The bill
To reauthorize the West Valley demonstration project.
HR. 6037, 119th Congress — read as touching Nuclear Power.
Sponsored by
Rep. Langworthy, Nicholas A. [R-NY-23]
ID: L000600
Follow the money
The bill
HR. 6037, 119th Congress — read as touching Nuclear Power.
The sponsor
Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.
The money
30 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.
The alignment
This bill's text tracks the "Department of Energy and Related Commissions" section, p. 428-430 of the Mandate for Leadership.
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Latest Action
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Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.
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2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Another masterpiece of legislative artistry, courtesy of the esteemed members of Congress. Let's dissect this monstrosity and expose the underlying disease.
**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The main purpose of HR 6037 is to reauthorize the West Valley demonstration project, because what's a few more years of throwing money at a problem without actually solving it? The objective is to prolong the agony, er, I mean, the "demonstration" phase, while lining the pockets of contractors and special interest groups.
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill amends Section 3(a) of the West Valley Demonstration Project Act by increasing funding from $75 million to $150 million per year for the next decade. Because, you know, doubling down on a failed strategy is always a great idea. This change will undoubtedly lead to more "demonstrations" of incompetence and waste.
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The affected parties include:
* Contractors and special interest groups who will reap the benefits of this pork-barrel project * Taxpayers, who will foot the bill for this boondoggle * The environment, which will continue to suffer from the lack of actual progress on nuclear waste management
**Potential Impact & Implications:** The potential impact is more of the same: a decade-long demonstration of bureaucratic ineptitude, with no tangible results. The implications are clear:
* A continued lack of accountability and transparency in government spending * Further enrichment of special interest groups at the expense of taxpayers * A perpetuation of the status quo, where politicians prioritize re-election over actual problem-solving
Diagnosis: This bill is a classic case of "Legislative Lethargy," a disease characterized by a lack of vision, courage, and intellectual honesty. The symptoms include:
* Doubling down on failed strategies * Prioritizing special interests over the public good * Ignoring the root causes of problems in favor of Band-Aid solutions
Treatment: A healthy dose of skepticism, a strong stomach for the absurdity of it all, and a willingness to call out the politicians and lobbyists who perpetuate this nonsense. But let's be real, folks, we're dealing with a terminal case here. The patient is beyond saving.
Rep. Langworthy, Nicholas A. [R-NY-23]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
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Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Showing 57 nodes and 30 connections (72 secondary connections hidden)
Total contributions: $141,700
Showing top 24 donors by contribution amount
Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 1 helped.
Section 1 amends the West Valley Demonstration Project Act to increase funding from $75 million to $150 million per fiscal year for FY2027-2037, providing a clear financial benefit to nuclear waste cleanup and related nuclear industry activities.
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.
AI Analysis:
"HR 6037 aligns strongly with Project 2025's focus on advancing nuclear waste management through increased funding and operational continuity, particularly supporting the Office of Spent Fuel and Waste Disposition's mission and the broader goal of accelerating cleanup and innovation in environmental management."
— 396 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise l Increase the use of commercial waste disposal. Using commercial disposal would reduce capital costs (~ $2 billion) for new disposal sites to accelerate cleanup and reduce local post-cleanup environmental liability at multiple sites. l Revisit the Hanford cleanup’s regulatory framework. Hanford poses significant political and legal challenges with the State of Washington, and DOE will have to work with Congress to make progress in accelerating cleanup at that site. DOE and EPA need to work more closely to coordinate their responses to claims made under the TPA and work more aggressively for changes, including congressional action if necessary, to achieve workable cleanup goals. l Establish more direct leadership and accountability to the Deputy Secretary consistent with Government Accountability Office recommendations.91 l Change Environmental Management’s culture to promote innovation and completion. Budget Environmental Management received slightly less than $7.6 billion in FY 2021, and its budget request for FY 2023 is approximately $8.06 billion.92 The additional funding necessary to accelerate closure of the program will need to be considered as part of a broader government-wide discussion about yearly appropriations. OFFICE OF CIVILIAN RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT (OCRWM) (CURRENTLY OFFICE OF SPENT FUEL AND WASTE DISPOSITION) Mission/Overview The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) of 1982 conferred the responsibility for commercial nuclear waste disposal on the federal government,93 and in 2002, Congress designated a single repository located at Yucca Mountain in Nevada as the national repository site. The act also established the Office of Civilian Radio- active Waste Management (OCRWM).94 The Obama Administration shut down OCRWM in 2010. The Office of Spent Fuel and Waste Disposition, which is headed by a non-confirmed Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Office of Nuclear Energy, is currently responsible for the management of nuclear waste, and interim disposal is taking place on various sites. Providing a plan for the proper disposal of civilian nuclear waste is essential to the promotion of nuclear power in the United States. — 397 — Department of Energy and Related Commissions Needed Reforms l Work with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission as it reviews DOE’s permit application for Yucca Mountain. According to both the scientific community and global experience, deep geologic storage is critical to any plan for the proper disposal of more than 75 years of defense waste and 80,000 tons of commercial spent nuclear fuel.95 Yucca Mountain remains a viable option for waste management, and DOE should recommit to working with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission as it reviews DOE’s permit application for a repository. Finishing the review does not mean that Yucca Mountain will be completed and operational; it merely presents all the information for the State of Nevada, Congress, the nuclear industry, and the Administration to use as the basis for informed decisions. l Reform the licensing process. The reactor licensing process is inadequate. Fixing nuclear waste management will require wholesale reform that realigns responsibilities, resets incentives, and introduces market forces without creating chaos within the current nuclear industry that has been built around the current system. l Produce concrete outcomes from consent-based siting. Beginning in the Obama Administration and resurrected during the Biden Administration, consent-based siting for a civilian waste nuclear repository has been a way to delay any politically painful decisions about siting a permanent civilian nuclear waste facility. In 2022, DOE announced $16 million to support local communities in consent-based siting.96 The next Administration should use the consent-based-siting process to identify and build temporary or permanent sites for a civilian waste nuclear repository (or repositories). New Policies l Restart Yucca Mountain licensing. DOE should restart the Yucca Mountain licensing process. Any continuation of interim storage facilities should be made part of an integrated waste management system that includes geologic storage. Further, building on the consent-based siting process already underway, DOE should find a second repository site. l Fix the policy and cost drivers that are preventing nuclear storage. The federal government continues to hold $46 billion97 in the Nuclear Waste Fund (NWF),98 funded by utilities and their ratepayers for permanent disposal of nuclear waste. However, no such storage exists, and spent nuclear fuel remains on site at most nuclear plants. Meanwhile, Congress uses those funds to finance unrelated spending. Moreover, DOE’s
AI Analysis:
"HR 6037 provides increased funding for the West Valley demonstration project, a DOE Environmental Management site, directly supporting the Project 2025 goal of accelerating EM cleanup and ensuring adequate resources for nuclear waste remediation."
— 395 — Department of Energy and Related Commissions weapons development and government-sponsored nuclear energy research.”85 Its cleanup program is the world’s largest, and EM reports that 92 (of 107) sites have been completed.86 According to the U.S. Government Accountability Office, “DOE is responsible for the largest share of the federal government’s environmental liability—about 85 percent in fiscal year 2020.”87 Since 2011, EM has spent a cumulative total of $63.2 billion, and its liability has grown by $243 billion.88 It is currently projected that cleanup will take another 70 years (FY 2022 to FY 2091).89 Projected “Low Range” and “High Range” lifecycle costs total slightly less than $652.4 billion and slightly more than $887.2 billion, respectively.90 Needed Reforms Some states (and contractors), see EM as a jobs program and have little interest in accelerating the cleanup. EM needs to move to an expeditious program with targets for cleanup of sites. The Hanford site in Washington State is a particular challenge. The Tri-Party Agreement (TPA) among DOE, the Environmental Pro- tection Agency, and Washington State’s Department of Ecology has hampered attempts to accelerate and innovate the cleanup. A central challenge at Hanford is the classification of radioactive waste. High-Level Waste (HLW) and Low-Level Waste (LLW) classifications drive the remediation and disposal process. Under President Trump, significant changes in waste classification from HLW to LLW enabled significant progress on remediation. Implementation needs to continue across the complex, particularly at Hanford. New Policies The next Administration should: l Accelerate the cleanup. This means that a comprehensive cost projection and schedule reflecting the entire scope of the job should be developed and appropriate reforms should be instituted. To save taxpayers a potential $500 billion over the long run and reduce current risk, a 10-year program to complete all sites by 2035 (except Hanford with a target date of 2060) should be considered. Such a commitment will require increased funding for EM during those accelerated periods. To the extent that funding from the IIJA and IRA cannot be repealed, requests to divert those funds to EM’s cleanup obligations should be considered. l Fully implement High-Level Waste determination. Fully adopting the High-Level Waste (HLW) determination across the DOE complex, particularly at Hanford, would allow LLW to be grouted rather than vitrified. — 396 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise l Increase the use of commercial waste disposal. Using commercial disposal would reduce capital costs (~ $2 billion) for new disposal sites to accelerate cleanup and reduce local post-cleanup environmental liability at multiple sites. l Revisit the Hanford cleanup’s regulatory framework. Hanford poses significant political and legal challenges with the State of Washington, and DOE will have to work with Congress to make progress in accelerating cleanup at that site. DOE and EPA need to work more closely to coordinate their responses to claims made under the TPA and work more aggressively for changes, including congressional action if necessary, to achieve workable cleanup goals. l Establish more direct leadership and accountability to the Deputy Secretary consistent with Government Accountability Office recommendations.91 l Change Environmental Management’s culture to promote innovation and completion. Budget Environmental Management received slightly less than $7.6 billion in FY 2021, and its budget request for FY 2023 is approximately $8.06 billion.92 The additional funding necessary to accelerate closure of the program will need to be considered as part of a broader government-wide discussion about yearly appropriations. OFFICE OF CIVILIAN RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT (OCRWM) (CURRENTLY OFFICE OF SPENT FUEL AND WASTE DISPOSITION) Mission/Overview The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) of 1982 conferred the responsibility for commercial nuclear waste disposal on the federal government,93 and in 2002, Congress designated a single repository located at Yucca Mountain in Nevada as the national repository site. The act also established the Office of Civilian Radio- active Waste Management (OCRWM).94 The Obama Administration shut down OCRWM in 2010. The Office of Spent Fuel and Waste Disposition, which is headed by a non-confirmed Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Office of Nuclear Energy, is currently responsible for the management of nuclear waste, and interim disposal is taking place on various sites. Providing a plan for the proper disposal of civilian nuclear waste is essential to the promotion of nuclear power in the United States.
AI Analysis:
"HR 6037 aligns strongly with Project 2025's focus on nuclear waste management by reauthorizing and increasing funding for the West Valley Demonstration Project, which supports the development of waste disposal technologies and federal responsibility for civilian radioactive waste—key themes in the Policy's call for reformed waste management mechanisms and OCRWM reconstitution."
— 398 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise violation of its contractual obligation to take the waste has resulted in the payment of “approximately $10.1 billion in settlements and judgments to contract holders.”99 l Develop new NWF funding and accounting mechanisms that allow licensed nuclear operators to guarantee resources for future nuclear waste disposal while also maintaining control of those resources. l Reconstitute OCRWM. OCRWM, as already established by statute, should be tasked with developing the next steps on Yucca Mountain and nuclear waste management. These steps should include initiating market reforms, including significant amendments to the NWPA, to allow additional industry responsibility for managing waste, market pricing and competition for waste services, and the opportunity for Nevadans to have more partnership involvement with any nuclear facility at Yucca Mountain. l Reestablish, consistent with the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, the position of Director of the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management. Budget Within the Office of Nuclear Energy budget, approximately $100 million is set aside for fuel cycle and waste management activities.100 These funds should be transferred to the newly established OCRWM, which should also be responsible for managing the Nuclear Waste Fund and given access to the fund as necessary to carry out its responsibilities. NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION (NNSA) Mission/Overview NNSA’s primary mission is to provide and maintain a modern, safe, and effective nuclear deterrent for the United States. This includes the design and production of nuclear warheads, their integration with delivery systems, and their safe storage and decommissioning. NNSA’s responsibilities also include developing nuclear reactors for the U.S. Navy and “work[ing] to prevent nuclear weapon proliferation and reduce the threat of nuclear and radiological terrorism around the world.”101 NNSA was established by the NNSA Act, which also defines its authority.102 Needed Reforms The United States, through the NNSA, needs to make the design, development, and deployment of new nuclear warheads a top priority. Existing warheads were — 399 — Department of Energy and Related Commissions designed and built during the Cold War, and the U.S. lacks sufficient plutonium production capabilities.103 Because this process will take time, NNSA and the NNSA Labs need to ensure that existing nuclear warheads are viable and provide an appropriate strategic deterrent. New Policies The expansion of Chinese nuclear forces, the continued nuclear threat from Russia, and active nuclear programs in North Korea, Iran, and elsewhere require NNSA’s recommitment to the nuclear mission. A conservative Adminis- tration should: l Continue to develop new warheads for each branch of the triad (land, sea, and air defenses). If possible, reverse the Biden Administration’s decision to retire the B83 bomb (in order to maintain two aircraft-delivered warheads) and its decision to cancel the submarine-launched cruise missile (SLCM).104 Also undertake an evaluation of the need for nuclear antisubmarine and air defense weapons in light of emerging threats. l Maintain two production sites for plutonium pits (a key element of warhead production) at Los Alamos and Savannah River.105 l Reject ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and indicate a willingness to conduct nuclear tests in response to adversary nuclear developments if necessary. This will require that NNSA be directed to move to immediate test readiness to give the Administration maximum flexibility in responding to adversary actions. l Review all new Navy, Department of Homeland Security, and U.S. Department of Transportation Maritime Administration construction programs. The review should be conducted by the Director of Naval Reactors (DNR) with an eye to the possible inclusion of advanced affordable nuclear reactor technology and extension of DNR authority over these agencies’ nuclear construction programs. l Review the non–national security portfolios at the Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore, and Sandia labs and identify divestments to focus on nuclear deterrence. Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore, and Sandia provide unique capabilities for nuclear deterrence, and each lab maintains extensive non–national security research programs and commercial activities.
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.