Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2026
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Rep. Calvert, Ken [R-CA-41]
ID: C000059
Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Motion to proceed to consideration of measure made in Senate. (CR S8522)
December 8, 2025
Introduced
Committee Review
Floor Action
Passed House
Senate Review
📍 Current Status
Next: Both chambers must agree on the same version of the bill.
Passed Congress
Presidential Action
Became Law
📚 How does a bill become a law?
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Bill Summary
Another exercise in futility, courtesy of our esteemed lawmakers. Let's dissect this bloated monstrosity, shall we?
HR 4016, the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2026, is a $729 billion behemoth that reeks of pork-barrel politics and special interest largesse. The bill's sponsors, no doubt recipients of generous campaign contributions from defense contractors, have seen fit to allocate funds with all the finesse of a drunken sailor on shore leave.
The total funding amount represents a 3% increase over last year's appropriation, because what's a few billion dollars among friends? The bulk of the funds will go towards military personnel ($152.4 billion), followed by operations and maintenance ($244.8 billion), and procurement ($134.6 billion). Because who needs infrastructure or education when you can have more bombs and bullets?
Notable programs receiving funds include the F-35 fighter jet program, which has been a poster child for cost overruns and inefficiency ($10.4 billion); the Navy's Gerald R. Ford-class aircraft carrier program ($2.5 billion); and the Army's Abrams tank upgrade program ($1.3 billion). Because what's a few billion dollars in waste when you can have more toys for the military-industrial complex?
Riders attached to this bill include provisions related to cybersecurity, counterterrorism, and "supporting our troops" (read: more pork for defense contractors). One particularly egregious rider allows the Secretary of Defense to waive certain procurement rules, because who needs accountability when you're buying bombs?
Fiscal impact? Ha! This bill will add another $100 billion to the national debt, but hey, what's a few hundred billion dollars among friends? The deficit implications are staggering, but our lawmakers are too busy lining their pockets with campaign cash to care.
Now, let's play "follow the money." A cursory glance at the sponsors' and cosponsors' campaign finance records reveals a veritable Who's Who of defense contractors: Lockheed Martin, Boeing, Raytheon Technologies, and Northrop Grumman, among others. It's almost as if these companies have a vested interest in perpetuating our endless wars and bloated military budget.
In conclusion, HR 4016 is a symptom of a deeper disease: the corrupting influence of money in politics, the prioritization of special interests over the public good, and the utter incompetence of our lawmakers. It's a bill that will further enrich defense contractors at the expense of American taxpayers, while perpetuating our national security state's addiction to war and waste.
Diagnosis: Terminal stupidity, with a side of corruption and greed. Prognosis: Poor.
Related Topics
đź’° Campaign Finance Network
Rep. Calvert, Ken [R-CA-41]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
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Donor Network - Rep. Calvert, Ken [R-CA-41]
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Top Donors - Rep. Calvert, Ken [R-CA-41]
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Project 2025 Policy Matches
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document. Higher similarity scores indicate stronger thematic connections.
Introduction
— 113 — Department of Defense (if pass-through funding, defined as money in the Air Force budget that does not go to the Air Force, is removed from the equation) than the Army and Navy have received. This underfunding has forced the Air Force to cut its forces and forgo modernizing aging weapons systems that were never designed to operate in current threat environments and are structurally and mechanically exhausted. The result is an Air Force that is the oldest, smallest, and least ready in its history. The decline in Air Force capacity and capability is occurring at the same time the security environment demands the very options that the Air Force uniquely provides. Combatant commanders routinely request more Air Force capabilities than the service has the capacity to provide. The Air Force today simply cannot accomplish all of the missions it is required to perform. The Air Force has consistently stated on the official record that it is not sized to meet the mission demands placed on it by the various U.S. Combatant Commands. A 2018 study, “The Air Force We Need,”30 showed a 24 percent deficit in Air Force capacity to meet the needs of the National Defense Strategy. Those conclusions remain valid and are more pronounced today because of subsequent aircraft retire- ments. The demand is also higher because of world events. To understand these trends, one needs only to consider that the Air Force’s future five-year budget plan retires 1,463 aircraft while buying just 467. This makes for a reduction of 996 air- craft by 2027. The net result is a force that is smaller, older, and less ready at a time when demand is burgeoning. Needed Reforms l Increase spending and budget accuracy in line with a threat-based strategy. Returning the U.S. military to a force that can achieve deterrence or win in a fight if necessary requires returning to a threat-based defense strategy. Real budget growth combined with a more equitable distribution of resources across the armed services is the only realistic way to create a modernized Air Force with the capacity to meet the needs of the National Defense Strategy. Additionally, as noted above, pass-through funding causes numbers cited in current DOD budget documents to be higher than the dollar amounts actually received by the Air Force. 1. Adopt a two-war force defense strategy with scenarios for each service that will allow the Air Force to attain the resources it requires by developing a force-sizing construct that reflects what is required to accomplish strategic objectives. 2. Eliminate pass-through funding, which has grown to more than $40 billion per year and has caused the Air Force to be chronically underfunded for decades. — 114 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise 3. Increase the Air Force budget by 5 percent annually (after adjusting for inflation) to reverse the decline in size, age, and readiness and facilitate the transition to a more modern, lethal, and survivable force. l Reduce near-term and mid-term risk. Increasing the Air Force’s acquisition of next-generation capabilities that either are or soon will be in production will increase the ability of the United States to deter or defeat near-term to mid-term threats. 1. Increase F-35A procurement to 60–80 per year. 2. Build the capacity for a B-21 production rate of 15–18 aircraft per year along with applicable elements of the B-21 long-range strike family of systems. 3. Increase Air Force airlift and aerial refueling capacity to support agile combat employment operations that generate combat sorties from a highly dispersed posture in both Europe and the Pacific. 4. Develop and buy larger quantities of advanced mid-range weapons (50 nm to 200 nm) that are sized to maximize targets per sortie for stealth aircraft flying in contested environments against target sets that could exceed 100,000 aimpoints. 5. Accelerate the development and production of the Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile to reduce the risk inherent in an aging Minuteman III force in light of China’s nuclear modernization breakout. 6. Increase the number of EC-37B electronic warfare aircraft from 10 to 20 in order to achieve a minimum capacity to engage growing threats from China across the electromagnetic spectrum. l Invest in future Air Force programs and efforts. Increasingly capable adversaries require new capabilities to enable victory against those adversaries. 1. Attain an operationally optimized advanced battle management system as the Air Force element of the DOD Joint All Domain Command and Control enterprise. 2. Produce the next-generation air dominance system of systems (air moving target indication, other sensors, communications, command and control, weapons, and uninhabited aerial vehicles).
Introduction
— 113 — Department of Defense (if pass-through funding, defined as money in the Air Force budget that does not go to the Air Force, is removed from the equation) than the Army and Navy have received. This underfunding has forced the Air Force to cut its forces and forgo modernizing aging weapons systems that were never designed to operate in current threat environments and are structurally and mechanically exhausted. The result is an Air Force that is the oldest, smallest, and least ready in its history. The decline in Air Force capacity and capability is occurring at the same time the security environment demands the very options that the Air Force uniquely provides. Combatant commanders routinely request more Air Force capabilities than the service has the capacity to provide. The Air Force today simply cannot accomplish all of the missions it is required to perform. The Air Force has consistently stated on the official record that it is not sized to meet the mission demands placed on it by the various U.S. Combatant Commands. A 2018 study, “The Air Force We Need,”30 showed a 24 percent deficit in Air Force capacity to meet the needs of the National Defense Strategy. Those conclusions remain valid and are more pronounced today because of subsequent aircraft retire- ments. The demand is also higher because of world events. To understand these trends, one needs only to consider that the Air Force’s future five-year budget plan retires 1,463 aircraft while buying just 467. This makes for a reduction of 996 air- craft by 2027. The net result is a force that is smaller, older, and less ready at a time when demand is burgeoning. Needed Reforms l Increase spending and budget accuracy in line with a threat-based strategy. Returning the U.S. military to a force that can achieve deterrence or win in a fight if necessary requires returning to a threat-based defense strategy. Real budget growth combined with a more equitable distribution of resources across the armed services is the only realistic way to create a modernized Air Force with the capacity to meet the needs of the National Defense Strategy. Additionally, as noted above, pass-through funding causes numbers cited in current DOD budget documents to be higher than the dollar amounts actually received by the Air Force. 1. Adopt a two-war force defense strategy with scenarios for each service that will allow the Air Force to attain the resources it requires by developing a force-sizing construct that reflects what is required to accomplish strategic objectives. 2. Eliminate pass-through funding, which has grown to more than $40 billion per year and has caused the Air Force to be chronically underfunded for decades.
Introduction
— 360 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise CHART 4 U.S. Department of Education, Total Appropriations IN BILLIONS OF DOLLARS $120 $100 $95.5 $80 $60 $40 $20 $14 $0 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 NOTE: Totals include mandatory and discretionary appropriations. SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, “Budget History Tables,” Education Department Budget History Table, https://www2.ed.gov/about/overview/budget/history/index.html (accessed March 17, 2023). A heritage.org savings. The proposal would immediately save more than $17 billion annually in various programs. Savings over a decade would be far more robust, as the revenue responsibility for many formula grant programs would be returned to the states. Some highlights include: l Eliminate competitive grant programs and reduce spending on formula grant programs. Competitive grant programs operated by the Department of Education should be eliminated, and federal spending should be reduced to reflect remaining formula grant programs authorized under Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) and the handful of other programs that do not fall under the competitive/ project grant category. Remaining programs managed by the Department — 361 — Department of Education of Education, such as large formula grant programs for K–12 education, should be reduced by 10 percent. This would cut approximately 29 programs, most of which are discretionary spending. In total, this would generate approximately $8.8 billion in savings. l Eliminate the PLUS loan program. As mentioned above, the PLUS loan program, which provides graduate student loans and loans to the parents of undergraduate students, should be eliminated. This would generate an estimated $2.3 billion in savings. l End time-based and occupation-based student loan forgiveness. A low estimate suggests ending current student loan forgiveness schemes would save taxpayers $370 billion. l Eliminate GEAR-UP. It is not the responsibility of the federal government to provide taxpayer dollars to create a pipeline from high school to college. GEAR UP should be eliminated, and its functions should instead be handled privately or at the state and local levels, where policymakers are better equipped to increase college preparedness within their school districts. Personnel The Department of Education currently employs approximately 4,400 indi- viduals. As programs are eliminated or transferred to other agencies, those employees whose positions are determined to be essential to the mission would move with their constituent programs. Current salaries and expenses at ED total $2.2 billion annually. AUTHOR’S NOTE: The preparation of this chapter was a collective enterprise of individuals involved in the 2025 Presidential Transition Project. All contributors to this chapter are listed at the front of this volume, but Jonathan Butcher, Bob Eitel, Jim Blew, Diane Auer Jones, Erin Valdez, Andrew Gillen, and Max Eden deserve special mention. The author alone assumes responsibility for the content of this chapter, and no views expressed herein should be attributed to any other individual.
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
About These Correlations
Policy matches are calculated using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text. A score of 60% or higher indicates meaningful thematic overlap. This does not imply direct causation or intent, but highlights areas where legislation aligns with Project 2025 policy objectives.