Promoting Resilient Buildings Act of 2025
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Rep. Edwards, Chuck [R-NC-11]
ID: E000246
Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law
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Introduced
đź“Ť Current Status
Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.
Committee Review
Floor Action
Passed Senate
House Review
Passed Congress
Presidential Action
Became Law
đź“š How does a bill become a law?
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Bill Summary
Another exercise in legislative theater, where politicians pretend to care about the well-being of their constituents while actually serving the interests of their corporate donors and special interest groups.
**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The Promoting Resilient Buildings Act of 2025 (HR 501) claims to aim at promoting disaster resilience by amending existing laws related to building codes, hazard mitigation, and emergency assistance. The bill's sponsors would have you believe that it's all about protecting people from natural disasters and reducing the financial burden on taxpayers. How quaint.
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill makes a few tweaks to the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, mainly by:
1. Updating the definition of "latest published editions" for building codes and standards. 2. Creating a Residential Retrofit and Resilience Pilot Program to provide grants for homeowners to retrofit their homes against natural disasters.
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The usual suspects are involved in this farce:
* Homeowners who might benefit from the pilot program (but only if they're lucky enough to get selected). * State and local governments that will administer the program. * The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), which will oversee the whole operation. * The construction industry, which will likely reap the benefits of increased demand for retrofitting services.
**Potential Impact & Implications:** Let's not be naive here. This bill is a Band-Aid on a bullet wound. It's a token effort to address the symptoms of a much larger problem – the country's lack of preparedness and investment in disaster resilience.
The pilot program might provide some benefits to a select few, but it's a drop in the bucket compared to the scale of the issue. The real winners will be the construction companies and contractors who'll get to cash in on the retrofitting contracts.
Meanwhile, the bill does nothing to address the root causes of disaster vulnerability, such as climate change, poor urban planning, or inadequate infrastructure investment. It's a classic case of treating the symptoms rather than the disease.
In conclusion, HR 501 is a legislative placebo – it might make some people feel good, but it won't actually cure anything. It's a waste of time and resources that could be better spent on meaningful reforms to address the country's disaster resilience challenges.
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đź’° Campaign Finance Network
No campaign finance data available for Rep. Edwards, Chuck [R-NC-11]
Project 2025 Policy Matches
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document. Higher similarity scores indicate stronger thematic connections.
Introduction
— 754 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise Disaster Loan Program and Direct Lending. The SBA’s disaster loan pro- gram provides low-interest loans to personal, business, and nonprofit borrowers following a federally declared disaster. The program suffers from problems of coordination with Federal Emergency Management Administration (FEMA) disas- ter assistance. For example, disaster relief applicants have an incentive to avoid being approved for SBA disaster loans in order to increase the amount of FEMA assistance for which they are eligible. Moreover, the availability of disaster loans reduces individuals’ incentives to purchase disaster-related insurance. More than 90 percent of SBA disaster loans are loans to individuals such as homeowners, not to small businesses. In view of the challenges the SBA has experienced in its administration of this program, as well as the fraud and abuse in the EIDL COVID-19–related program and the IG’s concern that the systemic problems within this lending program undermine the SBA’s work, the next Administration should: l Work with Congress to assess the extent to which disaster loans should be offered by another agency rather than the SBA and explore private-sector channels for administering the loans. l Specify clearly that no new direct lending programs will be developed at the SBA. Eligibility of Religious Entities for SBA Loans. Current SBA regulations46 and SBA Form 197147 make certain religious entities ineligible to participate in several SBA loan programs. The Trump Administration proposed a rule that would remove the provisions on the ground that they violate the First Amendment.48 Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have made their unconstitutionality clearer.49 In an April 3, 2020, letter to Congress pursuant to 28 U.S. Code § 530D,50 the Trump Administration SBA advised that two such provisions violate the Free Exer- cise Clause of the First Amendment and that it therefore would not enforce them. On January 19, 2021, the Trump Administration SBA proposed a rule to remove all of the unconstitutional religious exclusions from its regulations.51 The SBA has not acted on the proposed rule. A similar religious exclusion once appeared in the regulation governing eligibil- ity for SBA Business Loan Programs,52 but it was removed in a June 2022 final rule that noted tension with the First Amendment and Supreme Court precedent.53 That final rule announced that the SBA would nonetheless continue to make religious eligibility determinations for business loan applicants to comply with putative Establishment Clause requirements,54 but Supreme Court precedent and Office of Legal Counsel memoranda refute the notion that large government-backed loan programs raise any Establishment Clause concerns.55 — 755 — Small Business Administration The SBA uses the same “Religious Eligibility Worksheet,” SBA Form 1971, to make eligibility determinations for all affected programs, including the Business Loan Programs. Thus, the SBA continues to act as though the unconstitutional regulation were still in place, and there is no Establishment Clause basis for doing so. The next Administration should immediately: l Notify Congress under 28 U.S. Code § 530D that it will not enforce these unconstitutional regulations. l Take down SBA Form 1971. l Finalize the Trump Administration’s proposed rule or publish its own updated proposed rule to remove the unconstitutional regulations. Small Business Innovation Research and Small Business Technology Transfer Programs. The SBA “coordinates and monitors the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) and Small Business Technology Transfer (STTR) pro- grams for all federal agencies with extramural budgets for research or research and development (R/R&D) in excess of the expenditures established in sections 9(f) and 9(n) of the Small Business Act.”56 The SBIR and STTR Extension Act of 2022 extended these programs from September 30, 2022, through September 30, 2025.57 SBIR requires that 3.2 percent of spending by agencies with extramural R&D budgets of $100 million or more must be directed to small businesses. STTR allo- cates 0.45 percent of federal research spending to small firms.58 Research has shown that this small portion of federal R&D spending is disproportionately effective.59 The SBIR program has consistently demonstrated its ability to fund advanced technologies through to private-market viability and invests more in America’s heartland than venture capital invests.60 SBIR and STTR have overcome the tendency of federal contracting officers to deal only with large firms that are familiar to them and have the expertise and lobbying clout to navigate the federal procurement process. The next Adminis- tration should: l Continue the SBIR and SBTT programs as they successfully fund the next wave of technological innovation to compete with Big Tech. l Urge Congress to expand the amount that other agencies are required to set aside from their general R&D budgets for the SBIR program. l Ensure the enactment of stricter rules requiring that SBIR funds must be expended on capital investments in the United States.
Introduction
— 154 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise insurance at prices lower than the actuarially fair rate, thereby subsidizing flood insurance. Then, when flood costs exceed NFIP’s revenue, FEMA seeks taxpay- er-funded bailouts. Current NFIP debt is $20.5 billion, and in 2017, Congress canceled $16 billion in debt when FEMA reached its borrowing authority limit. These subsidies and bailouts only encourage more development in flood zones, increasing the potential losses to both NFIP and the taxpayer. The NFIP should be wound down and replaced with private insurance starting with the least risky areas currently identified by the program. Budget Issues FEMA manages all grants for DHS, and these grants have become pork for states, localities, and special-interest groups. Since 2002, DHS/FEMA have provided more than $56 billion in preparedness grants for state, local, tribal, and territorial governments. For FY 2023, President Biden requested more than $3.5 billion for federal assistance grants.13 Funds provided under these programs do not provide measurable gains for preparedness or resiliency. Rather, more than any objective needs, political interests appear to direct the flow of nondisaster funds. The principles of federalism should be upheld; these indicate that states better understand their unique needs and should bear the costs of their particularized programs. FEMA employees in Washington, D.C., should not determine how bil- lions of federal tax dollars should be awarded to train local law enforcement officers in Texas, harden cybersecurity infrastructure in Utah, or supplement migrant shelters in Arizona. DHS should not be in the business of handing out federal tax dollars: These grants should be terminated. Accomplishing this, however, will require action by Members of Congress who repeatedly vote to fund grants for political reasons. The transition should focus on building resilience and return on investment in line with real threats. Personnel FEMA currently has four Senate-confirmed positions. Only the Administrator should be confirmed by the Senate; other political leadership need not be con- firmed by the Senate. Additionally, FEMA’s “springing Cabinet position” should be eliminated, as this creates significant unnecessary challenges to the functioning of the whole of DHS at points in time when coordinated responses are most needed. CYBERSECURITY AND INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY AGENCY (CISA) Needed Reforms CISA is supposed to have two key roles: (1) protection of the federal civilian government networks (.gov) while coordinating the execution of national cyber defense and sharing information with non-federal and private-sector partners — 155 — Department of Homeland Security and (2) national coordination of critical infrastructure security and resilience. Yet CISA has rapidly expanded its scope into lanes where it does not belong, the most recent and most glaring example being censorship of so-called misinformation and disinformation. CISA’s funding and resources should align narrowly with the foregoing two mission requirements. The component’s emergency communications and Chem- ical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) roles should be moved to FEMA; its school security functions should be transferred to state homeland security offices; and CISA should refrain from duplicating cybersecurity functions done elsewhere at the Department of Defense, FBI, National Security Agency, and U.S. Secret Service. Of the utmost urgency is immediately ending CISA’s counter-mis/disinforma- tion efforts. The federal government cannot be the arbiter of truth. CISA began this work because of alleged Russian misinformation in the 2016 election, which in fact turned out to be a Clinton campaign “dirty trick.” The Intelligence Commu- nity, including the NSA or DOD, should counter foreign actors. At the time of this writing, release of the Twitter Files has demonstrated that CISA has devolved into an unconstitutional censoring and election engineering apparatus of the political Left. In any event, the entirety of the CISA Cybersecurity Advisory Committee should be dismissed on Day One. For election security, CISA should help states and localities assess whether they have good cyber hygiene in their hardware and software in preparation for an election—but nothing more. This is of value to smaller localities, particularly by flagging who is attacking their websites. CISA should not be significantly involved closer to an election. Nor should it participate in messaging or propaganda. U.S. COAST GUARD (USCG) Needed Reforms The U.S. Coast Guard fleet should be sized to the needs of great-power compe- tition, specifically focusing efforts and investment on protecting U.S. waters, all while seeking to find (where feasible) more economical ways to perform USCG missions. The scope of the Coast Guard’s mission needs to be focused on protecting U.S. resources and interests in its home waters, specifically its Exclusive Economic Zone (200 miles from shore). USCG’s budget should address the growing demand for it to address the increasing threat from the Chinese fishing fleet in home waters as well as narcotics and migrant flows in the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific. Doing this will require reversing years of shortfalls in shipbuilding, maintenance, and upgrades of shore facilities as well as seeking more cost-effective ship and facility designs. In wartime, the USCG supports the Navy, but it has limited capability and capacity to support wartime missions outside home waters.
Introduction
— 622 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise long-term maintenance costs. At a bare minimum, the number of grants should be consolidated. DOT would also reduce unnecessary burdens by returning to the Trump Admin- istration’s “rule on rules” approach to regulations, implemented in late 2019 as RIN 2105-AE84.4 This rule strengthened the Administration’s effort to remove outdated regulations, find cost-saving reforms, and clarify that guidance documents are in fact guidance rather than mandatory impositions. The Biden Administration unwisely moved away from this reform, and the next Administration should revive it without delay. BUILD AMERICA BUREAU The Build America Bureau (BAB) resides within the Office of the Secretary and describes itself as “responsible for driving transportation infrastructure develop- ment projects in the United States.”5 This lofty-sounding goal in practice means that the Bureau serves as the point of contact for distributing funds for transpor- tation projects in the form of subsidized 30-year loans. For higher-quality projects and in certain circumstances, these government loans may disintermediate the private sector from providing similar financing, albeit at higher costs. At certain times in the economic cycle, and for many lower-quality projects with more dubious economic return, similar loans from the private sector are simply not available. Should the BAB continue to exist and potentially disintermediate the private financing sector, it must maintain underwriting discipline and continue best practices of requiring rigorous financial modeling and cushion for repayment of loans in a variety of economic scenarios. In addition: l The BAB should ensure that these loans do not become grants in another form by maintaining the requirement that all project borrowers be rated at least investment grade by the major ratings agencies and that project sponsors remain liable to ensure that all financing is repaid, even in periods of financial stress and economic downturns. l Project sponsors should be required to show that projects have positive economic value to taxpayers, and sponsors should guarantee that all federal financing will be repaid through properly structured loan terms, including a minimum equity commitment from all project sponsors. l All projects should also be required to show repayment ability in various interest rate environments, and the BAB should ensure that long-term loans are structured appropriately with regard to the fixing of interest rates and hedging of interest rate risk on the part of the borrowers to avoid financial stress or default driven solely by rising interest rates. — 623 — Department of Transportation l Policymakers should maintain awareness and promote transparency regarding the continued existence of this loan program and whether private financiers are being disintermediated by the subsidized BAB lending that the private sector simply cannot match. l A cost-benefit analysis of the federal government’s potential replacement and disintermediation of the private financing sector regarding infrastructure loans, which is not currently performed, should be conducted on a regular basis. PUBLIC–PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS Much infrastructure could be funded through public–private partnerships (P3s), a procurement method that uses private financing to construct infrastructure. In exchange for providing the financing, the private partner typically retains the right to operate the asset under requirements specified by the government in a contract called a concession agreement. In addition, the private partner is given the right either to collect fees from the users of the asset or to receive a periodic payment from the government conditioned on the asset’s availability: If a highway is not open to traffic when it should be, for example, the government’s payment to the private concessionaire is reduced. The best practice for a government that is interested in using a P3 to deliver a project is for the government first to perform a value-for-money study, which compares the costs and benefits of procuring the asset under a typical procurement against the costs and benefits of utilizing a P3. Since private equity is involved, the financing costs for P3s are higher, but they also are frequently more than offset by the private sector’s ability to generate efficiencies and cost savings in the design, construction, maintenance, and operation of the asset. If the value-for-money study finds that the efficiencies of a P3 and the value of risk shifted to the private sector exceed the additional financing costs, then utilizing a P3 is good public policy because Americans have better infrastructure at a lower cost. As well as providing better transportation facilities for Americans, P3s offer a number of benefits to governments. Specifically, they: l Provide access to some of the world’s best talent with vast experience in delivering infrastructure, l Create incentives for innovation and creativity, l Shift unique project risks to companies that are familiar with those risks, and
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Policy matches are calculated using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text. A score of 60% or higher indicates meaningful thematic overlap. This does not imply direct causation or intent, but highlights areas where legislation aligns with Project 2025 policy objectives.