The bill
No Nuclear Testing Without Approval Act
HR. 5951, 119th Congress — read as touching Nuclear Power.
Sponsored by
Rep. Horsford, Steven [D-NV-4]
ID: H001066
Follow the money
The bill
HR. 5951, 119th Congress — read as touching Nuclear Power.
The sponsor
Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.
The money
30 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.
The alignment
This bill's text tracks the "Department of Energy and Related Commissions" section, p. 404-406 of the Mandate for Leadership.
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
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📍 Current Status
Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Another masterpiece of legislative theater, brought to you by the esteemed members of Congress. The "No Nuclear Testing Without Approval Act" - a bill so cleverly crafted, it's almost as if they want us to believe they're actually concerned about nuclear safety.
Let's dissect this farce, shall we?
**New regulations being created or modified:** This bill amends Section 4210(a) of the Atomic Energy Defense Act, requiring Congressional approval for explosive nuclear testing. Oh, how noble. Except, it's just a thinly veiled attempt to appear responsible while actually doing nothing.
**Affected industries and sectors:** The obvious ones are the defense industry and nuclear energy sector. But let's not forget the real beneficiaries: the politicians who get to grandstand about "safety" and "accountability" while lining their pockets with campaign donations from these very industries.
**Compliance requirements and timelines:** Ah, the meat of the bill. A notification process that requires the President to submit a proposal to Congress at least 180 days before testing, followed by a joint resolution approval process. How quaint. As if anyone actually thinks this will be followed to the letter. The real timeline is: "How quickly can we ram this through without anyone noticing?"
**Enforcement mechanisms and penalties:** Ha! Don't make me laugh. This bill has all the teeth of a toothless tiger. There are no meaningful enforcement mechanisms or penalties for non-compliance. It's just a feel-good exercise in bureaucratic busywork.
**Economic and operational impacts:** The only impact this bill will have is on the wallets of politicians and lobbyists, who'll reap the benefits of "consulting" fees and campaign donations. Meanwhile, the actual costs of nuclear testing will continue to be borne by taxpayers, with no real oversight or accountability.
Diagnosis: This bill suffers from a severe case of "Legislative Lip Service Syndrome" (LLSS), characterized by grandiose language, empty promises, and a complete lack of substance. The underlying disease is corruption, with symptoms including cronyism, incompetence, and a healthy dose of hypocrisy.
Treatment: A strong dose of skepticism, followed by a thorough examination of the politicians' and lobbyists' financial records. But let's be real - this bill will pass, and we'll all just pretend it means something.
Rep. Horsford, Steven [D-NV-4]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
No PAC contributions found
No committee contributions found
Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Showing 67 nodes and 30 connections (77 secondary connections hidden)
Total contributions: $102,250
Showing top 20 donors by contribution amount
Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 1 harmed.
Section 2 amends the Atomic Energy Defense Act to require congressional approval before explosive nuclear testing may be resumed, imposing procedural hurdles and potential delays that could hinder nuclear weapons-related activities, which are closely tied to the nuclear power industry's research, development, and national security missions.
For each industry this bill affects, here's what the sponsor (Rep. Horsford, Steven [D-NV-4])received from donors associated with that industry during the 2022–present cycles. Donations are not proof of intent — they are a record of who funds the people writing the law.
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.
AI Analysis:
"HR 5951 aligns moderately with Project 2025's focus on nuclear weapons development and national security, as it regulates explosive nuclear testing—a function tied to NNSA's warhead modernization mission. However, the bill emphasizes congressional oversight and restraint, whereas Project 2025 advocates for accelerated warhead development and reduced bureaucratic hurdles, creating a tension in approach despite shared concern for nuclear capabilities."
— 371 — Department of Energy and Related Commissions l Refocus the National Labs on fundamental and advanced science. DOE currently oversees 17 National Laboratories. The three National Labs run by DOE’s NNSA should continue to focus on national security issues. The remaining 14 science and energy labs should focus on basic research projects; demonstration and deployment of technology should be left to the private sector. This goal can be achieved by realigning the labs to limit duplication and mission creep and to maximize potential. l Conduct a whole-of-government assessment and consolidation of science. Before the start of a new Administration, there should be a review of all the federal science agencies.12 This should include a review of the ill-advised attempt to expand the National Science Foundation’s mission from supporting university research to supporting an all-encompassing technology transition. Specific to DOE, there should be a review to measure, prioritize, and consolidate DOE programs based on a range of beneficial factors, including degree of relationship to national security; furtherance of energy security (cyber but also international aspects); and importance to scientific discovery/advancement. New Policies: Remediation of Nuclear Weapons Development Programs and Civilian Nuclear Waste Cleaning up the radioactive waste produced in support of the Manhattan Project and the Cold War at America’s nuclear development sites is a massive and com- plicated process led by DOE’s Office of Environmental Management. Projected liabilities and costs to be borne by America’s taxpayers, according to DOE’s FY 2023 budget request, total $887,205 billion.13 In addition, the federal government is required by law to dispose of nuclear waste produced by the private sector, includ- ing spent fuel rods from nuclear power plants. The new DESAS should: l Continue DOE’s remediation of radioactive waste created by the nuclear weapons projects from the Manhattan Project and Cold War. Strong leadership focused on accelerating the cleanup, coupled with technical and administrative innovation, will be needed to reduce the federal government’s third largest liability. l Develop a new approach that increases the level of private-sector responsibility for the disposal of nuclear waste. Disposing of civilian nuclear waste is an important national issue that requires strong scientific study. According to an independent audit conducted by the public accounting firm of KPMG, the Nuclear Waste Fund holds $46 billion in payments by utilities and their ratepayers, plus interest, for a permanent waste disposal site for spent nuclear fuel and other nuclear waste.14 The — 372 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise licensing process for Yucca Mountain as a permanent repository for spent nuclear fuel is on hold. Without storage sites, spent nuclear fuel remains temporarily stored at nuclear plants. In addition to permanent storage, low- level nuclear waste facilities are needed. New Policies: NNSA The U.S. nuclear arsenal needs to be updated and reinvigorated if we are to be able to deal effectively with threats from China, Russia, and other adversaries. As a semi-autonomous agency, the NNSA has the primary responsibility for researching and designing new nuclear warheads and for ensuring that the existing nuclear arsenal is still potent. These efforts require significant funding and scientific know- how. In addition, NNSA develops and designs nuclear propulsion reactors for the U.S. Navy. NNSA also plays a role in preventing nuclear proliferation. With strong leadership by the Secretary of DESAS, the next Administration should: l Fund the design, development, and deployment of new nuclear warheads, including the production of plutonium pits in quantity.15 l Expand the U.S. Navy and develop new nuclear naval reactors to ensure that the Navy has the nuclear propulsion it needs to secure America’s strategic interests. l End ineffective and counterproductive nonproliferation activities like those involving Iran and the United Nations. Budget DOE’s total FY 2023 budget request (which does not include IIJA, IRA, and CHIPS and Science Act funding) was for $48,183,451,000.16 Many DOE activities are required by various authorization and appropriations bills. To implement many of the policies contained in these proposals, several laws will need to be amended, including the Department of Energy Organization Act, IIJA, IRA, and possibly portions of the CHIPS (Creating Healthy Incentives to Produce Semiconductors) and Science Act.17 Ending taxpayer subsidies will promote an “all of the above” energy policy, lead to more energy resources, reduce costs, and save taxpayers billions of dollars. OFFICE OF CYBERSECURITY, ENERGY SECURITY, AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE (CESER) Mission/Overview CESER’s mission is to “enhance the security and resilience of U.S. critical energy infrastructure to all hazards,” to “mitigate the impacts of disruptive events and risk
AI Analysis:
"HR 5951 imposes congressional approval and notification requirements for explosive nuclear testing, which contrasts with Project 2025's goal of enabling immediate test readiness and reducing barriers to nuclear testing. Both address nuclear testing and deterrence, but their policy directions are opposed."
— 399 — Department of Energy and Related Commissions designed and built during the Cold War, and the U.S. lacks sufficient plutonium production capabilities.103 Because this process will take time, NNSA and the NNSA Labs need to ensure that existing nuclear warheads are viable and provide an appropriate strategic deterrent. New Policies The expansion of Chinese nuclear forces, the continued nuclear threat from Russia, and active nuclear programs in North Korea, Iran, and elsewhere require NNSA’s recommitment to the nuclear mission. A conservative Adminis- tration should: l Continue to develop new warheads for each branch of the triad (land, sea, and air defenses). If possible, reverse the Biden Administration’s decision to retire the B83 bomb (in order to maintain two aircraft-delivered warheads) and its decision to cancel the submarine-launched cruise missile (SLCM).104 Also undertake an evaluation of the need for nuclear antisubmarine and air defense weapons in light of emerging threats. l Maintain two production sites for plutonium pits (a key element of warhead production) at Los Alamos and Savannah River.105 l Reject ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and indicate a willingness to conduct nuclear tests in response to adversary nuclear developments if necessary. This will require that NNSA be directed to move to immediate test readiness to give the Administration maximum flexibility in responding to adversary actions. l Review all new Navy, Department of Homeland Security, and U.S. Department of Transportation Maritime Administration construction programs. The review should be conducted by the Director of Naval Reactors (DNR) with an eye to the possible inclusion of advanced affordable nuclear reactor technology and extension of DNR authority over these agencies’ nuclear construction programs. l Review the non–national security portfolios at the Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore, and Sandia labs and identify divestments to focus on nuclear deterrence. Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore, and Sandia provide unique capabilities for nuclear deterrence, and each lab maintains extensive non–national security research programs and commercial activities. — 400 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise l Review the operations of the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC). The statutorily established NWC is required to report to the President and Congress but needs to refocus its efforts on providing comprehensive oversight of DOE and DOD nuclear weapons policy and requirements. Budget Concurrent modernization of the nuclear triad and its warheads will be a major challenge to the DOD and DOE budgets over the coming decade. DOE non-nuclear programs should be the first source of additional resources for NNSA activities. Divestment of non-nuclear activities from NNSA laboratories can address some overhead and operational costs. NNSA received $19.7 billion in 2021, and its FY 2023 budget request was $21.4 billion.106 The next Administration should ensure that funding is targeted to the accelerated development of new warheads. Personnel NNSA has tended to act as though it is not part of DOE and has resisted oversight by the Secretary of Energy. The NNSA Act grants some autonomy to the NNSA, but it also makes it clear that NNSA is under the authority of the Secretary. NNSA’s leaders need to understand that ultimately, they report to the Secretary. FERC: ELECTRIC RELIABILITY AND RESILIENCE Mission/Overview The Federal Power Act tasks FERC, along with the FERC-designated North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC), with promoting the reliability of the bulk power system (the transmission and generation needed to power the electric grid).107 NERC develops technical standards, and FERC adopts them as mandatory standards (including cyber security standards) with which transmis- sion providers, generators, and utilities must comply. Under the Federal Power Act, critical electric infrastructure security and issues like electromagnetic pulse (EMP) are addressed by both FERC and DOE.108 In addition, the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act directed FERC to establish incentive-based rate treat- ments by encouraging utilities to invest in advanced cyber security technology and participate in cyber security threat information-sharing programs. Needed Reforms There is a growing problem with the electric grid’s reliability because of the increasing growth of subsidized intermittent renewable generation (like wind and solar) and a lack of dispatchable generation (for example, power plants powered by natural gas, nuclear, and coal), especially during hot and cold weather.109 FERC and NERC have been studying the potential for generation shortages across the
AI Analysis:
"Both the bill and the Project 2025 section address nuclear policy and oversight, but the bill centers on congressional approval for explosive nuclear testing, whereas Project 2025 focuses on NRC licensing reforms for reactors and reducing regulatory barriers. The overlap is limited to the broader theme of nuclear governance."
— 408 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise FERC is considering policy statements that would consider GHG emissions as part of its NEPA review and its NGA determination as to whether approval of an LNG export facility is consistent with the public interest. New Policies Since Congress through the NGA has already determined that LNG exports to countries with free trade agreements are in the public interest,129 and because LNG exports help to ensure America’s ability to support our friends and allies around the world while also supporting domestic natural gas production, FERC: l Should not use environmental issues like climate change as a reason to stop LNG projects. l Should ensure that the natural gas pipelines that are needed deliver more of the product to market, both for domestic use and export, and are reviewed, developed and constructed in a timely manner. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Mission/Overview The Energy Reorganization Act of 1974130 created the Nuclear Regulatory Com- mission (NRC). Before then, the commercial nuclear industry was regulated by the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), which was established by the 1954 Atomic Energy Act.131 Importantly, the AEC was responsible for encouraging and regulat- ing commercial nuclear power. Broad criticism of this dual function was a major factor in the establishment of the NRC, which held regulatory authority while the newly established Department of Energy held the advocacy function. Today, the NRC is responsible for a broad range of regulatory activities, including reactor safety, oversight of nuclear materials, and protection against radiation as well as permitting new reactors, certifying new reactor designs, and regulating nuclear waste management activities. Needed Reforms In 1989, the NRC established alternative licensing processes that were meant to provide a more predictable and efficient regulatory pathway for new Light Water Reactors (LWRs) by combining construction and operating nuclear power plant licenses, allowing for Early Site Permits, and establishing a framework for pre- approval of reactor designs. More recently, the Nuclear Energy Innovation and Modernization Act directed the NRC to establish a technology-neutral licensing process for new, advanced reactor technologies.132 Despite these efforts, the NRC remains a significant cost and regulatory barrier to new nuclear power. Especially — 409 — Department of Energy and Related Commissions frustrating is that these costs to a large extent are due to the agencies being overly prescriptive rather than outcomes-focused and fall on well-known and understood LWR reactor technologies. New Policies While refocusing its regulatory efforts on new reactor technologies, the NRC should also continue to ensure the security of radiological sources and mitigate cybersecurity risks across the industry. Applications for Combined Operating Licenses (COLs) and design certifications that rely on light-water technology should generally be completed within two years. Early Site Permits should gener- ally be issued within one year for construction on or adjacent to an existing reactor site. Additionally, the NRC should: l Expedite the review and approval of license extensions of existing reactors, which will require the NRC to streamline and focus its NEPA review process. l Set clear radiation exposure and protection standards by eliminating ALARA (“as low as reasonably achievable”) as a regulatory principle and setting clear standards according to radiological risk and dose rather than arbitrary objectives. l Work with Congress to reform its funding approach so that licensee fees are generally required for activities that are specific to a regulated entity, with other agency costs being provided through normal appropriations. Budget In FY 2022, the NRC was required to recover approximately 85 percent of its $887.7 million budget through licensee fees.133 The Nuclear Energy Innovation and Modernization Act requires the NRC to recover nearly all of its costs through fees. These reforms would likely not cost additional money but could rebalance the fee-versus-appropriations calculation. AUTHOR’S NOTE: The preparation of this chapter was the work of many individuals. All contributors to this chapter are listed at the front of this volume, but I wish to give special thanks to Brent Bennett, Willis Bixby, Travis Fisher, Ben Lieberman, Brian McCormack, Tom Pyle, Mark Robeck, Daniel Simmons, Jack Spencer, Katie Tubb, and David Walsh. Though informed by many, the author alone assumes responsibility for the content of this chapter, and no views expressed herein should be attributed to any particular individual.
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.