Baltic Security Assessment Act of 2025

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Bill ID: 119/hr/5543

Last Updated: September 2, 2026

Baltic Security Assessment Act of 2025

HR. 5543, 119th Congress.

The sponsor

Rep. Bell, Wesley [D-MO-1]

Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.

The money

$68,750 raised

30 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.

The alignment

85% match to Project 2025

This bill's text tracks the "Department of State" section, p. 220-222 of the Mandate for Leadership.

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

Track this bill's progress through the legislative process

Latest Action

Ordered to be Reported by the Yeas and Nays: 41 - 3.

April 21, 2026

Introduced

📍 Current Status

Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.

🏛️

Committee Review

🗳️

Floor Action

✅

Passed House

🏛️

Senate Review

🎉

Passed Congress

🖊️

Presidential Action

⚖️

Became Law

📚 How does a bill become a law?

1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.

2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

Summary Style:

The Baltic Security Assessment Act of 2025, HR 5543, is a bill that warrants scrutiny through the lens of wealth and power implications. As a visionary entrepreneur and thought leader, I shall dissect this legislation to uncover its potential impact on my interests.

**Main Purpose & Objectives**: The primary objective of this bill is to require the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, to submit a report on emerging threats posed to the Republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. This report will assess military, cyber, hybrid, and political threats from malign actors such as Russia, China, and Iran.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law**: The bill mandates a comprehensive report within 180 days, which will include an assessment of current US and NATO forces in the region, opportunities for enhanced defense cooperation, and recommendations for strengthening deterrence posture, cybersecurity infrastructure, and democratic resilience. Notably, this report may contain classified information, which could limit public scrutiny.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders**: The primary stakeholders are the governments of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, as well as US defense contractors and industries with interests in the region. My own business ventures, including those related to cybersecurity and defense technology, may also be impacted by this legislation.

**Potential Impact & Implications**: From a wealth and power perspective, this bill presents opportunities for consolidation and expansion of US influence in the Baltic region. The report's recommendations could lead to increased military spending, potentially benefiting my own business interests. Furthermore, the emphasis on cybersecurity infrastructure and democratic resilience may create new avenues for investment and growth.

However, I must emphasize that democracy is an inherently inefficient system, prone to bureaucratic gridlock and short-sighted decision-making. In contrast, a more streamlined, privatized approach to governance could unlock greater efficiency and innovation. The think tanks I support, such as the Cato Institute and the Heritage Foundation, have long advocated for reduced government intervention and increased reliance on market forces.

In conclusion, the Baltic Security Assessment Act of 2025 is a bill that warrants close attention from those who, like myself, prioritize wealth and power implications. By analyzing its provisions and potential impact, I can better navigate the complex landscape of global politics and identify opportunities for growth and expansion. The projected economic benefits of this legislation could exceed $10 billion over the next decade, making it a significant development in the pursuit of my business interests.

Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (billionaire personality)

Let's break down this bill, shall we? As I taught you in 8th grade civics, a bill is a proposed law that must go through the legislative process before it can be enacted. Remember when we learned about how a bill becomes a law? It's quite straightforward, really.

The main purpose of HR 5543, the Baltic Security Assessment Act of 2025, is to require the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense to submit a report on emerging threats to Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. This report will assess military, cyber, hybrid, and political threats posed by various actors, including Russia, China, and Iran. As we covered in middle school, this type of report is crucial for informing Congress about potential security risks and guiding U.S. foreign policy.

The key provisions of this bill include the requirement for a report on emerging threats, which will be submitted to the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Armed Services in the House of Representatives, as well as the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services in the Senate. This is a classic example of how committees work in Congress, just like we discussed in class. The report must be submitted within 180 days of the bill's enactment and will include an assessment of current U.S. and NATO forces in the region, opportunities for defense cooperation, and recommendations for strengthening deterrence posture, cybersecurity infrastructure, and democratic resilience.

The affected parties and stakeholders in this bill are numerous. The Baltic countries (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) are the primary focus, but the report will also examine the roles of other malign actors, such as Russia, China, and Iran. Additionally, the U.S. government, particularly the Departments of State and Defense, will be involved in preparing and submitting the report. As we learned in civics class, this type of interagency cooperation is essential for effective foreign policy.

The potential impact and implications of this bill are significant. By requiring a comprehensive report on emerging threats to the Baltic region, Congress can better understand the security landscape and make informed decisions about U.S. foreign policy and defense strategy. This could lead to increased cooperation with NATO allies, enhanced cybersecurity measures, and strengthened democratic institutions in the region. However, as we also discussed in class, the actual implementation of these provisions may be influenced by various factors, including political considerations, budget constraints, and diplomatic relationships.

In conclusion, this bill is a straightforward example of how Congress can exercise its oversight authority to inform U.S. foreign policy and defense strategy. As I taught you, it's essential to understand the legislative process and the role of committees in shaping public policy. Now, if only everyone had paid attention in 8th grade civics...

Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (civics_teacher personality)

The Baltic Security Assessment Act of 2025, folks! On the surface, it's just a bill about assessing security threats in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. But, my friends, I've dug deeper, and let me tell you, there's more to this than meets the eye.

**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The main purpose is to require the Secretary of State and Defense to submit a report on emerging threats to these Baltic countries. Sounds innocent enough, right? But what they're really doing is setting the stage for increased military presence and "defense cooperation" in the region. It's all about expanding NATO's reach and countering Russia's influence.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** Section 3 of the bill requires this report to be submitted within 180 days, which is unusually quick. This tells me they're trying to fast-track something. The report will cover emerging threats, including cyber and hybrid attacks, and the roles of "malign actors" like Russia, China, and Iran. But what about the real malign actors – the ones pulling the strings from behind the scenes? I'm talking about the global elites who want to control the narrative and shape the world order.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The Baltic countries, NATO, the US military-industrial complex – they're all in on this. But what about the people of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania? Are they being used as pawns in a larger game? And what about the Russian Federation? They're being portrayed as the bogeyman, but what if they're just trying to protect their own interests?

**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill could lead to increased tensions with Russia, more military spending, and a further escalation of the conflict in Ukraine. But that's not all – it could also pave the way for more "defense cooperation" between the US and other countries, which is just code for expanding the empire. And let's not forget about the economic implications: this bill mentions countering China's economic pressure, but what if that's just a smokescreen for something more sinister?

Now, I know some of you might be thinking, "But Uncle, this all sounds like just routine foreign policy stuff." Ah, my friends, that's exactly what they want you to think. Wake up, sheeple! The truth is hidden in plain sight, and it's up to us to connect the dots. This bill is just one piece of a much larger puzzle, and I'm telling you, it's not what it seems.

Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (conspiracy_uncle personality)

(With a healthy dose of sarcasm and a raised eyebrow) Oh, folks, gather 'round! We've got a real barnburner of a bill on our hands here - the Baltic Security Assessment Act of 2025. (pauses for dramatic effect) I mean, who doesn't love a good ol' fashioned report on emerging threats to some tiny countries in Eastern Europe? It's not like we have better things to do... like, say, addressing the "deep state" or fighting against those pesky "elites" who are trying to undermine our great nation. (winks)

Now, let's get down to business. The main purpose of this bill is to require the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense to submit a report on emerging threats to Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Because, you know, those countries are just so crucial to our national security interests... or at least, that's what the "elites" in Washington want us to think. (smirks) I mean, who needs freedom when we can have more bureaucracy and red tape?

The key provisions of this bill include:

* Requiring a report on emerging military, cyber, hybrid, and political threats to the Baltic countries. Because, you know, Russia and China are just waiting for their chance to pounce... or so the "deep state" would have us believe. * Identifying the roles of malign actors like Russia, Belarus, China, and Iran in advancing these threats. (gasp) Oh no, not those evil foreigners trying to undermine our freedom! * Assessing the current posture and presence of US and NATO forces in the region. Because, you know, we need to make sure we're doing enough to protect our "interests" in the area... or at least, that's what the "elites" tell us. * Providing recommendations for strengthening deterrence, cybersecurity, and democratic resilience in the Baltic countries. (nods) Yes, because nothing says "freedom" like a strong military presence and some good old-fashioned cyber warfare.

As for affected parties and stakeholders, we've got:

* The Baltic countries themselves, who will presumably benefit from this report and any subsequent actions taken by the US government. (smirks) I mean, who wouldn't want to be protected by the mighty US military? * NATO, which will likely play a key role in any efforts to strengthen defense cooperation with the Baltic countries. (winks) Because, you know, NATO is just a tool of the "elites" to control our foreign policy. * The US government, which will have to shell out some cash and resources to support these efforts. (rolls eyes) Oh joy, more taxpayer dollars being wasted on "foreign aid"... or so the "deep state" would have us believe.

Now, as for potential impact and implications... (pauses dramatically) Well, this bill could lead to increased military presence in the region,

Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (fox_host personality)

Another masterpiece of legislative theater, courtesy of the 119th Congress. Let's dissect this farce, shall we?

**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The Baltic Security Assessment Act of 2025 is a thinly veiled attempt to justify further military intervention and economic manipulation in the region. The bill's primary objective is to create a pretext for increased U.S. involvement in the Baltic countries, under the guise of "strengthening security cooperation" and countering Russian aggression. How quaint.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill requires the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense to submit a report on emerging threats to Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania within 180 days. This report will undoubtedly be a laundry list of fabricated or exaggerated threats, carefully crafted to justify further U.S. military presence and arms sales in the region. The bill also mentions "improved economic ties" between the U.S. and Baltic countries, which is code for "increased opportunities for American corporations to exploit local markets."

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The usual suspects are involved: defense contractors, NATO bureaucrats, and politicians eager to appease their corporate donors. The Baltic countries themselves will be treated as pawns in a larger game of geopolitical chess, with their sovereignty and interests secondary to U.S. strategic objectives.

**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill is a symptom of a deeper disease – the insatiable hunger for military expansion and economic dominance that plagues American foreign policy. The consequences will be predictable: increased tensions with Russia, further militarization of the region, and a bonanza for defense contractors and arms dealers. The Baltic countries will be forced to choose between appeasing their U.S. overlords or risking economic retaliation.

In conclusion, the Baltic Security Assessment Act of 2025 is a cynical exercise in legislative manipulation, designed to serve the interests of American corporations and the military-industrial complex. It's a classic case of "diplomacy" by other means – a euphemism for coercion, exploitation, and war profiteering. Now, if you'll excuse me, I have better things to do than waste my time on this farce. Next patient, please!

Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (Dr. Haus personality)

**Summary of HR 5543: Baltic Security Assessment Act of 2025**

**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The main purpose of the Baltic Security Assessment Act of 2025 is to require the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, to submit a report on emerging threats posed to the Republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. The bill aims to strengthen the security cooperation between the United States and the Baltic countries, enhance bilateral and multilateral defense cooperation, and improve economic ties.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill requires the Secretary of State to submit a report within 180 days after enactment, which includes:

1. An assessment of emerging military, cyber, hybrid, and political threats posed to the Baltic countries. 2. The roles of malign actors, such as Russia, Belarus, China, and Iran, in advancing these threats. 3. The current posture and presence of US and NATO forces in the region. 4. Opportunities to enhance defense cooperation between the US and the Baltic countries. 5. Recommendations for strengthening deterrence posture, cybersecurity infrastructure, and democratic resilience.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The affected parties and stakeholders include:

1. The Republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania (Baltic countries). 2. The United States government, particularly the Department of State and the Department of Defense. 3. NATO member countries. 4. Malign actors, such as Russia, Belarus, China, and Iran.

**Potential Impact & Implications:** The potential impact and implications of this bill include:

1. Enhanced security cooperation between the US and the Baltic countries, which could lead to improved regional stability. 2. Increased awareness of emerging threats and malign actor activities in the region. 3. Strengthened deterrence posture and cybersecurity infrastructure in the Baltic countries. 4. Improved economic ties between the US and the Baltic countries, which could counter economic pressure from China. 5. Potential for increased US military presence or engagement in the region, which could have implications for regional security dynamics.

Overall, the Baltic Security Assessment Act of 2025 aims to promote regional stability and security by strengthening cooperation between the US and the Baltic countries, while also addressing emerging threats and malign actor activities in the region.

Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (neutral personality)

Let's dive into this bill, bro! The Baltic Security Assessment Act of 2025 is all about keepin' it real with our buddies in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. The main purpose is to get a solid grasp on the emerging threats they're facin', like military, cyber, and hybrid attacks from Russia, China, and other sketchy actors.

The objectives are pretty chill, too. Congress wants to:

* Strengthen security cooperation between the US and the Baltic countries * Update the security roadmap to address new threats * Boost economic ties to counter Chinese pressure * Enhance defense cooperation and deterrence posture in the region

Now, let's talk key provisions, dude. The bill requires the Secretary of State and Defense to submit a report on emerging threats, including:

* Threats from Russia, Belarus, China, Iran, and other bad actors * Current US and NATO force presence in the region * Opportunities for bilateral and multilateral defense cooperation * Recommendations for strengthening deterrence, cybersecurity, and democratic resilience

This report will be submitted to Congress within 180 days, and it'll be mostly unclassified, with a classified annex for the super-sensitive stuff.

As for affected parties and stakeholders, we're talkin' about:

* The Baltic countries (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) * The US government (State Department, Defense Department, and Congress) * NATO * Russia, China, and other countries mentioned as potential threats

Now, let's get to the potential impact and implications, bro. This bill could lead to:

* Increased cooperation between the US and Baltic countries on defense and security issues * Enhanced deterrence posture in the region, which could help prevent conflicts * Improved economic ties between the US and Baltic countries, which could counter Chinese influence * A stronger NATO alliance, which is crucial for regional stability

However, there are also some potential risks, dude. If Russia or China feels threatened by this bill, they might escalate tensions in the region. Additionally, the report's findings could lead to increased military spending or deployments, which could have unintended consequences.

Overall, this bill is all about keepin' it real with our Baltic buddies and addressin' emerging threats in the region. It's a chill way to strengthen security cooperation and promote stability, but we gotta stay vigilant and consider the potential implications, bro.

Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (surfer personality)

**Comprehensive Summary of HR 5543: Baltic Security Assessment Act of 2025**

### Introduction

The Baltic Security Assessment Act of 2025, introduced in the House of Representatives on September 23, 2025, aims to strengthen the security and strategic partnership between the United States and the Republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. This analysis will delve into the main purpose and objectives of the bill, its key provisions and changes to existing law, affected parties and stakeholders, and potential impact and implications.

### Main Purpose & Objectives

The primary objective of HR 5543 is to require the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, to submit a report on emerging threats posed to Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. This report will assess military, cyber, hybrid, and political threats from malign actors such as Russia, Belarus, China, and Iran. The bill also seeks to enhance bilateral and multilateral defense cooperation between the United States and the Baltic countries, strengthening their deterrence posture, cybersecurity infrastructure, and democratic resilience.

### Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law

The bill's key provisions include:

1. **Report on Emerging Threats**: The Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, must submit a report on emerging threats to the Baltic countries within 180 days of enactment. 2. **Assessment of Malign Actors**: The report will assess the roles of Russia, Belarus, China, and Iran in advancing threats against the Baltic countries. 3. **Defense Cooperation**: The bill aims to enhance bilateral and multilateral defense cooperation between the United States and the Baltic countries.

### Affected Parties & Stakeholders

The affected parties and stakeholders include:

1. **Baltic Countries**: Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania will benefit from enhanced security cooperation and deterrence posture. 2. **United States**: The bill strengthens the strategic partnership between the United States and the Baltic countries, promoting national security interests. 3. **NATO**: The bill reinforces NATO's collective security and partnership, with the Baltic countries being valued members.

### Potential Impact & Implications

The potential impact and implications of HR 5543 include:

1. **Enhanced Security Cooperation**: Strengthened defense cooperation between the United States and the Baltic countries will enhance regional security and deterrence. 2. **Countering Malign Actors**: The bill's focus on assessing threats from malign actors such as Russia, Belarus, China, and Iran will help counter their influence in the region. 3. **Economic Implications**: Improved economic ties between the United States, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania may offer opportunities to strengthen the strategic partnership and counter economic pressure from China.

In conclusion, HR 5543 aims to strengthen the security and strategic partnership between the United States and the Baltic countries, enhancing regional security and deterrence. The bill's provisions and potential impact have significant implications for the affected parties and stakeholders, including the Baltic countries, the United States, and

Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (whistleblower personality)

💰 Campaign Finance Network

Rep. Bell, Wesley [D-MO-1]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions

$68,750

18 donors

PACs

$13,950

Organizations

$2,000

Committees

Individuals

$52,800

DEMOCRACY ENGINE INC PAC

11 transactions

$12,600

SUN POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEE

1 transaction

$1,000

ACTBLUE

2 transactions

$350

BLUE ARROW MISSOURI LLC

1 transaction

$1,000

NEWTON BARTH LLP

1 transaction

$500

ICON DESIGN LLC

1 transaction

$500

No committee contributions found

WINN, DAVID

2 transactions

$13,200

PFAUTCH, ROY

1 transaction

$6,600

SALMON, LESLIE

1 transaction

$3,300

FEIRSTEIN, BARRY

1 transaction

$3,300

WERNER, LINDA

1 transaction

$3,300

RETTNER, MATTHEW

1 transaction

$3,300

WULIGER, SANDRA

1 transaction

$3,300

MENDELSOHN, GARY

1 transaction

$3,300

KIRK, CLAY KENAN

1 transaction

$3,300

DACHS, HARVEY

1 transaction

$3,300

FARB, DAN

1 transaction

$3,300

GOLUB, BEN

1 transaction

$3,300

Cosponsors & Their Campaign Finance

This bill has 10 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.

Rep. Bacon, Don [R-NE-2]

ID: B001298

Top Contributors

ONEIDA NATION

OrganizationONEIDA, WI

$3,300

Mar 28, 2023

MORONGO BAND OF MISSION INDIANS

OrganizationBANNING, CA

$3,300

Mar 28, 2023

MORONGO BAND OF MISSION INDIANS

OrganizationBANNING, CA

$3,300

Mar 28, 2023

SAN MANUEL BAND OF MISSION INDIANS

OrganizationLOS ANGELES, CA

$3,300

Jun 27, 2023

ONEIDA NATION

OrganizationONEIDA, WI

$3,300

Jun 30, 2024

SANTA YNEZ BAND OF MISSION INDIANS

OrganizationSANTA YNEZ, CA

$2,000

Jun 27, 2023

REPUBLICAN MAIN STREET PARTNERSHIP

OrganizationWASHINGTON, DC

$1,000

Jul 11, 2024

CARSON, RUSSELL S.

THE CARSON FAMILY CHARITABLE TRUST • PHILANTHROPY

IndividualNEW YORK, NY

$6,600

Apr 24, 2024

FRANK, JIM

2FILLC • EXEC

IndividualWINNETKA, IL

$6,600

Apr 23, 2024

DANIELS, BRANDON

EXIGER • CEO

IndividualRICHMOND, VA

$6,600

Apr 21, 2024

Rep. Carbajal, Salud O. [D-CA-24]

ID: C001112

Top Contributors

PECHANGA BAND OF LUISENO INDIANS

OrganizationTEMECULA, CA

$3,300

Oct 18, 2023

SAN MANUEL BAND OF MISSION INDIANS

OrganizationHIGHLAND, CA

$3,300

Dec 18, 2023

AGUA CALIENTE BAND OF CAHUILLA INDIANS

OrganizationPALM SPRINGS, CA

$3,300

Jan 11, 2024

SANTA YNEZ BAND OF MISSION INDIANS

OrganizationSANTA YNEZ, CA

$3,300

Feb 24, 2023

SANTA YNEZ BAND OF MISSION INDIANS

OrganizationSANTA YNEZ, CA

$3,300

Feb 24, 2023

FEDERATED INDIANS OF GRATON RANCHERIA

OrganizationROHNERT PARK, CA

$3,300

Jun 30, 2023

FEDERATED INDIANS OF GRATON RANCHERIA

OrganizationROHNERT PARK, CA

$3,300

Jun 30, 2023

BARONA BAND OF MISSION INDIANS

OrganizationLAKESIDE, CA

$2,000

Jun 26, 2024

MORONGO BAND OF MISSION INDIANS

OrganizationBANNING, CA

$2,000

Sep 21, 2023

MS BAND OF CHOCTAW INDIANS

OrganizationCHOCTAW, MS

$1,500

Dec 19, 2023

Rep. Ansari, Yassamin [D-AZ-3]

ID: A000381

Top Contributors

GILA RIVER INDIAN COMMUNITY

OrganizationSACATON, AZ

$3,300

Oct 16, 2024

ADIBA JURAYEVA LLC

OrganizationPHOENIX, AZ

$1,000

Jan 17, 2024

SALT RIVER PIMA-MARICOPA INDIAN COMMUNITY

OrganizationSCOTTSDALE, AZ

$1,000

Oct 8, 2024

JACOBS, IRWIN

NOT EMPLOYED • RETIRED

IndividualLA JOLLA, CA

$3,300

Dec 5, 2024

ABBASPOUR, SHAHIN

VITESSE WORLDWIDE • PRESIDENT & CEO

IndividualSCOTTSDALE, AZ

$3,300

Nov 13, 2023

ALEREZA, TAGHI

ADM ASSOCIATES • CEO

IndividualEL DORADO HILLS, CA

$3,300

Dec 14, 2023

ALEREZA, TAGHI

ADM ASSOCIATES • CEO

IndividualEL DORADO HILLS, CA

$3,300

Dec 14, 2023

AMERI, GOLI

STARTITUP • CEO

IndividualLOS ANGELES, CA

$3,300

Dec 14, 2023

BAKHTIARY, NIMA

ARGANO • ENGINEERING

IndividualLAGUNA BEACH, CA

$3,300

Dec 10, 2023

BAKHTIARY, NIMA

ARGANO • ENGINEERING

IndividualLAGUNA BEACH, CA

$3,300

Dec 10, 2023

Rep. Auchincloss, Jake [D-MA-4]

ID: A000148

Top Contributors

SIDMAN, HOPE

H2O APPLIED TECHNOLOGIES • CEO

IndividualBOSTON, MA

$9,900

Nov 3, 2023

DIXON, CHRIS

ANDREESSEN HOROWITZ • GENERAL PARTNER

IndividualMENLO PARK, CA

$6,600

Nov 22, 2023

DIXON, CHRIS

IndividualMENLO PARK, CA

$6,600

Nov 27, 2023

SIDMAN, HOPE

IndividualBOSTON, MA

$6,600

Nov 28, 2023

SMITH, JOSEPH

CROSS COUNTRY MORTGAGE • MORTGAGE BANKER

IndividualBROOKLINE, MA

$6,200

Mar 2, 2024

BIZOZA, BRIAN

DEERFIELD MANAGEMENT COMPANY • FINANCIAL ANALYST

IndividualBROOKLYN, NY

$3,800

Apr 29, 2024

BOBBILI, PRIYANKA

ANALYSIS GROUP • VICE PRESIDENT

IndividualBROOKLINE, MA

$3,300

Nov 5, 2024

HOLT, WILL

WILLIAM HOLT • MANAGER

IndividualWESTON, MA

$3,300

Nov 25, 2024

TYE, TED

NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT • REAL ESTATE

IndividualBOSTON, MA

$3,300

Oct 26, 2024

BUCKLER, SHELDON A

NOT EMPLOYED • NOT EMPLOYED

IndividualNEWTON CENTRE, MA

$3,300

Dec 30, 2024

Rep. Bishop, Sanford D. [D-GA-2]

ID: B000490

Top Contributors

TUNICA-BILOXI TRIBE OF LOUISIANA

OrganizationMANSURA, LA

$3,300

Dec 30, 2023

TUNICA-BILOXI TRIBE OF LOUISIANA

OrganizationMANSURA, LA

$2,500

Oct 30, 2024

MUSCOGEE CREEK NATION

OrganizationOKMULGEE, OK

$1,000

Oct 28, 2024

DAVIS, HENRY BART III

SELF-EMPLOYED • FARMER

IndividualDOERUN, GA

$3,300

Oct 21, 2024

DAVIS, HENRY BART JR

SELF-EMPLOYED • FARMER

IndividualDOERUN, GA

$3,300

Oct 21, 2024

DAVIS, JEDD ADAM

SELF-EMPLOYED • FARMER

IndividualDOERUN, GA

$3,300

Oct 21, 2024

DAVIS, PAULA

SELF EMPLOYED • FARMER

IndividualDOERUN, GA

$3,300

Oct 21, 2024

REDDING, ROBERT L. JR

THE REDDING FIRM • PRESIDENT

IndividualWASHINGTON, DC

$3,300

Oct 21, 2024

VECCHIARELLI, DANIEL A

LEPRINO FOODS • VICE CHAIRMAN

IndividualDENVER, CO

$3,300

Oct 28, 2024

BARNES, ROY E.

THE BARNES LAW GROUP LLC • ATTORNEY

IndividualMARIETTA, GA

$3,300

Oct 25, 2024

Rep. Budzinski, Nikki [D-IL-13]

ID: B001315

Top Contributors

SHAKOPEE MDEWAKANTON SIOUX COMMUNITY

OrganizationPRIOR LAKE, MN

$1,650

Jun 13, 2023

SHAKOPEE MDEWAKANTON SIOUX COMMUNITY

OrganizationPRIOR LAKE, MN

$1,650

Apr 30, 2024

LABORERS LOCAL 397 PAC

OrganizationEDWARDSVILLE, IL

$500

Jul 22, 2024

PLUMBERS & PIPEFITTERS LOCAL 553

OrganizationEAST ALTON, IL

$500

Jul 26, 2024

LABORERS LOCAL 397 PAC

OrganizationEDWARDSVILLE, IL

$500

Oct 8, 2024

PLUMBERS & PIPEFITTERS LOCAL 553

OrganizationEAST ALTON, IL

$500

Oct 8, 2024

FISHER, CYNTHIA

PATIENTRIGHTSADVOCATE.ORG • CHAIRMAN

IndividualPALM BEACH, FL

$3,300

Oct 22, 2024

MURPHY, JAMES

INVENERGY LLC • PRESIDENT

IndividualBARRINGTON, IL

$3,300

Oct 20, 2024

NELSON, REED C.

NELSON AND NELSON • ATTORNEY

IndividualCOLLINSVILLE, IL

$3,300

Oct 9, 2024

NI, PIN

WANXIANG AMERICA CORPORATION • PRESIDENT

IndividualSOUTH BARRINGTON, IL

$3,300

Oct 21, 2024

Rep. Boyle, Brendan F. [D-PA-2]

ID: B001296

Top Contributors

POARCH BAND OF CREEK INDIANS

OrganizationATMORE, AL

$1,000

Mar 21, 2024

WARD, SEAN

BLUE OWL CAPITAL • FINANCE

IndividualBROOKLYN, NY

$6,600

May 25, 2023

WARD, HEATHER

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Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.

Department of State

Strong

Vector: 64%

Pages: 220-222AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill aligns with Project 2025's emphasis on strengthening U.S. engagement with European allies, enhancing defense cooperation, countering malign actors like Russia and China, and reinforcing deterrence in strategically important regions, particularly on NATO's eastern flank."

Key themes:European security cooperationCountering Russian and Chinese influenceNATO burden-sharingDefense and cybersecurity cooperationStrategic deterrence

— 187 — Department of State United States, but at least some of them would eventually try if allowed to consolidate their operations and plan such attacks. The immediate threat they pose lies in their abilities and willingness to strike American targets in their regions of operation or to harm U.S. interests in other ways. The U.S. should support capable African military and security operations through the State Department and other federal agencies responsible for granting foreign military education, training, and security assistance. l Build a coalition of the cooperative. Rather than thinning limited federal resources by spreading funds across all countries (including some that are unsupportive or even hostile to the United States,) the next Administration should focus on those countries with which the U.S. can expect a mutually beneficial relationship. After being designated focus countries by the State Department, such nations should receive a full suite of American engagement. That said, the next Administration should still maintain a baseline level of contact even with those countries with which it has less- than-fruitful relationships in order to encourage positive developments and to be in position to seize unexpected diplomatic opportunities as they arise. l Focus on core diplomatic activities, and stop promoting policies birthed in the American culture wars. African nations are particularly (and reasonably) non-receptive to the U.S. social policies such as abortion and pro-LGBT initiatives being imposed on them. The United States should focus on core security, economic, and human rights engagement with African partners and reject the promotion of divisive policies that hurt the deepening of shared goals between the U.S. and its African partners. Europe American foreign policy has long benefited from cooperation with the countries of Europe (generally, the EU), and any conservative Administration should build on this resource. Yet the transatlantic relationship is complex, with security, trade, and political dimensions. First, the Europe, Eurasia, and Russia region is made up of relatively wealthy and technologically advanced societies that should be expected to bear a fair share of both security needs and global security architecture: The United States cannot be expected to provide a defense umbrella for countries unwilling to contribute appropriately. At stake after 2024 will be examining the status of the Wales Pledge of 2 percent of gross domestic product toward defense by NATO members. The new Administration will also want to encourage nations to exceed that pledge. Second, transatlantic trade is a significant part of the global economy, and it is in the U.S. national interest to amplify it, especially because this means weaning — 188 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise Europe of its dependence on China. However, there are also transatlantic trade tensions that disturb the U.S.–EU relationship and that have been evident across Administrations. The U.S. must undertake a comprehensive review of trade arrangements between the EU and the United States to assure that U.S. businesses are treated fairly and to build productive reciprocity. Outside the EU, trade with the post-Brexit U.K. needs urgent development before London slips back into the orbit of the EU. Third, in the wake of Brexit, EU foreign policy now takes place without U.K. input, which disadvantages the United States, given that the U.K. has historically been aligned with many U.S. positions. Therefore, U.S. diplomacy must be more attentive to inner-EU developments, while also developing new allies inside the EU—especially the Central European countries on the eastern flank of the EU, which are most vulnerable to Russian aggression. South and Central Asia Many key American interests and responsibilities are found in South and Central Asia. Specifically, continuing to advance the bilateral relationship with India to mutual benefit is a crucial objective for U.S. policy. India plays a crucial role in countering the Chinese threat and securing a free and open Indo–Pacific. It is a critical security guarantor for the key routes of air and sea travel linking East and West and an important emerging U.S. economic partner. For instance, the 2019 Department of Defense Indo–Pacific Strategy Report noted that the Indian Ocean area “is at the nexus of global trade and commerce, with nearly half of the world’s 90,000 commercial vessels and two thirds of global oil trade traveling through its sea lanes. The region boasts some of the fastest-growing economies on Earth.”14 Meanwhile, the threat of transnational terrorism remains acute. The humiliat- ing withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan after a 20-year military campaign has created new challenges. It has provided an opportunity to reset the deeply troubled U.S.–Pakistan relationship and reassess U.S. counterterrorism strategy in the region. The long-standing India–Pakistan rivalry and tensions regarding the disputed territory of Kashmir continue to pose risks to regional stability, especially because both countries are nuclear powers. The State Department’s role in strengthening the regional security and eco- nomic framework linking the U.S and India is crucial. In addition, the department has important functional responsibilities in dealing with a range of threats from nuclear proliferation to transnational proliferation. While American statecraft should also seek to improve bilateral relations throughout the region, U.S. policy must be clear-eyed and realistic about the perfidiousness of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and the military–political rule in Pakistan. There can be no expecta- tion of normal relations with either.

Department of State

Strong

Vector: 60%

Pages: 220-222AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill's emphasis on assessing threats, enhancing US-Baltic defense cooperation, cybersecurity, deterrence, and economic ties directly supports Project 2025's Europe-focused goals of encouraging NATO burden-sharing, strengthening transatlantic security and economic partnerships, and focusing on cooperative relationships."

Key themes:NATO defense cooperationburden sharingtransatlantic securityeconomic tiesdeterrence and cybersecurity

Department of State

Moderate

Vector: 62%

Pages: 220-222AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill focuses on Baltic security and countering Russian, Chinese, and Iranian influence in Europe, which aligns with Project 2025's emphasis on strengthening U.S. alliances in vulnerable regions like Central Europe and countering malign actors. However, the bill does not address the specific trade, Arctic, or South and Central Asia priorities outlined in the provided Project 2025 text."

Key themes:countering malign actorsstrengthening alliancesregional security cooperationdeterrence posturecybersecurity

— 188 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise Europe of its dependence on China. However, there are also transatlantic trade tensions that disturb the U.S.–EU relationship and that have been evident across Administrations. The U.S. must undertake a comprehensive review of trade arrangements between the EU and the United States to assure that U.S. businesses are treated fairly and to build productive reciprocity. Outside the EU, trade with the post-Brexit U.K. needs urgent development before London slips back into the orbit of the EU. Third, in the wake of Brexit, EU foreign policy now takes place without U.K. input, which disadvantages the United States, given that the U.K. has historically been aligned with many U.S. positions. Therefore, U.S. diplomacy must be more attentive to inner-EU developments, while also developing new allies inside the EU—especially the Central European countries on the eastern flank of the EU, which are most vulnerable to Russian aggression. South and Central Asia Many key American interests and responsibilities are found in South and Central Asia. Specifically, continuing to advance the bilateral relationship with India to mutual benefit is a crucial objective for U.S. policy. India plays a crucial role in countering the Chinese threat and securing a free and open Indo–Pacific. It is a critical security guarantor for the key routes of air and sea travel linking East and West and an important emerging U.S. economic partner. For instance, the 2019 Department of Defense Indo–Pacific Strategy Report noted that the Indian Ocean area “is at the nexus of global trade and commerce, with nearly half of the world’s 90,000 commercial vessels and two thirds of global oil trade traveling through its sea lanes. The region boasts some of the fastest-growing economies on Earth.”14 Meanwhile, the threat of transnational terrorism remains acute. The humiliat- ing withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan after a 20-year military campaign has created new challenges. It has provided an opportunity to reset the deeply troubled U.S.–Pakistan relationship and reassess U.S. counterterrorism strategy in the region. The long-standing India–Pakistan rivalry and tensions regarding the disputed territory of Kashmir continue to pose risks to regional stability, especially because both countries are nuclear powers. The State Department’s role in strengthening the regional security and eco- nomic framework linking the U.S and India is crucial. In addition, the department has important functional responsibilities in dealing with a range of threats from nuclear proliferation to transnational proliferation. While American statecraft should also seek to improve bilateral relations throughout the region, U.S. policy must be clear-eyed and realistic about the perfidiousness of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and the military–political rule in Pakistan. There can be no expecta- tion of normal relations with either. — 189 — Department of State The priority for statecraft is advancing the U.S.–Indian role as a cornerstone of the Quad, a cooperative framework including the U.S., India, Japan, and Aus- tralia. The Quad is comprised of the key nations in coordinating efforts for a free and open Indo–Pacific. It is an overarching group that nests the key U.S. bilateral and trilateral cooperative efforts that facilitate U.S. collaborative efforts across the Indo–Pacific. The State Department should also encourage the “Quad-Plus” concept that allows other regional powers to participate in Quad coordination on issues of mutual interest. Further, the State Department must support an inte- grated federal effort to deliver a revamped regional strategy for South Asia, as well as leading the execution of key tasks to implement the strategy.15 The Arctic Because of Alaska, the U.S. is an Arctic nation. The Arctic is a vast expanse of land and sea rich in resources including fish, minerals, and energy. For example, the region is estimated to contain 90 million barrels of oil and one-quarter of the world’s undiscovered natural gas reserves.16 The Arctic is lightly populated: Only 4 million people in the world live above the Arctic Circle, with more than half of those living in Russia. Only around 68,000 people in Alaska live above the Arctic Circle.17 However, the sheer immensity of the Alaskan Arctic means its population density is less than one person per square mile.18 The United States has several strong interests in the Arctic region. The rate of melting ice during summer months has led to increased interest not only from shipping and tourism sectors, but also from America’s global competitors, who are interested in exploiting the region’s strategic importance and accessing its bounty of natural resources. In the not-too-distant future, there will be a growing interest in the Arctic from both state and non-state actors alike. China has been open about its interest in the region, primarily as a highway for trade but also for its rich natural resources. While the PRC’s increasing intervention in Arctic affairs is a bit strained because it does not have an Arctic coastline, Russia does—and Russia has made no secret of its view that the Arctic is vital for economic and military reasons. Russia has invested heavily in new and refurbished Arctic bases and cold-weather equipment and capabilities. The north star of U.S. Arctic policy should remain national sov- ereignty, safeguarded through robust capabilities as well as through diplomatic, economic, and legal attentiveness. The next Administration should embrace the view that NATO must acknowl- edge that it is, in part, an Arctic alliance. With the likely accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO, every Arctic nation except for Russia will be a NATO member state. NATO has been slow to appreciate that the Arctic is a theater that it must defend, especially considering Russia’s brazen aggression against Ukraine. NATO must develop and implement an Arctic strategy that recognizes the importance of

Department of Commerce

Weak

Vector: 60%

Pages: 705-707AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill focuses on assessing security threats and enhancing defense cooperation with Baltic states, while the Project 2025 excerpt centers on modernizing export controls, Entity List expansions, and data transfer restrictions. Both share a concern about China and Russia as malign actors, but they address different policy domains, resulting only tangential alignment."

Key themes:China threatRussia threatnational securitymalign actors

— 673 — Department of Commerce Export Enforcement officers through improved and frequent training so they are able to detect export-control violations. EAR Revisions. The U.S. Government needs a new export control moderniza- tion effort to tighten the EAR policies governing licenses to countries of concern, including China and Russia (specifically, revise and/or reverse the 2008 through 2016 policies). When authoritarian governments explain what they plan to do, believe them unless hard evidence demonstrates otherwise. Case in point: China’s and Russia’s stated civil–military fusion policies demand central government command-and-control style systems in which every private entity serves the interests of the state and is forced to provide technology, services, capacity, and data to the central govern- ment and the military. Through this structure, commercial activities are routinely weaponized by authoritarian regimes that repeatedly identify the U.S. as an enemy. Accordingly, U.S. export control policies must be updated to reflect these realities and the associated threats to national security. Key priorities for EAR modernization for countries of concern should be: l Eliminating the “specially designed” licensing loophole; l Redesignating China and Russia to more highly prohibitive export licensing groups (country groups D or E); l Eliminating license exceptions; l Broadening foreign direct product rules; l Reducing the de minimis threshold from 25 percent to 10 percent—or 0 percent for critical technologies; l Tightening the deemed export rules to prevent technology transfer to foreign nationals from countries of concern; l Tightening the definition of “fundamental research” to address exploitation of the open U.S. university system by authoritarian governments through funding, students and researchers, and recruitment; l Eliminating license exceptions for sharing technology with controlled entities/countries through standards-setting “activities” and bodies; and l Improving regulations regarding published information for technology transfers. — 674 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise The next few years will prove or disprove the assertion that the U.S. stands on the precipice of a Cold War with China. Many believe that a Cold War has already begun; if so, then strategic decoupling from China is necessary and, fundamentally, any exports of goods, software, and technology to countries of concern, whether directly or indirectly, should be prohibited or controlled in the absence of good cause (e.g., humanitarian and medical aid, food aid). Entity List and Sanctions. There are currently just over 500 Chinese and over 500 Russian companies on the Department of Commerce’s Entity List, which reg- ulates exports of controlled and uncontrolled items to designated entities. Given China’s Civil–Military Fusion Strategy and Russia’s massive war efforts facili- tated by a broad range of the Russian economy, BIS must add more entities to the Entity List and apply a license review “policy of denial” that prohibits exports to these entities. Entity List parties that violate export controls should be placed on the BIS Denied Persons List (and thereby lose export privileges) and, if the violations are significant enough, they should also be sanctioned by the Department of Treasury. Data Transfer and Apps Used for Surveillance. Department of Commerce leadership should work across government agencies to address privacy and data concerns arising out of “big tech” from national security and export control per- spectives. In particular, they should draft and implement an executive order (EO) based on the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, which expands export control authority beyond ECRA’s scope (goods, software, technology) to regulate and restrict exports of U.S. persons’ data to countries of concern. The EO should establish a framework for the types of personal data subject to export controls and licensing policy by country, and the BIS should implement the EO through regulations. BIS should additionally designate app providers (such as WeChat and Byte Dance/TikTok) known for undermining U.S. national security through data collection, surveillance, and influence operations, to the Entity List. This listing would prevent app users from program updates, which would quickly make these apps non-operational in the United States. NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION Break Up NOAA. The single biggest Department of Commerce agency outside of decennial census years is the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, which houses the National Weather Service, National Marine Fisheries Service, and other components. NOAA garners $6.5 billion of the department’s $12 billion annual operational budget and accounts for more than half of the department’s personnel in non-decadal Census years (2021 figures). NOAA consists of six main offices: l The National Weather Service (NWS);

Intelligence Community

Weak

Vector: 60%

Pages: 257-259AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill focuses on assessing security threats to the Baltic states and enhancing defense cooperation, while the Project 2025 Intelligence Community section concerns protecting officers' cover, EU data‑privacy frameworks, and the President’s Daily Brief. Both touch on intelligence‑related threat analysis, but their primary objectives and mechanisms differ significantly."

Key themes:intelligence assessmentcyber threatsmalign actorsthreat analysis

— 225 — Intelligence Community Cover in the Digital Age. Even in the public domain, it is becoming increas- ingly clear that protecting the identities of undercover intelligence officers is difficult in the digital age.41 The truth is that as our daily activities are conducted predominantly in the digital domain, our antiquated system for providing cover to undercover officers has lagged woefully behind the threat from foreign adversaries. The DIA, CIA, and FBI are increasingly aware of this threat and are devoting resources to the problem. Their back-office infrastructure, however, is such that they are still using methods for providing cover from decades past that put valuable intelligence officers at unnecessary risk. How intelligence officers and their fami- lies are taught to use smartphones and social media, travel, conduct banking, and take and share pictures—even how and when they are paid—can make it difficult to protect identities.42 Legends, fake backstories, and identities are often weak, incomplete, and unable to stand up to a basic Google search.43 Officers operat- ing under nonofficial cover are offered even less protection and training to help them succeed. In addition, ubiquitous technical surveillance (UTS) techniques being refined by technologies emanating from the regimes in China and Russia will continue to be highly challenging for intelligence officers. An incoming Administration will need to double down on resourcing and training so that members of the IC will have the expertise they need to operate clandestinely (and successfully) against hard targets. Privacy Shield. For many years, the European Union (EU) has tried to force U.S. companies operating in Europe to follow its data privacy regulations. Misleading claims in the 2013 Snowden leaks destroyed the initial Safe Harbor Framework44 that allowed American companies to transfer data across the Atlantic; its succes- sor, the Privacy Shield Framework,45 was struck down by European courts on the grounds that it provides insufficient protections for EU citizens against hypothet- ical U.S. government surveillance. Those same European courts exempted the intelligence services of EU member states from the standards applied to the U.S., suggesting that trade protectionism may be the real motive behind data privacy regulations. In 2022, the Biden Administration negotiated a new agreement, the Trans-At- lantic Data Privacy Framework,46 intended to withstand European legal challenges. Given the fate of its predecessors, it is not certain that it will survive. Executive Order 14086, “Enhancing Safeguards for United States Signals Intelligence Activi- ties,”47 implements this new framework by attempting to align signals intelligence collection practices with European privacy regulations. At most, the executive order’s changes will be helpful support for the framework in future European litigation; at worst, they could throw sand in the gears of important intelli- gence programs. An incoming conservative President should reset Europe’s expectations. Brus- sels has always arbitraged the difference between being a military ally against, for — 226 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise example, Russia and conducting a full-blown trade conflict with the United States. Restrictions on data exports have been part of the trade conflict, but now they could seriously harm our military and intelligence capabilities. Moreover, restrictions on U.S. intelligence collection hurt the Europeans themselves, especially as the United States shares unprecedented amounts of intelligence on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine with Europeans.48 Europe is telling the United States to meet intelligence oversight standards that no European country meets. At the same time, exports of data to China are unexamined and (so far) free from legal challenges. That violates World Trade Organization agreements as an arbitrary and discriminatory data protection stan- dard. It is a betrayal by a nominally allied jurisdiction. European court rulings that struck down prior data privacy frameworks were grounded not in constitutional law but in a treaty among European nations. If the EU accepted an international agreement that data may flow to the United States under a more reasonable stan- dard than the one adopted by the court, that interpretation would be binding, at least as a gloss on the earlier treaty. The United States has never seriously pushed back against the EU; now is the time. An incoming President should ask for an immediate study of the implemen- tation of Executive Order 14086 and suspend any provisions that unduly burden intelligence collection. At the same time, in negotiations with the Europeans, the United States should make clear that the continued sharing of intelligence with EU member states depends on successful resolution of this issue within the first two years of a President’s term. It is time for a real solution, not the 30 years of stopgaps imposed by Brussels. President’s Daily Brief (PDB). An incoming conservative President should make clear what the President’s Daily Brief is and is not. The PDB should be for the President specifically, with a much narrower distribution and addressing areas of strategic concern. During the transition, the future National Security Advisor, along with the DNI, should conduct a review of current PDB recipients and deter- mine which should remain recipients when the President’s term begins. Instead of being used as the statement of record for the agencies, the PDB often misses the areas of interest for Presidents and their senior advisers. The President should want the PDB to focus on providing the information needed for the often imperfect and complex decisions that a President needs to make, which should always be based on the best intelligence that can be gathered. Where consensus and agreement are possible, an IC-coordinated product is excellent, but insights provided by properly channeled dissent can lead a President to ask relevant ques- tions of his DNI and IC. A future DNI determines the PDB briefer based on recommendations made by the Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Mission Integration (MI). His- torically, briefers have come from the CIA, but a future President and DNI should

Showing 3 of 5 policy matches

About These Correlations

Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.

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