The bill
Caribbean Basin Security Initiative Authorization Act
HR. 4368, 119th Congress — read as touching Law Enforcement & Surveillance Tech.
Sponsored by
Rep. Espaillat, Adriano [D-NY-13]
ID: E000297
Follow the money
The bill
HR. 4368, 119th Congress — read as touching Law Enforcement & Surveillance Tech.
The sponsor
Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.
The money
21 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.
The alignment
This bill's text tracks the "Department of Homeland Security" section, p. 177-179 of the Mandate for Leadership.
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Ordered to be Reported in the Nature of a Substitute by the Yeas and Nays: 42 - 5.
January 20, 2026
📍 Current Status
Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Another masterpiece of legislative theater, courtesy of the geniuses in Congress. Let's dissect this farce, shall we?
**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The Caribbean Basin Security Initiative Authorization Act (HR 4368) claims to promote citizen safety, security, and the rule of law in the Caribbean region. How quaint. In reality, it's a thinly veiled attempt to expand US influence, secure strategic interests, and line the pockets of defense contractors and corrupt officials.
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill authorizes the Secretary of State and USAID to carry out an initiative that includes:
* Maritime and aerial security cooperation (read: more military hardware and training for local forces) * Border and port security enhancements (because who doesn't love a good game of "keep the contraband out"?) * Capacity building and equipment provision for law enforcement and justice sector reform (code for "we'll give you guns and training, but don't expect us to actually care about human rights") * Cybersecurity cooperation (because the Caribbean is clearly the next frontier in cyber warfare)
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The usual suspects:
* Beneficiary countries: a laundry list of Caribbean nations that will receive US "aid" (read: bribes) in exchange for their loyalty and strategic access * Defense contractors: the real beneficiaries of this bill, as they'll get to sell more hardware and services to the US government * Local elites: corrupt officials who will skim off the top of US aid packages and use them to further entrench their power
**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill is a classic case of "security theater" – all spectacle, no substance. It will:
* Exacerbate existing corruption and inequality in the region * Fuel a regional arms race, as local forces become more militarized * Provide a convenient pretext for US interventionism and regime change * Line the pockets of defense contractors and corrupt officials
In short, HR 4368 is a cynical exercise in imperialist posturing, designed to maintain US dominance in the Caribbean while pretending to care about regional security. The real disease here is the insatiable hunger for power and profit that drives US foreign policy. And the diagnosis? Terminal stupidity, with a healthy dose of corruption and greed.
Rep. Espaillat, Adriano [D-NY-13]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
No PAC contributions found
No committee contributions found
This bill has 3 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.
ID: S000168
Top Contributors
10
ID: S000344
Top Contributors
10
ID: L000599
Top Contributors
10
Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Showing 34 nodes and 30 connections (37 secondary connections hidden)
Total contributions: $94,250
Showing top 14 donors by contribution amount
Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 3 helped, 1 harmed.
Section 3(b)(3) outlines support for law enforcement capacity building, training, and equipment, benefiting the industry.
Section 3(b)(3)(E) mentions strengthening cybersecurity and cybercrime cooperation, including capacity building and support for cybersecurity systems.
Section 3(b)(7)(C) discusses monitoring and restricting equipment from high-risk vendors of telecommunications infrastructure, which could harm certain telecom companies.
Section 3(b)(2)(A) mentions assistance to strengthen maritime and aerial interdiction operations, potentially involving defense contractors.
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.
AI Analysis:
"The bill focuses on Caribbean security cooperation, disaster resilience, and crime prevention, while the Project 2025 policy centers on domestic immigration enforcement, denaturalization, and restructuring USCIS within DHS. There is minimal thematic overlap, primarily in broader law enforcement and security cooperation concepts."
— 144 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise prosecuting criminal and civil denaturalization cases, in combination with the Department of Justice, for aliens who obtained citizenship through fraud or other illicit means. Additionally, USCIS should create a criminal enforcement compo- nent within the agency to investigate immigration benefits fraud under Title 8 (perhaps requiring additional legislative and regulatory authorities for the offi- cers themselves) and to prosecute cases through Special Assistant U.S. Attorneys (SAUSAs) with substantive knowledge in the field. Particular attention should be given to addressing increasing incidents of forced labor trafficking in temporary work visa programs. While the Biden regulatory agenda has focused on at least two major rules—the credible fear rule and the public charge rule—USCIS has utilized other policy and internal procedural mechanisms to extend employment authorization to large groups of people who are in the country without legal status. The agency has taken quiet steps to cut corners and lessen adjudicatory standards. During a tran- sition period, a complete audit of agency policies, memoranda, and management directives issued during the Biden Administration should be completed, and rescis- sion documents should be prepared for issuance within the first few days of the incoming Administration. Additionally, regulatory documents should be drafted to review or reverse all regulations promulgated during the Biden Administration. New Policies To advance the national interest, the three core immigration agencies—USCIS, ICE, and CBP—should remerge and have immigration elements outside of DHS (such as ORR of HHS) included. The fragmented immigration enforcement frame- work that developed in the wake of the Homeland Security Act has weakened each agency and should be remediated. Combining these critical agencies would strengthen their capabilities, ensure cooperation, and promote information-shar- ing. Agency responsibilities and the delineation of authorities, such as inconsistent use of deferred action and issuance of NTAs by each agency, have long been a point of contention that would be addressed much more easily if they were recombined into a single entity. Alternatively, new policies for USCIS as it currently exists should focus on mat- ters that can be addressed through administrative action. l The workforce should be realigned and, as necessary, retrained on base eligibility and fraud detection rather than speed in processing. l Training should be returned to Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers (FLETC), which would underscore the enforcement role of USCIS as a vetting agency, and be rebranded accordingly. — 145 — Department of Homeland Security l Management Directives and policies should realign to ensure that the workforce, while adaptable and able to handle the bulk of the USCIS mission, is not allowed to be pulled off mission work to focus on unlawful programs (DACA, mass parole for Afghans, Ukrainians, Venezuelans, etc.), which divert resources away from nuclear family and employment programs. The regulatory agenda should include the immediate submission of notices of proposed rulemaking for the Trump Administration’s public charge rule (includ- ing aspects from its original notice of proposed rulemaking), temporary work visa reform, employment authorization reform rules, asylum bars rule, and a third-country transit rule. At a minimum, an enhanced regulatory agenda should include rules strengthening the integrity of the asylum system, parole reform, and U visa reform that prioritizes relief for victims of heinous crimes and ensures that we protect the truest and most deserving victims of crime. Not all policy changes require formal rulemaking, however, as internal guidance documents are generally exempt under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).7 In this subregulatory space, USCIS policy memos and operational guidance should reduce the validity of employment authorization documents and end the COVID flexibilities, including the reliance on biometrics reuse. USCIS should also enforce existing regulations by rejecting incomplete applications and petitions, ensuring both that they are completed before accepted for filing and that FDNS signs off on all approved applications and petitions before approval notices are sent to the alien or petitioner. Other efforts should be focused on adjudication standards returning to nearly 100 percent interview requirements for all appropriate cases. The incoming Administration should spearhead an immigration legislative agenda focused on creating a merit-based immigration system that rewards high- skilled aliens instead of the current system that favors extended family–based and luck-of-the-draw immigration. To that end, the diversity visa lottery should be repealed, chain migration should be ended while focusing on the nuclear family, and the existing employment visa program should be replaced with a system to award visas only to the “best and brightest.” Internal efforts to limit employment authorization should be matched by con- gressional action to narrow statutory eligibility to work in the United States and mitigate unfair employment competition for U.S. citizens. The oft-abused H-1B program should be transformed into an elite program through which employers are vying to bring in only the top foreign workers at the highest wages so as not to depress American opportunities. Additionally, Congress should: l Improve the integrity of the temporary work visa programs; l Repeal Temporary Protected Status (TPS) designations;
AI Analysis:
"The bill focuses on security cooperation and disaster resilience in the Caribbean, while the Project 2025 SBA section concerns loan program accountability, disaster lending, and religious eligibility. The only notable overlap is the shared emphasis on disaster resilience/response, but the policy domains and mechanisms are otherwise unrelated."
— 753 — Small Business Administration COVID-19 Lending Program Accountability and Cleanup. A major immediate priority for the next Administration should be a final accounting and accelerated cleanup of fraudulent COVID-19 loan and grant activity. As noted by the SBA IG, “managing COVID-19 stimulus lending is the greatest overall challenge facing SBA, and it may likely continue to be for many years as the agency grapples with fraud in the programs….”40 The next Administration should: l Consider bringing in private-sector support and expertise to close out these programs. Forgiveness and fraud must be dealt with as swiftly as possible, and law enforcement officials must pursue fraud vigorously. Entities receiving PPP loans that did not meet eligibility for forgiveness must be required to pay back the money. For example, under the CARES Act,41 PPP loan applicants generally were eligible only if, together with all their affiliates, they had no more than 500 employees. Numerous Planned Parenthood affiliates self-certified eligibility for PPP loans during the initial wave of loans that were governed by the CARES Act’s size requirement. Many Senators and Representatives asserted that these Planned Parenthood organizations were ineligible because— considered together with their affiliates—they exceeded the maximum eligible size.42 The Trump Administration SBA notified several Planned Parenthood PPP recipients of its preliminary determination of their ineligibility and of SBA’s authority to take various actions against applicants that falsely certified their eligibility.43 To date, despite continued oversight attempts by Members of Congress,44 the SBA has taken no action on the Planned Parenthood loans other than to forgive them, and in 2021, it approved new PPP loans to Planned Parenthood affiliates.45 l Cooperate with ongoing congressional oversight efforts and determine whether SBA has authority to reverse the forgiveness decisions. If it does have that authority, the SBA should reverse the forgiveness decisions for the subject loans, reiterate its preliminary determinations of ineligibility, investigate the matter more thoroughly, and take all appropriate action when its investigation concludes. Regardless of whether it reverses its forgiveness, if its investigation uncovers evidence that Planned Parenthood affiliates or any other loan recipients knowingly misrepresented their eligibility in their applications, the SBA should make appropriate referrals to the Department of Justice. — 754 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise Disaster Loan Program and Direct Lending. The SBA’s disaster loan pro- gram provides low-interest loans to personal, business, and nonprofit borrowers following a federally declared disaster. The program suffers from problems of coordination with Federal Emergency Management Administration (FEMA) disas- ter assistance. For example, disaster relief applicants have an incentive to avoid being approved for SBA disaster loans in order to increase the amount of FEMA assistance for which they are eligible. Moreover, the availability of disaster loans reduces individuals’ incentives to purchase disaster-related insurance. More than 90 percent of SBA disaster loans are loans to individuals such as homeowners, not to small businesses. In view of the challenges the SBA has experienced in its administration of this program, as well as the fraud and abuse in the EIDL COVID-19–related program and the IG’s concern that the systemic problems within this lending program undermine the SBA’s work, the next Administration should: l Work with Congress to assess the extent to which disaster loans should be offered by another agency rather than the SBA and explore private-sector channels for administering the loans. l Specify clearly that no new direct lending programs will be developed at the SBA. Eligibility of Religious Entities for SBA Loans. Current SBA regulations46 and SBA Form 197147 make certain religious entities ineligible to participate in several SBA loan programs. The Trump Administration proposed a rule that would remove the provisions on the ground that they violate the First Amendment.48 Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have made their unconstitutionality clearer.49 In an April 3, 2020, letter to Congress pursuant to 28 U.S. Code § 530D,50 the Trump Administration SBA advised that two such provisions violate the Free Exer- cise Clause of the First Amendment and that it therefore would not enforce them. On January 19, 2021, the Trump Administration SBA proposed a rule to remove all of the unconstitutional religious exclusions from its regulations.51 The SBA has not acted on the proposed rule. A similar religious exclusion once appeared in the regulation governing eligibil- ity for SBA Business Loan Programs,52 but it was removed in a June 2022 final rule that noted tension with the First Amendment and Supreme Court precedent.53 That final rule announced that the SBA would nonetheless continue to make religious eligibility determinations for business loan applicants to comply with putative Establishment Clause requirements,54 but Supreme Court precedent and Office of Legal Counsel memoranda refute the notion that large government-backed loan programs raise any Establishment Clause concerns.55
AI Analysis:
"The bill focuses on foreign security assistance and cybersecurity cooperation with Caribbean nations, while the Project 2025 IC section emphasizes internal intelligence sharing, declassification reforms, and real-time auditing within the U.S. intelligence community. Overlap is limited to general cybersecurity and information-sharing themes."
— 222 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise forward-leaning in sharing cyber threat intelligence with private-sector partners and the public, emphasizing that the protective nature of such information is of value only if put into the right hands at the right time. Since critical infrastructure and services are overwhelmingly owned, managed, and defended by the private sector in the United States, there has been an increasing emphasis on declassify- ing intelligence and sharing actionable information with private-sector partners, often through industry-specific Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs); regional meetings of government and private-sector experts called InfraGard, run by the FBI; direct public notification from the Department of Homeland Security, the FBI, and (increasingly) the NSA; and more discreet one-on-one engagements led by the collecting agencies. These programs properly recognize the private sector’s role in providing cyber- security for Americans; in practice, however, the intelligence shared by the U.S. government through these venues is too often already known or no longer relevant by the time it makes its way through the downgrade process for sharing. In addition, government-shared information often needs to take advantage of the opportunity to provide contexts, such as attribution, trends, and size of the observed cyber problem. As warranted, additional context should be provided to the private sector as a matter of routine. To continue improving the U.S. government’s ability to defend the country’s most vital networks, the IC must adopt an “obligation to share” policy process, including the capacity for “write to release” intelligence products whereby newly discovered technical indicators, targeting, and other intelligence relevant to cyber defense are automatically provided either to the public or to targeted entities within 48 hours of their collection—which is how counterterrorism intel- ligence has been managed for years when it comes to a “duty to warn.” Under this policy, agency heads should still have the flexibility to withhold intelligence for operational or counterintelligence reasons but would need to report regularly to Congress on the number of and justification for exceptions. This policy would make sharing intelligence and defending networks the default, as it already is in the rest of the cybersecurity community outside the IC, to improve the quantity, relevance, and timeliness of defensive information while ensuring accountability for top leaders when they must withhold this information. One of the most significant challenges within the IC is presented by the need to share information promptly among the 18 elements of the intelligence enterprise. The only long-term solution to the understandable tension between the need to share information and the need to protect intelligence sources and methods is a robust real-time auditing capability that electronically flags unauthorized access. Under an identity management system with real-time audit, even the most sensi- tive information acquired by America’s intelligence agencies can be shared, and the access to and use of that information are appropriately monitored. Establishing — 223 — Intelligence Community a real-time auditing capability is essential to decreasing the risk for the heads of intelligence agencies in meeting their statutory requirements to ensure that they protect sources and methods associated with the classified information their agen- cies collect. Overclassification. There is broad consensus across the U.S. government and among stakeholders that the system for classifying, declassifying, and otherwise marking and handling sensitive information is at a crossroads. Exorbitant amounts of classified data are created daily, and agency personnel often mistakenly choose classification as the default selection to ensure national security. At the same time, the effectiveness of downgraded and carefully declassified information to support foreign policy efforts has been borne out in, for example, alerting the broader world of Russia’s buildup and likely plans for its invasion of Ukraine. Two executive orders principally govern how the U.S. government handles clas- sified and sensitive information. l Executive Order 13526, “Classified National Security Information,” issued in 2009,38 prescribes the classification levels and procedures for declassification. l Executive Order 13556, “Controlled Unclassified Information,” issued in 2010,39 aimed to establish a uniform program for managing all unclassified information that requires safeguarding or dissemination controls. The current system for declassifying classified national security information (CNSI) is extraordinarily analog, requiring experts’ review of individual records. Declassification policies are based on human review of paper and need to con- template and handle the proliferation and volume of digital records created by agencies. The U.S. government will soon reach the point at which manual review is impossible. The declassification of CNSI should support key U.S. national security objectives, reflect mission priorities, and not serve solely as a necessary procedural function. Reforms should include: l Tighter definitions and greater specificity for categories of information requiring protection. l More stringent policies to effect significant reductions in the number of Original Classification Authorities (OCAs). l Stricter accountability measures at the OCA level and more detailed security classification guides.
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.
A bill to require a briefing on increasing procurement of strategic and critical materials from sources in the United States.
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026
DHS Intelligence Rotational Assignment Program and Law Enforcement Support Act