downsize offices accordingly. This includes reverting to the original understanding of the function of individuals appointed to the Senior Executive Service: competent managers who can work capably with any subject matter and in any location. Over the first few months of the Administration, the advisers’ role should be to assess what structural and procedural changes are appropriate. They should dissect the current standing Management Directives and the approval processes in place to implement and/or change them; Office of the Chief Human Capital Officer’s processes and procedures; hurdles to the Office of Chief Procurement — 160 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise Officer’s procurement of innovative technology; and the facilities plan, including the consolidation into the St. Elizabeth’s campus. They should also be prepared to help implement any end to unionization of DHS components in response to an executive order pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 7103.15 Office of the Chief Financial Officer (OCFO). DHS responsibilities to work with Congress have been split between the Office of Legislative Affairs (OLA) and OCFO. OLA deals with the authorizing committees on policy issues, and OCFO works with the appropriations committees on budget planning, execution, and reprogramming. This split creates communication and visibility issues within DHS and inconsistency in answers to Congress. This is an issue not only within the HQ model, but also through- out the components. Either appropriations personnel should be moved to OLA and there should be a “dotted line” reporting structure to OCFO, or a policy that OLA per- sonnel must be included on communications to Congress should be implemented. To avoid “answer shopping” by congressional staff, particularly appropriations staff, all budget communications from the OCFO, including from the CFO him/ herself, should first be provided to the Director of OLA to ensure consistency of information, messaging, and answers. This may be deemed awkward given that the OCFO is a Senate-confirmed position, but it is necessary to avoid inaccuracies and inconsistencies in messaging. Federal Protective Service (FPS). FPS needs federal agents to develop, share, and receive operational information and maintain direct contact with the Secretary in the midst of heightened threats. Before the summer 2020 civil unrest, position- ing FPS under MGMT was justified, but given the current climate, they should not be reporting through MGMT. This may be especially problematic if a Management Directorate Under Secretary lacking law enforcement or military experience is in place when a situation like summer 2020 arises. FPS should report to the Secretary as other components (e.g., FLETC) do. This would add little to the Secretary’s current burden unless or until civil unrest arises, at which point reporting to the Secretary creates a direct line between the primary DHS decision-maker (S1 or S2) and the FPS Director. Regarding operational communication, there should be information-sharing mandates (MOAs)—which are applicable under specific circumstances where fed- eral facilities are involved—between FPS and the U.S. Marshals, U.S. Park Police, and FBI. Agreements with U.S. Capitol Police and Supreme Court Police should also be considered, but it is noteworthy that those entities are jurisdictionally out- side of the executive branch. OFFICE OF STRATEGY, POLICY, AND PLANS (PLCY) Department-Level Reforms. PLCY should perform a complete inventory, analysis, and reevaluation of the department’s domestic terrorism lines of effort to ensure that they are consistent with the President’s priorities, congressional authorization, and Americans’ constitutional rights.
Introduction
— 634 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise These shortcomings have been documented over many decades by the Govern- ment Accountability Office and DOT Inspector General. One peer-reviewed study for the Hudson Institute by scholar Robert Poole identified the ATO’s underlying problems as including an overly cautious culture, a growing lack of technological and managerial expertise, the inability to finance major capital projects with rev- enue bonds, and overdependence on aerospace/defense contractors.12 All of these problems are interrelated. Because of the ATO’s lack of top-notch engineers and program managers, it has become dependent on aerospace contrac- tors, unlike counterparts in Canada and the United Kingdom. Operating within the constraints imposed by the annual congressional appropriations process—and with no bonding authority—the ATO is forced to implement major projects piecemeal over many years. The ATO’s overly cautious culture appears to stem from its being embedded in a safety regulatory agency rather than being regulated at arm’s length (as are airlines and airports). Three organizational changes, all requiring legislation, offer the likelihood of dealing with these problems based on the experiences of air traffic providers in Canada and Europe. They could be implemented one at a time or together. l Separate the ATO from the FAA and relocate it to separate headquarters outside the District of Columbia. l Shift from aviation user taxes to fees for air traffic services paid directly to the ATO. l Allow the ATO to issue long-term revenue bonds for major projects. Shorter-term reforms could include implementing user fees for unconventional airspace users (for example, advanced air mobility, space launch, and recovery) and giving the ATO a deadline after which it could not authorize or fund any more nondigital/remote control towers. These reforms would also require legislation. FEDERAL TRANSIT POLICY The definition of “mobility” continues to evolve dramatically with the rise of new multimodal concepts, traveler needs, and emerging capabilities. These fun- damental changes in the way transportation services are offered also influence the form of our communities. New micromobility solutions, ridesharing, and a possible future that includes autonomous vehicles mean that mobility options—particularly in urban areas— can alter the nature of public transit, making it more affordable and flexible for Americans. Unfortunately, DOT now defines public transit only as transit pro- vided by municipal governments. This means that when individuals change their — 635 — Department of Transportation commutes from urban buses to rideshare or electric scooter, the use of public transit decreases. A better definition for public transit (which also would require congressional legislation) would be transit provided for the public rather than transit provided by a public municipality. The COVID-19 pandemic caused a substantial decline in usage for all forms of transportation. Mass transit has been the slowest mode to recover, with October 2022 ridership reaching only 64 percent of the level seen in October 2019. The sustained increase in remote work has caused changes in commuting patterns. Since facilitating travel for workers is one of the core functions of mass transit systems, a permanent reduction in commuting raises questions about the viability of fixed-route mass transit, especially considering that transit systems required substantial subsidization before the pandemic. Regrettably, the 2021 Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act13 authorized tens of billions of dollars for the expansion of transit systems even as Americans were moving away from them and into personal vehicles. Lower revenue from reduced ridership is already driving transit agencies to a budgetary breaking point, and added operational costs from system expansions will make this problem worse. The Capital Investment Grants (CIG) program is another example of Washing- ton’s tendency to fund transit expansion rather than maintaining or improving current facilities. The CIG program, which began in 1991, funds only novel transit projects. These can include new rail lines (regardless of the demand for preexisting rail in the area) and costly operations such as streetcars. Because Americans have demonstrated a strong preference for alternative means of transportation, rather than throwing good money after bad by continuing federal subsidies for transit expansion, there should be a focus on reducing costs that make transit uneconomical. The Trump Administration urged Congress to eliminate the CIG program, but the program has strong support on Capitol Hill. At a minimum, a new conservative Administration should ensure that each CIG project meets sound economic standards and a rigorous cost-benefit analysis. The largest expense in transit operational budgets is labor. Compensation costs for transit workers exceed both regional and sector compensation averages. This is driven by generous pension and health benefits rather than by exorbitant wages. Since workers value wages more than they value fringe benefits, this has led to a perverse situation in which transit agencies have high compensation costs yet are struggling to attract workers. The next Administration can remove the largest obstacle to reforming labor costs. Section 10(c) of the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 196414 was initially intended to protect bargaining rights for workers in privately owned transit sys- tems that were being absorbed by government-operated agencies. The provision has mutated into a requirement that any transit agency receiving federal funds cannot reduce compensation, an interpretation that far exceeds the original statute.
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
About These Correlations
Policy matches are calculated using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text. A score of 60% or higher indicates meaningful thematic overlap. This does not imply direct causation or intent, but highlights areas where legislation aligns with Project 2025 policy objectives.