One Vote One Choice Act
Download PDFSponsored by
Rep. Lawler, Michael [R-NY-17]
ID: L000599
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5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Bill Summary
Another masterpiece of legislative theater, courtesy of the intellectually bankrupt members of Congress. Let's dissect this farce, shall we?
**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The One Vote One Choice Act (HR 2561) is a thinly veiled attempt to restrict voting rights and consolidate power in the hands of the two-party duopoly. The bill's sponsors, Lawler, Tenney, and Miller, are either willfully ignorant or deliberately deceitful about the true intentions behind this legislation.
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill prohibits states from using ranked choice voting (RCV) in federal elections, effectively limiting voters' ability to express their preferences beyond a simple "yes" or "no." This is a blatant attempt to suppress voter choice and maintain the status quo of a two-party system. The amendments made by this section will apply to all elections held on or after the date of enactment.
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The real stakeholders here are not the voters, but rather the politicians who benefit from maintaining a restrictive voting system. By limiting RCV, they ensure that their own power and influence remain unchallenged. The bill's sponsors are merely pawns in this game, serving the interests of their party leaders and donors.
**Potential Impact & Implications:** This legislation has far-reaching implications for democracy itself. By restricting voter choice, it perpetuates a system where voters are forced to choose between two often-unpalatable options. This will lead to increased disillusionment with the electoral process, decreased voter turnout, and further entrenchment of the two-party duopoly.
In medical terms, this bill is akin to a patient self-administering a lethal dose of stupidity. The symptoms are clear: a severe case of partisan myopia, accompanied by a complete disregard for the well-being of the body politic. The diagnosis? Terminal idiocy, with a prognosis of continued erosion of democratic institutions.
To the sponsors and supporters of this bill, I offer a simple prescription: take two doses of intellectual honesty, followed by a healthy dose of civic responsibility. Unfortunately, I suspect they will continue to ignore the obvious symptoms of their own incompetence.
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đ° Campaign Finance Network
Rep. Lawler, Michael [R-NY-17]
Congress 119 ⢠2024 Election Cycle
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Donor Network - Rep. Lawler, Michael [R-NY-17]
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Top Donors - Rep. Lawler, Michael [R-NY-17]
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Project 2025 Policy Matches
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document. Higher similarity scores indicate stronger thematic connections.
Introduction
â 866 â Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise an advisory opinion, or issue regulations, ensures that there is bipartisan agreement before any action is taken and protects against the FEC being used as a political weapon. With only five commissioners, three members of the same political party could control the enforcement process of the agency, raising the potential of a powerful federal agency enforcing the law on a partisan basis against the members of the opposition political party. Efforts to impose a ânonpartisanâ or so-called âinde- pendentâ chair are impractical; the chair will inevitably be aligned with his or her appointing party, at least as a matter of perception. There are numerous other changes that should be considered in FECA and the FECâs regulations. The overly restrictive limits on the ability of party com- mittees to coordinate with their candidates, for example, violates associational rights and unjustifiably interferes with the very purpose of political parties: to elect their candidates. l Raise contribution limits and index reporting requirements to inflation. Contribution limits should generally be much higher, as they hamstring candidates and parties while serving no practical anticorruption purpose. And a wide range of reporting requirements have not been indexed to inflation, clogging the public record and the FECâs internal processes with small-dollar information of little use to the public. CONCLUSION When taking any action related to the FEC, the President should keep in mind that, as former FEC Chairman Bradley Smith says, the âgreater problem at the FEC has been overenforcement,â not underenforcement as some critics falsely allege.15 As he correctly concludes, the FECâs enforcement efforts âplace a substan- tial burden on small committees and campaigns, and are having a chilling effect on some political speechâŚsqueezing the life out of low level, volunteer politi- cal activity.â16 Commissioners have a duty to enforce FECA in a fair, nonpartisan, objective manner. But they must do so in a way that protects the First Amendment rights of the public, political parties, and candidates to fully participate in the political process. The President has the same duty to ensure that the Department of Justice enforces the law in a similar manner. â 867 â Federal Election Commission ENDNOTES 1. 52 U.S.C. § 30101 et seq. 2. 52 U.S.C. § 30106(b)(1). 3. 52 U.S.C. § 30109(c) and (d). 4. Bradley A. Smith and Stephen M. Hoersting, âA Toothless Anaconda: Innovation, Impotence and Overenforcement at the Federal Election Commission,â 1 Election Law Journal 2 (2002), p. 162. 5. 52 U.S.C. § 30106(a)(2). 6. 52 U.S.C. § 30106(a)(1). 7. Former Commissioner Steven Walther (2006â2022) was listed nominally as an independent but he was recommended to President George W. Bush for nomination by former Nevada Sen. Harry Reid (D) and almost always voted in line with the Democrat commissioners on the FEC. 8. Hans von Spakovsky served as a commissioner from 2006 to 2007 in a recess appointment. While no other nominee has been rejected by the Senate, the tradition of bipartisan voice vote confirmation has largely ended. Two Republican nomineesâAllen Dickerson and Sean Cookseyâwere confirmed on party-line votes in 2020. And one DemocratâDara Lindenbaumâwas confirmed with the support of only six Republican senators in 2022. 9. The term of the 6th Commissioner, Dara Lindenbaum (D), will expire on April 30, 2027. 10. 52 U.S.C. § 30107(a)(6). 11. âStatement of Chairman Allen J. Dickerson and Commissioners Sean J. Cooksey and James E. âTreyâ Trainor, III Regarding Concluded Enforcement Matters,â Federal Election Commission (May 13, 2022), https://www. fec.gov/resources/cms-content/documents/Redacted_Statement_Regarding_Concluded_Matters_13_ May_2022_Redacted.pdf. 12. See, e.g., McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission, 572 U.S. 185 (2014). 13. It should be noted, however, that the constitutional authority of a President to, among other things, remove appointees and direct the actions of independent agencies is a hotly contested and increasingly litigated issue. See Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, 561 U.S. 477 (2010); Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183 (2020); and Collins v. Yellen, 141 S. Ct. 1761 (2021). 14. H.R. 1, 117th Cong. (2021â2022). 15. Bradley A. Smith and Stephen M. Hoersting, âA Toothless Anaconda: Innovation, Impotence and Overenforcement at the Federal Election Commission,â 1 Election Law Journal 2 (2002), p. 171. 16. Id.
Introduction
â 865 â Federal Election Commission l As a legislative matter and given this abuse, the President should seriously consider recommending that Congress amend FECA to remove the agencyâs independent litigating authority and rely on the Department of Justice to handle all litigation involving the FEC. There are also multiple instances of existing statutory provisions of FECA and the accompanying FEC regulations having been found unlawful or unconstitu- tional by federal court decisions, yet those statutory provisions remain in the U.S. Code and the implementing regulations remain in the Code of Federal Regula- tions.12 In such instances, those regulated by the law, from candidates to the public, have no way of knowing (without engaging in extensive legal research) whether particular statutory provisions and regulations are still applicable to their actions in the political arena. l The President should request that the commissioners on the FEC prepare such guidance. l In the event that the FEC fails to act, the President should direct the attorney general to prepare a guidance document from the Department of Justice for the public that outlines all of the FECA statutory provisions and FEC regulations that have been changed, amended, or voided by specific court decisions. Legislative Changes. While a Presidentâs ability to make any changes at an independent agency like the FEC is limited,13 the President has the ability to make legislative recommendations to Congress. One of the most obvious changes that is needed is to end the current practice of allowing commissioners to remain as serving commissioners long after their term has expired, defying the clear intent of Congress in specifying that a commissioner can only serve a single term of six years. l The President should prioritize nominations to the FEC once commissioners reach the end of their terms and should be assisted by legislative language either eliminating or limiting overstays to a reasonable period of time to permit the vetting, nomination, and confirmation of successors. l The President should vigorously oppose all efforts, as proposed, for example, in Section 6002 of the âFor the People Act of 2021,â14 to change the structure of the FEC to reduce the number of commissioners from six to five or another odd number. The current requirement of four votes to authorize an enforcement action, provide
Introduction
â 865 â Federal Election Commission l As a legislative matter and given this abuse, the President should seriously consider recommending that Congress amend FECA to remove the agencyâs independent litigating authority and rely on the Department of Justice to handle all litigation involving the FEC. There are also multiple instances of existing statutory provisions of FECA and the accompanying FEC regulations having been found unlawful or unconstitu- tional by federal court decisions, yet those statutory provisions remain in the U.S. Code and the implementing regulations remain in the Code of Federal Regula- tions.12 In such instances, those regulated by the law, from candidates to the public, have no way of knowing (without engaging in extensive legal research) whether particular statutory provisions and regulations are still applicable to their actions in the political arena. l The President should request that the commissioners on the FEC prepare such guidance. l In the event that the FEC fails to act, the President should direct the attorney general to prepare a guidance document from the Department of Justice for the public that outlines all of the FECA statutory provisions and FEC regulations that have been changed, amended, or voided by specific court decisions. Legislative Changes. While a Presidentâs ability to make any changes at an independent agency like the FEC is limited,13 the President has the ability to make legislative recommendations to Congress. One of the most obvious changes that is needed is to end the current practice of allowing commissioners to remain as serving commissioners long after their term has expired, defying the clear intent of Congress in specifying that a commissioner can only serve a single term of six years. l The President should prioritize nominations to the FEC once commissioners reach the end of their terms and should be assisted by legislative language either eliminating or limiting overstays to a reasonable period of time to permit the vetting, nomination, and confirmation of successors. l The President should vigorously oppose all efforts, as proposed, for example, in Section 6002 of the âFor the People Act of 2021,â14 to change the structure of the FEC to reduce the number of commissioners from six to five or another odd number. The current requirement of four votes to authorize an enforcement action, provide â 866 â Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise an advisory opinion, or issue regulations, ensures that there is bipartisan agreement before any action is taken and protects against the FEC being used as a political weapon. With only five commissioners, three members of the same political party could control the enforcement process of the agency, raising the potential of a powerful federal agency enforcing the law on a partisan basis against the members of the opposition political party. Efforts to impose a ânonpartisanâ or so-called âinde- pendentâ chair are impractical; the chair will inevitably be aligned with his or her appointing party, at least as a matter of perception. There are numerous other changes that should be considered in FECA and the FECâs regulations. The overly restrictive limits on the ability of party com- mittees to coordinate with their candidates, for example, violates associational rights and unjustifiably interferes with the very purpose of political parties: to elect their candidates. l Raise contribution limits and index reporting requirements to inflation. Contribution limits should generally be much higher, as they hamstring candidates and parties while serving no practical anticorruption purpose. And a wide range of reporting requirements have not been indexed to inflation, clogging the public record and the FECâs internal processes with small-dollar information of little use to the public. CONCLUSION When taking any action related to the FEC, the President should keep in mind that, as former FEC Chairman Bradley Smith says, the âgreater problem at the FEC has been overenforcement,â not underenforcement as some critics falsely allege.15 As he correctly concludes, the FECâs enforcement efforts âplace a substan- tial burden on small committees and campaigns, and are having a chilling effect on some political speechâŚsqueezing the life out of low level, volunteer politi- cal activity.â16 Commissioners have a duty to enforce FECA in a fair, nonpartisan, objective manner. But they must do so in a way that protects the First Amendment rights of the public, political parties, and candidates to fully participate in the political process. The President has the same duty to ensure that the Department of Justice enforces the law in a similar manner.
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
About These Correlations
Policy matches are calculated using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text. A score of 60% or higher indicates meaningful thematic overlap. This does not imply direct causation or intent, but highlights areas where legislation aligns with Project 2025 policy objectives.