Post Quantum Cybersecurity Standards Act

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Bill ID: 119/hr/3259
Last Updated: May 18, 2026

Sponsored by

Rep. Stevens, Haley M. [D-MI-11]

ID: S001215

Follow the money

The bill

Post Quantum Cybersecurity Standards Act

HR. 3259, 119th Congress — read as touching Cybersecurity.

The sponsor

Rep. Stevens, Haley M. [D-MI-11]

Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.

The money

$84,700 raised

30 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.

The alignment

95% match to Project 2025

This bill's text tracks the "Intelligence Community" section, p. 266-268 of the Mandate for Leadership.

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

Track this bill's progress through the legislative process

Latest Action

Ordered to be Reported by the Yeas and Nays: 35 - 0.

June 10, 2025

Introduced

📍 Current Status

Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.

🏛️

Committee Review

🗳️

Floor Action

✅

Passed House

🏛️

Senate Review

🎉

Passed Congress

🖊️

Presidential Action

⚖️

Became Law

📚 How does a bill become a law?

1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.

2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

Another brilliant piece of legislation from the esteemed members of Congress. The Post Quantum Cybersecurity Standards Act, because what's a few billion dollars in unnecessary regulations when you can "advance the rapid deployment of post-quantum cybersecurity standards"? (Sarcasm alert)

Let's dissect this mess:

**New Regulations:** We're creating new definitions for "critical infrastructure" and "post-quantum cryptography", because apparently, no one knew what those terms meant before. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) gets to promote the voluntary adoption of post-quantum cryptography standards, which is code for "we'll make you do it eventually".

**Affected Industries:** Critical infrastructure providers, digital infrastructure providers, and anyone else deemed "high risk" by our benevolent government overlords. You know, the usual suspects: finance, healthcare, energy... basically anyone who can't afford to have their systems compromised.

**Compliance Requirements:** NIST will provide guidance and resources (read: more bureaucracy) to help organizations adopt post-quantum cryptography standards. There's also a grant program for entities at high risk of quantum cryptoanalytic attacks, because nothing says "security" like throwing money at the problem.

**Enforcement Mechanisms and Penalties:** Ah, the fun part! If you don't comply with these new regulations, you might face... (dramatic pause) ...a strongly worded letter from NIST? Okay, fine. There are no explicit penalties mentioned in the bill, but we can be sure that our friends at the Department of Homeland Security will find ways to "encourage" compliance.

**Economic and Operational Impacts:** This bill is a classic case of "regulatory capture", where industries with deep pockets (cough, finance, cough) get to shape policy to their advantage. The costs of implementing these new standards will be passed on to consumers, because that's what happens when you create unnecessary regulations.

In conclusion, this bill is a masterclass in bureaucratic doublespeak, designed to make it seem like our government is doing something about cybersecurity while actually just creating more red tape and opportunities for cronyism. Bravo, Congress! You've managed to turn a legitimate concern (quantum cryptography) into another excuse for regulatory overreach.

Diagnosis: Terminal case of Regulatory-itis, with symptoms including unnecessary complexity, bureaucratic bloat, and a complete disregard for the economic consequences of their actions. Prognosis: More of the same, until someone decides to actually address the underlying issues rather than just treating the symptoms.

Related Topics

Cybersecurity & Data PrivacyNational Security & IntelligenceBanking & Financial Services
Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (Dr. Haus personality)

💰 Campaign Finance Network

Rep. Stevens, Haley M. [D-MI-11]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions
$84,700
25 donors
PACs
$0
Organizations
$28,600
Committees
$0
Individuals
$56,100

No PAC contributions found

1
MATCH-E-BE-NASH-SHE-WISH BAND OF POTTAWATOMI INDIANS
2 transactions
$6,600
2
EASTERN BAND OF CHEROKEE INDIANS
1 transaction
$3,300
3
NOTTAWASEPPI HURON BAND OF THE POTAWATOMI
1 transaction
$3,300
4
POKAGON BAND OF POTAWATOMI INDIANS
1 transaction
$3,300
5
SAGINAW CHIPPEWA INDIAN TRIBE
1 transaction
$3,300
6
SHAKOPEE MDEWAKANTON SIOUX COMMUNITY
2 transactions
$3,300
7
SYCUAN BAND OF THE KUMEYAAY NATION
2 transactions
$2,500
8
SAN MANUEL BAND OF MISSION INDIANS
2 transactions
$2,000
9
MORONGO BAND OF MISSION INDIANS
1 transaction
$1,000

No committee contributions found

1
TURKISH, JASON
2 transactions
$6,600
2
JARBOU, FRANK
1 transaction
$3,300
3
SACKS, CARI B.
1 transaction
$3,300
4
JARVIS-SHEAN, ELIZABETH
1 transaction
$3,300
5
BLUHM, NEIL
1 transaction
$3,300
6
SILVERSTEIN, WILLIAM
1 transaction
$3,300
7
SACKS, MICHAEL
1 transaction
$3,300
8
SHAPIRO, ANDREW
1 transaction
$3,300
9
CHERN, ERIC
1 transaction
$3,300
10
SANDBERG, SHERYL
1 transaction
$3,300
11
CHERN, LAURA
1 transaction
$3,300
12
GURAL, JEFFREY R.
1 transaction
$3,300
13
GATES, WILLIAM H. III
1 transaction
$3,300
14
BROWN, GREGORY
1 transaction
$3,300
15
WALKER, KENT
1 transaction
$3,300
16
WYETT, TODD
1 transaction
$3,300

Cosponsors & Their Campaign Finance

This bill has 3 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.

Rep. Tenney, Claudia [R-NY-24]

ID: T000478

Top Contributors

10

1
WINRED EARMARKS
PACARLINGTON, VA
$27,879
Oct 22, 2024
2
WINRED EARMARKS
PACARLINGTON, VA
$21,566
Oct 29, 2024
3
WINRED EARMARKS
PACARLINGTON, VA
$10,970
Nov 25, 2024
4
WINRED EARMARKS
PACARLINGTON, VA
$5,493
Nov 19, 2024
5
SAN MANUEL BAND OF MISSION INDIANS
OrganizationLOS ANGELES, CA
$2,000
Nov 5, 2024
6
MORONGO BAND OF MISSION INDIANS
OrganizationBANNING, CA
$2,000
Jun 18, 2024
7
SANTA YNEZ BAND OF MISSION INDIANS
OrganizationSANTA YNEZ, CA
$2,000
Jun 18, 2024
8
MORONGO BAND OF MISSION INDIANS
OrganizationBANNING, CA
$1,000
Mar 31, 2023
9
TEXTOR, DONALD
RETIRED • RETIRED
IndividualLOCUST VALLEY, NY
$13,200
Apr 17, 2024
10
WINE, SCOTT
POLARIS • CEO
IndividualEXCELSIOR, MN
$6,600
Sep 30, 2024

Rep. Fitzpatrick, Brian K. [R-PA-1]

ID: F000466

Top Contributors

10

1
SANTA YNEZ BAND OF MISSION INDIANS
OrganizationSANTA YNEZ, CA
$1,500
Dec 31, 2024
2
STATA FAMILY OFFICE
Organization
$500
Apr 26, 2024
3
ASHER, ROBERT B.
IndividualGWYNEDD VALLEY, PA
$10,000
Oct 9, 2024
4
ASHER, ROBERT B.
ASHER CHOCOLATES • CHAIRMAN
IndividualGWYNEDD VALLEY, PA
$10,000
Sep 30, 2024
5
LEVY, EDWARD JR
EDW C LEVY CO • CHAIRMAN
IndividualBIRMINGHAM, MI
$6,600
Feb 26, 2024
6
CROTTY, THOMAS
RETIRED • RETIRED
IndividualSCOTTSDALE, AZ
$6,600
Feb 27, 2024
7
EVANS, ROGER
GREYLOCK PARTNERS • PARTNER EMERITUS
IndividualSAN FRANCISCO, CA
$6,600
Feb 27, 2024
8
LEACH, RONALD
NPX ONE • CHAIRMAN & CEO
IndividualGENEVA, IL
$6,600
Feb 28, 2024
9
MCCLAIN, MARK
SAILPOINT • CEO
IndividualAUSTIN, TX
$6,600
Mar 2, 2024
10
CROTTY, THOMAS
IndividualSCOTTSDALE, AZ
$6,600
Mar 8, 2024

Rep. Nunn, Zachary [R-IA-3]

ID: N000193

Top Contributors

10

1
OTOE MISSOURIA TRIBE OF OKLAHOMA
OrganizationRED ROCK, OK
$3,300
May 29, 2024
2
TURTLE MOUNTAIN BAND OF CHIPPEWA OF ND
OrganizationBELCOURT, ND
$3,300
May 29, 2024
3
SAC & FOX TRIBE OF THE MISSISSIPPI IN IOWA
OrganizationTAMA, IA
$2,500
Dec 31, 2024
4
SAC & FOX TRIBE OF THE MISSISSIPPI IN IOWA
OrganizationTAMA, IA
$1,000
Sep 1, 2023
5
SMITH, JOHN M.
CRST TRUCKING • CEO
IndividualCEDAR RAPIDS, IA
$6,600
Oct 28, 2024
6
SILVERMAN, JEFFREY
RETIRED • RETIRED
IndividualBAL HARBOUR, FL
$6,600
Oct 17, 2023
7
EMMET, RICHARD
JANE STREET CAPITAL • FINANCE
IndividualLARCHMONT, NY
$6,600
Nov 21, 2023
8
WEEKLEY, RICHARD W.
SELF EMPLOYED • REAL ESTATE DEVELOPER
IndividualHOUSTON, TX
$6,600
Nov 7, 2023
9
STERN, ELIZABETH
RETIRED • RETIRED
IndividualSCARSDALE, NY
$6,600
Dec 6, 2023
10
SILVERMAN, JEFFREY
RETIRED • RETIRED
IndividualBAL HARBOUR, FL
$6,600
Feb 15, 2024

Donor Network - Rep. Stevens, Haley M. [D-MI-11]

PACs
Organizations
Individuals
Politicians

Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.

Loading...

Showing 86 nodes and 39 connections (87 secondary connections hidden)

Total contributions: $166,215

Top Donors - Rep. Stevens, Haley M. [D-MI-11]

Showing top 25 donors by contribution amount

9 Orgs16 Individuals

Industry Impact

Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 3 helped.

  • +Cybersecurityconfidence 0.95

    Section 2(a)(2)(B) adds a new subsection (c) 'Post Quantum Cryptography Deployment' to the National Quantum Initiative Act, directing NIST to promote voluntary adoption and deployment of post-quantum cryptography standards, provide technical assistance to high-risk entities (including critical infrastructure and digital infrastructure providers), and establish a grant program for entities at high risk of quantum cryptoanalytic attacks to adopt such standards and remediate vulnerabilities. This d

  • +Telecommunicationsconfidence 0.85

    Section 2(a)(2)(B) specifies that entities determined to be 'critical infrastructure' or 'digital infrastructure providers' are high risk of quantum cryptoanalytic attacks and eligible for technical assistance and grants. Telecommunications carriers (e.g., AT&T, Verizon, T-Mobile) are critical infrastructure under Homeland Security definitions and operate extensive digital infrastructure, making them direct beneficiaries of the bill's deployment promotion, technical assistance, and grant program

  • Section 2(a)(2)(B) includes 'digital infrastructure providers' as entities that are high risk of quantum cryptoanalytic attacks and eligible for technical assistance and grants under the Post Quantum Cryptography Deployment program. Major AI & Cloud Infrastructure providers (e.g., AWS, Azure, Google Cloud) operate large-scale digital infrastructure and would benefit from government support to adopt post-quantum cryptography, enhancing their security offerings and potentially receiving grants or

Who funds the sponsor on these industries

For each industry this bill affects, here's what the sponsor (Rep. Stevens, Haley M. [D-MI-11])received from donors associated with that industry during the 2022–present cycles. Donations are not proof of intent — they are a record of who funds the people writing the law.

Industries this bill HELPS

  • from 3 contributions
    • GRILLO, KATHLEEN$3,000
    • GOHMANN, ANNA$500
    • KILGORE, HENRY$250

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.

Intelligence Community

Very Strong
Vector: 64%
Pages: 266-268AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill directly supports the Project 2025 Intelligence Community objective of mitigating risks to vulnerable cryptographic systems while promoting U.S. leadership in quantum computing, by advancing post-quantum cryptography standards, funding research, and guiding critical infrastructure adoption."

Key themes:quantum computingpost-quantum cryptographycryptographic risk mitigationNIST standardscritical infrastructure security

— 233 — Intelligence Community 19. Michael E. DeVine, “Covert Action and Clandestine Activities of the Intelligence Community: Selected Definitions,” Congressional Research Service Report for Members and Committees of Congress No. R45175, updated November 29, 2022, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/intel/R45175.pdf (accessed February 24, 2023). 20. H.R. 2663, Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, Public Law No. 81-110, 81st Congress, June 20, 1949, https:// govtrackus.s3.amazonaws.com/legislink/pdf/stat/63/STATUTE-63-Pg208.pdf (accessed March 6, 2023). 21. Nicole Ogrysko, “Intelligence Community Workforce Is More Diverse, but Still Struggles with Retention and Promotion,” Federal News Network, October 27, 2021, https://federalnewsnetwork.com/workforce/2021/10/ intelligence-community-workforce-is-more-diverse-but-still-struggles-with-retention-and-promotion/ (accessed March 18, 2023). 22. See James J. Wirtz, “The Intelligence Policy Nexus,” in Loch K. Johnson, ed., Strategic Intelligence, Volume 1: Understanding the Hidden Side of Government (Westport, CT: Prager, 2007), and Richard K. Betts, “Analysis, War, and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures Are Inevitable,” World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 1 (October 1978), pp. 61–89. 23. Letter from Barry A. Zulauf, IC Analytic Ombudsman, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, to Senator Marco Rubio, Acting Chairman, and Senator Mark Warner, Vice Chairman, Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. Senate, “RE: SSCI #2020-3029,” January 6, 2021, https://int.nyt.com/data/documenttools/ ic-ombudsman-election-interference-with-responses/c50e548011fd6168/full.pdf (accessed March 14, 2023). 24. Joshua Rovner, Fixing the Facts: National Security and the Politics of Intelligence (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011), pp. 30–31. 25. Joshua Rovner, “Is Politicization Ever a Good Thing?” Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 28, No. 1 (2013), p. 58. 26. S. 1566, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Public Law No. 95-511, 95th Congress, October 25, 1978, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-92/pdf/STATUTE-92-Pg1783.pdf (accessed March 6, 2023). 27. The Cipher Brief, “702 Reauthorization: Defending a Key Intelligence Tool,” remarks of Benjamin Powell, former General Counsel to the Director of National Intelligence, stating that FISA 702 provides “between 40 and 60 percent” of the intelligence in the PDB, December 18, 2017, https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=mRJ09GHVRFk&ab_channel=TheCipherBrief (accessed March 18, 2023). 28. An intelligence alliance that includes Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, National Counterintelligence and Security Center, “Five Eyes Intelligence Oversight and Review Council (FIORC),” https://www.dni.gov/index.php/ncsc-how-we- work/217-about/organization/icig-pages/2660-icig-fiorc (accessed March 10, 2023). 29. Porter, “Seven Questions the Next President Will Need the Intelligence Community to Answer to Win the Technology Competition with China.” 30. H.R. 1591, An Act to Require the Registration of Certain Persons Employed by Agencies to Disseminate Propaganda in the United States and for Other Purposes, Public Law No. 75-583, 75th Congress, June 8, 1938, https://govtrackus.s3.amazonaws.com/legislink/pdf/stat/52/STATUTE-52-Pg631.pdf (accessed March 6, 2023). 31. Kristina Wong, “Exclusive: Former DNI John Ratcliffe Pleased CIA Following His Lead on China Threat,” Breitbart, October 13, 2021, https://www.breitbart.com/politics/2021/10/13/exclusive-john-ratcliffe-pleased- cia-following-lead-china-threat/ (accessed March 11, 2023). 32. H.R. 4628, Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, Public Law No. 107-306, 107th Congress, November 27, 2002, Title IX, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-116/pdf/STATUTE-116-Pg2383.pdf (accessed March 6, 2023). 33. President George W. Bush, Executive Order 13354, “National Counterterrorism Center,” August 27, 2004, in Federal Register, Vol. 69, No. 169 (September 1, 2004), pp. 53589–53592, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/ pkg/FR-2004-09-01/pdf/04-20050.pdf (accessed March 6, 2023). 34. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, National Counterintelligence and Security Center, “Who We Are: History of NCSC,” https://www.dni.gov/index.php/ncsc-who-we-are/ncsc-history (accessed March 11, 2023). 35. Gregory F. Treverton and C. Bryan Gabbard, Assessing the Tradecraft of Intelligence Analysis, RAND Corporation, National Security Research Division Technical Report, 2008, p. 6, https://www.rand.org/pubs/ technical_reports/TR293.html (accessed March 1, 2023). — 234 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise 36. Letter from Barry A. Zulauf, IC Analytic Ombudsman, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, to Senator Marco Rubio, Acting Chairman, and Senator Mark Warner, Vice Chairman, Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. Senate, “RE: SSCI #2020-3029,” January 6, 2021, https://int.nyt.com/data/documenttools/ ic-ombudsman-election-interference-with-responses/c50e548011fd6168/full.pdf (accessed March 6, 2023). 37. “Independent IC Analytic Ombudsman’s [Report] on Politicization of Intelligence,” attached to January 6, 2021, Zulauf letter. 38. President Barack Obama, Executive Order 13526, “Classified National Security Information,” December 29, 2009, in Federal Register, Vol. 75, No. 2 (January 5, 2010), pp. 707–731, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/ FR-2010-01-05/pdf/E9-31418.pdf (accessed March 7, 2023). 39. President Barack Obama, Executive Order 13556, “Controlled Classified Information,” November 4, 2010, in Federal Register, Vol. 75, No. 216 (November 9, 2010), pp. 68675–68677, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/ pkg/FR-2010-11-09/pdf/2010-28360.pdf (accessed March 7, 2023). 40. Agathe Demarais, “How the U.S.–Chinese Technology War Is Changing the World,” Foreign Policy, November 19, 2022, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/11/19/demarais-backfire-sanctions-us-china-technology-war- semiconductors-export-controls-biden/ (accessed February 28, 2023). 41. Scott Stewart, “The Risk to Undercover Operatives in the Digital Age,” Stratfor Worldview, October 29, 2015, https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/risk-undercover-operatives-digital-age (accessed February 24, 2023). 42. Lauren Pitruzzello, “Human Intelligence: Former CIA Officer Talks About Espionage in the Digital Age, University of Delaware UDaily, March 22, 2012, https://www1.udel.edu/udaily/2012/mar/global-agenda- grenier-032212.html (accessed February 24, 2023). 43. Jenna McLaughlin and Zach Dorfman, “‘Shattered’: Inside the Secret Battle to Save America’s Undercover Spies in the Digital Age,” Yahoo News, December 30, 2019, https://news.yahoo.com/shattered-inside- the-secret-battle-to-save-americas-undercover-spies-in-the-digital-age-100029026.html (accessed February 24, 2023). 44. U.S. Federal Trade Commission, “U.S.–Safe Harbor Framework,” https://www.ftc.gov/business-guidance/ privacy-security/us-eu-safe-harbor-framework (accessed March 11, 2023). 45. “Fact Sheet: Overview of the EU–U.S. Privacy Shield Network,” U.S. Department of Commerce, https://2014-2017.commerce.gov/sites/commerce.gov/files/media/files/2016/eu-us_privacy_shield_fact_ sheet.pdf (accessed March 11, 2023). 46. “Fact Sheet: United States and European Commission Announce Trans-Atlantic Data Privacy Framework,” The White House, March 25, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/03/25/ fact-sheet-united-states-and-european-commission-announce-trans-atlantic-data-privacy-framework/ (accessed March 11, 2023). 47. President Joseph R. Biden Jr., Executive Order 14086, “Enhancing Safeguards for United States Signals Intelligence Activities,” October 7, 2022, in Federal Register, Vol. 87, No. 198 (October 14, 2022), pp. 62283– 62297, (accessed March 7, 2023). 48. Warren P. Strobel, “Release of Ukraine Intelligence Represents New Front in U.S. Information War with Russia,” The Wall Street Journal, updated April 4, 2022, https://www.wsj.com/articles/release-of-secrets-represents- new-front-in-u-s-information-war-with-russia-11649070001 (accessed February 24, 2023). 49. President Joseph R. Biden Jr., “National Security Memorandum on Promoting United States Leadership in Quantum Computing While Mitigating Risks to Vulnerable Cryptographic Systems,” The White House, May 4, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/05/04/national-security- memorandum-on-promoting-united-states-leadership-in-quantum-computing-while-mitigating-risks- to-vulnerable-cryptographic-systems/#:~:text=To%20mitigate%20this%20risk%2C%20the%20United%20 States%20must,the%20quantum%20risk%20as%20is%20feasible%20by%202035 (accessed March 12, 2023). See also President Joseph R. Biden Jr., Executive Order 14073, “Enhancing the National Quantum Initiative Advisory Committee,” May 4, 2022, in Federal Register, Vol. 87, No. 89 (May 9, 2022), pp. 27909–27911, https:// www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2022-05-09/pdf/2022-10076.pdf (accessed March 12, 2023); and “Fact Sheet: President Biden Announces Two Presidential Directives Advancing Quantum Technologies,” The White House, May 4, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/05/04/fact- sheet-president-biden-announces-two-presidential-directives-advancing-quantum-technologies/ (accessed March 12, 2023).

Intelligence Community

Moderate
Vector: 60%
Pages: 266-268AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill focuses on advancing post-quantum cryptography to protect critical infrastructure and digital systems, which aligns with the Intelligence Community's interest in safeguarding national security against emerging technological threats, including quantum decryption capabilities that could undermine intelligence operations."

Key themes:quantum cybersecuritynational securityintelligence communitycritical infrastructure protectiontechnology competition

— 233 — Intelligence Community 19. Michael E. DeVine, “Covert Action and Clandestine Activities of the Intelligence Community: Selected Definitions,” Congressional Research Service Report for Members and Committees of Congress No. R45175, updated November 29, 2022, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/intel/R45175.pdf (accessed February 24, 2023). 20. H.R. 2663, Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, Public Law No. 81-110, 81st Congress, June 20, 1949, https:// govtrackus.s3.amazonaws.com/legislink/pdf/stat/63/STATUTE-63-Pg208.pdf (accessed March 6, 2023). 21. Nicole Ogrysko, “Intelligence Community Workforce Is More Diverse, but Still Struggles with Retention and Promotion,” Federal News Network, October 27, 2021, https://federalnewsnetwork.com/workforce/2021/10/ intelligence-community-workforce-is-more-diverse-but-still-struggles-with-retention-and-promotion/ (accessed March 18, 2023). 22. See James J. Wirtz, “The Intelligence Policy Nexus,” in Loch K. Johnson, ed., Strategic Intelligence, Volume 1: Understanding the Hidden Side of Government (Westport, CT: Prager, 2007), and Richard K. Betts, “Analysis, War, and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures Are Inevitable,” World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 1 (October 1978), pp. 61–89. 23. Letter from Barry A. Zulauf, IC Analytic Ombudsman, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, to Senator Marco Rubio, Acting Chairman, and Senator Mark Warner, Vice Chairman, Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. Senate, “RE: SSCI #2020-3029,” January 6, 2021, https://int.nyt.com/data/documenttools/ ic-ombudsman-election-interference-with-responses/c50e548011fd6168/full.pdf (accessed March 14, 2023). 24. Joshua Rovner, Fixing the Facts: National Security and the Politics of Intelligence (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011), pp. 30–31. 25. Joshua Rovner, “Is Politicization Ever a Good Thing?” Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 28, No. 1 (2013), p. 58. 26. S. 1566, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Public Law No. 95-511, 95th Congress, October 25, 1978, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-92/pdf/STATUTE-92-Pg1783.pdf (accessed March 6, 2023). 27. The Cipher Brief, “702 Reauthorization: Defending a Key Intelligence Tool,” remarks of Benjamin Powell, former General Counsel to the Director of National Intelligence, stating that FISA 702 provides “between 40 and 60 percent” of the intelligence in the PDB, December 18, 2017, https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=mRJ09GHVRFk&ab_channel=TheCipherBrief (accessed March 18, 2023). 28. An intelligence alliance that includes Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, National Counterintelligence and Security Center, “Five Eyes Intelligence Oversight and Review Council (FIORC),” https://www.dni.gov/index.php/ncsc-how-we- work/217-about/organization/icig-pages/2660-icig-fiorc (accessed March 10, 2023). 29. Porter, “Seven Questions the Next President Will Need the Intelligence Community to Answer to Win the Technology Competition with China.” 30. H.R. 1591, An Act to Require the Registration of Certain Persons Employed by Agencies to Disseminate Propaganda in the United States and for Other Purposes, Public Law No. 75-583, 75th Congress, June 8, 1938, https://govtrackus.s3.amazonaws.com/legislink/pdf/stat/52/STATUTE-52-Pg631.pdf (accessed March 6, 2023). 31. Kristina Wong, “Exclusive: Former DNI John Ratcliffe Pleased CIA Following His Lead on China Threat,” Breitbart, October 13, 2021, https://www.breitbart.com/politics/2021/10/13/exclusive-john-ratcliffe-pleased- cia-following-lead-china-threat/ (accessed March 11, 2023). 32. H.R. 4628, Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, Public Law No. 107-306, 107th Congress, November 27, 2002, Title IX, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-116/pdf/STATUTE-116-Pg2383.pdf (accessed March 6, 2023). 33. President George W. Bush, Executive Order 13354, “National Counterterrorism Center,” August 27, 2004, in Federal Register, Vol. 69, No. 169 (September 1, 2004), pp. 53589–53592, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/ pkg/FR-2004-09-01/pdf/04-20050.pdf (accessed March 6, 2023). 34. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, National Counterintelligence and Security Center, “Who We Are: History of NCSC,” https://www.dni.gov/index.php/ncsc-who-we-are/ncsc-history (accessed March 11, 2023). 35. Gregory F. Treverton and C. Bryan Gabbard, Assessing the Tradecraft of Intelligence Analysis, RAND Corporation, National Security Research Division Technical Report, 2008, p. 6, https://www.rand.org/pubs/ technical_reports/TR293.html (accessed March 1, 2023).

Intelligence Community

Moderate
Vector: 60%
Pages: 254-256AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill focuses on advancing post-quantum cryptography standards to secure critical infrastructure, which aligns with the Project 2025 Intelligence Community goal of defending vital networks and improving cyber threat sharing, though it does not address intelligence analysis, objectivity, or real-time auditing mechanisms."

Key themes:cybersecuritycritical infrastructure protectionthreat mitigationinformation sharing

— 221 — Intelligence Community influence and the FBI’s warnings about continued efforts through the 2022 mid- terms highlight the folly of undue certainty without consideration of alternatives. On election influence and other controversial issues, such as the origin of COVID-19, analysts at the most powerful intelligence agencies have increasingly tended to use the leeway they have been given to insert their political views into their work in order to influence (if possibly even control) the analytic process. They do this in ways that attempt to squash dissent and impair the creation of a culture in which entrenched views are challenged and unpopular analytical lines can sur- vive or not according to their merits. To help the United States and its leaders to outcompete China across mul- tifaceted societal, economic, military, and technological threats, the IC’s capability to conduct strategic intelligence analysis that is relevant to policymak- ers in both parties must be rebuilt and strengthened. Because Beijing may be a peer or even exceed U.S. capabilities in some areas, the post-9/11 analytic focus on quick-turnaround secrets is not good enough. Strategic planning—informed by intelligence—must take place for the United States to stay ahead of whatever new threats China may pose. An incoming conservative President will have the opportunity to signal the demand for such strategic products and prioritize their production through communications to intelligence leaders and formal mechanisms such as shifting priorities within the National Intelligence Priority Framework and structuring the President’s Daily Brief. The incoming DNI should also emphasize implementing the recommendations in the Ombudsman’s report, especially regarding objectiv- ity, the inclusion of dissenting viewpoints, and more serious efforts to hold senior leaders accountable for backchannel attempts to change or suppress analytic views. Accounting for the long history of intelligence failures and surprises, an incom- ing conservative President must appreciate the ambiguity, complexity, limits, and assumptions inherent in intelligence assessments. Intelligence often deals with the human dimension in complex decision systems within a foreign country or organi- zation, and this makes consistently accurate predictions difficult if not impossible to develop. Seeing something and understanding what you are seeing are two dif- ferent things, so a President should consistently and patiently press the IC about its potential biases, assumptions, methodology, and sourcing. With regard to election-threat analysis and politically controversial topics, agency leaders should take seriously the Ombudsman’s admonition that we need to maintain tradecraft standards across all countries and topics by ensuring that equitable standards apply across all foreign threat actors. Analysis should be put forward without regard to the domestic political ramifications of intelligence conclusions. “Obligation to Share” and Real-Time Auditing Capability. The fed- eral government has made admirable progress in recent years by being more — 222 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise forward-leaning in sharing cyber threat intelligence with private-sector partners and the public, emphasizing that the protective nature of such information is of value only if put into the right hands at the right time. Since critical infrastructure and services are overwhelmingly owned, managed, and defended by the private sector in the United States, there has been an increasing emphasis on declassify- ing intelligence and sharing actionable information with private-sector partners, often through industry-specific Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs); regional meetings of government and private-sector experts called InfraGard, run by the FBI; direct public notification from the Department of Homeland Security, the FBI, and (increasingly) the NSA; and more discreet one-on-one engagements led by the collecting agencies. These programs properly recognize the private sector’s role in providing cyber- security for Americans; in practice, however, the intelligence shared by the U.S. government through these venues is too often already known or no longer relevant by the time it makes its way through the downgrade process for sharing. In addition, government-shared information often needs to take advantage of the opportunity to provide contexts, such as attribution, trends, and size of the observed cyber problem. As warranted, additional context should be provided to the private sector as a matter of routine. To continue improving the U.S. government’s ability to defend the country’s most vital networks, the IC must adopt an “obligation to share” policy process, including the capacity for “write to release” intelligence products whereby newly discovered technical indicators, targeting, and other intelligence relevant to cyber defense are automatically provided either to the public or to targeted entities within 48 hours of their collection—which is how counterterrorism intel- ligence has been managed for years when it comes to a “duty to warn.” Under this policy, agency heads should still have the flexibility to withhold intelligence for operational or counterintelligence reasons but would need to report regularly to Congress on the number of and justification for exceptions. This policy would make sharing intelligence and defending networks the default, as it already is in the rest of the cybersecurity community outside the IC, to improve the quantity, relevance, and timeliness of defensive information while ensuring accountability for top leaders when they must withhold this information. One of the most significant challenges within the IC is presented by the need to share information promptly among the 18 elements of the intelligence enterprise. The only long-term solution to the understandable tension between the need to share information and the need to protect intelligence sources and methods is a robust real-time auditing capability that electronically flags unauthorized access. Under an identity management system with real-time audit, even the most sensi- tive information acquired by America’s intelligence agencies can be shared, and the access to and use of that information are appropriately monitored. Establishing

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About These Correlations

Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.

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