The bill
LANDED Act
HR. 6042, 119th Congress — read as touching Law Enforcement & Surveillance Tech.
LANDED Act
Download PDFBill ID: 119/hr/6042
Last Updated: November 18, 2025
Sponsored by
Rep. Smith, Christopher H. [R-NJ-4]
ID: S000522
Follow the money
The sponsor
Rep. Smith, Christopher H. [R-NJ-4]
Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.
The alignment
55% match to Project 2025
This bill's text tracks the "Department of Defense" section, p. 152-154 of the Mandate for Leadership.
Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
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Introduced
📍 Current Status
Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.
🏛️
Committee Review
🗳️
Floor Action
✅
Passed Senate
🏛️
House Review
🎉
Passed Congress
🖊️
Presidential Action
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Became Law
📚 How does a bill become a law?
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Bill Summary
Another brilliant piece of legislation from the geniuses in Congress. The LANDED Act, because who doesn't love a good acronym? Let's dissect this masterpiece.
**Main Purpose & Objectives**
The bill's primary objective is to create mechanisms for state law enforcement agencies to coordinate with the federal government to detect and stop drones involved in unlawful activities. Because, you know, those pesky drones are just flying around, causing chaos and destruction everywhere. The real purpose, of course, is to give the government more power to surveil and control the skies.
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law**
The bill establishes a framework for state law enforcement agencies to acquire, deploy, and operate counter-UAS (unmanned aircraft system) mitigation systems. This includes defining what constitutes an "approved" counter-UAS detection system, which is essentially a fancy way of saying "we'll decide what's good enough." The bill also creates an application process for state agencies to obtain approval from the Secretary of Homeland Security to use these systems.
Oh, and let's not forget the obligatory "review and report" section, because Congress loves to create more bureaucracy. This provision requires the Secretary of Homeland Security to review UAS activity and submit a report to Congress. I'm sure this will be a thrilling read.
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders**
The usual suspects are involved: state law enforcement agencies, the Department of Homeland Security, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). Because when you're creating a new surveillance program, it's essential to get all the relevant three-letter agencies on board.
**Potential Impact & Implications**
The LANDED Act is a classic case of "mission creep." It starts with a seemingly innocuous goal – stopping drones involved in unlawful activities – but ultimately gives the government more power to surveil and control the skies. This will likely lead to an expansion of domestic surveillance, as state law enforcement agencies will be able to use these counter-UAS systems to monitor and track drones (and potentially other aircraft) without proper oversight.
The bill also raises concerns about the potential for abuse, as it allows state agencies to authorize personnel to take actions that could interfere with civilian communications and information technology networks. Because who needs secure communication when you can have a drone-hunting program?
In conclusion, the LANDED Act is just another example of Congress's tendency to create solutions in search of problems. It's a thinly veiled attempt to expand government surveillance powers under the guise of national security. But hey, at least it'll create some new jobs for bureaucrats and contractors.
Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (Dr. Haus personality)
💰 Campaign Finance Network
No campaign finance data available for Rep. Smith, Christopher H. [R-NJ-4]
Industry Impact
Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 2 helped, 1 harmed.
- +Law Enforcement & Surveillance Techconfidence 0.95
Sections 3 and 5 authorize State law enforcement to acquire, deploy, and operate counter-UAS mitigation systems, including detection, tracking, disruption, and seizure of drones, directly benefiting surveillance technology vendors (e.g., Axon, Palantir).
- +Defense Contractorsconfidence 0.90
Section 6 establishes a Counter-UAS Security Grant Program for State law enforcement agencies to acquire counter-UAS equipment, which will likely benefit defense contractors that produce such systems (e.g., Lockheed Martin, Raytheon).
- −Telecommunicationsconfidence 0.80
Section 3(e) requires consultation with the FCC Chair to ensure counter-UAS systems do not adversely impact civilian telecommunications, implying potential regulatory constraints on telecom spectrum use.
Project 2025 Policy Matches
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.
Department of Defense
Weak
Vector: 62%Pages: 152-154AI Enhanced
AI Analysis:
"The LANDED Act focuses on domestic counter-drone operations involving state law enforcement and DHS, while the Project 2025 DoD section emphasizes offensive/defensive cyber operations, election security, cyber-EW integration, and irregular warfare in great-power competition—there is minimal thematic overlap."
Key themes:national securitycritical infrastructure protection
— 120 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise 3. Expand defensive cyber-effects operations authorized by President Trump's classified National Security Presidential Memorandum 13, “United States Cyber Operations Policy.”36 4. End USCYBERCOM’s participation in federal efforts to “fortify” U.S. elections to eliminate the perception that DOD is engaging in partisan politics. l Increase USCYBERCOM’s effectiveness. 1. Accelerate the integration of cyber and electronic warfare (EW) doctrine and capabilities, abiding by the time-tested norms of combined-arms warfare. 2. Mandate that development teams will include both coders and soldiers, aircrew, and sailors with kinetic experience at the platoon level. 3. Break the paradigm of cyber authorities held at the strategic level. 4. Increase cyber resilience by, for example, protecting the Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications Network and the Air Force’s Cyber Resiliency Office for Weapons Systems (CROWS). 5. Expand coordination of joint operations with allies. 6. Implement the Government Accountability Office’s recommendation that the DOD Chief Information Officer, Commander of USCYBERCOM, and Commander of Joint Force Headquarters–DOD Information Network “align policy and system requirements to enable DOD to have enterprise-wide visibility of cyber incident reporting to support tactical, strategic, and military strategies for response.”37 l Rationalize strategy and doctrine. 1. Update the October 2022 National Security Strategy to define DOD roles and responsibilities beyond existing platitudes. 2. Apply traditional deterrence strategies and principles for using cyber/ EW in retaliation for foreign cyberattacks and/or EW actions against U.S. infrastructure and citizens. — 121 — Department of Defense SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES Even though America’s conventional war in Afghanistan was a failure, Special Operations Forces of the United States Special Operation Command (USSOCOM) executed an extremely effective counterterrorism campaign: There has not been another major attack on the homeland, global terrorist threats are reduced and managed, collaboration with international partners is effective, and units under USSOCOM are the most capable and experienced warfighters in two generations. There is a movement to reduce the scope and scale of USSOCOM’s mission in favor of other service priorities in great-power competition. This would be a mis- take because USSOCOM can be employed effectively in great-power competition. It makes sense to capitalize on USSOCOM’s experience and repurpose its mis- sion to include irregular warfare within the context of great-power competition, thereby providing a robust organization that is capable of achieving strategic effects that are critical both to our national defense and to the defense of our allies and partners around the globe. Irregular warfare should be used proactively to prevent state and nonstate actors from negatively affecting U.S. policies and objectives while simultaneously strengthening our regional partnerships. If we maintain irregular warfare’s traditional focus on nonstate actors, we limit ourselves to addressing only the symptoms (nonstate actors), not the problems themselves (China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran). Needed Reforms l Make irregular warfare a cornerstone of security strategy. The U.S. can project strength through unified action with our Interagency,38 allies, and partners by utilizing irregular warfare capabilities synchronized with elements of national power. Broadly redefining irregular warfare to address current state and nonstate actors is critical to countering irregular threats that range from the Chinese use of economic warfare to Russian disinformation and Islamist terrorism. A broad definition of irregular warfare in the National Security Strategy would allow for a whole-of- government approach, thereby providing resources and capabilities to counter threats and ultimately serve as credible deterrence at the strategic and tactical levels. 1. Define irregular warfare as “a means by which the United States uses all elements of national power to project influence abroad to counter state adversaries, defeat hostile nonstate actors, deter wider conflict, and maintain peace in great-power competition.” 2. Characterize the state and nonstate irregular threats facing the U.S. by region in the National Security Strategy.
Department of Transportation
Weak
Vector: 61%Pages: 670-672AI Enhanced
AI Analysis:
"The LANDED Act focuses on drone mitigation and law enforcement coordination with DHS, while the Project 2025 excerpt addresses DOT/FRA railroad safety and maritime administration reforms; they share only a broad concern for transportation safety and infrastructure protection."
Key themes:transportation safetycritical infrastructurefederal-state coordinationregulatory oversight
— 637 — Department of Transportation to track brake inspections on rolling stock electronically instead of by using paper air brake slips, which would enable extending the interval between brake inspections for trains and eliminating restrictions on the ability to place/remove blocks of cars in trains. l FRA will be proposing certification requirements for dispatchers and signal employees despite the failure of the Railroad Safety Advisory Committee (RSAC) to identify any safety benefit. l FRA is planning to propose emergency escape breathing apparatus requirements for train crews even though FRA staff long ago concluded that the costs of these requirements would far outweigh their very minimal benefits. It is vital that the integrity of FRA’s research program be preserved. In 2022, FRA switched the management of the Transportation Technology Center (TTC) in Pueblo, Colorado, from a subsidiary of the Association of American Railroads (AAR) to Ensco, Inc. FRA seems determined to direct research to TTC, even when there are better choices with respect to the research in question, in an effort to support TTC financially and justify its decision to change management at TTC. This change in approach threatens the collaborative approach to research between FRA and the railroads that has existed for decades. FRA should make its decisions on where to spend its research dollars solely on the merits of improving the safety and efficiency of the railroad industry. MARITIME POLICY The Maritime Administration (MARAD) was established by President Harry Truman in 1950 and was transferred to DOT in 1981. A principal function is “main- tain[ing] the overall health of the U.S. Merchant Marine,”15 which is important both to national defense and to foreign and domestic commerce. MARAD is also in charge of the United States Merchant Marine Academy and operates ships and funding for the six state maritime academies. MARAD would be better served by being transferred from DOT to the Depart- ment of Homeland Security (DHS). MARAD is the only DOT modal administration that does not regulate the industry that it represents: The maritime industry is regulated by the U.S. Coast Guard (ships and personnel) and by the Federal Mari- time Commission (cargo rates and competitive practices). Furthermore, MARAD has responsibilities both in peacetime commerce and operationally in wartime/crisis sealift through its responsibility to manage the National Defense Reserve Fleet and 45-ship Ready Reserve Force for the U.S. Navy. These missions are unique to MARAD within DOT. As a result, MARAD’s missions — 638 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise and purpose, and therefore its funding priorities, are not well understood and his- torically have been minimalized in planning and budgeting. MARAD, including its subordinate Service Academy (the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy) should be transferred to the Department of Defense (if the Coast Guard is located there because DHS has been eliminated) or to the Department of Home- land Security. In this way, the two agencies charged with oversight and regulation of the Maritime sector—MARAD and the United States Coast Guard—would be aligned under the same department where operational efficiencies could be real- ized more easily. Serious consideration should be given to repealing or substantially reforming the Jones Act,16 which would require legislation. The economic costs of the Jones Act, which is notionally in place to promote a robust Merchant Marine, vastly exceed its effect on the supply of domestic ships. For instance, no liquified natural gas (LNG) can be shipped from Alaska to the lower 48 states because there are no U.S.-flagged ships that carry LNG. If there are genuine concerns about U.S. fleet capacity in the absence of the Jones Act, it would be possible to do so through an expansion of the Defense Reserve Fleet. Another DHS agency, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), is a frequent user of MARAD Ready Reserve Force shipping during disaster assistance missions. Transferring MARAD to DHS would make coordination and requisition of those vessels a smoother and more rapid process. DHS has responsibility for reviewing and approving Jones Act waivers. This process first requires a market survey of available shipping tonnage that is completed by MARAD. The processing of Jones Act waiver requests would be streamlined if both agencies were in the same department. Finally, DHS as a department is experienced in administering and budgeting for the operation of an existing federal service academy, the U.S. Coast Guard Academy, which is similar to the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy in size. There would be increased efficiencies and better alignment of the missions of these two institutions if they were under one single department that has equity in the industries served by these academies. CONCLUSION Americans need more abundant and affordable transportation. They need more affordable and safer cars as well as physical aspects of transportation such as roads, bridges, airports, ports, and rail lines. The Department of Transportation should be evaluating which aspects of transportation are contributing to the economic competitiveness of the United States and the well-being of Americans—and that therefore should continue to be funded. All too often, DOT’s mission is described as reducing the number of trips, using less fuel, and raising the costs of travel to Americans through increased use of
Department of Transportation
Weak
Vector: 61%Pages: 661-663AI Enhanced
AI Analysis:
"The LANDED Act focuses on drone counter-UAS measures for state law enforcement, while the Project 2025 DOT section addresses fuel economy standards, EV policy, California waivers, and FHWA scope. The only tangential connection is a shared concern for public safety and federal‑state coordination, but the substantive topics do not overlap."
Key themes:public safetyfederal-state coordinationtransportation safety
— 628 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise translate into a loss of auto industry jobs for American workers: It will also mean a significant increase in traffic deaths and injuries. As fewer new cars are purchased, the price of used cars will rise, and more Americans will be left driving older cars, which traffic statistics show are much less safe than newer vehicles. NHTSA itself has acknowledged that the Biden Administration’s fuel economy standards will generate hundreds of additional fatalities and thousands of additional injuries on U.S. highways. Because older cars also produce more harmful air pollution, the aging of America’s fleet will also have negative consequences for air quality. In addition, the Biden Administration’s efforts to accelerate EV sales by reg- ulatory fiat work against the national security interests of the United States in contravention of Congress’s goals under EPCA. Increasing the production of EVs will make the U.S. more dependent on China and other foreign countries that control the supply and processing of rare earth minerals that are needed for EV batteries. And the faster deployment of EVs will put a major strain on America’s vulnerable power grid, requiring large investments in critical infrastructure and a big boost in the nation’s electricity production, including from gas-fired and oil- fired power plants. In exchange for all of these harmful effects—on traffic safety, consumer choice, American jobs, the nation’s air quality, and U.S. national security—the Biden fuel economy regulations are predicted to have no meaningful effect on global tem- perature trends over the long term.8 The next Administration must return the federal fuel economy program to the limits established by Congress. The standards issued by NHTSA must be reset at reasonable levels that are technologically feasible for ICE automobiles and con- sistent with an increase in domestic auto production and healthy growth in the sale of safer and more affordable new vehicles. To achieve these goals, the next Administration should: l Reduce proposed fuel economy levels. The Administration should consider returning to the minimum average fuel economy levels specified by Congress for model year 2020 vehicles: levels aimed at achieving a fleet-wide average of 35 miles per gallon. Consideration should be given to maintaining the standards at those levels for the near term in order to promote the objectives laid out by Congress. l Ensure that DOT again exercises priority in the setting of fuel economy standards. Any EPA limits on carbon dioxide emissions, even if authorized under the Clean Air Act, must support and work in harmony with DOT standards and must not override them or usurp DOT’s regulatory role under EPCA. For example, EPA could regulate air conditioning systems and leave engine standards to DOT. — 629 — Department of Transportation l Revoke the special waiver granted to California by the Biden Administration. California has no valid basis under the Clean Air Act to claim an extraordinary or unique air quality impact from carbon dioxide emissions, and EPCA is clear that under no circumstances may a state agency regulate fuel economy in place of DOT. The federal government should therefore exercise its preemptive authority over CARB and take all steps necessary to invalidate any inconsistent fuel economy requirements imposed by CARB, including its ban on sales of internal combustion engines. FEDERAL HIGHWAY ADMINISTRATION The Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) has jurisdiction over the inter- state highway system, which is vital for the transportation of goods and people throughout the country. The FHWA, in conjunction with state DOTs, works to ensure the quality and safety of highways and bridges. However, over the course of decades, presidential Administrations and Con- gress have caused the FHWA to go beyond its original mission. The variety of infrastructure projects now eligible for funding through the FHWA include fer- ryboat terminals, hiking trails, bicycle lanes, and local sidewalks. In many cases, such projects should be the sole responsibility of local or state governments, not dependent on FHWA funding. For local projects, federal involvement adds red tape and bureaucratic delays rather than value. The Biden Administration has broadened the FHWA’s scope by emphasizing the priorities of progressive activists instead of pursuing practical goals. These policies include a focus on “equity,” a nebulous concept that in practice means awarding grants to favored identity groups, as well as imposing obligations on states concern- ing carbon dioxide emissions from highway traffic—areas not encompassed within FHWA’s statutory authorities. Furthermore, the Biden Administration’s embrace of the “Vision Zero” approach to safety often means actively seeking congestion for automobiles to reduce speeds. Finally, the Administration has sought to use a “guidance memo” to impose policies not enacted by Congress, most notably to make it harder for growing states to expand highway capacity. Instead, the next Administration should: l Seek to refocus the FHWA on maintaining and improving the highway system. l Remove or reform rules and regulations that hamper state governments. l Reduce the amount of federal involvement in local infrastructure decisions.
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About These Correlations
Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.