Expanding WKSI Eligibility Act
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Rep. Steil, Bryan [R-WI-1]
ID: S001213
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Bill Summary
Another masterpiece from the esteemed members of Congress. The Expanding WKSI Eligibility Act, because what this country really needs is more loopholes for big business to exploit.
**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The main purpose of this bill is to lower the aggregate market value of voting and non-voting common equity required for an issuer to qualify as a well-known seasoned issuer (WKSI). Because, you know, it's just too hard for companies with only $400 million in market value to navigate the complexities of securities laws. I'm sure it has nothing to do with the fact that several large corporations have been lobbying for this change.
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill amends the definition of a WKSI by reducing the required aggregate market value from $700 million to $400 million. This means more companies can qualify as WKSIs, which in turn allows them to bypass certain disclosure requirements and enjoy other perks. Oh, and there's also a provision that requires the SEC to report on withdrawn applications related to WKSI status, because transparency is overrated.
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The usual suspects: big corporations, their lobbyists, and the politicians who are more than happy to do their bidding. The rest of us? Not so much. This bill is a gift to companies that want to avoid scrutiny and disclosure requirements, while the average investor gets to enjoy the thrill of potentially investing in companies with less transparent financials.
**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill is a classic case of regulatory capture, where politicians are more interested in pleasing their corporate donors than protecting the public interest. By lowering the bar for WKSIs, Congress is essentially saying that it's okay for companies to be less transparent and accountable. The potential impact? More Enrons, more Theranos, more financial crises waiting to happen.
In conclusion, this bill is a masterclass in legislative malpractice. It's a cynical attempt to further enrich the already wealthy at the expense of everyone else. But hey, who needs accountability and transparency when you have campaign donations and lobbying dollars?
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Rep. Steil, Bryan [R-WI-1]
Congress 119 ⢠2024 Election Cycle
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Project 2025 Policy Matches
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document. Higher similarity scores indicate stronger thematic connections.
Introduction
â 842 â Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise 19. Burton, âImproving Entrepreneursâ Access to Capital: Vital for Economic Growthâ; Campbell, âThe Case for Federal Pre-Emption of State Blue Sky Laws.â 20. David R. Burton, âWhy the SECâs Consolidated Audit Trail Is a Bad Idea,â Heritage Foundation Commentary, December 5, 2019, https://www.heritage.org/monetary-policy/commentary/why-the-secs-consolidated- audit-trail-bad-idea; Hester M. Peirce, Commissioner, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, âStatement on the Order Granting Temporary Conditional Exemptive Relief from Certain Requirements of the National Market System Plan Governing the Consolidated Audit Trail,â July 8, 2022, https://www.sec.gov/news/ statement/peirce-statement-consolidated-audit-trail-070822 (accessed February 20, 2023). 21. Peirce, âItâs Not Just Scope 3: Remarks at the American Enterprise Instituteâ; Uyeda, âRemarks at the 2022 Cato Summit on Financial Regulation.â 22. David R. Burton, âHow DoddâFrank Mandated Disclosures Harm, Rather than Protect, Investors,â Heritage Foundation Issue Brief No. 4526, March 10, 2016, http://thf-reports.s3.amazonaws.com/2016/IB4526.pdf. 23. For a detailed discussion of SEC administration, see Burton, âReforming the Securities and Exchange Commission.â 24. See, for example, Andrew N. Vollmer, âAccusers as Adjudicators in Agency Enforcement Proceedings,â University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform, Vol. 52, No. 1 (Fall 2018), pp. 103â155, https://repository.law. umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1602&context=mjlr (accessed February 20, 2023). 25. 7 U.S.C. § 1a(9), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/7/1a (accessed February 20, 2023). 26. Or the CFTC can undertake a rulemaking. 27. 7 U.S.C. § 2(i), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/7/2 (accessed February 20, 2023). 28. 7 U.S.C. § 7bâ3, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/7/7b-3 (accessed February 20, 2923). 29. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, âCross-Border Application of the Registration Thresholds and Certain Requirements Applicable to Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants,â Final Rule, Federal Register, Vol. 85, No. 178 (September 14, 2020), pp. 56924â57016, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2020-09- 14/pdf/2020-16489.pdf (accessed February 21, 2023). 30. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, âInterpretive Guidance and Policy Statement Regarding Compliance with Certain Swap Regulations,â Federal Register, Vol. 78, No. 144 (July 26, 2013), pp. 45292â45374, https:// www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/idc/groups/public/@lrfederalregister/documents/file/2013-17958a.pdf (accessed February 21, 2023). 31. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, âMargin Requirements for Uncleared Swaps for Swap Dealers and Major Swap ParticipantsâCross-Border Application of the Margin Requirements,â Final Rule, Federal Register, Vol. 81, No. 104 (May 31, 2016), pp. 34818â34854, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2016-05-31/ pdf/2016-12612.pdf (accessed February 21, 2023). 32. H.R. 4173, DoddâFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Public Law 111â203, 111th Congress, July 21, 2010, Title X, https://www.congress.gov/111/plaws/publ203/PLAW-111publ203.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). See also Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, âAbout Us,â https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about- us/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 33. See, for example, Paul Sperry, âTrump Is Finally Fixing This Economy-Killing Agency,â New York Post, December 2, 2017, https://nypost.com/2017/12/02/trump-is-finally-fixing-this-economy-killing-agency/ (accessed March 23, 2023). See also Jeb Hensarling âHow Weâll Stop a Rogue Federal Agency,â The Wall Street Journal, February 8, 2017, https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-well-stop-a-rogue-federal- agency-1486597413 (accessed March 23, 2023), and H.R. 3389, CFPB Slush Fund Elimination Act of 2013, 113th Congress, introduced October 30, 2013, https://www.congress.gov/113/bills/hr3389/BILLS-113hr3389ih.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 34. Editorial, âCFPB Joins Justice in Shaking Down Banks for Democrat Activist Groups,â Investorâs Business Daily, June 17, 2015, https://www.investors.com/politics/editorials/cfpb-diverts-civil-penalty-funds-to-democrat- activist-groups/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 35. Table, âBudget by Program,â in Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Annual Performance Plan and Report, and Budget Overview, February 2023, p. 15, https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_ performance-plan-and-report_fy23.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 36. Table, âFTE by Program,â in ibid., p. 16. â 843 â Financial Regulatory Agencies 37. Table 7, âCivil Penalty Fund Significant Activity,â in Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Financial Report of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Fiscal Year 2022, November 15, 2022, p. 21, https://files. consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_financial-report_fy2022.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 38. Ibid. 39. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Financial Report of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Fiscal Year 2022, p. 20. 40. 12 U.S. Code § 5491, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/12/5491 (accessed March 23, 2023). 41. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, âBureau Structure,â last updated March 15, 2023, https://www. consumerfinance.gov/about-us/the-bureau/bureau-structure/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 42. See Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, âConsumer Financial Civil Penalty Fund Rule,â https://www. consumerfinance.gov/rules-policy/final-rules/consumer-financial-civil-penalty-fund-rule/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 43. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, âCivil Penalty Fund: Consumer Education and Financial Literacy,â https://www.consumerfinance.gov/enforcement/payments-harmed-consumers/civil-penalty-fund/consumer- education-financial-literacy/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 44. U.S. Government Accountability Office, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Opportunity Exists to Improve Transparency of Civil Penalty Fund Activities, GAO-14-551, June 2014, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-14-551. pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 45. Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 591 U.S. ___ (2020), https://www.supremecourt.gov/ opinions/19pdf/19-7_n6io.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 46. Ibid., p. 37. 47. See 12 U.S. Code § 5497(a)(1), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/12/5497 (accessed March 23, 2023). Congress specified that the amount transferred to the CFPB âshall not exceedâ 12 percent âof the total operating expenses of the Federal Reserve SystemâŚin fiscal year 2013, and in each year thereafter.â Ibid., § 5497(2)(A)(iii). 48. Community Financial Services Association of America v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (5th Cir. 2022), pp. 31â32, https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/21/21-50826-CV0.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 49. Ibid., p. 32. 50. Ibid. (quoting Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2202 n. 8 (2020)). 51. U.S. Supreme Court, âOrder List: 598 U.S.,â February 27, 2023, Docket No. 22â448, CFPB et al. v. Com. Fin. Services Assn., et al., https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/022723zor_6537.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 52. Devin Watkins, Competitive Enterprise Institute, âConsumer Financial Protection Bureau: Ripe for Reform,â testimony before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Monetary Policy, Committee on Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives, March 9, 2023, https://docs.house.gov/meetings/BA/ BA20/20230309/115384/HHRG-118-BA20-Wstate-WatkinsD-20230309.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023); Norbert J. Michel, â7 Steps Next Director Can Take to Make the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Less Awful,â Heritage Foundation Commentary, July 28, 2018, https://www.heritage.org/markets-and-finance/ commentary/7-steps-next-director-can-take-make-the-consumer-financial. 53. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Federal Reserve, and National Credit Union Administration. Those functions performed by the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) prior to DoddâFrank should be transferred to the OCC since OTS has merged with OCC. 54. See âSection 1071 of the DoddâFrank Actâ in David R. Burton, âImproving Small Business Access to Capital,â Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Symposium on Section 1071 of the DoddâFrank Act, Small Business Lending Panel, November 6, 2019, https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_burton-written- statement_symposium-section-1071.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 55. 5 U.S. Code Chapter 5, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/part-I/chapter-5 (accessed March 23, 2023). 56. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, âAdministrative Adjudication Proceedings,â https://www. consumerfinance.gov/administrative-adjudication-proceedings/ (accessed March 23, 2023), and 12 Code of Federal Regulations Part 1081âRules of Practice for Adjudication Proceedings, https://www.law.cornell.edu/ cfr/text/12/part-1081 (accessed March 23, 2023).
Introduction
â 842 â Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise 19. Burton, âImproving Entrepreneursâ Access to Capital: Vital for Economic Growthâ; Campbell, âThe Case for Federal Pre-Emption of State Blue Sky Laws.â 20. David R. Burton, âWhy the SECâs Consolidated Audit Trail Is a Bad Idea,â Heritage Foundation Commentary, December 5, 2019, https://www.heritage.org/monetary-policy/commentary/why-the-secs-consolidated- audit-trail-bad-idea; Hester M. Peirce, Commissioner, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, âStatement on the Order Granting Temporary Conditional Exemptive Relief from Certain Requirements of the National Market System Plan Governing the Consolidated Audit Trail,â July 8, 2022, https://www.sec.gov/news/ statement/peirce-statement-consolidated-audit-trail-070822 (accessed February 20, 2023). 21. Peirce, âItâs Not Just Scope 3: Remarks at the American Enterprise Instituteâ; Uyeda, âRemarks at the 2022 Cato Summit on Financial Regulation.â 22. David R. Burton, âHow DoddâFrank Mandated Disclosures Harm, Rather than Protect, Investors,â Heritage Foundation Issue Brief No. 4526, March 10, 2016, http://thf-reports.s3.amazonaws.com/2016/IB4526.pdf. 23. For a detailed discussion of SEC administration, see Burton, âReforming the Securities and Exchange Commission.â 24. See, for example, Andrew N. Vollmer, âAccusers as Adjudicators in Agency Enforcement Proceedings,â University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform, Vol. 52, No. 1 (Fall 2018), pp. 103â155, https://repository.law. umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1602&context=mjlr (accessed February 20, 2023). 25. 7 U.S.C. § 1a(9), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/7/1a (accessed February 20, 2023). 26. Or the CFTC can undertake a rulemaking. 27. 7 U.S.C. § 2(i), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/7/2 (accessed February 20, 2023). 28. 7 U.S.C. § 7bâ3, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/7/7b-3 (accessed February 20, 2923). 29. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, âCross-Border Application of the Registration Thresholds and Certain Requirements Applicable to Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants,â Final Rule, Federal Register, Vol. 85, No. 178 (September 14, 2020), pp. 56924â57016, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2020-09- 14/pdf/2020-16489.pdf (accessed February 21, 2023). 30. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, âInterpretive Guidance and Policy Statement Regarding Compliance with Certain Swap Regulations,â Federal Register, Vol. 78, No. 144 (July 26, 2013), pp. 45292â45374, https:// www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/idc/groups/public/@lrfederalregister/documents/file/2013-17958a.pdf (accessed February 21, 2023). 31. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, âMargin Requirements for Uncleared Swaps for Swap Dealers and Major Swap ParticipantsâCross-Border Application of the Margin Requirements,â Final Rule, Federal Register, Vol. 81, No. 104 (May 31, 2016), pp. 34818â34854, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2016-05-31/ pdf/2016-12612.pdf (accessed February 21, 2023). 32. H.R. 4173, DoddâFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Public Law 111â203, 111th Congress, July 21, 2010, Title X, https://www.congress.gov/111/plaws/publ203/PLAW-111publ203.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). See also Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, âAbout Us,â https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about- us/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 33. See, for example, Paul Sperry, âTrump Is Finally Fixing This Economy-Killing Agency,â New York Post, December 2, 2017, https://nypost.com/2017/12/02/trump-is-finally-fixing-this-economy-killing-agency/ (accessed March 23, 2023). See also Jeb Hensarling âHow Weâll Stop a Rogue Federal Agency,â The Wall Street Journal, February 8, 2017, https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-well-stop-a-rogue-federal- agency-1486597413 (accessed March 23, 2023), and H.R. 3389, CFPB Slush Fund Elimination Act of 2013, 113th Congress, introduced October 30, 2013, https://www.congress.gov/113/bills/hr3389/BILLS-113hr3389ih.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 34. Editorial, âCFPB Joins Justice in Shaking Down Banks for Democrat Activist Groups,â Investorâs Business Daily, June 17, 2015, https://www.investors.com/politics/editorials/cfpb-diverts-civil-penalty-funds-to-democrat- activist-groups/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 35. Table, âBudget by Program,â in Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Annual Performance Plan and Report, and Budget Overview, February 2023, p. 15, https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_ performance-plan-and-report_fy23.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 36. Table, âFTE by Program,â in ibid., p. 16.
Introduction
â 840 â Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise ENDNOTES 1. H.R. 5480, Securities Act of 1933, Public Law No. 73-22, 73rd Congress, May 27, 1933, https://govtrackus. s3.amazonaws.com/legislink/pdf/stat/48/STATUTE-48-Pg74.pdf (accessed February 20, 2023). 2. H.R. 9323, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Public Law No. 73-291, 73rd Congress, June 6, 1934, https:// govtrackus.s3.amazonaws.com/legislink/pdf/stat/48/STATUTE-48-Pg881a.pdf (accessed February 20, 2023). 3. Mark T. Uyeda, Commissioner, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, âRemarks at the 2022 Cato Summit on Financial Regulation,â November 17, 2022, https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/uyeda-remarks- cato-summit-financial-regulation-111722 (accessed February 20, 2023); Hester M. Peirce, Commissioner, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, âItâs Not Just Scope 3: Remarks at the American Enterprise Institute,â December 7, 2022, https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/peirce-remarks-american-enterprise-institute-120722 (accessed February 20, 2023); comment letter from David R. Burton to Vanessa A. Countryman, Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission, âRe: The Enhancement and Standardization of Climate-Related Disclosures for Investors [File No. S7-10-2; Release No. 33-11042; RIN 3235-AM87],â June 17, 2022, https://www. sec.gov/comments/s7-10-22/s71022-20131980-302443.pdf (accessed February 20, 2023). 4. Size would probably be measured best by public float or the number of beneficial owners. 5. See David R. Burton, âSecurities Disclosure Reform,â Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3178, February 13, 2017, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2017-02/BG3178.pdf; David R. Burton, âOffering and Disclosure Reform,â Chapter 11 in Reframing Financial Regulation: Enhancing Stability and Protecting Consumers, ed. Hester Peirce and Benjamin Klutsey (Arlington, VA: Mercatus Center at George Mason University, 2016), pp. 277â315, https://www.mercatus.org/research/books/reframing-financial-regulation (accessed February 20, 2023); Andrew N. Vollmer, âInvestor-Friendly Securities Reform to Increase Economic Growth,â Securities Regulation & Law Report, Bloomberg BNA, Vol. 49, June 5, 2017. 6. See, for example, David R. Burton, âReforming the Securities and Exchange Commission,â Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3378, January 30, 2019, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2019-01/ BG3378.pdf; Andrew N. Vollmer, âTestimony on Workforce Management Disclosures and Other SEC Issues,â submitted to the Subcommittee on Investor Protection, Entrepreneurship, and Capital Markets, Committee on Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives, December 6, 2022, https://www.congress.gov/117/ meeting/house/115227/witnesses/HHRG-117-BA16-Wstate-VollmerA-20221208.pdf (accessed February 20, 2023); David R. Burton, âReforming FINRA,â Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3181, February 1, 2017, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2017-02/BG3181.pdf; Hester Peirce, âThe Financial Industry Regulatory Authority: Not Self-Regulation After All,â Mercatus Center at George Mason University Working Paper, January 2015, https://www.mercatus.org/research/working-papers/financial-industry-regulatory- authority-not-self-regulation-after-all (accessed February 20, 2023); Thaya Brook Knight, âTransparency and Accountability at the SEC and at FINRA,â Chapter 11 in Prosperity Unleashed: Smarter Financial Regulation, ed. Norbert J. Michel, (Washington: The Heritage Foundation, 2017) https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/ files/2017-02/11_ProsperityUnleashed_Chapter11.pdf. 7. Reorganization Plan No. 10 of 1950, U.S. Code Title 5âAppendix, Reorganization Plans, http://uscode.house. gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-prelim-title5a-node84-leaf114&num=0&edition=prelim (accessed February 20, 2023). 8. The board or commission should evaluate the regulatory functions of the National Securities Exchanges, Registered Securities Future Product Exchanges, Registered Clearing Agencies (such as the Depository Trust Company (DTC), the National Securities Clearing Corporation (NSCC) and the Options Clearing Corporation (OCC)), the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB) and the National Futures Association (NFA). This board or commission should have a broad composition and permit minority reports. 9. Boyden Gray & Associates, Comments Submitted on Behalf of Alliance for Fair Board Recruitment Concerning the Nasdaq Stock Market LLC; Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change to Adopt Listing Rules Related to Board Diversity, Amendment No. 1, File No. SR-NASDAQ-2020-081, April 6, 2021 https://www.sec.gov/ comments/sr-nasdaq-2020-081/srnasdaq2020081-8639478-230941.pdf (accessed February 20, 2023); David R. Burton, âNasdaqâs Proposed Board-Diversity Rule Is Immoral and Has No Basis in Economics,â Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3591, March 9, 2021, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/ files/2021-03/BG3591_0.pdf. The SEC is contemplating at least two rules that can be expected to require differential treatment based on race, sex, ethnicity, and so on. See Executive Office of the President, Office â 841 â Financial Regulatory Agencies of Management and Budget, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, âFall 2022 Unified Agenda of Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions: Active Regulatory Actions Listed by Agency,â https://www.reginfo.gov/ public/do/eAgendaMain (accessed February 20, 2023); âHuman Capital Management Disclosure,â RIN: 3235- AM88, https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eAgendaViewRule?pubId=202204&RIN=3235-AM88 (accessed February 20, 2023); âCorporate Board Diversity,â RIN: 3235-AL91, https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/ eAgendaViewRule?pubId=202204&RIN=3235-AL91 (accessed February 20, 2023). 10. 15 U.S. Code § 77zâ3, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/15/77z-3 (accessed February 20, 2023); 15 U.S. Code § 78mm, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/15/78mm (accessed February 20, 2023). 11. S. ___, Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act of 2022, discussion draft, 117th Congress, 2nd Session, https:// www.banking.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/the_jobs_act_4.0discussiondraft.pdf (accessed February 20, 2023); David R. Burton, âEntrepreneurial Capital Formation,â Testimony before the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate, April 5, 2022, https://www.heritage.org/testimony/entrepreneurial- capital-formation; âRemoving Barriers to Small Business Capital Formation and Expanding Investor Opportunities,â Section 6 in Nicholas Anthony, Norbert J. Michel, Jennifer J. Schulp, George Selgin, and Jack Solowey, âSound Financial Policy: Principled Recommendations for the 118th Congress,â ed. Norbert J. Michel and Ann Rulon, Cato Institute, 2022, pp. 22â27, https://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/2022-10/sound- financial-policy-118th-congress.pdf (accessed February 20, 2023); David R. Burton and Norbert J. Michel, Proposals to Foster Economic Growth and Capital Formation, Submission to Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate, March 18, 2021, https://www.banking.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/David%20 Burton%20and%20Norbert%20Michel%20-%202021-3-18.pdf (accessed February 20, 2023); David R. Burton, âImproving Entrepreneursâ Access to Capital: Vital for Economic Growth,â Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3182, February 14, 2017, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2017-02/BG3182.pdf. 12. The small issues exemptive authority has been in the Securities Act since its initial enactment. 13. The crowdfunding exemption was created by Title III of the 2012 JOBS Act. See H.R. 3606, Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Public Law No. 112-106, 112th Congress, April 5, 2021, Title III, § 302, https://www. govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PLAW-112publ106/pdf/PLAW-112publ106.pdf (accessed February 20, 2023). 14. Burton, âImproving Entrepreneursâ Access to Capital: Vital for Economic Growthâ; Rutheford B. Campbell Jr., âThe Case for Federal Pre-Emption of State Blue Sky Laws,â Chapter 6 in Prosperity Unleashed: Smarter Financial Regulation, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2017-02/06_ProsperityUnleashed_ Chapter06.pdf. 15. Andrew N. Vollmer, âAbandon the Concept of Accredited Investors in Private Securities Offerings,â Securities Regulation Law Journal, Vol. 49, No. 5 (Spring 2021), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ id=3719280 (accessed February 20, 2023); Thaya Brook Knight, âYour Moneyâs No Good Here: How Restrictions on Private Securities Offerings Harm Investors,â Cato Institute Policy Analysis No. 833, February 9, 2018, https:// www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa833.pdf (accessed February 20, 2023); David R. Burton, âCongress Should Increase Access to Private Securities Offerings,â Heritage Foundation Issue Brief No. 4899, August 29, 2018, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2018-08/IB4899.pdf; Andrew N. Vollmer, âEvidence on the Use of Disclosure Documents in Private Securities Offerings to Accredited Investors,â Mercatus Center at George Mason University Working Paper, October 22, 2020, https://www.mercatus.org/publications/financial-regulation/ evidence-use-disclosure-documents-private-securities-offerings-0 (accessed February 20, 2023). 16. For a detailed discussion, see âMicro-Offerings,â Section IId in Burton and Michel, Proposals to Foster Economic Growth and Capital Formation, pp. 15â17. 17. David R. Burton, âLet Entrepreneurs Raise Capital Using Finders and Private Placement Brokers,â Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3328, July 10, 2018, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2018-07/ BG3328.pdf; Andrew N. Vollmer, âMake It Easy for Startups to Sell Stock,â Mercatus Center at George Mason University Discourse, September 21, 2020, https://www.mercatus.org/bridge/commentary/make-it-easy- startups-sell-stock (accessed February 20, 2023). 18. See H.R. 531, S-Corp Access to Crowdfunding Act, 115th Congress, introduced January 13, 2017, https://www. govinfo.gov/content/pkg/BILLS-115hr531ih/pdf/BILLS-115hr531ih.pdf (accessed February 20, 2023); David Burton, âThe Tax Law Makes It Almost Impossible for âS Corporationsâ to Use Equity Crowdfunding,â The Daily Signal, April 19, 2016, https://www.dailysignal.com/2016/04/19/the-tax-law-makes-it-almost-impossible-for- s-corporations-to-use-equity-crowdfunding/.
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
About These Correlations
Policy matches are calculated using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text. A score of 60% or higher indicates meaningful thematic overlap. This does not imply direct causation or intent, but highlights areas where legislation aligns with Project 2025 policy objectives.