The bill
Chinese Currency Accountability Act of 2025
HR. 386, 119th Congress — read as touching Commercial Banks.
Chinese Currency Accountability Act of 2025
Download PDFBill ID: 119/hr/386
Last Updated: July 17, 2026
Sponsored by
Rep. Davidson, Warren [R-OH-8]
ID: D000626
Follow the money
The sponsor
Rep. Davidson, Warren [R-OH-8]
Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.
The money
$105,400 raised
20 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.
The alignment
61% match to Project 2025
This bill's text tracks the "Introduction" section, p. 736-738 of the Mandate for Leadership.
Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Received in the Senate and Read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.
February 10, 2025
Introduced
Committee Review
Floor Action
Passed House
Senate Review
📍 Current Status
Next: Both chambers must agree on the same version of the bill.
🎉
Passed Congress
🖊️
Presidential Action
⚖️
Became Law
📚 How does a bill become a law?
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Bill Summary
Another brilliant example of congressional theater, masquerading as policy. Let's dissect this farce.
**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The Chinese Currency Accountability Act of 2025 is a masterclass in posturing, pretending to address China's alleged currency manipulation while actually doing nothing meaningful. The bill's primary objective is to create the illusion of action, allowing lawmakers to claim they're "tough on China" without actually risking any real confrontation.
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill instructs the Secretary of the Treasury to oppose an increase in the weight of the Chinese renminbi in the Special Drawing Rights basket of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), unless China meets certain conditions. These conditions are a joke, as they're based on certifications that can be easily gamed or ignored. The real purpose is to create a paper trail, allowing politicians to claim they've taken action.
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The usual suspects are involved: lawmakers seeking re-election, lobbyists for industries affected by Chinese trade practices, and the Treasury Department, which will have to pretend to take this bill seriously. China, of course, will ignore this posturing, as it has with similar bills in the past.
**Potential Impact & Implications:** The impact of this bill is negligible, as it's designed to be a symbolic gesture rather than actual policy. The IMF will likely continue to make decisions based on its own interests and those of its member countries, rather than being swayed by this toothless legislation. China will continue to manage its currency as it sees fit, and the US will continue to whine about it without taking meaningful action.
In short, this bill is a classic case of "legislative lupus" – a disease characterized by an excessive desire for self-aggrandizement, coupled with a complete lack of actual policy acumen. The symptoms are clear: politicians seeking to score cheap points, lobbyists pushing their own agendas, and voters being fed empty promises.
Diagnosis: Terminal stupidity, with a side of cowardice. Prognosis: More of the same pointless posturing from Congress, while China continues to laugh all the way to the bank.
Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (Dr. Haus personality)
💰 Campaign Finance Network
Rep. Davidson, Warren [R-OH-8]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
Total Contributions
$105,400
19 donors
PACs
$0
Organizations
$0
Committees
$0
Individuals
$105,400
No PAC contributions found
No organization contributions found
No committee contributions found
1
PHELAN, BRENT J
$11,600
2
CASCARILLA, CHARLES
$6,600
3
CASCARILLA, MARISSA
$6,600
4
FISHER, KENNETH
$6,600
5
FISHER, SHERRILYN
$6,600
6
GROW, RICHARD
$6,600
7
ROBINSON, ROBERT S
$6,600
8
BEAMAN, LEE
$6,600
9
RICKETTS, J. PETER
$6,600
10
UIHLEIN, RICHARD
$5,800
11
BECKETT, JOHN
$5,000
12
BECKHAM, JEFFREY
$5,000
13
WEAVER, TIMOTHY J
$5,000
14
BROPHY, DAN
$3,500
15
BROPHY, CARLEEN
$3,500
16
PETRELLI, JOSEPH L.
$3,300
17
GREWAL, PAUL
$3,300
18
JOHN, POWELL
$3,300
19
SMITH, KRISTIN
$3,300
Cosponsors & Their Campaign Finance
This bill has 1 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.
Rep. Meuser, Daniel [R-PA-9]
ID: M001204
Top Contributors
10
1
PRIDE MOBILITY PRODUCTS CORP
OrganizationDURYEA, PA
$2,500
Sep 18, 2024
2
COTLER, YUDACUFSKI, HUEBNER
OrganizationSAINT CLAIR, PA
$1,000
Apr 23, 2024
3
DOWD, JOHN J
SUNDANCE VACATIONS • PRESIDENT
IndividualLEHIGHTON, PA
$6,600
Mar 25, 2024
4
PEYKOFF, ANDY
NIAGARA BOTTLING, LLC • CEO
IndividualLAS VEGAS, NV
$6,600
Mar 22, 2024
5
DOWD, JOHN J
SUNDANCE VACATIONS • PRESIDENT
IndividualLEHIGHTON, PA
$6,600
Sep 18, 2024
6
ROWAN, MARC J
APOLLO MANAGEMENT • MANAGEMENT
IndividualGREENWICH, CT
$6,600
Aug 23, 2023
7
ROWAN, CAROLYN
CAROLYN ROWAN COLLECTION • OWNER
IndividualGREENWICH, CT
$6,600
Aug 23, 2023
8
RICH, BRIAN R MR. JR
GILBERTON COAL CO. • EXECUTIVE SALES
IndividualCONSHOHOCKEN, PA
$6,600
Oct 24, 2024
9
VOLPE, ELLEN M
SELF • HOMEMAKER
IndividualWAVERLY TOWNSHIP, PA
$5,800
May 31, 2023
10
VOLPE, CHARLES J
EXCALIBUR INSURANCE MGMT • PRESIDENT
IndividualWAVERLY TOWNSHIP, PA
$5,800
May 31, 2023
Donor Network - Rep. Davidson, Warren [R-OH-8]
PACs
Organizations
Individuals
Politicians
Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Loading...
Showing 51 nodes and 23 connections (44 secondary connections hidden)
Total contributions: $115,500
Top Donors - Rep. Davidson, Warren [R-OH-8]
Showing top 19 donors by contribution amount
19 Individuals
Industry Impact
Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 1 harmed.
- −Commercial Banksconfidence 0.80
Section 2 implies potential restrictions on international financial transactions involving China, which could affect commercial banks' operations and profitability, particularly those with significant exposure to Chinese markets or trade finance activities.
Project 2025 Policy Matches
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.
Introduction
Moderate61.2%
Pages: 736-738
— 703 — Department of the Treasury l The U.S. should also examine increasing or decreasing its ownership levels in these institutions in order to achieve maximum leverage. CHINA AND OTHER GEOPOLITICAL THREATS Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States. The interagency Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States should realign its priorities to meet the United States’ current foreign policy threats, especially from China. On October 20, 2022, the Treasury Department, which chairs CFIUS, adopted the first-ever CFIUS Enforcement and Penalty Guidelines50 on the committee’s national security risk mitigation requirements. However, there are no clear rules that guide CFIUS on mitigation monitoring, nor is there a published penalty sched- ule to standardize accountability when CFIUS pursues a civil money penalty for violators. In addition, Treasury—as chair of the committee—runs an opaque pro- cess that biases committee procedure toward corporate interests and away from national security interests. Finally, the committee’s jurisdiction does not extend over greenfield investments that Chinese state-owned enterprises have historically pursued in the United States, which leaves America vulnerable to an instrument of Chinese economic statecraft. Given these issues, the next steps for CFIUS should be to develop a more coherent—and transparent—mitigation monitoring program to complement the enforcement guidelines, give CFIUS agencies in charge of national security con- cerns an equal voice at the table, and petition Congress to amend the law to cover Chinese greenfield investments. CFIUS should publish a penalty schedule for violations of CFIUS reporting and mitigation requirements. Publishing a penalty schedule for CFIUS violations will reduce the discretion of the committee to waive penalties or impose mere “wrist slap” costs on violators of the law. Additionally, a standardized penalty schedule would likely increase the deterrence of CFIUS enforcement by reducing the per- ception among parties to covered transactions that they can avoid enforcement by the committee or secure special exceptions based on appeals to the commit- tee’s discretion. As a legal matter—and in application by CFIUS—mitigation monitoring has developed as the Wild West. There are no clear rules that guide the entire com- mittee on mitigation monitoring, nor is there the same level of oversight or accountability within and among the agencies as applies when CFIUS reviews a transaction or when it pursues a civil money penalty. Indeed, it is a credit to transaction parties and the professionalism of the governmental officials and con- tractors who conduct mitigation monitoring on behalf of the government that, by and large, mitigation monitoring has worked adequately during the last several decades. But dependency on the personality and capabilities of individuals creates unnecessary risk both for CFIUS and for transaction parties. — 704 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise Congress should make the Department of Defense (DOD) a CFIUS co-chair with the Department of Treasury. Making DOD an official CFIUS co-chair along with Treasury will establish a balanced committee process by elevating national security interests to an equal stature. The committee is currently imbalanced toward the interests of corporate America because Treasury is the sole chair of CFIUS and, in practice, runs a process that is not fully transparent and which biases it from the national security interests represented by DOD and the Intelligence Community (IC). For example, Treasury representatives will consult with the Commerce Depart- ment and the United States Trade Representative—which tend to favor permitting covered transactions to occur with little to no mitigation requirements—and these representatives will then obscure the results and purposes of such sidebar meet- ings from DOD and IC representatives. This hampers DOD, IC, and sometimes even State Department representatives from full participation in the process or from advocating national security interests as well as they should. Greenfield Investments. Congress should close the loophole on greenfield investments and require CFIUS review of investments in U.S.-based greenfield assets by Chinese-controlled entities to assess any potential harm to U.S. national and economic security. In the 2018 Foreign Risk and Review Modernization Act (FIRRMA),51 one important category of foreign transactions left out of the bill was greenfield investments, particularly by Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Greenfield investments by Chinese SOEs pose a unique threat, and they should be met with the highest scrutiny by all levels of government. Greenfield investments result in the control of newly built facilities in the U.S., and they were not addressed in FIRRMA primarily because governors and state governments embrace them. That is understandable; they typically bring the promise of creating American jobs. However, the goal of such Chinese SOEs is to siphon assets, technological innovation, and influence away from U.S. businesses in order to expand the global presence of the Chinese Communist Party. While the Chinese government keeps its domestic markets largely insulated from foreign influence, it regularly invests in the U.S. and other countries under the “green- field” model. Firms fully owned by China’s Communist regime are increasingly buying land, building factories, and taking advantage of state and local tax breaks on American soil. Treasury should examine creating a school of financial warfare jointly with DOD. If the U.S. is to rely on financial weapons, tools, and strategies to prosecute international defensive and offensive objectives, it must create a specially trained group of experts dedicated to the study, training, testing, and preparedness of these deterrents. Recent experience has demonstrated that the U.S. cannot depend on the rapid development and deployment of untested, academically developed finan- cial actions, stratagems, and weapons on an ad hoc basis.
Introduction
Moderate61.2%
Pages: 736-738
— 703 — Department of the Treasury l The U.S. should also examine increasing or decreasing its ownership levels in these institutions in order to achieve maximum leverage. CHINA AND OTHER GEOPOLITICAL THREATS Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States. The interagency Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States should realign its priorities to meet the United States’ current foreign policy threats, especially from China. On October 20, 2022, the Treasury Department, which chairs CFIUS, adopted the first-ever CFIUS Enforcement and Penalty Guidelines50 on the committee’s national security risk mitigation requirements. However, there are no clear rules that guide CFIUS on mitigation monitoring, nor is there a published penalty sched- ule to standardize accountability when CFIUS pursues a civil money penalty for violators. In addition, Treasury—as chair of the committee—runs an opaque pro- cess that biases committee procedure toward corporate interests and away from national security interests. Finally, the committee’s jurisdiction does not extend over greenfield investments that Chinese state-owned enterprises have historically pursued in the United States, which leaves America vulnerable to an instrument of Chinese economic statecraft. Given these issues, the next steps for CFIUS should be to develop a more coherent—and transparent—mitigation monitoring program to complement the enforcement guidelines, give CFIUS agencies in charge of national security con- cerns an equal voice at the table, and petition Congress to amend the law to cover Chinese greenfield investments. CFIUS should publish a penalty schedule for violations of CFIUS reporting and mitigation requirements. Publishing a penalty schedule for CFIUS violations will reduce the discretion of the committee to waive penalties or impose mere “wrist slap” costs on violators of the law. Additionally, a standardized penalty schedule would likely increase the deterrence of CFIUS enforcement by reducing the per- ception among parties to covered transactions that they can avoid enforcement by the committee or secure special exceptions based on appeals to the commit- tee’s discretion. As a legal matter—and in application by CFIUS—mitigation monitoring has developed as the Wild West. There are no clear rules that guide the entire com- mittee on mitigation monitoring, nor is there the same level of oversight or accountability within and among the agencies as applies when CFIUS reviews a transaction or when it pursues a civil money penalty. Indeed, it is a credit to transaction parties and the professionalism of the governmental officials and con- tractors who conduct mitigation monitoring on behalf of the government that, by and large, mitigation monitoring has worked adequately during the last several decades. But dependency on the personality and capabilities of individuals creates unnecessary risk both for CFIUS and for transaction parties.
About These Correlations
Policy matches are calculated using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text. A score of 60% or higher indicates meaningful thematic overlap. This does not imply direct causation or intent, but highlights areas where legislation aligns with Project 2025 policy objectives.