The bill
FISH Act of 2025
HR. 3756, 119th Congress — read as touching Agribusiness.
Sponsored by
Rep. Crenshaw, Dan [R-TX-2]
ID: C001120
Follow the money
The bill
HR. 3756, 119th Congress — read as touching Agribusiness.
The sponsor
Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.
The money
26 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.
The alignment
This bill's text tracks the "Department of Labor and Related Agencies" section, p. 645-647 of the Mandate for Leadership.
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Ordered to be Reported in the Nature of a Substitute by Unanimous Consent.
April 20, 2026
📍 Current Status
Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Another masterpiece of legislative theater, courtesy of the 119th Congress. The FISH Act of 2025 is a sprawling mess of bureaucratic doublespeak and feel-good platitudes, masquerading as a serious attempt to combat illegal fishing practices.
**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The bill's stated purpose is to "combat illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing at its sources globally." Sounds noble enough. But let's not be naive – this is just a thinly veiled excuse for the United States to exert its influence over international fisheries management organizations and expand its regulatory reach.
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill establishes an "IUU Vessel List" (because who doesn't love a good blacklist?), which will supposedly identify foreign vessels, fleets, and beneficial owners engaged in IUU fishing or supporting activities. The Secretary of Commerce, in coordination with other agencies, will maintain this list and make it public. Oh joy, more bureaucratic red tape.
The bill also amends the High Seas Driftnet Fishing Moratorium Protection Act to include provisions for the IUU Vessel List and expands the definition of "IUU fishing" to include activities that undermine international fishery management organizations' conservation measures.
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** This bill affects a wide range of stakeholders, including:
* Foreign governments and fisheries management organizations * Commercial and recreational fishing industries * Civil society groups and NGOs * Subnational coastal communities * Fishers and the private sector
But let's be real – the only ones who will truly benefit from this bill are the bureaucrats and politicians who get to pat themselves on the back for "doing something" about IUU fishing.
**Potential Impact & Implications:** The potential impact of this bill is negligible, at best. It's a classic case of "legislative theater," where Congress passes a bill that sounds good but accomplishes little in practice. The real implications are:
* Increased regulatory burdens on foreign vessels and fleets * Expanded U.S. influence over international fisheries management organizations * More opportunities for bureaucratic empire-building and job creation
In short, this bill is a perfect example of the "disease" I love to diagnose: legislative myopia, where politicians focus on symptoms rather than underlying problems, and prioritize self-aggrandizement over actual solutions.
Now, if you'll excuse me, I have better things to do than waste my time analyzing this legislative abomination. Next patient, please!
Rep. Crenshaw, Dan [R-TX-2]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
No PAC contributions found
No committee contributions found
This bill has 6 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.
ID: M001223
Top Contributors
10
ID: B001323
Top Contributors
10
ID: M000194
Top Contributors
10
ID: V000138
Top Contributors
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ID: R000600
Top Contributors
0
No contribution data available
ID: S000522
Top Contributors
10
Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Showing 75 nodes and 38 connections (63 secondary connections hidden)
Total contributions: $175,935
Showing top 23 donors by contribution amount
Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 2 helped, 4 harmed.
Section 11 requires CBP to develop a strategy to identify imports of seafood harvested using forced labor, which could restrict seafood imports and affect agribusiness supply chains that rely on seafood processing or distribution.
Section 11's focus on identifying seafood harvested using forced labor may lead to increased scrutiny and potential restrictions on seafood imports, impacting meat and dairy processors that also handle seafood products or rely on similar supply chains.
Section 4(d)(3) prohibits import of seafood caught, processed, or transported by foreign vessels on the IUU vessel list, which could disrupt shipping and logistics operations for surface transportation companies involved in seafood freight.
Section 11's enforcement strategy targeting forced labor in seafood harvesting could extend to agricultural supply chains if similar labor practices are found, potentially affecting crop producers through broader forced labor enforcement.
Section 9(c)(7) recommends dissemination of IUU fishing and forced labor analysis to governmental and non-governmental entities, which could create opportunities for media outlets to report on or distribute such information.
Section 9(c)(7) recommends dissemination of IUU fishing and forced labor analysis to entities that could use it for awareness, which could include streaming platforms producing documentaries or educational content on maritime issues.
For each industry this bill affects, here's what the sponsor (Rep. Crenshaw, Dan [R-TX-2])received from donors associated with that industry during the 2022–present cycles. Donations are not proof of intent — they are a record of who funds the people writing the law.
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.
AI Analysis:
"The FISH Act directly addresses forced labor and human trafficking in the seafood supply chain, aligning with Project 2025’s emphasis on eliminating forced labor, enhancing supply‑chain transparency, and investigating foreign labor violations that harm American workers."
— 613 — Department of Labor and Related Agencies l Congress must amend the law so that employers can again have the freedom to make hiring Americans a priority. Despite the significant advantages that preferring citizens over (work-authorized) aliens in hiring would provide to American workers, businesses, and the country at large, such a practice has been illegal since 1986.25 This makes no sense. Alternative View Some conservatives believe that the government has a duty to limit its spending in order to limit how much it takes from American families. This means that when the government spends money, it must find the most econom- ical and effective way to do so. Excessive government spending will be borne by American workers and families through reduced incomes and purchasing power. There may be good reasons to require a certain percentage of American workers on federal contracts, but those decisions should be based on economy and efficiency as opposed to arbitrary quotas. Visa Fraud. American businesses that commit visa fraud and hire illegal immi- grants should not be the beneficiaries of federal spending. But a 2020 report by the Department of Labor’s Office of Inspector General (OIG) examined the depart- ment’s process for excluding employers who commit visa fraud and abuse from federal contracts and found much to be desired. l To protect the American workforce from unscrupulous immigration lawyers, employers, and labor brokers, the department must follow the recommendations of the OIG and institute more robust investigations for suspected visa fraud and speedier debarments for those found guilty. INTERNATIONAL LABOR POLICY Leveling the International Playing Field for Workers. As recent decades of intense import competition and offshoring have made clear, American workers suffer when the U.S. opens its markets to foreign nations’ minimal labor standards and exploitative conditions. While federal law already prohibits the importation of goods produced with forced labor, the prohibitions are toothless without effective means of enforcement and cover only the most basic of workers’ rights. The Trump Administration and its United States Trade Representative (USTR) took unprece- dented steps to redress the issue for workers. The U.S.–Mexico–Canada Agreement (USMCA) contained the strongest and most far-reaching labor provisions of any free trade agreement (FTA), with protections and commitments to reduce labor abuses and raise wages. It also established new modes of enforcement. For future FTAs, the USTR should replicate the labor provisions of USMCA, especially the provisions to: — 614 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise l Eliminate all forms of forced or compulsory labor. l Protect workers’ rights to organize and participate voluntarily in a union without employer interference or discrimination. l Create a rapid-response mechanism to provide for an independent panel investigation of denial of labor rights at covered facilities. l Shift the burden of proof by presuming that an alleged violation affects trade and investment, unless otherwise demonstrated. For future authorizations of Trade Promotion Authority (TPA), the President should urge Congress to: l Create mechanisms for supply-chain transparency. l Institute a general prohibition on forced labor conditions. Investigate Foreign Labor Violations That Undermine American Work- ers. The United States’ embrace of globalization has exposed American workers to unfair competition from nations with cheap, abundant, and often exploited labor. American workers have, as a consequence, seen their earning power erode. While negotiating stronger trade agreements with robust labor provisions should be the primary tool with which to regulate international labor competition, the federal government can also take steps to identify the worst labor abuses and rule breakers. DOL’s Bureau of International Labor Affairs (ILAB) plays a critical role in monitor- ing and enforcing the labor provisions of U.S. trade agreements and trade preference programs as well as investigating child labor and human trafficking violations. l The next Administration should focus ILAB investigations on foreign labor violations that do the most to damage American workers’ earning power, specifically regimes that engage in child and forced labor, fail to protect workers’ organizing rights, and permit hazardous or otherwise exploitative working conditions. Alternative/Additional View. Conservatives share a belief in protecting and pro- moting American workers and their families and orienting international policies with Americans’ interests first. Some conservatives believe that the best way to put Amer- ica first is by making America more attractive. In addition to restrictions imposed on other countries, removing existing barriers to American manufacturing, employ- ment, and commerce can help American workers, entrepreneurs, and families.
AI Analysis:
"The FISH Act focuses on combating illegal fishing and related human rights abuses, while the Project 2025 Treasury section concerns CFIUS reform, China-related investment screening, and penalty standardization. Both share a general emphasis on enforcement transparency and addressing illicit activities, but their substantive domains and policy mechanisms are largely unrelated."
— 703 — Department of the Treasury l The U.S. should also examine increasing or decreasing its ownership levels in these institutions in order to achieve maximum leverage. CHINA AND OTHER GEOPOLITICAL THREATS Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States. The interagency Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States should realign its priorities to meet the United States’ current foreign policy threats, especially from China. On October 20, 2022, the Treasury Department, which chairs CFIUS, adopted the first-ever CFIUS Enforcement and Penalty Guidelines50 on the committee’s national security risk mitigation requirements. However, there are no clear rules that guide CFIUS on mitigation monitoring, nor is there a published penalty sched- ule to standardize accountability when CFIUS pursues a civil money penalty for violators. In addition, Treasury—as chair of the committee—runs an opaque pro- cess that biases committee procedure toward corporate interests and away from national security interests. Finally, the committee’s jurisdiction does not extend over greenfield investments that Chinese state-owned enterprises have historically pursued in the United States, which leaves America vulnerable to an instrument of Chinese economic statecraft. Given these issues, the next steps for CFIUS should be to develop a more coherent—and transparent—mitigation monitoring program to complement the enforcement guidelines, give CFIUS agencies in charge of national security con- cerns an equal voice at the table, and petition Congress to amend the law to cover Chinese greenfield investments. CFIUS should publish a penalty schedule for violations of CFIUS reporting and mitigation requirements. Publishing a penalty schedule for CFIUS violations will reduce the discretion of the committee to waive penalties or impose mere “wrist slap” costs on violators of the law. Additionally, a standardized penalty schedule would likely increase the deterrence of CFIUS enforcement by reducing the per- ception among parties to covered transactions that they can avoid enforcement by the committee or secure special exceptions based on appeals to the commit- tee’s discretion. As a legal matter—and in application by CFIUS—mitigation monitoring has developed as the Wild West. There are no clear rules that guide the entire com- mittee on mitigation monitoring, nor is there the same level of oversight or accountability within and among the agencies as applies when CFIUS reviews a transaction or when it pursues a civil money penalty. Indeed, it is a credit to transaction parties and the professionalism of the governmental officials and con- tractors who conduct mitigation monitoring on behalf of the government that, by and large, mitigation monitoring has worked adequately during the last several decades. But dependency on the personality and capabilities of individuals creates unnecessary risk both for CFIUS and for transaction parties.
AI Analysis:
"The FISH Act focuses on combating illegal fishing and related human rights issues, while the Project 2025 Treasury section concerns CFIUS reform, Chinese investment screening, and financial warfare capabilities. Both involve Treasury-led national security efforts, but their substantive topics and mechanisms are largely unrelated."
— 703 — Department of the Treasury l The U.S. should also examine increasing or decreasing its ownership levels in these institutions in order to achieve maximum leverage. CHINA AND OTHER GEOPOLITICAL THREATS Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States. The interagency Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States should realign its priorities to meet the United States’ current foreign policy threats, especially from China. On October 20, 2022, the Treasury Department, which chairs CFIUS, adopted the first-ever CFIUS Enforcement and Penalty Guidelines50 on the committee’s national security risk mitigation requirements. However, there are no clear rules that guide CFIUS on mitigation monitoring, nor is there a published penalty sched- ule to standardize accountability when CFIUS pursues a civil money penalty for violators. In addition, Treasury—as chair of the committee—runs an opaque pro- cess that biases committee procedure toward corporate interests and away from national security interests. Finally, the committee’s jurisdiction does not extend over greenfield investments that Chinese state-owned enterprises have historically pursued in the United States, which leaves America vulnerable to an instrument of Chinese economic statecraft. Given these issues, the next steps for CFIUS should be to develop a more coherent—and transparent—mitigation monitoring program to complement the enforcement guidelines, give CFIUS agencies in charge of national security con- cerns an equal voice at the table, and petition Congress to amend the law to cover Chinese greenfield investments. CFIUS should publish a penalty schedule for violations of CFIUS reporting and mitigation requirements. Publishing a penalty schedule for CFIUS violations will reduce the discretion of the committee to waive penalties or impose mere “wrist slap” costs on violators of the law. Additionally, a standardized penalty schedule would likely increase the deterrence of CFIUS enforcement by reducing the per- ception among parties to covered transactions that they can avoid enforcement by the committee or secure special exceptions based on appeals to the commit- tee’s discretion. As a legal matter—and in application by CFIUS—mitigation monitoring has developed as the Wild West. There are no clear rules that guide the entire com- mittee on mitigation monitoring, nor is there the same level of oversight or accountability within and among the agencies as applies when CFIUS reviews a transaction or when it pursues a civil money penalty. Indeed, it is a credit to transaction parties and the professionalism of the governmental officials and con- tractors who conduct mitigation monitoring on behalf of the government that, by and large, mitigation monitoring has worked adequately during the last several decades. But dependency on the personality and capabilities of individuals creates unnecessary risk both for CFIUS and for transaction parties. — 704 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise Congress should make the Department of Defense (DOD) a CFIUS co-chair with the Department of Treasury. Making DOD an official CFIUS co-chair along with Treasury will establish a balanced committee process by elevating national security interests to an equal stature. The committee is currently imbalanced toward the interests of corporate America because Treasury is the sole chair of CFIUS and, in practice, runs a process that is not fully transparent and which biases it from the national security interests represented by DOD and the Intelligence Community (IC). For example, Treasury representatives will consult with the Commerce Depart- ment and the United States Trade Representative—which tend to favor permitting covered transactions to occur with little to no mitigation requirements—and these representatives will then obscure the results and purposes of such sidebar meet- ings from DOD and IC representatives. This hampers DOD, IC, and sometimes even State Department representatives from full participation in the process or from advocating national security interests as well as they should. Greenfield Investments. Congress should close the loophole on greenfield investments and require CFIUS review of investments in U.S.-based greenfield assets by Chinese-controlled entities to assess any potential harm to U.S. national and economic security. In the 2018 Foreign Risk and Review Modernization Act (FIRRMA),51 one important category of foreign transactions left out of the bill was greenfield investments, particularly by Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Greenfield investments by Chinese SOEs pose a unique threat, and they should be met with the highest scrutiny by all levels of government. Greenfield investments result in the control of newly built facilities in the U.S., and they were not addressed in FIRRMA primarily because governors and state governments embrace them. That is understandable; they typically bring the promise of creating American jobs. However, the goal of such Chinese SOEs is to siphon assets, technological innovation, and influence away from U.S. businesses in order to expand the global presence of the Chinese Communist Party. While the Chinese government keeps its domestic markets largely insulated from foreign influence, it regularly invests in the U.S. and other countries under the “green- field” model. Firms fully owned by China’s Communist regime are increasingly buying land, building factories, and taking advantage of state and local tax breaks on American soil. Treasury should examine creating a school of financial warfare jointly with DOD. If the U.S. is to rely on financial weapons, tools, and strategies to prosecute international defensive and offensive objectives, it must create a specially trained group of experts dedicated to the study, training, testing, and preparedness of these deterrents. Recent experience has demonstrated that the U.S. cannot depend on the rapid development and deployment of untested, academically developed finan- cial actions, stratagems, and weapons on an ad hoc basis.
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.