TELL Act
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Rep. Allen, Rick W. [R-GA-12]
ID: A000372
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7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Bill Summary
Joy. Another bill from the esteemed members of Congress, who apparently think they're doctors, diagnosing a non-existent disease and prescribing a cure that's nothing more than a placebo.
**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The TELL Act (Telling Everyone the Location of data Leaving the U.S. Act) is a masterclass in legislative theater. Its main purpose is to make it seem like Congress cares about your online security, while actually doing nothing to address the real issues. The bill's objective is to require companies that store user data in China to disclose this information to users. Wow, what a bold move.
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill requires companies to disclose whether they store user data in China and if the Chinese Communist Party or state-owned entities have access to it. Oh, how novel. This is not a new concept; we've seen similar "disclosure" requirements before, which have done nothing to actually protect users.
The real kicker is that this bill doesn't change existing law in any meaningful way. It's just a rehashing of the same old FTC guidelines with some added window dressing. The Federal Trade Commission will still be responsible for enforcing this act, because we all know how effective they've been at regulating Big Tech.
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The affected parties are companies that store user data in China (i.e., most major tech firms). They'll have to add some extra language to their terms of service and maybe create a new pop-up window. Oh, the horror! The real stakeholders, however, are the politicians who get to grandstand about "protecting American data" while doing nothing to actually address the issue.
**Potential Impact & Implications:** The impact will be negligible. Users won't care about this disclosure requirement; they'll just click through it like they do with every other terms of service agreement. Companies will comply, but only because it's a minor inconvenience. The real implication is that Congress gets to pretend they're doing something about online security while actually just kicking the can down the road.
In conclusion, the TELL Act is a perfect example of legislative malpractice. It's a placebo bill designed to make politicians look good without actually addressing any real issues. I'd prescribe a healthy dose of skepticism and a strong stomach for anyone who thinks this bill will make a difference.
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Rep. Allen, Rick W. [R-GA-12]
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Project 2025 Policy Matches
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document. Higher similarity scores indicate stronger thematic connections.
Introduction
â 216 â Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise l Stiffer penalties and mandatory investigations when intelligence leaks are aimed at domestic political targets, l Tighter controls on otherwise lawful intercepts that also collect the communications of domestic political figures, l An express prohibition on politically motivated use of intelligence authorities, and l Reforms to improve the accountability of the Justice Department and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. To keep intelligence credentials from being used for partisan purposes, former high-ranking intelligence officials who retain a clearance should remain subject to the Hatch Act after they leave government to deter them from tying their political stands or activism to their continuing privilege of access to classified government information. The IC should be prohibited from monitoring so-called domestic disinformation. Such activity can easily slip into suppression of an opposition partyâs speech, is corrosive of First Amendment protections, and raises questions about impartiality when the IC chooses not to act. CHINA-FOCUSED CHANGES, REFORMS, AND RESOURCES The term âwhole of governmentâ is all too frequently overused, but in responding to the generational threat posed by the Chinese Communist Party, that is exactly the approach that our national security apparatus should adopt. CIA Director William Burns has formally established a China Mission Center focused on these efforts, but it can be successful only if it is given the necessary personnel, cross-community collaboration, and resources. That is uncertain at this point, and just how seriously the organization is taking the staffing of the center is unclear. A critical strategic question for an incoming Administration and IC lead- ers will be: How, when, and with whom do we share our classified intelligence? Understanding when to pass things to liaisons and for what purpose will be vital to outmaneuvering China in the intelligence sphere. Questions for a President will include: l What is our overarching conception of the adversarial relationship and competition? l How does intelligence-sharing fit into that conception? â 217 â Intelligence Community Some Members of Congress have said that intelligence relationships such as the Five Eyes28 should be expanded to include other allies in the AsiaâPacific in, for example, a âNine Eyesâ framework. This fails to take into account the fact that any blanket expansion would necessarily involve protecting the sources and methods of a larger and quite possibly more diverse group of member countries that might or might not have congruent interests. That being said, however, a future conservative President should consider what resources and information-sharing relationships could be included in an ad hoc or quasi-formal intelligence expansion (for example, with the Quad) among nations trying to counter the threat from China. Significant technology, language skills, and financial intelligence resources are needed to counter Chinaâs capabilities.29 The IC was caught flat-footed by the recent discovery of Chinaâs successful test of a nuclear-capable hypersonic missile. No longer can Americaâs information and technological dominance be assumed. Chinaâs gains and intense focus on emerging technologies have taken it in some areas from being a near-peer competitor to probably being ahead of the United States. Chinaâs centralized government allocates endless resources (sometimes inefficiently) to its strategic âMade in China 2025â and military apparatuses, which combine government, military, and private-sector activities on quantum infor- mation sciences and technologies, artificial intelligence (AI), machine learning, biotechnologies, and advanced robotics. The IC must do more than understand these advancements: It must rally non- government and allied partners and inspire unified action to counter them. In addition, to combat Chinaâs economic espionage, authorities and loopholes in the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA)30 will have to be examined and addressed in conjunction with the Attorney General. Many issues within the broader government can be tied back to a more general congressional understanding of the threat due to the compartmentalization of committee jurisdictions and the responsibilities of executive agencies to brief on the nature of the threat. Broader committee jurisdictions should receive additional intelligence from IC agencies as necessary to inform Chinaâs unique and more com- prehensive threat across layers of the U.S. government bureaucracy and economy. Former DNI John Ratcliffe increased the intelligence budget as it related to China by 20 percent. âWhen people ask me why I did that,â he explained in an interview, âI say, âBecause no one would let me increase it by 40%.â I had an $85 billion combined annual budget for both the national intelligence program and military intelligence program. My perspective was, âWhatever weâre spending on countering China, it isnât enough.ââ31 From an intelligence standpoint, the need to understand Chinese motivations, capabilities, and intent will be of paramount importance to a future conservative President. It is therefore also of paramount importance that the âwhole of governmentâ be rowing together.
Introduction
â 826 â Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise moderate content in good faithââin a way that eliminates the expansive, non-tex- tual immunities that courts have read into the statute.â In addition to taking unilateral action, Carr says, the FCC should work with Congress on legislative changes to ensure that âInternet companies no longer have carte blanche to censor protected speech while maintaining their Section 230 protections.â Carr writes that during the Trump Administration, the FCC took an âappro- priately strong approach to the national security threats posed by the Chinese Communist Party.â The FCC put Huawei on its Covered List of entitiesâits list of those posing âan unacceptable riskâ to U.S. national security. Carr writes that TikTok also poses a âserious and unacceptableâ risk to U.S. national security, while providing âBeijing with an opportunity to run a foreign influence campaign by determining the news and information that the app feeds to millions of Americans,â and the next Administration should ban it. Whatâs more, Carr writes, âU.S. busi- nesses are aiding Beijingâoften unwittinglyââin its effort to become, by 2030, âthe global leader in artificial intelligence.â In part, they are doing so by providing âBei- jing access to their high-powered cloud computing services.â Carr asserts that âit is time for an Administration to put in place a comprehensive plan that aims to stop U.S. entities from directly or indirectly contributing to Chinaâs malign AI goals .â Former Federal Election Commissioner Hans von Spakovsky writes in Chap- ter 29 that while âthe authority of the President over the actions ofâ the Federal Election Commission âis extremely limited,â the President âmust ensure that the [Justice Department], just like the FEC, is directed to only prosecute clear viola- tionsâ of the Federal Election Campaign Act. âThe department must not construe ambiguous provisionsâŚin a way that infringes on protected First Amendment activity,â he writes. The FEC has six members, three from each party, and its determinations require a majorityâso, they require the support of at least one member of each party. DOJ should not âprosecute an individual for supposedly violating the law when the FEC has previously determined that a similarly situated individual has not violated the law,â writes von Spakovsky. Moreover, he writes that the âPresident should vigorously oppose all effortsââsuch as the language in the âFor the People Act of 2021âââto change the structure of the FECâ so that it would have an âodd numberâ of members. The current structure âensures that there is bipartisan agreement before any action is taken and protects against the FEC being weaponized.â In Chapter 27, David R. Burton writes that the Securities and Exchange Com- mission (SEC) âshould be reducing impediments to capital formation, not radically increasing themâ by pushing a costly âclimate changeâ agenda, as it is doing under the Biden Administration. Discussing the Federal Trade Commission, Adam Can- deub writes in Chapter 30, âAntitrust law can combat dominant firmsâ baleful effects on democraticâ notionsââsuch as free speech, the marketplace of ideas, shareholder control, and managerial accountability as well as collusive behavior â 827 â Section 5: Independent Regulatory Agencies with government.â Under the Biden FTC, he writes, firms try âto get out of anti- trust liability by offering climate, diversity, or other forms of ESG-type offerings.â Candeub says that state AGs âare far more responsive to their constituentsâ than the federal government generally is, and he recommends that the FTC establish a position in the chairmanâs office that is âfocused on state AG cooperation and inviting state AGs to Washington, DC, to discuss enforcement policy in key sectors under the FTCâs jurisdiction: Big Tech, hospital mergers, supermarket mergers, and so forth.â
Introduction
â 826 â Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise moderate content in good faithââin a way that eliminates the expansive, non-tex- tual immunities that courts have read into the statute.â In addition to taking unilateral action, Carr says, the FCC should work with Congress on legislative changes to ensure that âInternet companies no longer have carte blanche to censor protected speech while maintaining their Section 230 protections.â Carr writes that during the Trump Administration, the FCC took an âappro- priately strong approach to the national security threats posed by the Chinese Communist Party.â The FCC put Huawei on its Covered List of entitiesâits list of those posing âan unacceptable riskâ to U.S. national security. Carr writes that TikTok also poses a âserious and unacceptableâ risk to U.S. national security, while providing âBeijing with an opportunity to run a foreign influence campaign by determining the news and information that the app feeds to millions of Americans,â and the next Administration should ban it. Whatâs more, Carr writes, âU.S. busi- nesses are aiding Beijingâoften unwittinglyââin its effort to become, by 2030, âthe global leader in artificial intelligence.â In part, they are doing so by providing âBei- jing access to their high-powered cloud computing services.â Carr asserts that âit is time for an Administration to put in place a comprehensive plan that aims to stop U.S. entities from directly or indirectly contributing to Chinaâs malign AI goals .â Former Federal Election Commissioner Hans von Spakovsky writes in Chap- ter 29 that while âthe authority of the President over the actions ofâ the Federal Election Commission âis extremely limited,â the President âmust ensure that the [Justice Department], just like the FEC, is directed to only prosecute clear viola- tionsâ of the Federal Election Campaign Act. âThe department must not construe ambiguous provisionsâŚin a way that infringes on protected First Amendment activity,â he writes. The FEC has six members, three from each party, and its determinations require a majorityâso, they require the support of at least one member of each party. DOJ should not âprosecute an individual for supposedly violating the law when the FEC has previously determined that a similarly situated individual has not violated the law,â writes von Spakovsky. Moreover, he writes that the âPresident should vigorously oppose all effortsââsuch as the language in the âFor the People Act of 2021âââto change the structure of the FECâ so that it would have an âodd numberâ of members. The current structure âensures that there is bipartisan agreement before any action is taken and protects against the FEC being weaponized.â In Chapter 27, David R. Burton writes that the Securities and Exchange Com- mission (SEC) âshould be reducing impediments to capital formation, not radically increasing themâ by pushing a costly âclimate changeâ agenda, as it is doing under the Biden Administration. Discussing the Federal Trade Commission, Adam Can- deub writes in Chapter 30, âAntitrust law can combat dominant firmsâ baleful effects on democraticâ notionsââsuch as free speech, the marketplace of ideas, shareholder control, and managerial accountability as well as collusive behavior
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About These Correlations
Policy matches are calculated using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text. A score of 60% or higher indicates meaningful thematic overlap. This does not imply direct causation or intent, but highlights areas where legislation aligns with Project 2025 policy objectives.