To amend the Fair Credit Reporting Act to prevent consumer reporting agencies from furnishing consumer reports under certain circumstances, and for other purposes.

Bill ID: 119/hr/2808
Last Updated: April 15, 2025

Sponsored by

Rep. Rose, John W. [R-TN-6]

ID: R000612

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

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2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

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Bill Summary

Another masterpiece of legislative theater, brought to you by the same geniuses who think a "Homebuyers Privacy Protection Act" will actually protect anyone's privacy.

**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The main purpose of this bill is to pretend to care about consumer protection while actually serving the interests of the financial industry. The objective is to limit the sharing of consumer reports in connection with residential mortgage loans, but only in a way that benefits the lenders and credit reporting agencies.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill amends the Fair Credit Reporting Act to restrict the furnishing of consumer reports by credit reporting agencies under certain circumstances. Specifically, it limits the sharing of reports when a person requests a report from a consumer reporting agency in connection with a residential mortgage loan, unless:

* The transaction involves a firm offer of credit or insurance * The other party has obtained certification from the consumer or is an insured depository institution or credit union

In short, this bill creates more hoops for consumers to jump through while allowing lenders and credit reporting agencies to maintain their grip on sensitive financial information.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The usual suspects are affected by this bill:

* Consumers (who will be "protected" from the horrors of having their credit reports shared without their consent) * Lenders and mortgage servicers (who will benefit from the restrictions on sharing consumer reports) * Credit reporting agencies (who will continue to profit from selling sensitive financial information)

**Potential Impact & Implications:** The impact of this bill will be negligible for consumers, who will still have to deal with the same predatory lending practices and invasive data collection. The real beneficiaries are the lenders and credit reporting agencies, which will enjoy increased control over consumer financial information.

In conclusion, HR 2808 is a classic case of "legislative lupus" – a disease where politicians pretend to address a problem while actually making it worse. This bill is a symptom of a deeper illness: the corrupting influence of money and power in politics. The diagnosis? Terminal stupidity, with a side of greed and cowardice.

Now, if you'll excuse me, I have better things to do than dissect this legislative abomination further.

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💰 Campaign Finance Network

Rep. Rose, John W. [R-TN-6]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions
$48,643
25 donors
PACs
$3,343
Organizations
$3,300
Committees
$0
Individuals
$42,000
1
WINRED
1 transaction
$3,343
1
OTOE MISSOURIA TRIBE OF OKLAHOMA
1 transaction
$3,300

No committee contributions found

1
JURINSKY, DANIELLE
2 transactions
$6,600
2
STEWART, SANDRA
2 transactions
$4,900
3
ROCKWELL, PAGE
1 transaction
$3,300
4
YEE, TIMOTHY
1 transaction
$3,300
5
LAGOC, JULIA
1 transaction
$3,300
6
STURM, MELANIE
2 transactions
$3,300
7
MILLIKEN, NANCY
1 transaction
$3,000
8
YEE, EDMOND
1 transaction
$2,000
9
GROLNIC MCCLURG, SARAH
2 transactions
$2,000
10
MOLLNER, TERRY
1 transaction
$1,000
11
COUPOUNAS, KIMBERLY
1 transaction
$1,000
12
JONES BLESSMAN, PATRICIA
1 transaction
$1,000
13
COHEN, BEN
1 transaction
$1,000
14
LAGOC-DINGUS, RANDY
1 transaction
$1,000
15
WARRENS, JOANNA
2 transactions
$1,000
16
LAGOC, RAILEEN
1 transaction
$800
17
DARLING ALLEN, CATHY
1 transaction
$500
18
HIGGINS, BRUCE
1 transaction
$500
19
BARSTEIN, DIANE
1 transaction
$500
20
CHAZEN, JEANNE
1 transaction
$500
21
MCINNIS, LORI
1 transaction
$500
22
MCINNIS, SCOTT
1 transaction
$500
23
MEIS, CRAIG
1 transaction
$500

Donor Network - Rep. Rose, John W. [R-TN-6]

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Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.

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Showing 26 nodes and 30 connections

Total contributions: $48,643

Top Donors - Rep. Rose, John W. [R-TN-6]

Showing top 25 donors by contribution amount

1 PAC1 Org23 Individuals

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document. Higher similarity scores indicate stronger thematic connections.

Introduction

Low 58.2%
Pages: 869-871

— 837 — Financial Regulatory Agencies l Require the SEC and the CFTC to publish a detailed annual report on SRO supervision. AUTHOR’S NOTE: The preparation of this chapter was a collective enterprise of individuals involved in the 2025 Presidential Transition Project. All contributors to this chapter are listed at the front of this volume, but Paul Atkins, C. Wallace DeWitt, Christopher Iacovella, Brian Knight, Chelsea Pizzola, and Andrew Vollmer deserve special mention. The author alone assumes responsibility for the content of this chapter, and no views expressed herein should be attributed to any other individual. CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU Robert Bowes The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) was authorized in 2010 by the Dodd–Frank Act.32 Since the Bureau’s inception, its status as an “inde- pendent” agency with no congressional oversight has been questioned in multiple court cases, and the agency has been assailed by critics33 as a shakedown mecha- nism to provide unaccountable funding to leftist nonprofits politically aligned with those who spearheaded its creation. In 2015, for example, Investor’s Business Daily accused the CFPB of “diverting potentially millions of dollars in settlement payments for alleged victims of lending bias to a slush fund for poverty groups tied to the Democratic Party” and plan- ning “to create a so-called Civil Penalty Fund from its own shakedown operations targeting financial institutions” that would use “ramped-up (and trumped-up) anti-discrimination lawsuits and investigations” to “bankroll some 60 liberal non- profits, many of whom are radical Acorn-style pressure groups.”34 The CFPB has a fiscal year (FY) 2023 budget of $653.2 million35 and 1,635 full- time equivalent (FTE) employees.36 From FY 2012 through FY 2020, it imposed approximately $1.25 billion in civil money penalties;37 in FY 2022, it imposed approximately $172.5 million in civil money penalties.38 These penalties are imposed by the CFPB Civil Penalty Fund, described as “a victims relief fund, into which the CFPB deposits civil penalties it collects in judicial and administrative actions under Federal consumer financial laws.”39 The CFPB is headed by a single Director who is appointed by the President to a five-year term.40 Its organizational structure includes five divisions: Operations; Consumer Education and External Affairs; Legal; Supervision, Enforcement and Fair Lending; and Research, Monitoring and Regulations.41 Each of these divisions reports to the Office of the Director, except for the Operations Division, which reports to the Deputy Director. Passage of Title X of Dodd–Frank was a bid to placate concern over a series of regulatory failures identified in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis. The law imported a new superstructure of federal regulation over consumer finance and — 838 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise mortgage lending and servicing industries traditionally regulated by state bank- ing regulators. Consumer protection responsibilities previously handled by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Office of Thrift Supervision, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Federal Reserve, National Credit Union Admin- istration, and Federal Trade Commission were transferred to and consolidated in the CFPB, which issues rules, orders, and guidance to implement federal consumer financial law. The CFPB collects fines from the private sector that are put into the Civil Pen- alty Fund.42 The fund serves two ostensible purposes: to compensate the victims whom the CFPB perceives to be harmed and to underwrite “consumer education” and “financial literacy” programs.43 How the Civil Penalty Fund is spent is at the discretion of the CFPB Director. The CFPB has been unclear as to how it decides what “consumer education” or “financial literacy programs” to fund.44 As noted, critics have charged that money from the Civil Penalty Fund has ended up in the pockets of leftist activist organizations. In Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau,45 the Supreme Court of the United States held that the CFPB’s leadership by a single individual remov- able only for inefficiency, neglect, or malfeasance violated constitutional separation of powers requirements because “[t]he Constitution requires that such officials remain dependent on the President, who in turn is accountable to the people.”46 The CFPB Director is thus subject to removal by the President. The CFPB is not subject to congressional oversight, and its funding is not determined by elected lawmakers in Congress as part of the typical congressional appropriations process. It receives its funding from the Federal Reserve, which is itself funded outside the appropriations process through bank assessments. CFPB funding represents 12 percent of the total operating expenses of the Fed- eral Reserve and is disbursed by the unelected Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.47 This is not the case with respect to any other federal agency. On October 19, 2022, in Community Financial Services Association of America v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the CFPB’s “perpetual insulation from Congress’s appropriations power, including the express exemption from congressional review of its funding, renders the Bureau ‘no longer dependent and, as a result, no longer accountable’ to Congress and, ultimately, to the people”48 and that “[b]y abandoning its ‘most complete and effectual’ check on ‘the overgrown prerogatives of the other branches of the government’—indeed, by enabling them in the Bureau’s case—Congress ran afoul of the separation of powers embodied in the Appropriations Clause.”49 The Court further remarked that the CFPB’s “capacious portfolio of authority acts ‘as a mini legislature, prosecutor, and court, responsible for creating substantive rules for a wide swath of industries, prosecuting violations, and levying knee-buckling penalties against private citizens.’”50

Introduction

Low 52.8%
Pages: 748-751

— 715 — Department of the Treasury 67. On banks, credit unions, broker-dealers, and other financial institutions as normally understood, but note that 31 U.S. Code §5312(a)(2) also defines “financial institutions” to include money service businesses; insurance companies; jewelers; pawnbrokers; travel agencies; dealers in automobiles, airplanes, and boats; persons involved in real estate closings and settlements; casinos; and telegraph companies. 68. David R. Burton, “The Corporate Transparency Act and the ILLICIT CASH Act,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3449, November 7, 2019, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2019-11/BG3449_0. pdf, and David R. Burton to AnnaLou Tirol, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, “Re: Beneficial Ownership Information Reporting Requirements,” Comment, May 5, 2021 http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2022/ Regulatory_Comments/FINCEN-2021-0005-0132_attachment_1.pdf (accessed March 19, 2023). 69. Burton comment, ibid. 70. Federal Register, Vol. 87, No. 189, September 30, 2022, pp. 59498–59596. 71. U.S. Department of the Treasury, Fiscal Year 2022–2026 Strategic Plan. 72. Ibid. 73. United Nations, “Paris Agreement,” 2015, https://unfccc.int/files/essential_background/convention/ application/pdf/english_paris_agreement.pdf (accessed March 20, 2023). 74. United Nations, “United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,” GE.5–62220, 1992, https://unfccc. int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf (accessed March 20, 2023). 75. “What Is ESG?” ESG Hurts, https://esghurts.com/ (accessed March 22, 2023), and Samuel Gregg, “Why Business Should Dispense with ESG,” American Institute for Economic Research, December 4, 2022, https:// www.aier.org/article/why-business-should-dispense-with-esg/ (accessed March 22, 2023). 76. PRI Association, “What are the Principles for Responsible Investment?” https://www.unpri.org/about-us/ what-are-the-principles-for-responsible-investment (accessed March 22, 2023). The PRI Association is a U.N.- affiliated non-governmental organization. See also PRI Association, “Articles of Association of PRI Association,” Art. 9, November 14, 2016, https://d8g8t13e9vf2o.cloudfront.net/Uploads/g/e/r/2016-11-14-Articles-of- Association-of-PRI-Association-.pdf (accessed March 22, 2023). — 717 — 23 EXPORT–IMPORT BANK THE EXPORT–IMPORT BANK SHOULD BE ABOLISHED Veronique de Rugy The Export–Import Bank of the United States (EXIM or the Bank) is a federal agency that was established in 1934 to provide export subsidies through tax- payer-backed financing to private exporting corporations, as well as to foreign companies buying U.S. exports, with the ostensible purpose of promoting American exports, creating jobs, supporting small businesses, improving U.S. competitive- ness, and protecting U.S. taxpayers. In 1986, David Stockman, who served as Director of the Office of Management and Budget under President Ronald Reagan, wrote that: Export subsidies are a mercantilist illusion, based on the illogical proposition that a nation can raise its employment and GNP by giving away its goods for less than what it costs to make them.… Export subsidies subtract from GNP and jobs, not expand them…. Moreover, in 1981, the EXIM’s practice was to bestow about two thirds of its subsidies on a handful of giant manufacturers, including Boeing aircraft, General Electric, and Westinghouse.1 Since then, very little has changed. EXIM operates in effect as a protectionist agency that picks winners and losers in the market by providing political privi- leges to firms that are already well-financed. By doing so, it risks taxpayer funds as it stymies economic growth. This reality is not altered by the argument that the Bank could be a weapon to fight China—an argument that rests on a misguided

Introduction

Low 52.8%
Pages: 748-751

— 715 — Department of the Treasury 67. On banks, credit unions, broker-dealers, and other financial institutions as normally understood, but note that 31 U.S. Code §5312(a)(2) also defines “financial institutions” to include money service businesses; insurance companies; jewelers; pawnbrokers; travel agencies; dealers in automobiles, airplanes, and boats; persons involved in real estate closings and settlements; casinos; and telegraph companies. 68. David R. Burton, “The Corporate Transparency Act and the ILLICIT CASH Act,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3449, November 7, 2019, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2019-11/BG3449_0. pdf, and David R. Burton to AnnaLou Tirol, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, “Re: Beneficial Ownership Information Reporting Requirements,” Comment, May 5, 2021 http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2022/ Regulatory_Comments/FINCEN-2021-0005-0132_attachment_1.pdf (accessed March 19, 2023). 69. Burton comment, ibid. 70. Federal Register, Vol. 87, No. 189, September 30, 2022, pp. 59498–59596. 71. U.S. Department of the Treasury, Fiscal Year 2022–2026 Strategic Plan. 72. Ibid. 73. United Nations, “Paris Agreement,” 2015, https://unfccc.int/files/essential_background/convention/ application/pdf/english_paris_agreement.pdf (accessed March 20, 2023). 74. United Nations, “United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,” GE.5–62220, 1992, https://unfccc. int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf (accessed March 20, 2023). 75. “What Is ESG?” ESG Hurts, https://esghurts.com/ (accessed March 22, 2023), and Samuel Gregg, “Why Business Should Dispense with ESG,” American Institute for Economic Research, December 4, 2022, https:// www.aier.org/article/why-business-should-dispense-with-esg/ (accessed March 22, 2023). 76. PRI Association, “What are the Principles for Responsible Investment?” https://www.unpri.org/about-us/ what-are-the-principles-for-responsible-investment (accessed March 22, 2023). The PRI Association is a U.N.- affiliated non-governmental organization. See also PRI Association, “Articles of Association of PRI Association,” Art. 9, November 14, 2016, https://d8g8t13e9vf2o.cloudfront.net/Uploads/g/e/r/2016-11-14-Articles-of- Association-of-PRI-Association-.pdf (accessed March 22, 2023).

Showing 3 of 5 policy matches

About These Correlations

Policy matches are calculated using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text. A score of 60% or higher indicates meaningful thematic overlap. This does not imply direct causation or intent, but highlights areas where legislation aligns with Project 2025 policy objectives.