Financial Exploitation Prevention Act of 2025

— 748 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise loan credit subsidy costs, and miscellaneous program “enhancements” to support small businesses through economic challenges or circumstances. As noted by the Congressional Research Service: Overall, the SBA’s appropriations have ranged from a high of over $761.9 billion in FY2020 to a low of $571.8 million in FY2007. Much of this volatility is due to significant variation in supplemental appropriations for disaster assistance to address economic damages caused by major hurricanes and for SBA lending program enhancements to help small businesses access capital during and immediately following recessions. For example, in FY2020, the SBA received over $760.9 billion in supplemental appropriations to assist small businesses adversely affected by the novel coronavirus (COVID- 19) pandemic.18 The CRS further notes that “[o]verall, since FY2000, appropriations for SBA’s other programs, excluding supplemental appropriations, have increased at a pace that exceeds inflation.”19 In terms of current loan volume, the SBA “reached nearly $43 billion in fund- ing to small businesses, providing more than 62,000 traditional loans through its 7(a), 504, and Microloan lending partners and over 1,200 investments through SBA licensed Small Business Investment Companies (SBICs) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2022.”20 The agency’s total budgetary resources for FY 2022 amount to $44.25 billion, which represents 0.4 percent of the FY 2022 U.S. federal budget.21 HISTORY OF MISMANAGEMENT Throughout its history, various SBA programs and practices have generated negative news headlines and scathing Government Accountability Office (GAO) and Inspector General (IG) reports that have centered on mismanagement, lack of competent personnel and/or systems, and waste, fraud and abuse.22 From the 8a program23 to Hurricane Katrina24 to the more current COVID-19 (EIDL) program and PPP lending program,25 the SBA has managed to maintain its lending role even when repeated system failures have affected its distribution of funds. Congress has been somewhat responsive, pressuring the SBA to clean up fraud-related matters within its COVID-19 lending and grant programs.26 Repub- licans in the U.S. House of Representatives have gone farther, specifying that the SBA needs to improve transparency and accountability and deal with mission creep, the expansion of unauthorized programs, and structural and reporting deficiencies that have allowed mismanagement and fraud to reoccur, largely through massive supplemental appropriations.27 The SBA is led by an Administrator (currently a member of the President’s Cabinet) and a Deputy Administrator. Senate-confirmed appointees include — 749 — Small Business Administration the Administrator, Deputy Administrator, Chief Counsel for Advocacy, and Inspector General. Entrepreneurs and small businesses require limited-government policies that do not impede their risk-taking and growth. A future Administration can leverage and strengthen core SBA functions that have been fairly effective at reining in and calling attention to costly regulations and policies that are harmful to small businesses. This core advocacy function is aided both by statutory authority and by a network of small-business organizations and allies that support limited-gov- ernment policies.28 Moreover, an effective SBA Administrator and leadership team can work and advocate across the federal government to ensure that extreme regulatory poli- cies—or anticompetitive rules and actions that may favor big businesses over small businesses or international competitors over American small businesses—are dismantled or do not progress when proposed. MISSION CREEP AND ENLARGEMENT As noted, Republicans in the U.S. House of Representatives have evidenced con- cern about SBA mission creep and the need to make a sprawling, unaccountable agency more focused and operationally sound. Moreover, there is unease that the agency has moved from being open to any eligible small business searching for sup- port to being hyperfocused on “disproportionately impacted,” politically favored, or geographically situated small businesses and entrepreneurs. Today, initiatives aimed at “inclusivity” are in fact creating exclusivity and stringent selectivity in deciding what types of small businesses and entities can use SBA programs. For example, even though the SBA under President Donald Trump proposed a rule to remove all of the unconstitutional religious exclusions from its regulations29 to conform with Supreme Court decisions that have made their unconstitutionality clear, the SBA has not acted on the proposed rule and still uses religious exclusions in determining eligibility for business loans. Several other specific concerns include but are not limited to: l The SBA’s request to become a “designated voter agency” in response to President Biden’s executive order on “Promoting Access to Voting.”30 l The creation of duplicative channels and “pilot programs” for the delivery of business training rather than working through existing counseling partners. The programs are largely duplicative of private, state and local government, and educational system offerings.31 l A push to expand direct government lending.32

— 837 — Financial Regulatory Agencies l Require the SEC and the CFTC to publish a detailed annual report on SRO supervision. AUTHOR’S NOTE: The preparation of this chapter was a collective enterprise of individuals involved in the 2025 Presidential Transition Project. All contributors to this chapter are listed at the front of this volume, but Paul Atkins, C. Wallace DeWitt, Christopher Iacovella, Brian Knight, Chelsea Pizzola, and Andrew Vollmer deserve special mention. The author alone assumes responsibility for the content of this chapter, and no views expressed herein should be attributed to any other individual. CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU Robert Bowes The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) was authorized in 2010 by the Dodd–Frank Act.32 Since the Bureau’s inception, its status as an “inde- pendent” agency with no congressional oversight has been questioned in multiple court cases, and the agency has been assailed by critics33 as a shakedown mecha- nism to provide unaccountable funding to leftist nonprofits politically aligned with those who spearheaded its creation. In 2015, for example, Investor’s Business Daily accused the CFPB of “diverting potentially millions of dollars in settlement payments for alleged victims of lending bias to a slush fund for poverty groups tied to the Democratic Party” and plan- ning “to create a so-called Civil Penalty Fund from its own shakedown operations targeting financial institutions” that would use “ramped-up (and trumped-up) anti-discrimination lawsuits and investigations” to “bankroll some 60 liberal non- profits, many of whom are radical Acorn-style pressure groups.”34 The CFPB has a fiscal year (FY) 2023 budget of $653.2 million35 and 1,635 full- time equivalent (FTE) employees.36 From FY 2012 through FY 2020, it imposed approximately $1.25 billion in civil money penalties;37 in FY 2022, it imposed approximately $172.5 million in civil money penalties.38 These penalties are imposed by the CFPB Civil Penalty Fund, described as “a victims relief fund, into which the CFPB deposits civil penalties it collects in judicial and administrative actions under Federal consumer financial laws.”39 The CFPB is headed by a single Director who is appointed by the President to a five-year term.40 Its organizational structure includes five divisions: Operations; Consumer Education and External Affairs; Legal; Supervision, Enforcement and Fair Lending; and Research, Monitoring and Regulations.41 Each of these divisions reports to the Office of the Director, except for the Operations Division, which reports to the Deputy Director. Passage of Title X of Dodd–Frank was a bid to placate concern over a series of regulatory failures identified in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis. The law imported a new superstructure of federal regulation over consumer finance and — 838 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise mortgage lending and servicing industries traditionally regulated by state bank- ing regulators. Consumer protection responsibilities previously handled by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Office of Thrift Supervision, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Federal Reserve, National Credit Union Admin- istration, and Federal Trade Commission were transferred to and consolidated in the CFPB, which issues rules, orders, and guidance to implement federal consumer financial law. The CFPB collects fines from the private sector that are put into the Civil Pen- alty Fund.42 The fund serves two ostensible purposes: to compensate the victims whom the CFPB perceives to be harmed and to underwrite “consumer education” and “financial literacy” programs.43 How the Civil Penalty Fund is spent is at the discretion of the CFPB Director. The CFPB has been unclear as to how it decides what “consumer education” or “financial literacy programs” to fund.44 As noted, critics have charged that money from the Civil Penalty Fund has ended up in the pockets of leftist activist organizations. In Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau,45 the Supreme Court of the United States held that the CFPB’s leadership by a single individual remov- able only for inefficiency, neglect, or malfeasance violated constitutional separation of powers requirements because “[t]he Constitution requires that such officials remain dependent on the President, who in turn is accountable to the people.”46 The CFPB Director is thus subject to removal by the President. The CFPB is not subject to congressional oversight, and its funding is not determined by elected lawmakers in Congress as part of the typical congressional appropriations process. It receives its funding from the Federal Reserve, which is itself funded outside the appropriations process through bank assessments. CFPB funding represents 12 percent of the total operating expenses of the Fed- eral Reserve and is disbursed by the unelected Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.47 This is not the case with respect to any other federal agency. On October 19, 2022, in Community Financial Services Association of America v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the CFPB’s “perpetual insulation from Congress’s appropriations power, including the express exemption from congressional review of its funding, renders the Bureau ‘no longer dependent and, as a result, no longer accountable’ to Congress and, ultimately, to the people”48 and that “[b]y abandoning its ‘most complete and effectual’ check on ‘the overgrown prerogatives of the other branches of the government’—indeed, by enabling them in the Bureau’s case—Congress ran afoul of the separation of powers embodied in the Appropriations Clause.”49 The Court further remarked that the CFPB’s “capacious portfolio of authority acts ‘as a mini legislature, prosecutor, and court, responsible for creating substantive rules for a wide swath of industries, prosecuting violations, and levying knee-buckling penalties against private citizens.’”50

— 715 — Department of the Treasury 67. On banks, credit unions, broker-dealers, and other financial institutions as normally understood, but note that 31 U.S. Code §5312(a)(2) also defines “financial institutions” to include money service businesses; insurance companies; jewelers; pawnbrokers; travel agencies; dealers in automobiles, airplanes, and boats; persons involved in real estate closings and settlements; casinos; and telegraph companies. 68. David R. Burton, “The Corporate Transparency Act and the ILLICIT CASH Act,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3449, November 7, 2019, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2019-11/BG3449_0. pdf, and David R. Burton to AnnaLou Tirol, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, “Re: Beneficial Ownership Information Reporting Requirements,” Comment, May 5, 2021 http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2022/ Regulatory_Comments/FINCEN-2021-0005-0132_attachment_1.pdf (accessed March 19, 2023). 69. Burton comment, ibid. 70. Federal Register, Vol. 87, No. 189, September 30, 2022, pp. 59498–59596. 71. U.S. Department of the Treasury, Fiscal Year 2022–2026 Strategic Plan. 72. Ibid. 73. United Nations, “Paris Agreement,” 2015, https://unfccc.int/files/essential_background/convention/ application/pdf/english_paris_agreement.pdf (accessed March 20, 2023). 74. United Nations, “United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,” GE.5–62220, 1992, https://unfccc. int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf (accessed March 20, 2023). 75. “What Is ESG?” ESG Hurts, https://esghurts.com/ (accessed March 22, 2023), and Samuel Gregg, “Why Business Should Dispense with ESG,” American Institute for Economic Research, December 4, 2022, https:// www.aier.org/article/why-business-should-dispense-with-esg/ (accessed March 22, 2023). 76. PRI Association, “What are the Principles for Responsible Investment?” https://www.unpri.org/about-us/ what-are-the-principles-for-responsible-investment (accessed March 22, 2023). The PRI Association is a U.N.- affiliated non-governmental organization. See also PRI Association, “Articles of Association of PRI Association,” Art. 9, November 14, 2016, https://d8g8t13e9vf2o.cloudfront.net/Uploads/g/e/r/2016-11-14-Articles-of- Association-of-PRI-Association-.pdf (accessed March 22, 2023). — 717 — 23 EXPORT–IMPORT BANK THE EXPORT–IMPORT BANK SHOULD BE ABOLISHED Veronique de Rugy The Export–Import Bank of the United States (EXIM or the Bank) is a federal agency that was established in 1934 to provide export subsidies through tax- payer-backed financing to private exporting corporations, as well as to foreign companies buying U.S. exports, with the ostensible purpose of promoting American exports, creating jobs, supporting small businesses, improving U.S. competitive- ness, and protecting U.S. taxpayers. In 1986, David Stockman, who served as Director of the Office of Management and Budget under President Ronald Reagan, wrote that: Export subsidies are a mercantilist illusion, based on the illogical proposition that a nation can raise its employment and GNP by giving away its goods for less than what it costs to make them.… Export subsidies subtract from GNP and jobs, not expand them…. Moreover, in 1981, the EXIM’s practice was to bestow about two thirds of its subsidies on a handful of giant manufacturers, including Boeing aircraft, General Electric, and Westinghouse.1 Since then, very little has changed. EXIM operates in effect as a protectionist agency that picks winners and losers in the market by providing political privi- leges to firms that are already well-financed. By doing so, it risks taxpayer funds as it stymies economic growth. This reality is not altered by the argument that the Bank could be a weapon to fight China—an argument that rests on a misguided