Widespread Information Management for the Welfare of Infrastructure and Government Act

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Bill ID: 119/hr/5079

Last Updated: October 14, 2025

Widespread Information Management for the Welfare of Infrastructure and Government Act

HR. 5079, 119th Congress — read as touching Cybersecurity.

The sponsor

Rep. Garbarino, Andrew R. [R-NY-2]

Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.

The money

$68,000 raised

22 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.

The alignment

85% match to Project 2025

This bill's text tracks the "Intelligence Community" section, p. 254-256 of the Mandate for Leadership.

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

Track this bill's progress through the legislative process

Latest Action

Ordered to be Reported (Amended) by the Yeas and Nays: 25 - 0.

September 2, 2025

Introduced

📍 Current Status

Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.

🏛️

Committee Review

🗳️

Floor Action

✅

Passed House

🏛️

Senate Review

🎉

Passed Congress

🖊️

Presidential Action

⚖️

Became Law

📚 How does a bill become a law?

1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.

2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

Summary Style:

**Bill Analysis: HR 5079 - Widespread Information Management for the Welfare of Infrastructure and Government Act**

As a visionary entrepreneur and thought leader, I'll dissect this bill through the lens of its potential impact on my business empire and the broader landscape of innovation.

**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The primary objective of HR 5079 is to reauthorize the Cybersecurity Act of 2015, with a focus on enhancing information sharing between the federal government and non-federal entities. The bill aims to improve cybersecurity measures for critical infrastructure and promote the use of artificial intelligence in threat detection.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:**

1. **Expanded definitions**: The bill updates definitions for "artificial intelligence" and "critical infrastructure," which will likely lead to increased regulatory scrutiny. 2. **Enhanced information sharing**: The legislation facilitates the sharing of cyber threat indicators and defensive measures between federal agencies and non-federal entities, potentially creating new opportunities for collaboration and revenue streams. 3. **Sector Risk Management Agencies**: The bill introduces a new concept, Sector Risk Management Agencies, which may lead to increased regulatory oversight and potential partnerships.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:**

1. **Federal agencies**: The bill impacts various federal agencies, including the Department of Homeland Security, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the National Institute of Standards and Technology. 2. **Non-federal entities**: Private companies, particularly those operating critical infrastructure, will be affected by the enhanced information sharing provisions. 3. **Artificial intelligence developers**: The bill's focus on AI in cybersecurity may create new opportunities for innovation and investment.

**Potential Impact & Implications:**

1. **Regulatory burden**: The expanded definitions and enhanced information sharing provisions may lead to increased regulatory compliance costs for non-federal entities. 2. **New business opportunities**: The bill's emphasis on AI in cybersecurity and the introduction of Sector Risk Management Agencies may create new revenue streams for companies that can provide innovative solutions. 3. **Consolidation of power**: The legislation's focus on information sharing and coordination between federal agencies may lead to a consolidation of power, potentially benefiting larger players in the industry.

As a visionary entrepreneur, I see HR 5079 as an opportunity to further my business interests by:

1. Developing AI-powered cybersecurity solutions that cater to the needs of non-federal entities. 2. Establishing partnerships with Sector Risk Management Agencies to provide expertise and services. 3. Leveraging the bill's emphasis on information sharing to create new revenue streams through data analytics and threat intelligence.

However, I also recognize the potential regulatory burden imposed by this legislation. As such, I will continue to monitor its progress and advocate for provisions that benefit my business empire while minimizing unnecessary regulatory hurdles.

💰 Campaign Finance Network

Rep. Garbarino, Andrew R. [R-NY-2]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions

$68,000

19 donors

PACs

Organizations

$2,000

Committees

Individuals

$66,000

No PAC contributions found

MS BAND OF CHOCTAW INDIANS

1 transaction

$1,000

THE CHICKASAW NATION

1 transaction

$1,000

No committee contributions found

BANKE, BARBARA R.

2 transactions

$6,600

MCMAHON, LINDA

2 transactions

$6,600

WEEKLEY, RICHARD

2 transactions

$6,600

DUIT, JAMES

1 transaction

$3,300

DUIT, PAMELA

1 transaction

$3,300

ROCKEFELLER, LISENNE

1 transaction

$3,300

RICKETTS, MARLENE

1 transaction

$3,300

LEACH, HOWARD

1 transaction

$3,300

FEINSTEIN, LEONARD

1 transaction

$3,300

SMITH, HOLLY

1 transaction

$3,300

STEPHENS, WARREN

1 transaction

$3,300

MCCLURE, JAMES

1 transaction

$3,300

SMITH, BURR R.

1 transaction

$3,300

SILVERMAN, JEFFREY

1 transaction

$3,300

EMMET, RICHARD

1 transaction

$3,300

GILLIAM, RICHARD

1 transaction

$3,300

SCHWAB, CHARLES

1 transaction

$3,300

Cosponsors & Their Campaign Finance

This bill has 1 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.

Rep. McCaul, Michael T. [R-TX-10]

ID: M001157

Top Contributors

SOUTH SPUR LP

OrganizationHOUSTON, TX

$3,300

Jan 31, 2024

TRACEY FOX KING & WALTERS

OrganizationHOUSTON, TX

$1,000

Feb 17, 2023

CHILDS, JOHN W.

JW CHILDS ASSOCIATES • OWNER

IndividualVERO BEACH, FL

$50,000

Dec 12, 2023

LANIER, BECKY MRS.

LANIER LAW FIRM • ATTORNEY

IndividualHOUSTON, TX

$50,000

Mar 4, 2024

LANIER, MARK W.

LANIER LAW FIRM • ATTORNEY

IndividualHOUSTON, TX

$50,000

Mar 4, 2024

CHILDS, JOHN W

IndividualVERO BEACH, FL

$38,400

Mar 15, 2024

CHILDS, JOHN W.

JW CHILDS ASSOCIATES • OWNER

IndividualVERO BEACH, FL

$38,400

May 7, 2024

CHILDS, JOHN W

IndividualVERO BEACH, FL

$33,400

Nov 14, 2024

CARLTON, C. CRAIG MR.

C.C. CARLTON INDUSTRIES • OWNER

IndividualAUSTIN, TX

$25,000

Feb 13, 2024

LUROS, HILARY

RETIRED • RETIRED

IndividualSUGAR LAND, TX

$25,000

Feb 27, 2024

Donor Network - Rep. Garbarino, Andrew R. [R-NY-2]

Show Also Donated To

PACs

Organizations

Individuals

Politicians

Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.

Showing 57 nodes and 25 connections (58 secondary connections hidden)

Total contributions: $122,300

Top Donors - Rep. Garbarino, Andrew R. [R-NY-2]

Showing top 19 donors by contribution amount

2 Orgs17 Individuals

Industry Impact

Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 2 helped, 1 harmed.

+Cybersecurityconfidence 0.95
Section 2(a)(3)(A)(iv) adds a new subparagraph (C) to section 104(c) to preclude the use of AI developed or strictly deployed for cybersecurity purposes in carrying out authorized activities, which could be interpreted as a limitation on certain AI uses in cybersecurity, but overall the bill reauthorizes and updates cybersecurity information sharing provisions, including outreach and updates, which benefits the cybersecurity industry by enhancing federal support and coordination. Section 2(a)(4)
+Defense Contractorsconfidence 0.85
The bill amends Section 2200 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 650) in Section 2(b)(1)(B) to include 'including a security vulnerability affecting an information system or a technology included in the critical and emerging technologies list of the Office of Science and Technology Policy or successor list, such as artificial intelligence (as such term is defined in section 5002 of the National Artificial Intelligence Initiative Act of 2020 (15 U.S.C. 9401)), which may be in a Federal
−AI & Cloud Infrastructureconfidence 0.80
Section 2(a)(3)(A)(iv) adds a new subparagraph (C) to section 104(c) to 'preclude the use of artificial intelligence that is developed or strictly deployed for cybersecurity purposes in carrying out the activities authorized under paragraph (1).' Similarly, Section 2(a)(5)(A)(iii) adds ', which may utilize artificial intelligence that is developed or strictly deployed for cybersecurity purposes,' after 'technical capability' in section 104(d)(2)(B)(iii). Section 2(a)(8)(iv) adds a new paragraph

Who funds the sponsor on these industries

For each industry this bill affects, here's what the sponsor (Rep. Garbarino, Andrew R. [R-NY-2])received from donors associated with that industry during the 2022–present cycles. Donations are not proof of intent — they are a record of who funds the people writing the law.

Industries this bill HELPS

Defense Contractors$500
from 1 contribution
- PEDDIBHOTLA, SRIRAM$500

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.

Intelligence Community

Strong

Vector: 67%

Pages: 254-256AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"HR 5079 strongly aligns with Project 2025's Intelligence Community objective by promoting timely sharing of cyber threat intelligence with private-sector partners, enhancing information sharing mechanisms, and emphasizing actionable, context-rich intelligence for critical infrastructure defense—core themes in the Project 2025 vision."

Key themes:cyber threat intelligence sharingprivate-sector partnershiptimely information disseminationcritical infrastructure protectionactionable intelligence

— 222 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise forward-leaning in sharing cyber threat intelligence with private-sector partners and the public, emphasizing that the protective nature of such information is of value only if put into the right hands at the right time. Since critical infrastructure and services are overwhelmingly owned, managed, and defended by the private sector in the United States, there has been an increasing emphasis on declassify- ing intelligence and sharing actionable information with private-sector partners, often through industry-specific Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs); regional meetings of government and private-sector experts called InfraGard, run by the FBI; direct public notification from the Department of Homeland Security, the FBI, and (increasingly) the NSA; and more discreet one-on-one engagements led by the collecting agencies. These programs properly recognize the private sector’s role in providing cyber- security for Americans; in practice, however, the intelligence shared by the U.S. government through these venues is too often already known or no longer relevant by the time it makes its way through the downgrade process for sharing. In addition, government-shared information often needs to take advantage of the opportunity to provide contexts, such as attribution, trends, and size of the observed cyber problem. As warranted, additional context should be provided to the private sector as a matter of routine. To continue improving the U.S. government’s ability to defend the country’s most vital networks, the IC must adopt an “obligation to share” policy process, including the capacity for “write to release” intelligence products whereby newly discovered technical indicators, targeting, and other intelligence relevant to cyber defense are automatically provided either to the public or to targeted entities within 48 hours of their collection—which is how counterterrorism intel- ligence has been managed for years when it comes to a “duty to warn.” Under this policy, agency heads should still have the flexibility to withhold intelligence for operational or counterintelligence reasons but would need to report regularly to Congress on the number of and justification for exceptions. This policy would make sharing intelligence and defending networks the default, as it already is in the rest of the cybersecurity community outside the IC, to improve the quantity, relevance, and timeliness of defensive information while ensuring accountability for top leaders when they must withhold this information. One of the most significant challenges within the IC is presented by the need to share information promptly among the 18 elements of the intelligence enterprise. The only long-term solution to the understandable tension between the need to share information and the need to protect intelligence sources and methods is a robust real-time auditing capability that electronically flags unauthorized access. Under an identity management system with real-time audit, even the most sensi- tive information acquired by America’s intelligence agencies can be shared, and the access to and use of that information are appropriately monitored. Establishing — 223 — Intelligence Community a real-time auditing capability is essential to decreasing the risk for the heads of intelligence agencies in meeting their statutory requirements to ensure that they protect sources and methods associated with the classified information their agen- cies collect. Overclassification. There is broad consensus across the U.S. government and among stakeholders that the system for classifying, declassifying, and otherwise marking and handling sensitive information is at a crossroads. Exorbitant amounts of classified data are created daily, and agency personnel often mistakenly choose classification as the default selection to ensure national security. At the same time, the effectiveness of downgraded and carefully declassified information to support foreign policy efforts has been borne out in, for example, alerting the broader world of Russia’s buildup and likely plans for its invasion of Ukraine. Two executive orders principally govern how the U.S. government handles clas- sified and sensitive information. l Executive Order 13526, “Classified National Security Information,” issued in 2009,38 prescribes the classification levels and procedures for declassification. l Executive Order 13556, “Controlled Unclassified Information,” issued in 2010,39 aimed to establish a uniform program for managing all unclassified information that requires safeguarding or dissemination controls. The current system for declassifying classified national security information (CNSI) is extraordinarily analog, requiring experts’ review of individual records. Declassification policies are based on human review of paper and need to con- template and handle the proliferation and volume of digital records created by agencies. The U.S. government will soon reach the point at which manual review is impossible. The declassification of CNSI should support key U.S. national security objectives, reflect mission priorities, and not serve solely as a necessary procedural function. Reforms should include: l Tighter definitions and greater specificity for categories of information requiring protection. l More stringent policies to effect significant reductions in the number of Original Classification Authorities (OCAs). l Stricter accountability measures at the OCA level and more detailed security classification guides.

Intelligence Community

Strong

Vector: 67%

Pages: 254-256AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"Both HR 5079 and the Project 2025 Intelligence Community section emphasize strengthening cyber threat information sharing between federal entities and private‑sector critical infrastructure owners, promoting timely dissemination and accountability. While the bill establishes sharing procedures and technical assistance, it does not explicitly mandate the real‑time auditing or 'write to release' mechanisms called for in Project 2025, resulting in strong but not complete alignment."

Key themes:cyber threat information sharingprivate‑sector partnershipsector risk management agenciestimely dissemination of indicatorsaccountability for sharing

— 221 — Intelligence Community influence and the FBI’s warnings about continued efforts through the 2022 mid- terms highlight the folly of undue certainty without consideration of alternatives. On election influence and other controversial issues, such as the origin of COVID-19, analysts at the most powerful intelligence agencies have increasingly tended to use the leeway they have been given to insert their political views into their work in order to influence (if possibly even control) the analytic process. They do this in ways that attempt to squash dissent and impair the creation of a culture in which entrenched views are challenged and unpopular analytical lines can sur- vive or not according to their merits. To help the United States and its leaders to outcompete China across mul- tifaceted societal, economic, military, and technological threats, the IC’s capability to conduct strategic intelligence analysis that is relevant to policymak- ers in both parties must be rebuilt and strengthened. Because Beijing may be a peer or even exceed U.S. capabilities in some areas, the post-9/11 analytic focus on quick-turnaround secrets is not good enough. Strategic planning—informed by intelligence—must take place for the United States to stay ahead of whatever new threats China may pose. An incoming conservative President will have the opportunity to signal the demand for such strategic products and prioritize their production through communications to intelligence leaders and formal mechanisms such as shifting priorities within the National Intelligence Priority Framework and structuring the President’s Daily Brief. The incoming DNI should also emphasize implementing the recommendations in the Ombudsman’s report, especially regarding objectiv- ity, the inclusion of dissenting viewpoints, and more serious efforts to hold senior leaders accountable for backchannel attempts to change or suppress analytic views. Accounting for the long history of intelligence failures and surprises, an incom- ing conservative President must appreciate the ambiguity, complexity, limits, and assumptions inherent in intelligence assessments. Intelligence often deals with the human dimension in complex decision systems within a foreign country or organi- zation, and this makes consistently accurate predictions difficult if not impossible to develop. Seeing something and understanding what you are seeing are two dif- ferent things, so a President should consistently and patiently press the IC about its potential biases, assumptions, methodology, and sourcing. With regard to election-threat analysis and politically controversial topics, agency leaders should take seriously the Ombudsman’s admonition that we need to maintain tradecraft standards across all countries and topics by ensuring that equitable standards apply across all foreign threat actors. Analysis should be put forward without regard to the domestic political ramifications of intelligence conclusions. “Obligation to Share” and Real-Time Auditing Capability. The fed- eral government has made admirable progress in recent years by being more — 222 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise forward-leaning in sharing cyber threat intelligence with private-sector partners and the public, emphasizing that the protective nature of such information is of value only if put into the right hands at the right time. Since critical infrastructure and services are overwhelmingly owned, managed, and defended by the private sector in the United States, there has been an increasing emphasis on declassify- ing intelligence and sharing actionable information with private-sector partners, often through industry-specific Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs); regional meetings of government and private-sector experts called InfraGard, run by the FBI; direct public notification from the Department of Homeland Security, the FBI, and (increasingly) the NSA; and more discreet one-on-one engagements led by the collecting agencies. These programs properly recognize the private sector’s role in providing cyber- security for Americans; in practice, however, the intelligence shared by the U.S. government through these venues is too often already known or no longer relevant by the time it makes its way through the downgrade process for sharing. In addition, government-shared information often needs to take advantage of the opportunity to provide contexts, such as attribution, trends, and size of the observed cyber problem. As warranted, additional context should be provided to the private sector as a matter of routine. To continue improving the U.S. government’s ability to defend the country’s most vital networks, the IC must adopt an “obligation to share” policy process, including the capacity for “write to release” intelligence products whereby newly discovered technical indicators, targeting, and other intelligence relevant to cyber defense are automatically provided either to the public or to targeted entities within 48 hours of their collection—which is how counterterrorism intel- ligence has been managed for years when it comes to a “duty to warn.” Under this policy, agency heads should still have the flexibility to withhold intelligence for operational or counterintelligence reasons but would need to report regularly to Congress on the number of and justification for exceptions. This policy would make sharing intelligence and defending networks the default, as it already is in the rest of the cybersecurity community outside the IC, to improve the quantity, relevance, and timeliness of defensive information while ensuring accountability for top leaders when they must withhold this information. One of the most significant challenges within the IC is presented by the need to share information promptly among the 18 elements of the intelligence enterprise. The only long-term solution to the understandable tension between the need to share information and the need to protect intelligence sources and methods is a robust real-time auditing capability that electronically flags unauthorized access. Under an identity management system with real-time audit, even the most sensi- tive information acquired by America’s intelligence agencies can be shared, and the access to and use of that information are appropriately monitored. Establishing

Intelligence Community

Moderate

Vector: 66%

Pages: 266-268AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill focuses on cybersecurity information sharing and technical assistance, which aligns with the Intelligence Community's emphasis on threat intelligence sharing, oversight, and the use of tools like FISA 702 and AI in national security. However, the bill does not directly address IC workforce diversity, politicization, or specific IC reforms highlighted in the Project 2025 section."

Key themes:information sharingcyber threat intelligencecritical infrastructure protectioninteragency collaborationAI in security

— 233 — Intelligence Community 19. Michael E. DeVine, “Covert Action and Clandestine Activities of the Intelligence Community: Selected Definitions,” Congressional Research Service Report for Members and Committees of Congress No. R45175, updated November 29, 2022, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/intel/R45175.pdf (accessed February 24, 2023). 20. H.R. 2663, Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, Public Law No. 81-110, 81st Congress, June 20, 1949, https:// govtrackus.s3.amazonaws.com/legislink/pdf/stat/63/STATUTE-63-Pg208.pdf (accessed March 6, 2023). 21. Nicole Ogrysko, “Intelligence Community Workforce Is More Diverse, but Still Struggles with Retention and Promotion,” Federal News Network, October 27, 2021, https://federalnewsnetwork.com/workforce/2021/10/ intelligence-community-workforce-is-more-diverse-but-still-struggles-with-retention-and-promotion/ (accessed March 18, 2023). 22. See James J. Wirtz, “The Intelligence Policy Nexus,” in Loch K. Johnson, ed., Strategic Intelligence, Volume 1: Understanding the Hidden Side of Government (Westport, CT: Prager, 2007), and Richard K. Betts, “Analysis, War, and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures Are Inevitable,” World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 1 (October 1978), pp. 61–89. 23. Letter from Barry A. Zulauf, IC Analytic Ombudsman, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, to Senator Marco Rubio, Acting Chairman, and Senator Mark Warner, Vice Chairman, Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. Senate, “RE: SSCI #2020-3029,” January 6, 2021, https://int.nyt.com/data/documenttools/ ic-ombudsman-election-interference-with-responses/c50e548011fd6168/full.pdf (accessed March 14, 2023). 24. Joshua Rovner, Fixing the Facts: National Security and the Politics of Intelligence (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011), pp. 30–31. 25. Joshua Rovner, “Is Politicization Ever a Good Thing?” Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 28, No. 1 (2013), p. 58. 26. S. 1566, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Public Law No. 95-511, 95th Congress, October 25, 1978, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-92/pdf/STATUTE-92-Pg1783.pdf (accessed March 6, 2023). 27. The Cipher Brief, “702 Reauthorization: Defending a Key Intelligence Tool,” remarks of Benjamin Powell, former General Counsel to the Director of National Intelligence, stating that FISA 702 provides “between 40 and 60 percent” of the intelligence in the PDB, December 18, 2017, https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=mRJ09GHVRFk&ab_channel=TheCipherBrief (accessed March 18, 2023). 28. An intelligence alliance that includes Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, National Counterintelligence and Security Center, “Five Eyes Intelligence Oversight and Review Council (FIORC),” https://www.dni.gov/index.php/ncsc-how-we- work/217-about/organization/icig-pages/2660-icig-fiorc (accessed March 10, 2023). 29. Porter, “Seven Questions the Next President Will Need the Intelligence Community to Answer to Win the Technology Competition with China.” 30. H.R. 1591, An Act to Require the Registration of Certain Persons Employed by Agencies to Disseminate Propaganda in the United States and for Other Purposes, Public Law No. 75-583, 75th Congress, June 8, 1938, https://govtrackus.s3.amazonaws.com/legislink/pdf/stat/52/STATUTE-52-Pg631.pdf (accessed March 6, 2023). 31. Kristina Wong, “Exclusive: Former DNI John Ratcliffe Pleased CIA Following His Lead on China Threat,” Breitbart, October 13, 2021, https://www.breitbart.com/politics/2021/10/13/exclusive-john-ratcliffe-pleased- cia-following-lead-china-threat/ (accessed March 11, 2023). 32. H.R. 4628, Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, Public Law No. 107-306, 107th Congress, November 27, 2002, Title IX, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-116/pdf/STATUTE-116-Pg2383.pdf (accessed March 6, 2023). 33. President George W. Bush, Executive Order 13354, “National Counterterrorism Center,” August 27, 2004, in Federal Register, Vol. 69, No. 169 (September 1, 2004), pp. 53589–53592, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/ pkg/FR-2004-09-01/pdf/04-20050.pdf (accessed March 6, 2023). 34. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, National Counterintelligence and Security Center, “Who We Are: History of NCSC,” https://www.dni.gov/index.php/ncsc-who-we-are/ncsc-history (accessed March 11, 2023). 35. Gregory F. Treverton and C. Bryan Gabbard, Assessing the Tradecraft of Intelligence Analysis, RAND Corporation, National Security Research Division Technical Report, 2008, p. 6, https://www.rand.org/pubs/ technical_reports/TR293.html (accessed March 1, 2023). — 234 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise 36. Letter from Barry A. Zulauf, IC Analytic Ombudsman, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, to Senator Marco Rubio, Acting Chairman, and Senator Mark Warner, Vice Chairman, Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. Senate, “RE: SSCI #2020-3029,” January 6, 2021, https://int.nyt.com/data/documenttools/ ic-ombudsman-election-interference-with-responses/c50e548011fd6168/full.pdf (accessed March 6, 2023). 37. “Independent IC Analytic Ombudsman’s [Report] on Politicization of Intelligence,” attached to January 6, 2021, Zulauf letter. 38. President Barack Obama, Executive Order 13526, “Classified National Security Information,” December 29, 2009, in Federal Register, Vol. 75, No. 2 (January 5, 2010), pp. 707–731, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/ FR-2010-01-05/pdf/E9-31418.pdf (accessed March 7, 2023). 39. President Barack Obama, Executive Order 13556, “Controlled Classified Information,” November 4, 2010, in Federal Register, Vol. 75, No. 216 (November 9, 2010), pp. 68675–68677, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/ pkg/FR-2010-11-09/pdf/2010-28360.pdf (accessed March 7, 2023). 40. Agathe Demarais, “How the U.S.–Chinese Technology War Is Changing the World,” Foreign Policy, November 19, 2022, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/11/19/demarais-backfire-sanctions-us-china-technology-war- semiconductors-export-controls-biden/ (accessed February 28, 2023). 41. Scott Stewart, “The Risk to Undercover Operatives in the Digital Age,” Stratfor Worldview, October 29, 2015, https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/risk-undercover-operatives-digital-age (accessed February 24, 2023). 42. Lauren Pitruzzello, “Human Intelligence: Former CIA Officer Talks About Espionage in the Digital Age, University of Delaware UDaily, March 22, 2012, https://www1.udel.edu/udaily/2012/mar/global-agenda- grenier-032212.html (accessed February 24, 2023). 43. Jenna McLaughlin and Zach Dorfman, “‘Shattered’: Inside the Secret Battle to Save America’s Undercover Spies in the Digital Age,” Yahoo News, December 30, 2019, https://news.yahoo.com/shattered-inside- the-secret-battle-to-save-americas-undercover-spies-in-the-digital-age-100029026.html (accessed February 24, 2023). 44. U.S. Federal Trade Commission, “U.S.–Safe Harbor Framework,” https://www.ftc.gov/business-guidance/ privacy-security/us-eu-safe-harbor-framework (accessed March 11, 2023). 45. “Fact Sheet: Overview of the EU–U.S. Privacy Shield Network,” U.S. Department of Commerce, https://2014-2017.commerce.gov/sites/commerce.gov/files/media/files/2016/eu-us_privacy_shield_fact_ sheet.pdf (accessed March 11, 2023). 46. “Fact Sheet: United States and European Commission Announce Trans-Atlantic Data Privacy Framework,” The White House, March 25, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/03/25/ fact-sheet-united-states-and-european-commission-announce-trans-atlantic-data-privacy-framework/ (accessed March 11, 2023). 47. President Joseph R. Biden Jr., Executive Order 14086, “Enhancing Safeguards for United States Signals Intelligence Activities,” October 7, 2022, in Federal Register, Vol. 87, No. 198 (October 14, 2022), pp. 62283– 62297, (accessed March 7, 2023). 48. Warren P. Strobel, “Release of Ukraine Intelligence Represents New Front in U.S. Information War with Russia,” The Wall Street Journal, updated April 4, 2022, https://www.wsj.com/articles/release-of-secrets-represents- new-front-in-u-s-information-war-with-russia-11649070001 (accessed February 24, 2023). 49. President Joseph R. Biden Jr., “National Security Memorandum on Promoting United States Leadership in Quantum Computing While Mitigating Risks to Vulnerable Cryptographic Systems,” The White House, May 4, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/05/04/national-security- memorandum-on-promoting-united-states-leadership-in-quantum-computing-while-mitigating-risks- to-vulnerable-cryptographic-systems/#:~:text=To%20mitigate%20this%20risk%2C%20the%20United%20 States%20must,the%20quantum%20risk%20as%20is%20feasible%20by%202035 (accessed March 12, 2023). See also President Joseph R. Biden Jr., Executive Order 14073, “Enhancing the National Quantum Initiative Advisory Committee,” May 4, 2022, in Federal Register, Vol. 87, No. 89 (May 9, 2022), pp. 27909–27911, https:// www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2022-05-09/pdf/2022-10076.pdf (accessed March 12, 2023); and “Fact Sheet: President Biden Announces Two Presidential Directives Advancing Quantum Technologies,” The White House, May 4, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/05/04/fact- sheet-president-biden-announces-two-presidential-directives-advancing-quantum-technologies/ (accessed March 12, 2023).

Intelligence Community

Moderate

Vector: 65%

Pages: 266-268AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill's focus on cybersecurity threat information sharing aligns with the Intelligence Community's mission to collect, analyze, and disseminate intelligence for national security, particularly in the cyber domain."

Key themes:cybersecurityinformation sharingthreat intelligencecritical infrastructure protectionintelligence community coordination

Department of State

Moderate

Vector: 64%

Pages: 232-235AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill focuses on cybersecurity information sharing and technical assistance, which aligns with Project 2025's emphasis on strengthening national security, intelligence community capabilities, and cyber diplomacy to counter adversarial threats."

Key themes:cybersecurityinformation sharingnational securityintelligence communitycritical infrastructure

— 199 — Department of State 21. “Geneva Consensus Declaration on Promoting Women’s Health and Strengthening the Family,” October 22, 2021, https://www.theiwh.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/GCD-Declaration-2021-2.pdf (accessed March 13, 2023). 22. U.S. Commission on National Security, Road Map for National Security. 23. U.S. Department of State, “Organization Chart,” November 2004, https://2009-2017.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/ perfrpt/2004/html/39764.htm (accessed March 9, 2023); U.S. Department of State, “Organization Chart,” November 2016, https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/263637.pdf (accessed March 9, 2023); U.S. Department of State, “Organization Chart,” February 2020, https://2017-2021.state.gov/wp-content/ uploads/2021/01/Dept-Org-Chart-Feb-2020-508.pdf (accessed March 9, 2023); U.S. Department of State, “DOS Org Chart August 2021,” August 2021, https://www.state.gov/department-of-state-organization-chart/ dos-org-chart-august-2021/ (accessed March 9, 2023); and U.S. Department of State, “Organization Chart,” May 2022, https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/DOS-Org-Chart-5052022-Non-Accessible. pdf (accessed March 9, 2023). 24. Emily O. Goldman, “Cyber Diplomacy for Strategic Competition: Fresh Thinking and New Approaches Are Needed on Diplomacy’s Newest Frontier,” Foreign Service Journal, June 2021, http://afsa.org/cyber- diplomacy-strategic-competition (accessed March 9, 2023). 25. Emily Goldman, “From Reaction to Action: Adopting a Competitive Posture in Cyber Diplomacy,” Texas National Security Review, Vol. 3, No. 4 (Fall 2020), https://tnsr.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/TNSR-Vol3- Iss4-Goldman.pdf (accessed March 9, 2023). 26. United Nations General Assembly, “Group of Government Experts on Advancing Responsible State Behaviour in Cyberspace in the Context of International Security,” A/76/135, July 14, 2021, https://front.un-arm.org/wp- content/uploads/2021/08/A_76_135-2104030E-1.pdf (accessed March 10, 2023). 27. Goldman, “Cyber Diplomacy.” — 201 — 7 INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY Dustin J. Carmack MISSION STATEMENT To arm a future incoming conservative President with the knowledge and tools necessary to fortify the United States Intelligence Community; to defend against all foreign enemies and ensure the security and prosperity of our sovereign nation, devoid of all political motivations; and to maintain constitutional civil liberties. OVERVIEW The United States Intelligence Community (IC) is a vast, intricate bureaucracy spread throughout 18 independent and Cabinet subagencies.1 According to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), the IC’s mission is “to col- lect, analyze, and deliver foreign intelligence and counterintelligence information to America’s leaders so they can make sound decisions to protect our country.”2 An incoming conservative President needs to use these intelligence authorities aggressively to anticipate and thwart our adversaries, including Russia, Iran, North Korea, and especially China, while maintaining counterterrorism tools that have demonstrated their effectiveness. This means empowering the right personnel to manage, build, and effectively execute actions dispersed throughout the IC to deliver intelligence in an ever-challenging world. It also means removing redun- dancies, mission creep, and IC infighting that could prevent these collection tools from providing objective, apolitical, and empirically backed intelligence to the IC’s premier customer: the President of the United States. Today, as Abraham Lincoln famously said, “The occasion is piled high with difficulty, and we must rise with the occasion…. [W]e must think anew, and act

Showing 3 of 5 policy matches

About These Correlations

Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.

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