Passenger Rail Liability Adjustment Act of 2025

— 640 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise ENDNOTES 1. U.S. Department of Transportation, 2023 Budget Highlights, p. 1, https://www.transportation.gov/sites/dot. gov/files/2022-03/Budget_Highlights_FY2023.pdf (accessed March 3, 2023). 2. U.S. Department of Transportation, DEIA [Diversity, Equity, Inclusion, and Accessibility] Strategic Plan FY22– FY26, p. 2, https://www.transportation.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/2022-09/DOT%20DEIA%20Strategic%20Plan. pdf (accessed March 3, 2023). 3. 23 U.S. Code §§ 601–609, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/23 (accessed March 3, 2023). 4. U.S. Department of Transportation, Office of the Secretary, “Administrative Rulemaking, Guidance, and Enforcement Procedures,” Final Rule, Federal Register, Vol. 84, No. 248 (December 27, 2019), pp. 71714–71734, https://www.transportation.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/docs/regulations/361831/fed-reg-published-final-admin- rule.pdf (accessed March 3, 2023). 5. U.S. Department of Transportation, Build America Bureau, “About the Build America Bureau,” last updated October 24, 2022, https://www.transportation.gov/buildamerica/about (accessed March 3, 2023). 6. S. 622, Energy Policy and Conservation Act, Public Law No. 94-163, 94th Congress, December 22, 1995, https:// www.congress.gov/94/statute/STATUTE-89/STATUTE-89-Pg871.pdf (accessed March 3, 2023). 7. 42 U.S. Code Chapter 85, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/chapter-85 (accessed March 3, 2023). 8. U.S. Department of Transportation, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, “Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards for Model Years 2024–2026 Passenger Cars and Light Trucks,” Final Rule, Federal Register, Vol. 87, No. 84 (May 2, 2022), pp. 25710–26092, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2022-05- 02/pdf/2022-07200.pdf (accessed March 10, 2023). 9. U.S. Department of Transportation, Office of the Secretary, “Defining Unfair or Deceptive Practices,” Final Rule, Federal Register, Vol. 85, No. 235 (December 7, 2020), pp. 78707–78718, https://www.transportation.gov/ sites/dot.gov/files/2020-12/Defining%20Unfair%20or%20Deceptive%20Practices%20Final%20Rule%20-%20 85%20FR%2078707.pdf (accessed March 3, 2023). 10. U.S. Department of Transportation, Office of the Secretary, “Procedures in Regulating Unfair or Deceptive Practices,” Final Rule, Federal Register, Vol. 87, No. 22 (February 2, 2022), pp. 5655–5659, https://www. govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2022-02-02/pdf/2022-01589.pdf (accessed March 3, 2023). 11. U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration, Budget Estimates Fiscal Year 2023, p. 1, https://www.transportation.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/2022-04/FAA_Budget_Estimates_FY2023.pdf (accessed March 3, 2023). 12. Robert W. Poole, Jr., Organization and Innovation in Air Traffic Control, Hudson Institute Initiative on Future Innovation, November 2013, https://www.hudson.org/sites/default/files/researchattachments/ attachment/1199/poole_hi_res.pdf (accessed March 3, 2023). Also published subsequently as Reason Foundation Policy Study No. 431, January 2014, https://reason.org/wp-content/uploads/files/air_traffic_ control_organization_innovation.pdf (accessed March 3, 2023). 13. H.R. 3684, Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, Public Law No. 117-58, 117th Congress, November 15, 2021, https://www.congress.gov/117/plaws/publ58/PLAW-117publ58.pdf (accessed March 3, 2023). 14. S. 6, Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964, Public Law 88-365, 88th Congress, July 9, 1964, https://www. govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-78/pdf/STATUTE-78-Pg302-2.pdf (accessed March 3, 2023). 15. U.S. Department of Transportation, Maritime Administration, “About Us,” last updated March 23, 2022, https:// www.maritime.dot.gov/about-us (accessed March 4, 2023). 16. H.R. 10378, Merchant Marine Act of 1920, Public Law 66-261, 66th Congress, June 5, 1920, https://govtrackus. s3.amazonaws.com/legislink/pdf/stat/41/STATUTE-41-Pg988.pdf (accessed March 3, 2023). — 641 — 20 DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS Brooks D. Tucker MISSION STATEMENT The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) is the primary provider of health care, benefits, and memorial affairs for America’s veterans and their families. The VA has the noble responsibility to render exceptional and timely support and services with respect, compassion, and competence. The veteran is at the forefront of every VA process and interaction. The VA must continually strive to be recognized as a “best in class,” “Veteran-centric”1 system with an organizational ethos inspired by and accountable to the needs and problems of veterans, not subservient to the parochial preferences of a bureaucracy. OVERVIEW At the end of the Obama Administration, the VA was held in low esteem both by the veterans it served and by the employees who served these former warriors. Eroding morale caused by the downstream effects of a health care access crisis in 2014 led to the resignation of Secretary Eric Shinseki and extensive oversight investigations by Congress from 2015–2016. By 2020, however, the VA had become one of the most respected U.S. agencies. This significant progress was due in part to the leadership of Secretary Robert Wilkie (2018–2021) and his team of political appointees and career senior executives, many of them veterans, who led the effort to ensure that the VA became “Veteran-centric” in its governance decisions and fostered a more positive work environment. This mindset translated into a department that was better attuned to employees’ and veterans’ needs and experiences in the daily operations of health care, benefits,

— 640 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise ENDNOTES 1. U.S. Department of Transportation, 2023 Budget Highlights, p. 1, https://www.transportation.gov/sites/dot. gov/files/2022-03/Budget_Highlights_FY2023.pdf (accessed March 3, 2023). 2. U.S. Department of Transportation, DEIA [Diversity, Equity, Inclusion, and Accessibility] Strategic Plan FY22– FY26, p. 2, https://www.transportation.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/2022-09/DOT%20DEIA%20Strategic%20Plan. pdf (accessed March 3, 2023). 3. 23 U.S. Code §§ 601–609, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/23 (accessed March 3, 2023). 4. U.S. Department of Transportation, Office of the Secretary, “Administrative Rulemaking, Guidance, and Enforcement Procedures,” Final Rule, Federal Register, Vol. 84, No. 248 (December 27, 2019), pp. 71714–71734, https://www.transportation.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/docs/regulations/361831/fed-reg-published-final-admin- rule.pdf (accessed March 3, 2023). 5. U.S. Department of Transportation, Build America Bureau, “About the Build America Bureau,” last updated October 24, 2022, https://www.transportation.gov/buildamerica/about (accessed March 3, 2023). 6. S. 622, Energy Policy and Conservation Act, Public Law No. 94-163, 94th Congress, December 22, 1995, https:// www.congress.gov/94/statute/STATUTE-89/STATUTE-89-Pg871.pdf (accessed March 3, 2023). 7. 42 U.S. Code Chapter 85, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/chapter-85 (accessed March 3, 2023). 8. U.S. Department of Transportation, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, “Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards for Model Years 2024–2026 Passenger Cars and Light Trucks,” Final Rule, Federal Register, Vol. 87, No. 84 (May 2, 2022), pp. 25710–26092, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2022-05- 02/pdf/2022-07200.pdf (accessed March 10, 2023). 9. U.S. Department of Transportation, Office of the Secretary, “Defining Unfair or Deceptive Practices,” Final Rule, Federal Register, Vol. 85, No. 235 (December 7, 2020), pp. 78707–78718, https://www.transportation.gov/ sites/dot.gov/files/2020-12/Defining%20Unfair%20or%20Deceptive%20Practices%20Final%20Rule%20-%20 85%20FR%2078707.pdf (accessed March 3, 2023). 10. U.S. Department of Transportation, Office of the Secretary, “Procedures in Regulating Unfair or Deceptive Practices,” Final Rule, Federal Register, Vol. 87, No. 22 (February 2, 2022), pp. 5655–5659, https://www. govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2022-02-02/pdf/2022-01589.pdf (accessed March 3, 2023). 11. U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration, Budget Estimates Fiscal Year 2023, p. 1, https://www.transportation.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/2022-04/FAA_Budget_Estimates_FY2023.pdf (accessed March 3, 2023). 12. Robert W. Poole, Jr., Organization and Innovation in Air Traffic Control, Hudson Institute Initiative on Future Innovation, November 2013, https://www.hudson.org/sites/default/files/researchattachments/ attachment/1199/poole_hi_res.pdf (accessed March 3, 2023). Also published subsequently as Reason Foundation Policy Study No. 431, January 2014, https://reason.org/wp-content/uploads/files/air_traffic_ control_organization_innovation.pdf (accessed March 3, 2023). 13. H.R. 3684, Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, Public Law No. 117-58, 117th Congress, November 15, 2021, https://www.congress.gov/117/plaws/publ58/PLAW-117publ58.pdf (accessed March 3, 2023). 14. S. 6, Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964, Public Law 88-365, 88th Congress, July 9, 1964, https://www. govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-78/pdf/STATUTE-78-Pg302-2.pdf (accessed March 3, 2023). 15. U.S. Department of Transportation, Maritime Administration, “About Us,” last updated March 23, 2022, https:// www.maritime.dot.gov/about-us (accessed March 4, 2023). 16. H.R. 10378, Merchant Marine Act of 1920, Public Law 66-261, 66th Congress, June 5, 1920, https://govtrackus. s3.amazonaws.com/legislink/pdf/stat/41/STATUTE-41-Pg988.pdf (accessed March 3, 2023).

— 635 — Department of Transportation commutes from urban buses to rideshare or electric scooter, the use of public transit decreases. A better definition for public transit (which also would require congressional legislation) would be transit provided for the public rather than transit provided by a public municipality. The COVID-19 pandemic caused a substantial decline in usage for all forms of transportation. Mass transit has been the slowest mode to recover, with October 2022 ridership reaching only 64 percent of the level seen in October 2019. The sustained increase in remote work has caused changes in commuting patterns. Since facilitating travel for workers is one of the core functions of mass transit systems, a permanent reduction in commuting raises questions about the viability of fixed-route mass transit, especially considering that transit systems required substantial subsidization before the pandemic. Regrettably, the 2021 Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act13 authorized tens of billions of dollars for the expansion of transit systems even as Americans were moving away from them and into personal vehicles. Lower revenue from reduced ridership is already driving transit agencies to a budgetary breaking point, and added operational costs from system expansions will make this problem worse. The Capital Investment Grants (CIG) program is another example of Washing- ton’s tendency to fund transit expansion rather than maintaining or improving current facilities. The CIG program, which began in 1991, funds only novel transit projects. These can include new rail lines (regardless of the demand for preexisting rail in the area) and costly operations such as streetcars. Because Americans have demonstrated a strong preference for alternative means of transportation, rather than throwing good money after bad by continuing federal subsidies for transit expansion, there should be a focus on reducing costs that make transit uneconomical. The Trump Administration urged Congress to eliminate the CIG program, but the program has strong support on Capitol Hill. At a minimum, a new conservative Administration should ensure that each CIG project meets sound economic standards and a rigorous cost-benefit analysis. The largest expense in transit operational budgets is labor. Compensation costs for transit workers exceed both regional and sector compensation averages. This is driven by generous pension and health benefits rather than by exorbitant wages. Since workers value wages more than they value fringe benefits, this has led to a perverse situation in which transit agencies have high compensation costs yet are struggling to attract workers. The next Administration can remove the largest obstacle to reforming labor costs. Section 10(c) of the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 196414 was initially intended to protect bargaining rights for workers in privately owned transit sys- tems that were being absorbed by government-operated agencies. The provision has mutated into a requirement that any transit agency receiving federal funds cannot reduce compensation, an interpretation that far exceeds the original statute. — 636 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise Returning to the original intent would allow transit agencies to adjust fringe ben- efits without fearing a federal lawsuit. It is also vital to move away from using the Highway Trust Fund to prop up mass transit. The fund was driven into insolvency (and repeated bailouts) through decades of transfers to transit without any increase in transit usage to show for it. With the federal government facing mounting debt, the best course of action would be to remove federal subsidies for transit spending, allowing states and localities to decide whether mass transit is a good investment for them. FEDERAL RAILROAD POLICY The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) is making decisions based on political considerations that are at variance with its safety mission. Instead of basing regulatory decisions on the costs and benefits of the available alterna- tives, FRA is promoting actions that favor the status quo and inhibit the use of technology to improve railroad safety. FRA should be making decisions based on objective evidence of the most cost-effective way to accomplish the agency’s safety goals. FRA’s singular focus on job preservation is contrary to FRA’s mission, and it has a deleterious effect on the morale of FRA’s professional staff, as shown by the annual employee surveys conducted by the Office of Personnel Management. FRA needs to communicate clearly to its career employees a new commitment to making decisions that are consistent with the agency’s safety mission. FRA’s procedures call for decisions on waivers to be made by its Safety Board. Appeals can be taken to the Administrator. However, FRA has deviated from these procedures as the Administrator has injected himself into Safety Board decisions. FRA needs to review its actions with respect to specific proceedings where the agency’s direction cannot be justified. For example: l FRA’s Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) on crew size is not based on safety considerations; it is designed to reduce flexibility by making it impossible for railroads to operate with crews of fewer than two in circumstances where there is no operational need for the second crew member. l Although FRA could adopt a modern inspection program that takes advantage of technological ways to inspect track, it is refusing to amend 50-year-old track inspection requirements, leaving customers with higher costs. l FRA is refusing to take final action on a rulemaking proceeding that would modernize brake inspection requirements by taking advantage of the ability