Nuclear Waste Informed Consent Act
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Rep. Titus, Dina [D-NV-1]
ID: T000468
Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law
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3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
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5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
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7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Bill Summary
Another masterpiece from the esteemed members of Congress, who apparently think they're playing doctor with the nation's nuclear waste problem. The Nuclear Waste Informed Consent Act (HR 466) is a perfect example of legislative theater, designed to make voters feel like something is being done while actually accomplishing nothing.
**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The bill's primary objective is to require the Secretary of Energy to obtain consent from affected state and local governments before spending money on a nuclear waste repository. Sounds reasonable, right? Wrong. This is just a cleverly worded attempt to delay or block any actual progress on dealing with our growing nuclear waste problem.
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill introduces new definitions for "affected Indian tribe," "affected unit of local government," and other terms, because God forbid we use existing laws and regulations. The real meat of the bill is in Section 3, which requires the Secretary of Energy to obtain written consent from various parties before making any expenditures on a nuclear waste repository. This is where the theater comes in – it's all about creating an illusion of local control while actually giving politicians more excuses to do nothing.
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The usual suspects are affected: state and local governments, Indian tribes, and units of general local government. But let's be real, the only stakeholders who truly matter are the ones with deep pockets – the nuclear industry lobbyists and their Congressional puppets.
**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill will accomplish exactly what its sponsors intend: nothing. It will create a bureaucratic nightmare, allowing politicians to claim they're taking action while actually kicking the can down the road. Meanwhile, our nuclear waste problem will continue to grow, posing an ever-increasing threat to public health and safety.
Diagnosis: This bill is suffering from a severe case of "Legislative Constipation Syndrome" – a condition where politicians pretend to take action but are actually too afraid or corrupt to make any real progress. The underlying disease? A toxic mix of cowardice, greed, and stupidity.
Treatment: None required, as this bill will likely die in committee or be watered down to the point of irrelevance. But hey, at least we can all pretend that our elected officials are doing something about the nuclear waste problem...
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Rep. Titus, Dina [D-NV-1]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
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Project 2025 Policy Matches
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document. Higher similarity scores indicate stronger thematic connections.
Introduction
— 375 — Department of Energy and Related Commissions OFFICE OF NUCLEAR ENERGY (NE) Mission/Overview The Office of Nuclear Energy’s “mission is to advance nuclear energy science and technology to meet U.S. energy, environmental, and economic needs.” It has five stated goals: “Enable continued operation of existing U.S. nuclear reactors,” “Enable deployment of advanced nuclear reactors,” “Develop advanced nuclear fuel cycles,” “Maintain U.S. leadership in nuclear energy technology,” and “Enable a high-performing organization.”29 Under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act,30 the Office of Nuclear Energy “has also been responsible for the DOE’s statutory requirements to collect and dispose of spent nuclear fuel…since the Obama Administration’s dissolution of the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management.”31 Needed Reforms NE is too influential in driving the business decisions of commercial nuclear energy firms. Instead of focusing on a limited set of basic research and devel- opment activities that solve foundational technical issues that apply broadly to energy production, NE intervenes in nearly all aspects of the commercial nuclear energy industry. Absent wholesale reforms that restructure the federal energy and science bureaucracy to eliminate such functional energy offices, the next Admin- istration should: l Substantially limit NE’s size and scope. l Adopt broader regulatory and energy policy reforms that reduce regulatory obstacles, allow all energy sources to compete fairly in the marketplace, and establish a predictable policy environment. This will avoid unfair bias against the nuclear industry. New Policies NE should transition to a more limited scope of responsibilities that focuses on basic research, solving broadly applicable technology challenges, and solving the nuclear waste management issue as it relates to the development and deployment of advanced next-generation reactors, which can include small modular reactors (SMR). While respecting existing contractual obligations, NE should not initi- ate any new civilian reactor demonstration and commercialization projects. NE also should: l Focus on overcoming technical barriers that are preventing commercial reactor demonstration projects from moving forward. Any activities in support of existing nuclear plants and any other projects — 376 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise directed toward commercialization, including licensing support, should be shouldered by the private sector. l Reorganize its remaining activities into three basic lines of responsibility: nuclear fuels across the fuel cycle, reactor technology, and civilian radioactive waste. Budget The above reforms would cost substantially less than the $1,675,060,000 requested for FY 2023.32 Legislation such as the IIJA placed additional funding for new reactor demonstration projects outside of NE. These responsibilities and their associated funds should be moved to NE as appropriate. NE should not simply add or subtract programs, as some programs may help to support NE’s new priorities. The better approach would be to build a new budget and program strategy that accounts for related DOE programs and submit a new budget request reflecting NE’s new priorities. OFFICE OF FOSSIL ENERGY AND CARBON MANAGEMENT (FECM) Mission/Overview DOE is authorized by law to increase the conversion efficiency of all forms of fossil energy, reduce costs, improve environmental performance, and increase the energy security of the United States.33 In recent years, the Office of Fossil Energy (FE) has been transformed from its statutory role of improving fossil energy pro- duction to one that is focused primarily on reducing the carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuel extraction, transport, and combustion. This change is reflected in the office’s new name, the Office of Fossil Energy and Carbon Management (FECM), effective as of July 2021, and FECM’s mission: “to minimize the environmental impacts of fossil fuels while working towards net-zero emissions.”34 Needed Reforms l Eliminate carbon capture utilization and storage (CCUS) programs. Despite the recent expansion of the 45Q tax credit for carbon capture utilization and storage (CCUS) to $87 per ton, most carbon capture technology remains economically unviable, although private-sector innovations are on the horizon. CCUS programs should be left to the private sector to develop.35 If the office continues any CCUS research, that research should be focused more on innovative utilization. l Pursue the processing of critical minerals. Development of domestic critical material sources is important for national security, as the vast
Introduction
— 398 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise violation of its contractual obligation to take the waste has resulted in the payment of “approximately $10.1 billion in settlements and judgments to contract holders.”99 l Develop new NWF funding and accounting mechanisms that allow licensed nuclear operators to guarantee resources for future nuclear waste disposal while also maintaining control of those resources. l Reconstitute OCRWM. OCRWM, as already established by statute, should be tasked with developing the next steps on Yucca Mountain and nuclear waste management. These steps should include initiating market reforms, including significant amendments to the NWPA, to allow additional industry responsibility for managing waste, market pricing and competition for waste services, and the opportunity for Nevadans to have more partnership involvement with any nuclear facility at Yucca Mountain. l Reestablish, consistent with the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, the position of Director of the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management. Budget Within the Office of Nuclear Energy budget, approximately $100 million is set aside for fuel cycle and waste management activities.100 These funds should be transferred to the newly established OCRWM, which should also be responsible for managing the Nuclear Waste Fund and given access to the fund as necessary to carry out its responsibilities. NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION (NNSA) Mission/Overview NNSA’s primary mission is to provide and maintain a modern, safe, and effective nuclear deterrent for the United States. This includes the design and production of nuclear warheads, their integration with delivery systems, and their safe storage and decommissioning. NNSA’s responsibilities also include developing nuclear reactors for the U.S. Navy and “work[ing] to prevent nuclear weapon proliferation and reduce the threat of nuclear and radiological terrorism around the world.”101 NNSA was established by the NNSA Act, which also defines its authority.102 Needed Reforms The United States, through the NNSA, needs to make the design, development, and deployment of new nuclear warheads a top priority. Existing warheads were
Introduction
— 398 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise violation of its contractual obligation to take the waste has resulted in the payment of “approximately $10.1 billion in settlements and judgments to contract holders.”99 l Develop new NWF funding and accounting mechanisms that allow licensed nuclear operators to guarantee resources for future nuclear waste disposal while also maintaining control of those resources. l Reconstitute OCRWM. OCRWM, as already established by statute, should be tasked with developing the next steps on Yucca Mountain and nuclear waste management. These steps should include initiating market reforms, including significant amendments to the NWPA, to allow additional industry responsibility for managing waste, market pricing and competition for waste services, and the opportunity for Nevadans to have more partnership involvement with any nuclear facility at Yucca Mountain. l Reestablish, consistent with the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, the position of Director of the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management. Budget Within the Office of Nuclear Energy budget, approximately $100 million is set aside for fuel cycle and waste management activities.100 These funds should be transferred to the newly established OCRWM, which should also be responsible for managing the Nuclear Waste Fund and given access to the fund as necessary to carry out its responsibilities. NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION (NNSA) Mission/Overview NNSA’s primary mission is to provide and maintain a modern, safe, and effective nuclear deterrent for the United States. This includes the design and production of nuclear warheads, their integration with delivery systems, and their safe storage and decommissioning. NNSA’s responsibilities also include developing nuclear reactors for the U.S. Navy and “work[ing] to prevent nuclear weapon proliferation and reduce the threat of nuclear and radiological terrorism around the world.”101 NNSA was established by the NNSA Act, which also defines its authority.102 Needed Reforms The United States, through the NNSA, needs to make the design, development, and deployment of new nuclear warheads a top priority. Existing warheads were — 399 — Department of Energy and Related Commissions designed and built during the Cold War, and the U.S. lacks sufficient plutonium production capabilities.103 Because this process will take time, NNSA and the NNSA Labs need to ensure that existing nuclear warheads are viable and provide an appropriate strategic deterrent. New Policies The expansion of Chinese nuclear forces, the continued nuclear threat from Russia, and active nuclear programs in North Korea, Iran, and elsewhere require NNSA’s recommitment to the nuclear mission. A conservative Adminis- tration should: l Continue to develop new warheads for each branch of the triad (land, sea, and air defenses). If possible, reverse the Biden Administration’s decision to retire the B83 bomb (in order to maintain two aircraft-delivered warheads) and its decision to cancel the submarine-launched cruise missile (SLCM).104 Also undertake an evaluation of the need for nuclear antisubmarine and air defense weapons in light of emerging threats. l Maintain two production sites for plutonium pits (a key element of warhead production) at Los Alamos and Savannah River.105 l Reject ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and indicate a willingness to conduct nuclear tests in response to adversary nuclear developments if necessary. This will require that NNSA be directed to move to immediate test readiness to give the Administration maximum flexibility in responding to adversary actions. l Review all new Navy, Department of Homeland Security, and U.S. Department of Transportation Maritime Administration construction programs. The review should be conducted by the Director of Naval Reactors (DNR) with an eye to the possible inclusion of advanced affordable nuclear reactor technology and extension of DNR authority over these agencies’ nuclear construction programs. l Review the non–national security portfolios at the Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore, and Sandia labs and identify divestments to focus on nuclear deterrence. Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore, and Sandia provide unique capabilities for nuclear deterrence, and each lab maintains extensive non–national security research programs and commercial activities.
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About These Correlations
Policy matches are calculated using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text. A score of 60% or higher indicates meaningful thematic overlap. This does not imply direct causation or intent, but highlights areas where legislation aligns with Project 2025 policy objectives.