The bill
Protect LNG Act of 2025
HR. 3592, 119th Congress — read as touching Pipelines & Energy Infrastructure.
Sponsored by
Rep. Hunt, Wesley [R-TX-38]
ID: H001095
Follow the money
The bill
HR. 3592, 119th Congress — read as touching Pipelines & Energy Infrastructure.
The sponsor
Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.
The money
20 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.
The alignment
This bill's text tracks the "Department of Energy and Related Commissions" section, p. 440-442 of the Mandate for Leadership.
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Ordered to be Reported (Amended) by the Yeas and Nays: 14 - 9.
September 9, 2025
📍 Current Status
Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Another masterpiece of legislative theater, courtesy of our esteemed representatives in Congress. Let's dissect this farce and reveal the underlying disease.
**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The Protect LNG Act of 2025 is a thinly veiled attempt to shield liquefied natural gas (LNG) facilities from environmental lawsuits and regulatory scrutiny. The bill's primary objective is to grease the wheels for LNG exports, regardless of the environmental consequences. It's a classic case of "regulatory capture," where industry interests hijack the legislative process to serve their own agenda.
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill introduces several provisions that undermine environmental regulations and judicial review:
1. **Limiting litigation:** Section 3(a) ensures that civil actions related to environmental reviews won't affect the validity of permits, licenses, or approvals issued to LNG facilities. 2. **Remand without vacating:** If a court finds an environmental review flawed, the bill requires the agency to resolve the issue instead of setting aside the permit (Section 3(b)). 3. **Expedited judicial review:** Section 4(a) grants exclusive jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals for the circuit where the LNG facility is located, with expedited review and a tight deadline for filing claims (90 days). 4. **Transfer of existing actions:** Pending petitions will be transferred to the new court, ensuring that existing lawsuits won't hinder the LNG industry's plans.
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The usual suspects are involved:
1. **LNG industry:** The primary beneficiary of this bill, as it streamlines the permitting process and reduces regulatory hurdles. 2. **Environmental groups:** These organizations will face significant obstacles in challenging LNG projects, thanks to the bill's limitations on litigation and judicial review. 3. **Local communities:** Residents near proposed LNG facilities may be exposed to environmental risks without adequate recourse or protection.
**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill is a recipe for disaster:
1. **Environmental degradation:** By weakening environmental regulations and limiting judicial review, the bill increases the risk of ecological damage and health hazards associated with LNG production. 2. **Industry dominance:** The Protect LNG Act further entrenches the influence of corporate interests in the legislative process, undermining democratic principles and public accountability. 3. **Erosion of trust:** This bill will likely exacerbate public distrust in government and regulatory agencies, as it prioritizes industry profits over environmental protection and community well-being.
In conclusion, the Protect LNG Act is a symptom of a deeper disease: the corrupting influence of corporate power on our democracy. It's a stark reminder that, in Washington D.C., money talks, and the environment walks.
Rep. Hunt, Wesley [R-TX-38]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
No PAC contributions found
No organization contributions found
No committee contributions found
This bill has 10 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.
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Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Showing 58 nodes and 35 connections (49 secondary connections hidden)
Total contributions: $164,903
Showing top 17 donors by contribution amount
Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 2 helped.
Section 3(a) states that civil actions relating to environmental review under the Natural Gas Act or NEPA shall not affect the validity of a permit, license, or approval issued to a covered facility (LNG facility). Section 3(b) further provides that if a court finds the environmental review violates law, the court shall remand to the agency rather than vacate the permit, and the agency shall continue processing covered applications. This reduces litigation risk and delays for LNG export faciliti
The bill facilitates LNG export authorizations by limiting judicial challenges to permits under the Natural Gas Act and NEPA. Since LNG exports depend on natural gas supply from upstream producers, this benefits oil and gas companies involved in gas extraction and production by securing export markets and reducing regulatory uncertainty.
For each industry this bill affects, here's what the sponsor (Rep. Hunt, Wesley [R-TX-38])received from donors associated with that industry during the 2022–present cycles. Donations are not proof of intent — they are a record of who funds the people writing the law.
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.
AI Analysis:
"The Protect LNG Act of 2025 directly supports Project 2025's objective to streamline FERC's permitting process for LNG export facilities by limiting judicial delays and litigation risks, thereby promoting domestic natural gas access and export capabilities as emphasized in the policy."
— 407 — Department of Energy and Related Commissions New Policies FERC should: l Recommit itself to the NGA’s purpose of providing the American people with access to affordable and reliable natural gas. l Limit its NGA decision-making on natural gas pipeline certificates to the question of whether there is a need for the natural gas. l Limit its NEPA analysis to the impacts of the actual pipeline itself, not indirect upstream and downstream effects. In addition, Congress, the states, and FERC should consider how better to pro- tect and compensate property owners whose property is taken for the benefit of the public. FERC also needs to be mindful that natural gas pipelines and projects are important for domestic access to natural gas, including local natural gas utilities, natural gas–fired electric generation, and manufacturing, as well as for exports of liquefied natural gas. FERC: LNG EXPORT FACILITIES Mission/Overview FERC permits, sites, and authorizes the construction and operation of LNG export facilities.125 It does not authorize the export of natural gas; DOE exercises that authority. LNG export facilities are important for delivering natural gas to markets around the world and have become an important policy tool in limiting the ability of Russia and Middle Eastern countries to use energy as a tool in for- eign affairs. Needed Reforms LNG exports are opposed by climate activists. In addition, some domestic man- ufacturers argue that LNG exports decrease available U.S. supplies of natural gas and increase the domestic price, thereby harming the competitive advantages of U.S. manufacturers in world markets. Currently, most LNG export facilities are along the Gulf of Mexico in Texas and Louisiana.126 Attempts to build facilities on the west coast (Jordan Cove LNG127) and the east coast have not moved forward for a variety of reasons; delays and costs of litigation can cause developers to cancel projects. An Alaska facility was approved by FERC in 2020, and the Biden Administration has indicated its sup- port.128 An east coast facility in Pennsylvania (or nearby) would unlock Marcellus shale natural gas for export.
AI Analysis:
"The Protect LNG Act directly implements Project 2025's goal of ensuring timely FERC review of LNG export facilities by limiting judicial delays and expediting appeals, thereby supporting the policy's emphasis on not using environmental litigation to block LNG projects."
— 407 — Department of Energy and Related Commissions New Policies FERC should: l Recommit itself to the NGA’s purpose of providing the American people with access to affordable and reliable natural gas. l Limit its NGA decision-making on natural gas pipeline certificates to the question of whether there is a need for the natural gas. l Limit its NEPA analysis to the impacts of the actual pipeline itself, not indirect upstream and downstream effects. In addition, Congress, the states, and FERC should consider how better to pro- tect and compensate property owners whose property is taken for the benefit of the public. FERC also needs to be mindful that natural gas pipelines and projects are important for domestic access to natural gas, including local natural gas utilities, natural gas–fired electric generation, and manufacturing, as well as for exports of liquefied natural gas. FERC: LNG EXPORT FACILITIES Mission/Overview FERC permits, sites, and authorizes the construction and operation of LNG export facilities.125 It does not authorize the export of natural gas; DOE exercises that authority. LNG export facilities are important for delivering natural gas to markets around the world and have become an important policy tool in limiting the ability of Russia and Middle Eastern countries to use energy as a tool in for- eign affairs. Needed Reforms LNG exports are opposed by climate activists. In addition, some domestic man- ufacturers argue that LNG exports decrease available U.S. supplies of natural gas and increase the domestic price, thereby harming the competitive advantages of U.S. manufacturers in world markets. Currently, most LNG export facilities are along the Gulf of Mexico in Texas and Louisiana.126 Attempts to build facilities on the west coast (Jordan Cove LNG127) and the east coast have not moved forward for a variety of reasons; delays and costs of litigation can cause developers to cancel projects. An Alaska facility was approved by FERC in 2020, and the Biden Administration has indicated its sup- port.128 An east coast facility in Pennsylvania (or nearby) would unlock Marcellus shale natural gas for export. — 408 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise FERC is considering policy statements that would consider GHG emissions as part of its NEPA review and its NGA determination as to whether approval of an LNG export facility is consistent with the public interest. New Policies Since Congress through the NGA has already determined that LNG exports to countries with free trade agreements are in the public interest,129 and because LNG exports help to ensure America’s ability to support our friends and allies around the world while also supporting domestic natural gas production, FERC: l Should not use environmental issues like climate change as a reason to stop LNG projects. l Should ensure that the natural gas pipelines that are needed deliver more of the product to market, both for domestic use and export, and are reviewed, developed and constructed in a timely manner. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Mission/Overview The Energy Reorganization Act of 1974130 created the Nuclear Regulatory Com- mission (NRC). Before then, the commercial nuclear industry was regulated by the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), which was established by the 1954 Atomic Energy Act.131 Importantly, the AEC was responsible for encouraging and regulat- ing commercial nuclear power. Broad criticism of this dual function was a major factor in the establishment of the NRC, which held regulatory authority while the newly established Department of Energy held the advocacy function. Today, the NRC is responsible for a broad range of regulatory activities, including reactor safety, oversight of nuclear materials, and protection against radiation as well as permitting new reactors, certifying new reactor designs, and regulating nuclear waste management activities. Needed Reforms In 1989, the NRC established alternative licensing processes that were meant to provide a more predictable and efficient regulatory pathway for new Light Water Reactors (LWRs) by combining construction and operating nuclear power plant licenses, allowing for Early Site Permits, and establishing a framework for pre- approval of reactor designs. More recently, the Nuclear Energy Innovation and Modernization Act directed the NRC to establish a technology-neutral licensing process for new, advanced reactor technologies.132 Despite these efforts, the NRC remains a significant cost and regulatory barrier to new nuclear power. Especially
AI Analysis:
"The Protect LNG Act directly advances Project 2025's goal of expanding domestic fossil fuel production and reducing regulatory barriers for LNG exports by streamlining judicial review, limiting court interference, and expediting permitting processes, thereby aligning closely with the Department of Energy's fossil energy and energy dominance objectives."
— 411 — Department of Energy and Related Commissions 19. President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13920, “Securing the United States Bulk-Power System,” May 1, 2020, in Federal Register, Vol. 85, No. 86 (May 4, 2020), pp. 26595–26599, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/ pkg/FR-2020-05-04/pdf/2020-09695.pdf (accessed February 13, 2023). 20. 18 U.S. Code § 824a(c), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/16/824a (accessed February 27, 2023). 21. Report No. 117-98, Energy and Water Development and Related Agencies Appropriations Bill, 2022, Committee on Appropriations, U.S. House of Representatives, 117th Cong. 1st Sess., July 20, 2021, p. 6, https:// www.congress.gov/117/crpt/hrpt98/CRPT-117hrpt98.pdf (accessed February 13, 2023). 22. H.R. 3684, Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, Public Law No. 11-58, 117th Congress, November 15, 2021, Division J, Title III. 23. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2023 Congressional Budget Request, Budget in Brief, p. 7. 24. Timothy Gardner, “White House Asks Congress for $500 mln to Modernize Oil Reserve,” Reuters, November 16, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/article/usa-oil-spr-idAFL1N32C36I (accessed February 13, 2023). 25. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Electricity, “Our History,” https://www.energy.gov/oe/about-us/our- history (accessed February 13, 2023). 26. Press release, “Secretary of Energy Signs Order to Mitigate Security Risks to the Nation’s Electric Grid,” U.S. Department of Energy, December 17, 2021, https://www.energy.gov/articles/secretary-energy-signs-order- mitigate-security-risks-nations-electric-grid (accessed February 13, 2023). 27. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Electricity, “Revocation of Prohibition Order Securing Critical Defense Facilities,” Federal Register, Vol. 86, No. 76 (April 22, 2021), pp. 21308–21309, https://www.govinfo.gov/ content/pkg/FR-2021-04-22/pdf/2021-08483.pdf (accessed February 13, 2023). 28. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2023 Congressional Budget Request, Budget in Brief, pp. 19 and 61. 29. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Nuclear Energy, “About Us,” https://www.energy.gov/ne/about-us (accessed February 13, 2023). 30. H.R. 3809, Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, Public Law No. 97-425, 97th Congress, January 7, 1983, https:// www.congress.gov/97/statute/STATUTE-96/STATUTE-96-Pg2201.pdf (accessed February 24, 2023). 31. The Heritage Foundation, “Budget Blueprint for Fiscal Year 2023: Reduce the DOE Office of Nuclear Energy,” https://www.heritage.org/budget/pages/recommendations/1.270.127.html. 32. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2023 Congressional Budget Request, Budget in Brief, pp. 23 and 58. 33. 42 USC § 16291, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/16291 (accessed February 27, 2023). 34. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Fossil Energy and Carbon Management, “About Us: Mission,” https:// www.energy.gov/fecm/mission (accessed February 13, 2023). 35. U.S. Government Accountability Office, Carbon Capture and Storage: Actions Needed to Improve DOE Management of Demonstration Projects, GAO-22-105111, December2021, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-22- 105111.pdf (accessed February 13, 2023). 36. International Energy Agency, The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions, World Energy Outlook Special Report, revised March 2022, https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/ffd2a83b-8c30-4e9d-980a- 52b6d9a86fdc/TheRoleofCriticalMineralsinCleanEnergyTransitions.pdf (accessed February 13, 2023). 37. See 42 U.S. Code § 16291. 38. 42 U.S. Code Ch. 55, §§ 4321–4347, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/chapter-55 (accessed February 27, 2023). 39. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “Categorical Exclusions from Environmental Review,” Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking; Request for Comment, Federal Register, Vol. 86, No. 87 (May 7, 2021), pp. 24514–24516, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2021-05-07/pdf/2021-09675.pdf (accessed February 27, 2023), and Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “Categorical Exclusions from Environmental Review,” Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking; Reopening of Comment Period, Federal Register, Vol. 86, No. 160 (August 23, 2021), pp. 47032–47033, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2021-08-23/pdf/2021-18058.pdf (accessed February 27, 2023). 40. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2023 Congressional Budget Request, Budget in Brief, pp. 19, 21, 23, and 52. — 412 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise 41. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2023 Congressional Budget Request, Budget in Brief, pp. 3, 6, 12, 19, 21, and 23. 42. S. 622, Energy Policy and Conservation Act, Public Law 94-163, 94th Congress, December 22, 1975, https:// www.congress.gov/94/statute/STATUTE-89/STATUTE-89-Pg871.pdf (accessed February 27, 2023). 43. H.R. 6, Energy Policy Act of 2005, Public Law No. 109-58, 109th Congress, August 8, 2005, https://www. congress.gov/109/plaws/publ58/PLAW-109publ58.pdf (accessed February 27, 2023). 44. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy, “About the Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy,” https://www.energy.gov/eere/about-office-energy-efficiency-and- renewable-energy (accessed February 28, 2023). 45. Ibid. 46. See note 41, supra. 47. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2023 Congressional Budget Request, Budget in Brief, pp. 19, 23, 43, and 49. 48. See U.S. Department of Energy, Grid Deployment Office, “About Us,” https://www.energy.gov/gdo/about-us (accessed February 13, 2023). 49. U.S. Department of Energy, Grid Deployment Office, “Building a Better Grid Initiative,” https://www.energy. gov/gdo/building-better-grid-initiative (accessed February 13, 2023). 50. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2023 Congressional Budget Request, Budget in Brief, pp. 2, 19, 21, 23, and 84. “The FY 2023 Budget Request to Congress proposes to split the Electricity appropriation account into two accounts: Electricity and Grid Deployment Office (GDO). Had the proposed FY 2023 structure been in place in FY 2021 and FY 2022, the $7,000,000 shown under the Electricity account’s Transmission Permitting and Technical Assistance (TPTA) program would have appeared under Grid Technical Assistance in GDO and the $3,000,000 shown under Program Direction in the Electricity account represents the estimated share of Electricity PD funding associated with TPTA and would have appeared under Program Direction in GDO.” Ibid., p. 84, note. 51. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Clean Energy Demonstrations, “About Us: Our Mission,” https://www. energy.gov/oced/about-us (accessed February 13, 2023). 52. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2023 Congressional Budget Request, Budget in Brief, p. 6. 53. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Clean Energy Demonstrations, “About Us: Our Story,” https://www. energy.gov/oced/about-us (accessed February 28, 2023). 54. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Clean Energy Demonstrations, “OCED Project Portfolio,” https://www. energy.gov/oced/office-clean-energy-demonstrations (accessed February 28, 2023). 55. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2023 Congressional Budget Request, Volume 3, Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response, Federal Energy Management Program, Grid Deployment Office, Indian Energy Policy & Programs, Loan Programs, Manufacturing & Energy Supply Chains, Office of Clean Energy Demonstrations, Petroleum Reserves, Power Marketing Administrations, State and Community Energy Programs, April 2022, p. 104, https://www.energy. gov/sites/default/files/2022-09/doe-fy2023-budget-volume-3-v2.pdf (accessed February 13, 2023). 56. See, for example, ibid., pp. 104 and 107. 57. U.S. Department of Energy, Loan Program Office, “LPO Year in Review 2022: New Legislation,” January 5, 2023, https://www.energy.gov/lpo/articles/lpo-year-review-2022 (accessed February 28, 2023). Emphases in original. 58. H.R. 6256, To Ensure That Goods Made with Forced Labor in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of the People’s Republic of China Do Not Enter the United States Market, and for Other Purposes, Public Law No. 117-78, 117th Congress, December 23, 2021, https://www.congress.gov/117/plaws/publ78/PLAW-117publ78.pdf (accessed February 28, 2023). 59. H.R. 2272, America COMPETES Act, Public Law 110–69, 110th Congress, August 9, 2007, § 5012, https://www. congress.gov/110/plaws/publ69/PLAW-110publ69.pdf (accessed February 13, 2023). 60. Ibid., § 5012(c)(1). 61. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2023 Congressional Budget Request, Budget in Brief, March 2022, p. 103.
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Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.
Tradeable Energy Performance Standards Act
Fire Safe Electrical Corridors Act of 2025
Providing for congressional disapproval under chapter 8 of title 5, United States Code, of the rule submitted by the Department of Energy relating to "Energy Conservation Program: Energy Conservation Standards for Walk-In Coolers and Walk-In Freezers".