To provide for the authorities of the Secretary of State.

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Bill ID: 119/hr/5244

Last Updated: December 14, 2025

To provide for the authorities of the Secretary of State.

HR. 5244, 119th Congress — read as touching Defense Contractors.

The sponsor

Rep. Mills, Cory [R-FL-7]

Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.

The money

$66,270 raised

20 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.

The alignment

85% match to Project 2025

This bill's text tracks the "Department of Homeland Security" section, p. 201-204 of the Mandate for Leadership.

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

Track this bill's progress through the legislative process

Latest Action

Ordered to be Reported (Amended) by the Yeas and Nays: 27 - 20.

September 17, 2025

Introduced

📍 Current Status

Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.

🏛️

Committee Review

🗳️

Floor Action

✅

Passed House

🏛️

Senate Review

🎉

Passed Congress

🖊️

Presidential Action

⚖️

Became Law

📚 How does a bill become a law?

1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.

2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

Summary Style:

The bill HR 5244, "To provide for the authorities of the Secretary of State," is a legislative attempt to reorganize and clarify the roles within the Department of State. As a self-serving billionaire, I'll analyze this bill through the lens of its potential impact on my wealth, influence, and control.

**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The primary objective of HR 5244 is to establish clear authorities for the Secretary of State, particularly in relation to the United Nations. The bill aims to enhance the Secretary's situational awareness and decision-making capabilities within the Department.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill introduces several key provisions:

1. Establishment of new positions within the Office of the Secretary, including a Chief of Staff, Counselor, and Executive Secretariat. 2. Clarification of the role and responsibilities of the United States Ambassador to the United Nations, including their reporting structure and collaboration with the Secretary of State. 3. Expansion of the United States Mission to the United Nations, including the appointment of additional representatives and staff.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The primary stakeholders affected by this bill are:

1. The Department of State, particularly the Office of the Secretary and the Bureau of International Organization Affairs. 2. The United States Ambassador to the United Nations and their staff. 3. Other government agencies involved in foreign policy and international relations.

**Potential Impact & Implications:** From my perspective as a self-serving billionaire, this bill has limited direct implications for my wealth and influence. However, I do see potential opportunities for consolidation and deregulation:

1. **Streamlined decision-making:** The establishment of clear authorities within the Department of State could lead to more efficient decision-making processes, potentially benefiting my business interests. 2. **Increased diplomatic flexibility:** The clarification of roles and responsibilities within the United Nations could provide more opportunities for diplomatic maneuvering, allowing me to exert influence through backchannels. 3. **Potential for deregulation:** As the bill focuses on organizational changes rather than substantive policy reforms, it may create an opportunity for future deregulatory efforts that could benefit my business interests.

In conclusion, while HR 5244 does not directly impact my wealth and influence, it presents potential opportunities for consolidation and deregulation. I will continue to monitor this legislation and explore ways to leverage its provisions to further my interests.

**Projection:** Based on my analysis, I estimate a moderate increase in diplomatic flexibility and potential deregulatory opportunities, resulting in a projected 5-10% growth in my business interests over the next 2-3 years.

**Recommendation:** I will instruct my think tank, the "Liberty Institute," to produce a policy brief highlighting the benefits of streamlined decision-making and increased diplomatic flexibility. This will help shape public discourse and create an environment conducive to deregulatory efforts that benefit my business interests.

💰 Campaign Finance Network

Rep. Mills, Cory [R-FL-7]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions

$66,270

17 donors

PACs

Organizations

Committees

Individuals

$66,270

No PAC contributions found

No organization contributions found

No committee contributions found

RASMUSSEN, DALE

2 transactions

$6,870

MILLER, JEFFREY

2 transactions

$6,600

ARMSTRONG, WAYMON

2 transactions

$6,600

BRANDT, HARRY

1 transaction

$3,300

WEINBERGER, MEG

1 transaction

$3,300

MANGI, ROBERT

1 transaction

$3,300

MCMAHON, JOHN

1 transaction

$3,300

BROWN, REGINALD

1 transaction

$3,300

GREEN, JEFF

1 transaction

$3,300

ARMSTRONG, FRANCES

1 transaction

$3,300

HUNT, WOODY

1 transaction

$3,300

KEISER, BELINDA

1 transaction

$3,300

GALLAGHER, DANIEL

1 transaction

$3,300

SAYFIE, JUSTIN

1 transaction

$3,300

DANIELS, GEORGE

1 transaction

$3,300

BOOK, RONALD L

1 transaction

$3,300

GRIMES, DEMETRIES

1 transaction

$3,300

Donor Network - Rep. Mills, Cory [R-FL-7]

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Total contributions: $66,270

Top Donors - Rep. Mills, Cory [R-FL-7]

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17 Individuals

Industry Impact

Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 3 helped.

+Defense Contractorsconfidence 0.80
Section 111(b)(4) supports Presidential actions in response to malign influence operations, which could lead to increased defense spending and contracts for defense contractors.
+Cybersecurityconfidence 0.70
Section 111(b)(1) mentions identifying and holding accountable Member States that engage in malign influence operations, which may involve cybersecurity threats and thus benefit the cybersecurity industry.
+Telecommunicationsconfidence 0.60
Section 112(d) discusses representatives voting in accordance with Presidential instructions, which could involve secure communication systems provided by telecommunications companies.

Who funds the sponsor on these industries

For each industry this bill affects, here's what the sponsor (Rep. Mills, Cory [R-FL-7])received from donors associated with that industry during the 2022–present cycles. Donations are not proof of intent — they are a record of who funds the people writing the law.

Industries this bill HELPS

Defense Contractors$729
from 4 contributions
- PEDDIBHOTLA, SRIRAM$500
- STREIBER, DEBORAH ANN$229

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.

Department of Homeland Security

Strong

Vector: 67%

Pages: 201-204AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"Both the bill and the Project 2025 objective seek to strengthen and streamline the Department of State’s structure to better implement the President’s foreign policy agenda, improve internal coordination, and enhance diplomatic effectiveness."

Key themes:Department of State reorganizationSecretary of State authorityPresidential agenda alignmentDiplomatic coordinationUN representation

— 169 — Department of Homeland Security 19. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General, Management Directive No. 0810.1, June 10, 2004, https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/foia/mgmt_directive_0810_1_the_office_of_inspector_general. pdf (accessed March 15, 2023). 20. H.R. 5005, Homeland Security Act of 2002, Public Law No. 107-296, 107th Congress, November 25, 2002, https://www.congress.gov/bill/107th-congress/house-bill/5005 (accessed January 18, 2023). — 171 — 6 DEPARTMENT OF STATE Kiron K. Skinner The U.S. Department of State’s mission is to bilaterally, multilaterally, and regionally implement the President’s foreign policy priorities; to serve U.S. citizens abroad; and to advance the economic, foreign policy, and national security interests of the United States. Since the U.S. Founding, the Department of State has been the American gov- ernment’s designated tool of engagement with foreign governments and peoples throughout the world. Country names, borders, leaders, technology, and people have changed in the more than two centuries since the Founding, but the basics of diplomacy remain the same. Although the Department has also evolved throughout the years, at least in the modern era, there is one significant problem that the next President must address to be successful. There are scores of fine diplomats who serve the President’s agenda, often helping to shape and interpret that agenda. At the same time, however, in all Administrations, there is a tug-of-war between Presidents and bureaucracies— and that resistance is much starker under conservative Presidents, due largely to the fact that large swaths of the State Department’s workforce are left-wing and predisposed to disagree with a conservative President’s policy agenda and vision. It should not and cannot be this way: The American people need and deserve a diplomatic machine fully focused on the national interest as defined through the election of a President who sets the domestic and international agenda for the nation. The next Administration must take swift and decisive steps to reforge the department into a lean and functional diplomatic machine that serves the

Department of Homeland Security

Strong

Vector: 66%

Pages: 205-207AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"Both the bill and the Project 2025 proposal seek to strengthen the State Department by clarifying the Secretary's authority, improving organizational structure, and enhancing leadership coordination to better implement the President's foreign policy vision."

Key themes:State Department reorganizationSecretary of State authorityPolitical leadership/appointmentsInteragency coordinationForeign policy implementation

— 172 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise President and, thereby, the American people. Below is the basic but essential road- map for achieving these repairs. HISTORY AND CONTEXT Founded in 1789, the Department of State was one of the first Cabinet-level agencies in the new American government. The first Secretary of State, Thomas Jefferson, oversaw a small staff, diplomatic posts in London and Paris, and 10 con- sular posts.1 Today, the Department of State has almost 80,000 total employees (including 13,517 foreign service employees and 11,683 civil service employees) in 275 embassies, consulates, and other posts around the world.2 In theory, the State Department is the principal agency responsible for carrying out the President’s foreign policy and representing the United States in other nations and international organizations. To the extent consistent with presidential policy and federal law, the department also supports U.S. citizens and businesses in other nations and vets foreign nationals seeking temporary or permanent entrance to the United States. The State Department also provides humanitarian, security, and other assistance to non-U.S. populations in need, and otherwise advances and supports U.S. national interests abroad. Properly led, the State Department can be instrumental for commu- nicating and implementing a foreign policy vision that best serves American citizens. As the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century (the Hart–Rudman Commission) observed more than 20 years ago, the State Department is a “crip- pled institution” suffering from “an ineffective organizational structure in which regional and functional policies do not serve integrated goals, and in which sound management, accountability, and leadership are lacking.”3 Unfortunately, this critique remains accurate. The State Department’s failures are not due to a lack of resources. As one expert has observed, the department “has significantly more at its disposal than was the case at the end of the Cold War, in the mid-1990s, and at the height of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars.”4 A major source, if not the major source, of the State Department’s ineffectiveness lies in its institutional belief that it is an independent institution that knows what is best for the United States, sets its own foreign policy, and does not need direction from an elected President. The next President can make the State Department more effective by providing a clear foreign policy vision, selecting political officials and career diplomats that will enthusiastically turn that vision into a policy agenda, and firmly supporting the State Department as it makes the necessary institutional adjustments. POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AND BUREAUCRATIC LEADERSHIP AND SUPPORT Focusing the State Department on the needs and goals of the next President will require the President’s handpicked political leadership—as well as foreign — 173 — Department of State service and civil service personnel who share the President’s vision and policy agendas—to run the department. This can be done by taking these steps at the outset of the next Administration. Exert Leverage During the Confirmation Process. Notwithstanding the challenges and slowness of the modern U.S. Senate confirmation process, the next President can exert leverage on the Senate if he or she is willing to place State Department appointees directly into those roles, pending confirmation. Doing so would both ensure that the department has immediate senior political leadership and would force the Senate to act on nominees’ appointments instead of being allowed to engage in dilatory tactics that cripple the State Department’s function- ality for weeks, months, or even years. Assert Leadership in the Appointment Process. The next Administration should assert leadership over, and guidance to, the State Department by placing political appointees in positions that do not require Senate confirmation, including senior advisors, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretaries, and Deputy Assistant Sec- retaries. Given the department’s size, the next Administration should also increase the number of political appointees to manage it. To the extent possible, all non-confirmed senior appointees should be selected by the President-elect’s transition team or the new President’s Office of Presiden- tial Personnel (depending on the timing of selection) and be in place the first day of the Administration. No one in a leadership position on the morning of January 20 should hold that position at the end of the day. These recommendations do not imply that foreign service and civil service officials should be excluded from key roles: It is hard to imagine a scenario in which they are not immediately relevant to the transition of power. The main suggestion here is that as many political appoin- tees as possible should be in place at the start of a new Administration. Support and Train Political Appointees. The Secretary of State should use his or her office and its resources to ensure regular coordination among all political appointees, which should take the form of strategy meetings, trainings, and other events. The secretary should also take reasonable steps to ensure that the State Department’s political appointees are connected to other departments’ political appointees, which is critical for cross-agency effectiveness and morale. The sec- retary should capitalize on the more experienced political appointees by using them as the foundation for a mentorship program for less experienced political appointees. The interaction of political appointees must be routine and operational rather than incidental or occasional, and it must be treated as a crucial dimension for the next Administration’s success. Maximize the Value of Career Officials. Career foreign service and civil service personnel can and must be leveraged for their expertise and commit- ment to the President’s mission. Indeed, the State Department has thousands of employees with unparalleled linguistic, cultural, policy, and administrative skills,

Department of State

Moderate

Vector: 67%

Pages: 208-210AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"HR 5244 aligns moderately with Project 2025 by enhancing interagency coordination and clarifying the Secretary of State's role in advancing presidential foreign policy, particularly through structured UN engagement and improved congressional coordination—both emphasized in the policy. However, the bill does not directly address key Project 2025 priorities such as responding to the Chinese threat, visa reciprocity, or immigration enforcement."

Key themes:interagency coordinationpresidential foreign policy agendacongressional engagementSecretary of State authorityUN representation

— 176 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise Secretary of State should work as part of an agile foreign policy team along with the National Security Advisor, the Secretary of Defense, and other agency heads to flesh out and advance the President’s foreign policy. Bureaucratic stovepipes of the past should be less important than commitment to, and achievement of, the President’s foreign policy agenda. The State Department’s role in these interagency discussions must reflect the President’s clear direction and disallow resources and tools to be used in any way that detracts from the presidentially directed mission. Coordinate with Congress. Congress has both the statutory and appropri- ations authority to impact the State Department’s operations and has a strong interest in key aspects of American foreign policy. The department must therefore take particular care in its interaction with Congress, since poor interactions with Congress, regardless of intentions, could trigger congressional pushback or have other negative impacts on the President’s agenda. This will require particularly strong leadership of the Department of State’s Bureau of Legislative Affairs. The Secretary of State and political leadership should ensure full coordination with the White House regarding congressional engage- ment on any State Department responsibility. This may lead to, for example, the President authorizing the State Department to engage with Members of Congress and relevant committees on certain issues (including statutorily designated con- gressional consultations), but to remain “radio silent” on volatile or designated issues on which the White House wants to be the primary or only voice. All such authorized department engagements with Congress must be driven and handled by political appointees in conjunction with career officials who have the relevant expertise and are willing to work in concert with the President’s political appoin- tees on particularly sensitive matters. Respond Vigorously to the Chinese Threat. The State Department recently opened the Office of China Coordination, or “China House.” This office is intended to bring together experts inside and outside the State Department to coordinate U.S. government relations with China “and advance our vision for an open, inclu- sive international system.”7 Whether China House will streamline U.S. government communication, consensus, and action on China policy—given the presence of other agencies with strong competing or adverse interests—remains to be seen. The unit is dependent on adequate and competent staff being assigned by other bureaus within the State Department. Nonetheless, the concept is one a Republican Administration should support mutatis mutandis. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has been “at war” with the U.S. for decades. Now that this reality has been accepted throughout the gov- ernment, the State Department must be prepared to lead the U.S. diplomatic effort accordingly. The centralization of efforts in one place is critical to this end. Review Immigration and Domestic Security Requirements. Arguably, the department’s most noteworthy challenge on the global stage has been its handling — 177 — Department of State of immigration and domestic security issues, which are inextricably related. The State Department’s apparent posture toward these two issues, which are of para- mount importance to the American people, has historically been that they are of lesser importance than other issues and that they can be treated as concessions in broader diplomatic engagements. In other instances in which access to the U.S. in the form of immigrant (permanent) and nonimmigrant (temporary) visas could potentially serve as diplomatic leverage, it is almost never used. To some degree, the State Department and many of its personnel appear to view the U.S. immigra- tion system less as a tool for strengthening the United States and more as a global welfare program. To ensure the safety, security, and prosperity of all Americans, this must change. Below are several key areas in which the department’s formal and informal postures must adjust to reflect the current immigration and domestic security environment: l Visa reciprocity. The United States should strictly enforce the doctrine of reciprocity when issuing visas to all foreign nationals. For too long, the U.S. has provided virtually unfettered access to foreign nationals from countries that do not respond in kind—including countries that are actively hostile to U.S. interests and nationals. Mandatory reciprocity will convey the necessary reality that other countries do not have an unfettered right to U.S. access and must reciprocally offer favorable visa-based access to U.S. nationals. The State Department’s reaction time to other countries’ changes in visa policies with respect to the U.S. must be streamlined to ensure it can be updated in real time. l Section 243(d) visa sanctions. Visa sanctions under section 243(d) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA),8 enacted into law to motivate countries to accept the return of any nationals who have been ordered removed from the U.S., should be quickly and fully enforced. Recalcitrant countries that do not accept receipt of their returned nationals will risk the suspension of issuance of all immigrant visas, all nonimmigrant visas, or all visas. These country-specific sanctions should remain in place until the sanctioned country accepts the return of all its removal-pending nationals and formally commits to future, regular acceptance of its nationals. Black- letter implementation of this law will demonstrate a heretofore lacking seriousness to the international community that other nations must respect U.S. immigration laws and work with federal authorities to accept returning nationals—or lose access to the United States. l Rightsizing refugee admissions. The Biden Administration has engineered what is nothing short of a collapse of U.S. border security and

Department of Homeland Security

Moderate

Vector: 66%

Pages: 205-207AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"HR 5244 focuses on clarifying the Secretary of State's authorities and establishing the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations and a corresponding mission, which aligns with Project 2025's emphasis on placing loyal political appointees in key diplomatic posts and improving departmental coordination. However, the bill does not directly address the political loyalty vetting, career official leverage, or treaty review mechanisms highlighted in the Project 2025 policy."

Key themes:State Department leadershipAmbassador appointmentsOrganizational structureStrategic coordinationUN engagement

— 173 — Department of State service and civil service personnel who share the President’s vision and policy agendas—to run the department. This can be done by taking these steps at the outset of the next Administration. Exert Leverage During the Confirmation Process. Notwithstanding the challenges and slowness of the modern U.S. Senate confirmation process, the next President can exert leverage on the Senate if he or she is willing to place State Department appointees directly into those roles, pending confirmation. Doing so would both ensure that the department has immediate senior political leadership and would force the Senate to act on nominees’ appointments instead of being allowed to engage in dilatory tactics that cripple the State Department’s function- ality for weeks, months, or even years. Assert Leadership in the Appointment Process. The next Administration should assert leadership over, and guidance to, the State Department by placing political appointees in positions that do not require Senate confirmation, including senior advisors, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretaries, and Deputy Assistant Sec- retaries. Given the department’s size, the next Administration should also increase the number of political appointees to manage it. To the extent possible, all non-confirmed senior appointees should be selected by the President-elect’s transition team or the new President’s Office of Presiden- tial Personnel (depending on the timing of selection) and be in place the first day of the Administration. No one in a leadership position on the morning of January 20 should hold that position at the end of the day. These recommendations do not imply that foreign service and civil service officials should be excluded from key roles: It is hard to imagine a scenario in which they are not immediately relevant to the transition of power. The main suggestion here is that as many political appoin- tees as possible should be in place at the start of a new Administration. Support and Train Political Appointees. The Secretary of State should use his or her office and its resources to ensure regular coordination among all political appointees, which should take the form of strategy meetings, trainings, and other events. The secretary should also take reasonable steps to ensure that the State Department’s political appointees are connected to other departments’ political appointees, which is critical for cross-agency effectiveness and morale. The sec- retary should capitalize on the more experienced political appointees by using them as the foundation for a mentorship program for less experienced political appointees. The interaction of political appointees must be routine and operational rather than incidental or occasional, and it must be treated as a crucial dimension for the next Administration’s success. Maximize the Value of Career Officials. Career foreign service and civil service personnel can and must be leveraged for their expertise and commit- ment to the President’s mission. Indeed, the State Department has thousands of employees with unparalleled linguistic, cultural, policy, and administrative skills, — 174 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise and large numbers of them have been an enormous resource to the Secretaries of State under which they have served. The secretary must find a way to make clear to career officials that despite prior history and modes of operation, they need not be adversaries of a conservative President, Secretary of State, or the team of political appointees. Reboot Ambassadors Worldwide. All ambassadors are required to submit letters of resignation at the start of a new Administration. Previous Republican Administrations have accepted the resignations of only the political ambassadors and allowed the foreign service ambassadors to retain their posts, sometimes for months or years into a new Administration.5 The next Administration must go further: It should both accept the resignations of all political ambassadors and quickly review and reassess all career ambassadors. This review should commence well before the new Administration’s first day. Ambassadors in countries where U.S. policy or posture would substantially change under the new Administration, as well as any who have evinced hostility toward the incoming Administration or its agenda, should be recalled immediately. The priority should be to put in place new ambassadors who support the Presi- dent’s agenda among political appointees, foreign service officers, and civil service personnel, with no predetermined percentage among these categories. Political ambassadors with strong personal relationships with the President should be pri- oritized for key strategic posts such as Australia, Japan, the United Kingdom, the United Nations, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). RIGHTING THE SHIP Ensuring the State Department is accountable for serving American citi- zens first will require—at a minimum—that the following steps be implemented immediately: Review Retroactively. Before inauguration, the President-elect’s department transition team should assess every aspect of State Department negotiations and funding commitments. Upon inauguration, the Secretary of State should order an immediate freeze on all efforts to implement unratified treaties and international agreements, allocation of resources, foreign assistance disbursements, domestic and international contracts and payments, hiring and recruiting decisions, etc., pending a political appointee-driven review to ensure that such efforts comport with the new Administration’s policies. The quality of this review is more import- ant than speed. The posture of the department during this review should be an unwavering desire to prioritize the American people—including a recognition that the federal government must be a diligent steward of taxpayer dollars. Implement Repair. The State Department must change its handling of international agreements to restore constitutional governance. Under prior Administrations, unnecessary institutional factors in the department caused

Department of State

Weak

Vector: 67%

Pages: 208-210AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"HR 5244 mainly reorganizes the Secretary of State's office and establishes UN representation roles, which tangentially relates to Project 2025's emphasis on interagency and congressional coordination but does not address its core treaty review, C-175 revocation, or strategic direction priorities."

Key themes:interagency coordinationcongressional oversightorganizational authority

— 175 — Department of State numerous logistical challenges in negotiating, approving, and implementing trea- ties and agreements. This is particularly true under the Biden Administration. For example, under the Biden Administration, the State Department was considered sufficiently unreliable in terms of alignment and effectiveness such that its political leadership invoked its Circular 175 (C-175) authority to delegate its diplomatic capacity to other agencies such as the Department of Homeland Security. At time of publication, the State Department is negotiating (or seeking to nego- tiate) large-scale, sovereignty-eroding agreements that could come at considerable economic and other costs to the American people. Although such agreements should be evaluated and approved as are treaties, the Biden Administration is likely to simply call them “agreements.” The Biden State Department not only approves but also enforces treaties that have not been ratified by the U.S. Senate. This practice must be thoroughly reviewed—and most likely jettisoned. The next President should recalibrate how the State Department handles trea- ties and agreements, primarily by restoring constitutionality to these processes. He or she should direct the Secretary of State to freeze any ongoing treaty or inter- national agreement negotiations and assess whether those efforts align with the new President’s foreign policy direction. The next Administration should also direct the secretary to order an immediate stand-down on enforcement of any treaties that have not been ratified by the Senate, and order a thorough review of the degree to which such enforcement has impacted the department’s functions, policies, and use of resources. The Secretary of State, in cooperation with the Office of the Attorney General and the White House Counsel’s Office, should also conduct a review to identify “agreements” that are really treaty commitments within the ordinary public mean- ing of the Constitution,6 and suspend compliance pending presidential transmittal of those agreements to the Senate for advice and consent. The next Administration should also move to withdraw from treaties that have been under Senate consider- ation for 20 years or more, with the understanding that those treaties are unlikely to be ratified. Under circumstances in which ratification of a stale treaty before the Senate still serves national interests, the treaty letter of transmittal and sub- mission should be updated for current circumstances. The Secretary of State must revoke most outstanding C-175 authorities that have been granted to other agen- cies during previous Administrations, although such revocations should be closely coordinated with the White House for logistical reasons. Coordinate with Other Agencies. Interagency engagement in this new environment must be similarly adjusted to mirror presidential direction. Indeed, coordination among federal agencies is challenging even in the most well-oiled Administrations. Although such coordination is inescapable and sometimes produc- tive, agencies tend to leverage each other’s resources in ways that occasionally have off-mission consequences for the agency or agencies with the resources. Ideally, the — 176 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise Secretary of State should work as part of an agile foreign policy team along with the National Security Advisor, the Secretary of Defense, and other agency heads to flesh out and advance the President’s foreign policy. Bureaucratic stovepipes of the past should be less important than commitment to, and achievement of, the President’s foreign policy agenda. The State Department’s role in these interagency discussions must reflect the President’s clear direction and disallow resources and tools to be used in any way that detracts from the presidentially directed mission. Coordinate with Congress. Congress has both the statutory and appropri- ations authority to impact the State Department’s operations and has a strong interest in key aspects of American foreign policy. The department must therefore take particular care in its interaction with Congress, since poor interactions with Congress, regardless of intentions, could trigger congressional pushback or have other negative impacts on the President’s agenda. This will require particularly strong leadership of the Department of State’s Bureau of Legislative Affairs. The Secretary of State and political leadership should ensure full coordination with the White House regarding congressional engage- ment on any State Department responsibility. This may lead to, for example, the President authorizing the State Department to engage with Members of Congress and relevant committees on certain issues (including statutorily designated con- gressional consultations), but to remain “radio silent” on volatile or designated issues on which the White House wants to be the primary or only voice. All such authorized department engagements with Congress must be driven and handled by political appointees in conjunction with career officials who have the relevant expertise and are willing to work in concert with the President’s political appoin- tees on particularly sensitive matters. Respond Vigorously to the Chinese Threat. The State Department recently opened the Office of China Coordination, or “China House.” This office is intended to bring together experts inside and outside the State Department to coordinate U.S. government relations with China “and advance our vision for an open, inclu- sive international system.”7 Whether China House will streamline U.S. government communication, consensus, and action on China policy—given the presence of other agencies with strong competing or adverse interests—remains to be seen. The unit is dependent on adequate and competent staff being assigned by other bureaus within the State Department. Nonetheless, the concept is one a Republican Administration should support mutatis mutandis. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has been “at war” with the U.S. for decades. Now that this reality has been accepted throughout the gov- ernment, the State Department must be prepared to lead the U.S. diplomatic effort accordingly. The centralization of efforts in one place is critical to this end. Review Immigration and Domestic Security Requirements. Arguably, the department’s most noteworthy challenge on the global stage has been its handling

Showing 3 of 5 policy matches

About These Correlations

Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.

To provide for the authorities of the Secretary of State.