Combatting Money Laundering in Cyber Crime Act of 2025

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Bill ID: 119/hr/5877
Last Updated: July 22, 2026

Sponsored by

Rep. Fitzgerald, Scott [R-WI-5]

ID: F000471

Follow the money

The bill

Combatting Money Laundering in Cyber Crime Act of 2025

HR. 5877, 119th Congress — read as touching Crypto & Fintech.

The sponsor

Rep. Fitzgerald, Scott [R-WI-5]

Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.

The money

$122,400 raised

20 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.

The alignment

85% match to Project 2025

This bill's text tracks the "Department of Homeland Security" section, p. 201-204 of the Mandate for Leadership.

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

Track this bill's progress through the legislative process

Latest Action

Placed on the Union Calendar, Calendar No. 530.

April 14, 2026

Introduced

📍 Current Status

Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.

🏛️

Committee Review

🗳️

Floor Action

✅

Passed House

🏛️

Senate Review

🎉

Passed Congress

🖊️

Presidential Action

⚖️

Became Law

📚 How does a bill become a law?

1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.

2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

Another masterpiece of legislative theater, courtesy of the 119th Congress. Let's dissect this farce, shall we?

**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The Combatting Money Laundering in Cyber Crime Act of 2025 is a laughable attempt to strengthen the United States Secret Service's authority to investigate cyber crimes related to digital asset transactions. Because, you know, the Secret Service was just twiddling its thumbs, waiting for Congress to give them permission to do their job.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill expands the Secret Service's investigative authorities to include money laundering, structured transactions, and fraud against financial institutions. Oh, wow, what a bold move. It also amends various sections of title 18 and 31 of the United States Code, because who doesn't love a good game of legislative Jenga? The changes are about as substantial as a placebo pill – they might make you feel better, but they won't actually cure the disease.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The usual suspects: financial institutions, law enforcement agencies, and cyber criminals. But let's be real, the only ones who will truly benefit from this bill are the politicians who get to tout it as a "tough on crime" measure, and the lobbyists who will use it to line their pockets with cash.

**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill is a classic case of legislative lip service. It's a Band-Aid on a bullet wound, a token effort to address the symptoms of cyber crime without actually treating the underlying disease. The real impact will be minimal, but it will provide a nice soundbite for politicians to use during their re-election campaigns. Meanwhile, cyber criminals will just find new ways to evade detection, and financial institutions will continue to prioritize profits over security.

In conclusion, this bill is a joke, a pathetic attempt to appear tough on crime without actually doing anything meaningful. It's a testament to the incompetence of our lawmakers and the gullibility of the American public. So, let's all just take a deep breath, pretend to be impressed, and wait for the next iteration of legislative theater to begin.

Related Topics

Cybersecurity & Data PrivacyCriminal Justice & Law EnforcementBanking & Financial Services
Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (Dr. Haus personality)

💰 Campaign Finance Network

Rep. Fitzgerald, Scott [R-WI-5]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions
$122,400
19 donors
PACs
$0
Organizations
$0
Committees
$0
Individuals
$122,400

No PAC contributions found

No organization contributions found

No committee contributions found

1
SHAFFER, JOHN E
2 transactions
$10,000
2
HENDRICKS, DIANE M
1 transaction
$6,600
3
ROWAN, CAROLYN
1 transaction
$6,600
4
ROWAN, MARC J.
1 transaction
$6,600
5
SCHWARZMAN, STEPHEN
1 transaction
$6,600
6
SCHMIDT, TIM
1 transaction
$6,600
7
SCHWARZMAN, CHRISTINE
1 transaction
$6,600
8
LEVY, EDWARD
1 transaction
$6,600
9
FOREST COUNTY POTAWATOMI COMMU, .
1 transaction
$6,600
10
FISHER, SHERRILYN
1 transaction
$6,600
11
FISHER, KENNETH
1 transaction
$6,600
12
FRYE, NATALIE
1 transaction
$6,600
13
UIHLEIN, ELIZABETH A
1 transaction
$6,600
14
UIHLEIN, RICHARD
1 transaction
$6,600
15
TRUNZO, ANNE
1 transaction
$5,800
16
HOLLFELDER, BEA M
1 transaction
$5,800
17
SCHWERTFEGER, RUTH
1 transaction
$5,000
18
SCHWERTFEGER, FREDERICK F
1 transaction
$5,000
19
WALL, TERRENCE R
1 transaction
$5,000

Cosponsors & Their Campaign Finance

This bill has 3 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.

Rep. Pettersen, Brittany [D-CO-7]

ID: P000620

Top Contributors

10

1
HABEMATOLEL POMO OF UPPER LAKE TRIBE OF CALIFORNIA
OrganizationUPPER LAKE, CA
$3,300
Mar 31, 2023
2
HABEMATOLEL POMO OF UPPER LAKE TRIBE OF CALIFORNIA
OrganizationUPPER LAKE, CA
$3,300
Mar 31, 2023
3
OTOE-MISSOURIA TRIBE OF OKLAHOMA
OrganizationRED ROCK, OK
$3,300
Mar 31, 2023
4
OTOE-MISSOURIA TRIBE OF OKLAHOMA
OrganizationRED ROCK, OK
$3,300
Mar 31, 2023
5
TURTLE MOUNTAIN BAND OF CHIPPEWA OF NORTH DAKOTA
OrganizationBELCOURT, ND
$3,300
Mar 31, 2023
6
TURTLE MOUNTAIN BAND OF CHIPPEWA OF NORTH DAKOTA
OrganizationBELCOURT, ND
$3,300
Jun 10, 2024
7
EASTERN BAND OF CHEROKEE INDIANS
OrganizationCHEROKEE, NC
$3,300
Oct 16, 2024
8
THE CHICKASAW NATION
OrganizationADA, OK
$2,300
Dec 21, 2023
9
BGR GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS, LLC
OrganizationWASHINGTON, DC
$1,000
Oct 12, 2023
10
THE CHICKASAW NATION
OrganizationADA, OK
$1,000
May 22, 2023

Rep. Nunn, Zachary [R-IA-3]

ID: N000193

Top Contributors

10

1
OTOE MISSOURIA TRIBE OF OKLAHOMA
OrganizationRED ROCK, OK
$3,300
May 29, 2024
2
TURTLE MOUNTAIN BAND OF CHIPPEWA OF ND
OrganizationBELCOURT, ND
$3,300
May 29, 2024
3
SAC & FOX TRIBE OF THE MISSISSIPPI IN IOWA
OrganizationTAMA, IA
$2,500
Dec 31, 2024
4
SAC & FOX TRIBE OF THE MISSISSIPPI IN IOWA
OrganizationTAMA, IA
$1,000
Sep 1, 2023
5
SMITH, JOHN M.
CRST TRUCKING • CEO
IndividualCEDAR RAPIDS, IA
$6,600
Oct 28, 2024
6
SILVERMAN, JEFFREY
RETIRED • RETIRED
IndividualBAL HARBOUR, FL
$6,600
Oct 17, 2023
7
EMMET, RICHARD
JANE STREET CAPITAL • FINANCE
IndividualLARCHMONT, NY
$6,600
Nov 21, 2023
8
WEEKLEY, RICHARD W.
SELF EMPLOYED • REAL ESTATE DEVELOPER
IndividualHOUSTON, TX
$6,600
Nov 7, 2023
9
STERN, ELIZABETH
RETIRED • RETIRED
IndividualSCARSDALE, NY
$6,600
Dec 6, 2023
10
SILVERMAN, JEFFREY
RETIRED • RETIRED
IndividualBAL HARBOUR, FL
$6,600
Feb 15, 2024

Rep. Sherman, Brad [D-CA-32]

ID: S000344

Top Contributors

10

1
MORONGO BAND OF MISSION INDIANS NATIVE AMERICAN RIGHTS FUND
OrganizationBANNING, CA
$2,000
Oct 30, 2023
2
MS BAND OF CHOCTAW INDIANS
OrganizationCHOCTAW, MS
$2,000
Oct 5, 2023
3
SANTA YNEZ BAND OF MISSION INDIANS
OrganizationSANTA YNEZ, CA
$2,000
Sep 30, 2024
4
SANTA YNEZ BAND OF MISSION INDIANS
OrganizationSANTA YNEZ, CA
$1,300
Oct 21, 2024
5
BARONA BAND OF MISSION INDIANS
OrganizationLAKESIDE, CA
$1,000
Oct 28, 2024
6
SANTA YNEZ BAND OF MISSION INDIANS
OrganizationSANTA YNEZ, CA
$700
Oct 21, 2024
7
AHMED, TAIMOOR
MARKHOR LOGISTICS • CEO
IndividualSACRAMENTO, CA
$3,300
Mar 30, 2023
8
GARHWAL, HARI
GARHWAL, CHAN & WILLIAMS • CPA
IndividualSAN FRANCISCO, CA
$3,300
Mar 23, 2023
9
GARHWAL, HARI
GARHWAL, CHAN & WILLIAMS • CPA
IndividualSAN FRANCISCO, CA
$3,300
Mar 23, 2023
10
GARHWAL, SANJEEV
WWMG • PHYSICIAN
IndividualSEATTLE, WA
$3,300
Mar 29, 2023

Donor Network - Rep. Fitzgerald, Scott [R-WI-5]

PACs
Organizations
Individuals
Politicians

Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.

Loading...

Showing 51 nodes and 29 connections (37 secondary connections hidden)

Total contributions: $147,400

Top Donors - Rep. Fitzgerald, Scott [R-WI-5]

Showing top 19 donors by contribution amount

19 Individuals

Industry Impact

Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 1 helped, 2 harmed.

  • −Crypto & Fintechconfidence 0.90

    Section 2 expands Secret Service authority to investigate crimes related to digital asset transactions, including unlicensed money transmitting businesses and structured transactions, which directly targets crypto and fintech activities, imposing regulatory/enforcement costs.

  • +Commercial Banksconfidence 0.85

    Section 2 enhances Secret Service authority to investigate fraud against financial institutions, which benefits commercial banks by improving fraud detection and deterrence, providing a clear benefit.

  • Section 3 extends the retention period for FinCEN Exchange data from 5 to 10 years, increasing data storage and compliance burdens for AI/cloud infrastructure providers that handle financial data, imposing a cost.

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.

Department of Homeland Security

Strong
Vector: 63%
Pages: 201-204AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"HR 5877 aligns with Project 2025's focus on strengthening the Department of Homeland Security's role in combating transnational crime, particularly by expanding the Secret Service's authority to investigate digital asset-related money laundering and cybercrime, which supports DHS's broader mission of securing financial systems and national security."

Key themes:Secret Service authority expansiondigital asset regulationanti-money launderingtransnational cybercrimefinancial institution oversight

— 168 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise ENDNOTES 1. H.R. 5005, Homeland Security Act of 2002, Public Law No. 107-296, 107th Congress, November 25, 2002, § 101(b)(1), https://www.congress.gov/107/plaws/publ296/PLAW-107publ296.pdf (accessed March 14, 2023). 2. See, for example, “Elon Musk Slams CISA Censorship Network as ‘Propaganda Platform,’” Kanekoa News, December 28, 2022, https://kanekoa.substack.com/p/elon-musk-slams-cisa-censorship-network (accessed March 14, 2023). 3. H.R. 2680, An Act to Amend the Immigration and Nationality Act, and for Other Purposes, Public Law No. 89-236, 89th Congress, October 3, 1965, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-79/pdf/STATUTE-79- Pg911.pdf (accessed March 14, 2023). 4. Added to the Immigration and Nationality Act by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996. See H.R. 3610, Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997, Public Law No. 104-208, 104th Congress, September 30, 1996, Division C, https://www.congress.gov/104/plaws/publ208/ PLAW-104publ208.pdf (accessed March 14, 2023). 5. 8 U.S. Code, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/8 (accessed March 14, 2023). 6. 18 U.S. Code, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18 (accessed March 14, 2023). 7. 5 U.S. Code §§ 551–559, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/part-I/chapter-5/subchapter-II (accessed March 14, 2023). 8. Table, “United States Citizenship and Immigration Services Budget Comparison and Adjustments Appropriation and PPA Summary,” in U.S. Department of Homeland Security, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, Department of Homeland Security, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, Budget Overview, Fiscal Year 2023 Congressional Justification, p. CIS-4, https://www.uscis.gov/ sites/default/files/document/reports/U.S._Citizenship_and_Immigration_Services%E2%80%99_Budget_ Overview_Document_for%20Fiscal_Year_2023.pdf#:~:text=The%20FY%202023%20Budget%20includes%20 %24913.6M%2C%204%2C001%20positions%3B,of%20%24444.1M%20above%20the%20FY%202022%20 President%E2%80%99s%20Budget (accessed March 14, 2023), and Table, “United States Citizenship and Immigration Services Comparison of Budget Authority and Request,” in ibid., p. CIS-5. 9. H.R. 7311, William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008, Public Law No. 110-457, 110th Congress, December 23, 2008, § 235, https://www.congress.gov/110/plaws/publ457/PLAW- 110publ457.pdf (accessed March 15, 2023). 10. Matter of A-B-, Respondent, 27 I&N Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1070866/ download (accessed January 18, 2023). 11. Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387 (2012), https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/567/387/ (accessed January 18, 2023). 12. Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act [Public Law 93–288; Approved May 22, 1974] [As Amended Through P.L. 117–328, Enacted December 29, 2022], https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/ COMPS-2977/pdf/COMPS-2977.pdf (accessed March 15, 2023). 13. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Budget Overview, Fiscal Year 2023 Congressional Justification, p. FEMA-24, https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2022-03/Federal%20Emergency%20 Management%20Agency_Remediated.pdf (accessed March 15, 2023). 14. Report, United States Secret Service: An Agency in Crisis, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, U.S. House of Representatives, 114th Congress, December 9, 2015, https://republicans-oversight.house.gov/ wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Oversight-USSS-Report.pdf (accessed January 18, 2023). 15. 5 U.S. Code § 7103, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/7103 (accessed March 15, 2023). 16. S. 3418, Privacy Act of 1974, Public Law No. 93-579, 93rd Congress, December 31, 1974, https://www.govinfo. gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-88/pdf/STATUTE-88-Pg1896.pdf (accessed March 15, 2023). 17. H.R. 1428, Judicial Redress Act of 2015, Public Law No. 114-126, 114th Congress, February 24, 2016, https://www. congress.gov/114/plaws/publ126/PLAW-114publ126.pdf (accessed March 15, 2023). 18. H.R. 1158, Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020, Public Law No. 116-93, 116th Congress, December 20, 2019, https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/1158 (accessed January 18, 2023). — 169 — Department of Homeland Security 19. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General, Management Directive No. 0810.1, June 10, 2004, https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/foia/mgmt_directive_0810_1_the_office_of_inspector_general. pdf (accessed March 15, 2023). 20. H.R. 5005, Homeland Security Act of 2002, Public Law No. 107-296, 107th Congress, November 25, 2002, https://www.congress.gov/bill/107th-congress/house-bill/5005 (accessed January 18, 2023).

Intelligence Community

Moderate
Vector: 64%
Pages: 266-268AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill targets cyber-enabled money laundering and strengthens law enforcement tools, which overlaps with the Intelligence Community's interest in illicit finance threats and transnational cyber crime, but it does not directly modify IC authorities, oversight, or analytic functions."

Key themes:cyber crimemoney launderingillicit financetransnational threatsfinancial intelligence

— 233 — Intelligence Community 19. Michael E. DeVine, “Covert Action and Clandestine Activities of the Intelligence Community: Selected Definitions,” Congressional Research Service Report for Members and Committees of Congress No. R45175, updated November 29, 2022, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/intel/R45175.pdf (accessed February 24, 2023). 20. H.R. 2663, Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, Public Law No. 81-110, 81st Congress, June 20, 1949, https:// govtrackus.s3.amazonaws.com/legislink/pdf/stat/63/STATUTE-63-Pg208.pdf (accessed March 6, 2023). 21. Nicole Ogrysko, “Intelligence Community Workforce Is More Diverse, but Still Struggles with Retention and Promotion,” Federal News Network, October 27, 2021, https://federalnewsnetwork.com/workforce/2021/10/ intelligence-community-workforce-is-more-diverse-but-still-struggles-with-retention-and-promotion/ (accessed March 18, 2023). 22. See James J. Wirtz, “The Intelligence Policy Nexus,” in Loch K. Johnson, ed., Strategic Intelligence, Volume 1: Understanding the Hidden Side of Government (Westport, CT: Prager, 2007), and Richard K. Betts, “Analysis, War, and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures Are Inevitable,” World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 1 (October 1978), pp. 61–89. 23. Letter from Barry A. Zulauf, IC Analytic Ombudsman, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, to Senator Marco Rubio, Acting Chairman, and Senator Mark Warner, Vice Chairman, Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. Senate, “RE: SSCI #2020-3029,” January 6, 2021, https://int.nyt.com/data/documenttools/ ic-ombudsman-election-interference-with-responses/c50e548011fd6168/full.pdf (accessed March 14, 2023). 24. Joshua Rovner, Fixing the Facts: National Security and the Politics of Intelligence (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011), pp. 30–31. 25. Joshua Rovner, “Is Politicization Ever a Good Thing?” Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 28, No. 1 (2013), p. 58. 26. S. 1566, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Public Law No. 95-511, 95th Congress, October 25, 1978, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-92/pdf/STATUTE-92-Pg1783.pdf (accessed March 6, 2023). 27. The Cipher Brief, “702 Reauthorization: Defending a Key Intelligence Tool,” remarks of Benjamin Powell, former General Counsel to the Director of National Intelligence, stating that FISA 702 provides “between 40 and 60 percent” of the intelligence in the PDB, December 18, 2017, https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=mRJ09GHVRFk&ab_channel=TheCipherBrief (accessed March 18, 2023). 28. An intelligence alliance that includes Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, National Counterintelligence and Security Center, “Five Eyes Intelligence Oversight and Review Council (FIORC),” https://www.dni.gov/index.php/ncsc-how-we- work/217-about/organization/icig-pages/2660-icig-fiorc (accessed March 10, 2023). 29. Porter, “Seven Questions the Next President Will Need the Intelligence Community to Answer to Win the Technology Competition with China.” 30. H.R. 1591, An Act to Require the Registration of Certain Persons Employed by Agencies to Disseminate Propaganda in the United States and for Other Purposes, Public Law No. 75-583, 75th Congress, June 8, 1938, https://govtrackus.s3.amazonaws.com/legislink/pdf/stat/52/STATUTE-52-Pg631.pdf (accessed March 6, 2023). 31. Kristina Wong, “Exclusive: Former DNI John Ratcliffe Pleased CIA Following His Lead on China Threat,” Breitbart, October 13, 2021, https://www.breitbart.com/politics/2021/10/13/exclusive-john-ratcliffe-pleased- cia-following-lead-china-threat/ (accessed March 11, 2023). 32. H.R. 4628, Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, Public Law No. 107-306, 107th Congress, November 27, 2002, Title IX, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-116/pdf/STATUTE-116-Pg2383.pdf (accessed March 6, 2023). 33. President George W. Bush, Executive Order 13354, “National Counterterrorism Center,” August 27, 2004, in Federal Register, Vol. 69, No. 169 (September 1, 2004), pp. 53589–53592, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/ pkg/FR-2004-09-01/pdf/04-20050.pdf (accessed March 6, 2023). 34. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, National Counterintelligence and Security Center, “Who We Are: History of NCSC,” https://www.dni.gov/index.php/ncsc-who-we-are/ncsc-history (accessed March 11, 2023). 35. Gregory F. Treverton and C. Bryan Gabbard, Assessing the Tradecraft of Intelligence Analysis, RAND Corporation, National Security Research Division Technical Report, 2008, p. 6, https://www.rand.org/pubs/ technical_reports/TR293.html (accessed March 1, 2023). — 234 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise 36. Letter from Barry A. Zulauf, IC Analytic Ombudsman, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, to Senator Marco Rubio, Acting Chairman, and Senator Mark Warner, Vice Chairman, Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. Senate, “RE: SSCI #2020-3029,” January 6, 2021, https://int.nyt.com/data/documenttools/ ic-ombudsman-election-interference-with-responses/c50e548011fd6168/full.pdf (accessed March 6, 2023). 37. “Independent IC Analytic Ombudsman’s [Report] on Politicization of Intelligence,” attached to January 6, 2021, Zulauf letter. 38. President Barack Obama, Executive Order 13526, “Classified National Security Information,” December 29, 2009, in Federal Register, Vol. 75, No. 2 (January 5, 2010), pp. 707–731, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/ FR-2010-01-05/pdf/E9-31418.pdf (accessed March 7, 2023). 39. President Barack Obama, Executive Order 13556, “Controlled Classified Information,” November 4, 2010, in Federal Register, Vol. 75, No. 216 (November 9, 2010), pp. 68675–68677, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/ pkg/FR-2010-11-09/pdf/2010-28360.pdf (accessed March 7, 2023). 40. Agathe Demarais, “How the U.S.–Chinese Technology War Is Changing the World,” Foreign Policy, November 19, 2022, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/11/19/demarais-backfire-sanctions-us-china-technology-war- semiconductors-export-controls-biden/ (accessed February 28, 2023). 41. Scott Stewart, “The Risk to Undercover Operatives in the Digital Age,” Stratfor Worldview, October 29, 2015, https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/risk-undercover-operatives-digital-age (accessed February 24, 2023). 42. Lauren Pitruzzello, “Human Intelligence: Former CIA Officer Talks About Espionage in the Digital Age, University of Delaware UDaily, March 22, 2012, https://www1.udel.edu/udaily/2012/mar/global-agenda- grenier-032212.html (accessed February 24, 2023). 43. Jenna McLaughlin and Zach Dorfman, “‘Shattered’: Inside the Secret Battle to Save America’s Undercover Spies in the Digital Age,” Yahoo News, December 30, 2019, https://news.yahoo.com/shattered-inside- the-secret-battle-to-save-americas-undercover-spies-in-the-digital-age-100029026.html (accessed February 24, 2023). 44. U.S. Federal Trade Commission, “U.S.–Safe Harbor Framework,” https://www.ftc.gov/business-guidance/ privacy-security/us-eu-safe-harbor-framework (accessed March 11, 2023). 45. “Fact Sheet: Overview of the EU–U.S. Privacy Shield Network,” U.S. Department of Commerce, https://2014-2017.commerce.gov/sites/commerce.gov/files/media/files/2016/eu-us_privacy_shield_fact_ sheet.pdf (accessed March 11, 2023). 46. “Fact Sheet: United States and European Commission Announce Trans-Atlantic Data Privacy Framework,” The White House, March 25, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/03/25/ fact-sheet-united-states-and-european-commission-announce-trans-atlantic-data-privacy-framework/ (accessed March 11, 2023). 47. President Joseph R. Biden Jr., Executive Order 14086, “Enhancing Safeguards for United States Signals Intelligence Activities,” October 7, 2022, in Federal Register, Vol. 87, No. 198 (October 14, 2022), pp. 62283– 62297, (accessed March 7, 2023). 48. Warren P. Strobel, “Release of Ukraine Intelligence Represents New Front in U.S. Information War with Russia,” The Wall Street Journal, updated April 4, 2022, https://www.wsj.com/articles/release-of-secrets-represents- new-front-in-u-s-information-war-with-russia-11649070001 (accessed February 24, 2023). 49. President Joseph R. Biden Jr., “National Security Memorandum on Promoting United States Leadership in Quantum Computing While Mitigating Risks to Vulnerable Cryptographic Systems,” The White House, May 4, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/05/04/national-security- memorandum-on-promoting-united-states-leadership-in-quantum-computing-while-mitigating-risks- to-vulnerable-cryptographic-systems/#:~:text=To%20mitigate%20this%20risk%2C%20the%20United%20 States%20must,the%20quantum%20risk%20as%20is%20feasible%20by%202035 (accessed March 12, 2023). See also President Joseph R. Biden Jr., Executive Order 14073, “Enhancing the National Quantum Initiative Advisory Committee,” May 4, 2022, in Federal Register, Vol. 87, No. 89 (May 9, 2022), pp. 27909–27911, https:// www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2022-05-09/pdf/2022-10076.pdf (accessed March 12, 2023); and “Fact Sheet: President Biden Announces Two Presidential Directives Advancing Quantum Technologies,” The White House, May 4, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/05/04/fact- sheet-president-biden-announces-two-presidential-directives-advancing-quantum-technologies/ (accessed March 12, 2023).

Department of the Treasury

Moderate
Vector: 63%
Pages: 739-741AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"HR 5877 focuses on expanding anti-money laundering enforcement capabilities, particularly regarding digital assets and cybercrime, which aligns with Project 2025's concern about the AML-CFT regime's effectiveness and costs. However, while the bill enhances enforcement and reporting mechanisms, it does not address Project 2025's specific calls for evaluating AML-CFT effectiveness, publishing disaggregated enforcement data, or repealing the Corporate Transparency Act—instead, it expands certain AM"

Key themes:anti-money launderingFinCEN oversightfinancial crime enforcementregulatory compliancedigital asset regulation

— 707 — Department of the Treasury There were 2 .7 million suspicious activity reports (SARs) filed in 2021.60 The number of CTRs filed were approximately 10 times that number.61 In 2014, FinCEN anti-money laundering/countering the financing of terrorism (AML-CFT) rules cost an estimated $5 billion to $8 billion per year.62 Undoubtedly, this cost is now substantially higher both because of inflation and because the rules have become more onerous.63 Yet there is little evidence that this massive expenditure of resources is doing much good,64 and there is no evidence regarding which aspects of the AML-CFT regime are effective and which are not. The AML-CFT regime is a major contributing factor causing the decline in the number of small broker-deal- ers and the decline in the competitiveness of community banks. Congress must require FinCEN to annually publish data regarding: l The number of SARs filed; l The number of CTRs filed;65 l The number of AML-CFT prosecutions, disaggregating those in which the AML-CFT prosecution is stand-alone and in which the prosecution is an add-on count connected to other predicate crime;66 l The number of AML-CFT convictions (similarly disaggregated); l The number and aggregate amount of AML-CFT fines imposed and the type of institution upon which the fine was imposed; and l Annual estimates of the aggregate costs imposed on private entities by the AML-CFT regime.67 Without this data, it is impossible for policymakers to make an informed judg- ment about the effectiveness of the AML-CFT regime. Congress should also require both FinCEN and the Government Accountability Office to undertake separate evaluations regarding which aspects of the AML-CFT regime are effective and which are not. FinCEN should be required to undertake a thorough retrospec- tive review of its regulations and various statutory requirements and report to Congress on its findings in a publicly available report. Anecdotes and assurances from FinCEN staff that all is well—but that even more onerous requirements are needed—are not enough. Congress should repeal the Corporate Transparency Act, and FinCEN should withdraw its poorly written and overbroad beneficial ownership reporting rule. Both are targeted at the smallest businesses in the U.S. (those with 20 or fewer employees) and will do nothing material to impede criminal finance.68 The FinCEN — 708 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise beneficial ownership reporting rule will impose costs exceeding $1 billion annu- ally and is exceedingly poorly drafted.69 FinCEN itself estimates that more than 33 million businesses will be affected and that costs will be $547 million to $8.1 billion annually.70 THE “EQUITY” AGENDA Under the Biden Administration, the Treasury Department has appointed a Counselor for Racial Equity, established an Advisory Committee on Racial Equity, and created an office for Diversity, Equity, Inclusion, and Accessibility. All these should be eliminated. Treasury has created several new offices to promote “equity” and has made this its first of five strategic goals in its Fiscal Year 2022–2226 Strategic Plan. “Equity” is identified as a cross-cutting theme in 15 of 19 of the plan’s objectives. The avowed purpose of these initiatives is to implement policies that delib- erately favor some races or ethnicities over others. The casual acceptance and rapid spread of racist policymaking in the federal government must be forcefully opposed and reversed. The next conservative Administration should take affirma- tive steps to expose and eradicate the practice of critical race theory and diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) throughout the Treasury Department. These steps will include: l Identify every Treasury official who participated in DEI initiatives and interview him or her for the purpose of determining the scope and nature of these initiatives and to ensure that such initiatives are completely ended. l Make public immediately all communications relating to the work of the Treasury’s critical race theory and DEI initiatives. l Treat the participation in any critical race theory or DEI initiative, without objecting on constitutional or moral grounds, as per se grounds for termination of employment. l Expose and make public all training materials and initiatives designed to single out any race, ethnicity, or sex for special treatment. The Administration should eliminate the 25-member Treasury Advisory Com- mittee on Racial Equity. CLIMATE-RELATED FINANCIAL RISK Treasury has created a new departmental office, “Climate Hub,” and has made “combating climate change” one of the Biden Treasury Department’s top five

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Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.

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