The bill
Secure Our Ports Act of 2025
HR. 252, 119th Congress — read as touching Surface Transportation.
Sponsored by
Rep. Calvert, Ken [R-CA-41]
ID: C000059
Follow the money
The bill
HR. 252, 119th Congress — read as touching Surface Transportation.
The sponsor
Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.
The money
30 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.
The alignment
This bill's text tracks the "Department of the Treasury" section, p. 736-738 of the Mandate for Leadership.
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Received in the Senate and Read twice and referred to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation.
June 9, 2025
📍 Current Status
Next: Both chambers must agree on the same version of the bill.
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Another masterpiece of legislative theater, brought to you by the same geniuses who thought "Operation Iraqi Freedom" was a good idea.
**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The Secure Our Ports Act of 2025 is a thinly veiled attempt to pander to national security concerns while lining the pockets of special interest groups. Its primary objective is to prohibit contracts for port operations and management with certain foreign entities, because God forbid we let those evil Chinese, Russians, North Koreans, or Iranians get their hands on our precious ports.
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill amends title 46 of the United States Code by adding a new section that prohibits owners or operators of facilities requiring a facility security plan from entering into contracts with entities owned by countries listed in paragraph (1). Wow, what a bold move. I'm sure this will completely prevent any potential security threats and not at all create a bureaucratic nightmare for port authorities.
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The usual suspects are affected: foreign entities trying to do business with the US, American companies that might have to deal with said foreign entities, and of course, the poor, beleaguered taxpayers who will foot the bill for this exercise in futility. Oh, and let's not forget the politicians who get to grandstand about national security while taking campaign donations from defense contractors.
**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill is a classic case of "security theater" – all show, no substance. It won't actually make our ports more secure, but it will create a lot of red tape and give politicians something to crow about on the campaign trail. In reality, this bill is likely to:
* Increase costs for American companies doing business with foreign entities * Create new bureaucratic hurdles for port authorities * Provide a convenient excuse for politicians to avoid actual security reforms
Diagnosis: This bill suffers from a bad case of "National Security-itis" – a disease characterized by an excessive reliance on empty rhetoric and a complete disregard for practical solutions. Treatment involves a healthy dose of skepticism, a strong stomach for bureaucratic nonsense, and a willingness to call out the obvious lies and half-truths peddled by our esteemed lawmakers.
Prognosis: This bill will likely pass with flying colors, because who doesn't love a good game of "National Security Chicken"? The real question is how long it'll take before we realize that this "security" measure has done nothing to actually secure our ports.
Rep. Calvert, Ken [R-CA-41]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
No PAC contributions found
No committee contributions found
No individual contributions found
This bill has 2 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.
ID: G000593
Top Contributors
20
ID: G000559
Top Contributors
28
Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Showing 59 nodes and 88 connections
Total contributions: $88
Showing top 18 donors by contribution amount
Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 1 harmed.
Section 2(a) prohibits contracts for port operation and management with entities owned by China, Russia, North Korea, or Iran, which directly affects freight rail, trucking, shipping, and logistics companies that rely on port operations for cargo movement.
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.
AI Analysis:
"The bill aligns closely with Project 2025's focus on strengthening CFIUS oversight and restricting Chinese state-owned enterprise investments in U.S. critical infrastructure, particularly by targeting foreign ownership of port facilities—a form of greenfield or operational asset that poses national security risks."
— 703 — Department of the Treasury l The U.S. should also examine increasing or decreasing its ownership levels in these institutions in order to achieve maximum leverage. CHINA AND OTHER GEOPOLITICAL THREATS Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States. The interagency Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States should realign its priorities to meet the United States’ current foreign policy threats, especially from China. On October 20, 2022, the Treasury Department, which chairs CFIUS, adopted the first-ever CFIUS Enforcement and Penalty Guidelines50 on the committee’s national security risk mitigation requirements. However, there are no clear rules that guide CFIUS on mitigation monitoring, nor is there a published penalty sched- ule to standardize accountability when CFIUS pursues a civil money penalty for violators. In addition, Treasury—as chair of the committee—runs an opaque pro- cess that biases committee procedure toward corporate interests and away from national security interests. Finally, the committee’s jurisdiction does not extend over greenfield investments that Chinese state-owned enterprises have historically pursued in the United States, which leaves America vulnerable to an instrument of Chinese economic statecraft. Given these issues, the next steps for CFIUS should be to develop a more coherent—and transparent—mitigation monitoring program to complement the enforcement guidelines, give CFIUS agencies in charge of national security con- cerns an equal voice at the table, and petition Congress to amend the law to cover Chinese greenfield investments. CFIUS should publish a penalty schedule for violations of CFIUS reporting and mitigation requirements. Publishing a penalty schedule for CFIUS violations will reduce the discretion of the committee to waive penalties or impose mere “wrist slap” costs on violators of the law. Additionally, a standardized penalty schedule would likely increase the deterrence of CFIUS enforcement by reducing the per- ception among parties to covered transactions that they can avoid enforcement by the committee or secure special exceptions based on appeals to the commit- tee’s discretion. As a legal matter—and in application by CFIUS—mitigation monitoring has developed as the Wild West. There are no clear rules that guide the entire com- mittee on mitigation monitoring, nor is there the same level of oversight or accountability within and among the agencies as applies when CFIUS reviews a transaction or when it pursues a civil money penalty. Indeed, it is a credit to transaction parties and the professionalism of the governmental officials and con- tractors who conduct mitigation monitoring on behalf of the government that, by and large, mitigation monitoring has worked adequately during the last several decades. But dependency on the personality and capabilities of individuals creates unnecessary risk both for CFIUS and for transaction parties. — 704 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise Congress should make the Department of Defense (DOD) a CFIUS co-chair with the Department of Treasury. Making DOD an official CFIUS co-chair along with Treasury will establish a balanced committee process by elevating national security interests to an equal stature. The committee is currently imbalanced toward the interests of corporate America because Treasury is the sole chair of CFIUS and, in practice, runs a process that is not fully transparent and which biases it from the national security interests represented by DOD and the Intelligence Community (IC). For example, Treasury representatives will consult with the Commerce Depart- ment and the United States Trade Representative—which tend to favor permitting covered transactions to occur with little to no mitigation requirements—and these representatives will then obscure the results and purposes of such sidebar meet- ings from DOD and IC representatives. This hampers DOD, IC, and sometimes even State Department representatives from full participation in the process or from advocating national security interests as well as they should. Greenfield Investments. Congress should close the loophole on greenfield investments and require CFIUS review of investments in U.S.-based greenfield assets by Chinese-controlled entities to assess any potential harm to U.S. national and economic security. In the 2018 Foreign Risk and Review Modernization Act (FIRRMA),51 one important category of foreign transactions left out of the bill was greenfield investments, particularly by Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Greenfield investments by Chinese SOEs pose a unique threat, and they should be met with the highest scrutiny by all levels of government. Greenfield investments result in the control of newly built facilities in the U.S., and they were not addressed in FIRRMA primarily because governors and state governments embrace them. That is understandable; they typically bring the promise of creating American jobs. However, the goal of such Chinese SOEs is to siphon assets, technological innovation, and influence away from U.S. businesses in order to expand the global presence of the Chinese Communist Party. While the Chinese government keeps its domestic markets largely insulated from foreign influence, it regularly invests in the U.S. and other countries under the “green- field” model. Firms fully owned by China’s Communist regime are increasingly buying land, building factories, and taking advantage of state and local tax breaks on American soil. Treasury should examine creating a school of financial warfare jointly with DOD. If the U.S. is to rely on financial weapons, tools, and strategies to prosecute international defensive and offensive objectives, it must create a specially trained group of experts dedicated to the study, training, testing, and preparedness of these deterrents. Recent experience has demonstrated that the U.S. cannot depend on the rapid development and deployment of untested, academically developed finan- cial actions, stratagems, and weapons on an ad hoc basis.
AI Analysis:
"The bill aligns with Project 2025's focus on national security risks posed by foreign entities from countries of concern, particularly China and Russia, by restricting their involvement in critical infrastructure. However, it addresses port facility ownership rather than export controls, data transfers, or Entity List mechanisms emphasized in the Commerce section."
— 673 — Department of Commerce Export Enforcement officers through improved and frequent training so they are able to detect export-control violations. EAR Revisions. The U.S. Government needs a new export control moderniza- tion effort to tighten the EAR policies governing licenses to countries of concern, including China and Russia (specifically, revise and/or reverse the 2008 through 2016 policies). When authoritarian governments explain what they plan to do, believe them unless hard evidence demonstrates otherwise. Case in point: China’s and Russia’s stated civil–military fusion policies demand central government command-and-control style systems in which every private entity serves the interests of the state and is forced to provide technology, services, capacity, and data to the central govern- ment and the military. Through this structure, commercial activities are routinely weaponized by authoritarian regimes that repeatedly identify the U.S. as an enemy. Accordingly, U.S. export control policies must be updated to reflect these realities and the associated threats to national security. Key priorities for EAR modernization for countries of concern should be: l Eliminating the “specially designed” licensing loophole; l Redesignating China and Russia to more highly prohibitive export licensing groups (country groups D or E); l Eliminating license exceptions; l Broadening foreign direct product rules; l Reducing the de minimis threshold from 25 percent to 10 percent—or 0 percent for critical technologies; l Tightening the deemed export rules to prevent technology transfer to foreign nationals from countries of concern; l Tightening the definition of “fundamental research” to address exploitation of the open U.S. university system by authoritarian governments through funding, students and researchers, and recruitment; l Eliminating license exceptions for sharing technology with controlled entities/countries through standards-setting “activities” and bodies; and l Improving regulations regarding published information for technology transfers. — 674 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise The next few years will prove or disprove the assertion that the U.S. stands on the precipice of a Cold War with China. Many believe that a Cold War has already begun; if so, then strategic decoupling from China is necessary and, fundamentally, any exports of goods, software, and technology to countries of concern, whether directly or indirectly, should be prohibited or controlled in the absence of good cause (e.g., humanitarian and medical aid, food aid). Entity List and Sanctions. There are currently just over 500 Chinese and over 500 Russian companies on the Department of Commerce’s Entity List, which reg- ulates exports of controlled and uncontrolled items to designated entities. Given China’s Civil–Military Fusion Strategy and Russia’s massive war efforts facili- tated by a broad range of the Russian economy, BIS must add more entities to the Entity List and apply a license review “policy of denial” that prohibits exports to these entities. Entity List parties that violate export controls should be placed on the BIS Denied Persons List (and thereby lose export privileges) and, if the violations are significant enough, they should also be sanctioned by the Department of Treasury. Data Transfer and Apps Used for Surveillance. Department of Commerce leadership should work across government agencies to address privacy and data concerns arising out of “big tech” from national security and export control per- spectives. In particular, they should draft and implement an executive order (EO) based on the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, which expands export control authority beyond ECRA’s scope (goods, software, technology) to regulate and restrict exports of U.S. persons’ data to countries of concern. The EO should establish a framework for the types of personal data subject to export controls and licensing policy by country, and the BIS should implement the EO through regulations. BIS should additionally designate app providers (such as WeChat and Byte Dance/TikTok) known for undermining U.S. national security through data collection, surveillance, and influence operations, to the Entity List. This listing would prevent app users from program updates, which would quickly make these apps non-operational in the United States. NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION Break Up NOAA. The single biggest Department of Commerce agency outside of decennial census years is the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, which houses the National Weather Service, National Marine Fisheries Service, and other components. NOAA garners $6.5 billion of the department’s $12 billion annual operational budget and accounts for more than half of the department’s personnel in non-decadal Census years (2021 figures). NOAA consists of six main offices: l The National Weather Service (NWS);
AI Analysis:
"Both the bill and the HUD policy seek to limit foreign influence over domestic markets—ports versus housing—by restricting ownership or operation by state‑owned enterprises from China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran. However, the bill focuses on national security of port infrastructure while the HUD policy addresses housing market disruption, regulatory reform, and DEI/ESG concerns, resulting in only partial thematic overlap."
— 515 — Department of Housing and Urban Development 25. Process must prioritize where political leadership can implement administrative reforms through regulatory action and subregulatory guidance reforms. 26. China and other foreign nations should not be able to disrupt our nation’s housing markets, including by artificially driving up prices and reducing affordability and access to housing for Americans who are crowded out of the market by such market participation. 27. These initiatives are maintained under such designations as diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI); critical race theory (CRT); black, indigenous, Pacific Islander, and other people of color (BIPOC); and environmental, social, and governance (ESG). 28. At a minimum, these efforts duplicate what the federal government already collects and assesses; at worst, they institute arbitrary procedures in real estate appraisal practices that undermine integrity and perversely introduce arbitrary biases into what should be an unbiased system for determining financial value. 29. Revise regulatory and subregulatory guidance, where applicable within statutory authorities, that adds unnecessary delay and costs to the construction and development of new housing and has been estimated to account for about 40 percent of new housing unit costs in multifamily housing. 30. The Biden Administration has issued a proposed rule to replace the Trump Administration’s “Preserving Community and Neighborhood Choice” rule that had repealed earlier rules expanding AFFH enforcement. See U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office of Fair Housing, “Preserving Community and Neighborhood Choice,” Final Rule, Federal Register, Vol. 85, No. 153 (August 7, 2020), pp. 47899–47912, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2020-08-07/pdf/2020-16320.pdf (accessed March 5, 2023), and U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office of the Secretary, “Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing,” Proposed Rule, Federal Register, Vol. 88, No. 27 (February 9, 2023), pp. 8516–8590, https://www. govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2015-07-16/pdf/2015-17032.pdf (accessed March 5, 2023). 31. Certain pilot initiatives may encourage greater take-up of loan products designed for faster equity accumulation, including loans with shorter terms and accelerated amortization schedules. In concept, the FHA’s Home Equity Accelerator Loan (HEAL) and Good Neighbor Next Door (GNND) pilot initiatives might lead to meaningful wealth generation for first-time buyers, but they should be available to all eligible households only when they do not arbitrarily discriminate based on race or other characteristics. 32. Housing supply does remain a problem in the U.S., but constructing more units at the low end of the market will not solve the problem. Investors and developers can deliver at more efficient cost new units that will allow for greater upward mobility of rental and ownership housing stock and better target increased construction of mid-tier rental units. Further, and more fundamental to the housing supply challenge in markets across the U.S., localities can consider revising land use, zoning, and building regulations that constrict new housing development, adding time delays and costs that impede construction. Federal housing policy should get out of the way where possible and minimize the distortive impact that stimulating greater demand through loose lending can have in driving up housing prices for households that are looking for affordable entry into the housing market. 33. U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office of the Secretary, “Housing and Community Development Act of 1980: Verification of Eligible Status,” Proposed Rule, Federal Register, Vol. 84, No. 91 (May 10, 2019), pp. 20589–20595, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2019-05-10/pdf/2019-09566.pdf (accessed March 5, 2023). 34. Reforms should contemplate rent payment flexibilities, allow escrow savings, and set maximum term limits that can reduce implicit penalties for increasing household incomes over eligibility terms for housing assistance and reweight waiting-list prioritization for two-parent households. 35. Some PHAs have been able to implement work requirements and term limit policies in various congressionally authorized demonstration programs, notably the Moving to Work (MTW) demonstration program established in 1996 for 39 PHAs (Congress has since authorized another 100 PHAs) in which participating MTW PHAs were given authority to implement rent reforms, work requirements and other experimental policies in rental assistance programs along with flexibilities in the use of capital and operating appropriations. 36. The FSS program has a general five-year term with a possible two-year extension, which could be applied at the term limit for overall benefits, and certain PHAs have imposed five-year to seven-year term limits. Families in these programs build escrow savings during their term eligibility that helps to facilitate successful transitions to family self-sufficiency and unassisted housing.
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.