ADVERSARIES Act

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Bill ID: 119/hr/6331
Last Updated: July 16, 2026

Sponsored by

Rep. Miller, Max L. [R-OH-7]

ID: M001222

Follow the money

The bill

ADVERSARIES Act

HR. 6331, 119th Congress — read as touching Defense Contractors.

The sponsor

Rep. Miller, Max L. [R-OH-7]

Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.

The money

$125,700 raised

21 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.

The alignment

85% match to Project 2025

This bill's text tracks the "Department of Commerce" section, p. 705-707 of the Mandate for Leadership.

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

Track this bill's progress through the legislative process

Latest Action

Ordered to be Reported in the Nature of a Substitute by the Yeas and Nays: 44 - 0.

April 21, 2026

Introduced

📍 Current Status

Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.

🏛️

Committee Review

🗳️

Floor Action

✅

Passed House

🏛️

Senate Review

🎉

Passed Congress

🖊️

Presidential Action

⚖️

Became Law

📚 How does a bill become a law?

1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.

2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

Another masterpiece of legislative theater, courtesy of the geniuses in Congress. The ADVERSARIES Act, because who doesn't love a good acronym? Let's dissect this mess and uncover the real disease beneath the symptoms.

**Main Purpose & Objectives:** Ah, the stated purpose: to modify certain definitions under the Export Control Reform Act of 2018. How quaint. In reality, this bill is a thinly veiled attempt to pander to the China-hawks and defense contractors, while pretending to address "national security concerns." The actual objective? To further entrench the military-industrial complex and justify more bloated defense spending.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill amends Section 1742 of the Export Control Reform Act, expanding the definition of "foreign person" to include various Chinese entities, their subsidiaries, and affiliates. Because, you know, the previous definitions were just too narrow and didn't sufficiently stoke the flames of Sinophobia. The changes are a laundry list of bureaucratic tweaks, designed to create the illusion of action while maintaining the status quo.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The usual suspects: defense contractors, China-bashing politicians, and the clueless voters who swallow this nonsense whole. The bill's proponents will claim it's about protecting national security, but let's be real – it's about lining the pockets of Lockheed Martin, Boeing, and their ilk. The actual victims? American businesses and consumers, who'll face increased regulatory burdens and higher costs due to these "security" measures.

**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill is a classic case of legislative myopia. By further restricting exports and tightening screws on Chinese entities, the U.S. will only accelerate the decline of its own competitiveness in the global market. The real impact? More jobs lost, more innovation stifled, and more taxpayer dollars funneled into the abyss of defense spending. But hey, who needs a functioning economy when you can have a robust military-industrial complex?

In conclusion, the ADVERSARIES Act is a textbook example of legislative malpractice. It's a cynical ploy to exploit fears, pad the pockets of special interests, and perpetuate the cycle of militarism. The diagnosis? A bad case of "Patriot-itis" – a disease characterized by an inflated sense of national security, a severe lack of critical thinking, and a healthy dose of hypocrisy. Prognosis? More of the same: a never-ending cycle of bureaucratic bloat, crony capitalism, and legislative theater. Joy.

Related Topics

Defense Spending & Procurement
Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (Dr. Haus personality)

💰 Campaign Finance Network

Rep. Miller, Max L. [R-OH-7]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions
$125,700
21 donors
PACs
$0
Organizations
$1,000
Committees
$0
Individuals
$124,700

No PAC contributions found

1
THE CHICKASAW NATION
1 transaction
$1,000

No committee contributions found

1
GROVER, JACOB
1 transaction
$13,200
2
BEREN, ADAM
1 transaction
$6,600
3
SHEAR, HERB
1 transaction
$6,600
4
STAHL, LEWIS
1 transaction
$6,600
5
DARIVOFF, PHILIP
1 transaction
$6,600
6
PACKER, PAUL
1 transaction
$6,600
7
SINGER, PAUL
1 transaction
$6,600
8
FRIEDMAN, MARK
1 transaction
$6,600
9
HABER, JAMES
1 transaction
$6,600
10
MORENO, KEVIN
1 transaction
$6,600
11
FISHER, KENNETH
1 transaction
$6,600
12
FISHER, SHERRILYN
1 transaction
$6,600
13
KLINGENSTEIN, THOMAS
1 transaction
$6,600
14
SURACE, JAMES MR.
1 transaction
$6,600
15
SCHALL, BRIAN
1 transaction
$5,000
16
WEINBERG, RONALD
1 transaction
$5,000
17
SALZBERG, MICHAEL
1 transaction
$5,000
18
BLAHA, GEORGE
1 transaction
$3,900
19
STRUNK, JEFFREY
1 transaction
$3,500
20
HAWKINS, SHAFRON E
1 transaction
$3,300

Cosponsors & Their Campaign Finance

This bill has 3 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.

Rep. Shreve, Jefferson [R-IN-6]

ID: S001229

Top Contributors

10

1
SASSO, APRIL
HOMEMAKER • HOMEMAKER
IndividualCARMEL, IN
$6,600
Oct 30, 2024
2
PONDER, JACQUELINE
BOWMAN FAMILY HOLDINGS • LAWYER
IndividualGREENWOOD, IN
$3,437
Oct 29, 2024
3
KING, CHRISTOPHER M.
RUNNEBOHM CONSTRUCTION, INC. • OWNER
IndividualSHELBYVILLE, IN
$3,300
Jun 7, 2024
4
CALDWELL, JORDAN
CALDWELL'S INC. • EXECUTIVE
IndividualSHELBYVILLE, IN
$3,300
Oct 20, 2024
5
DOPPELT, BRIAN
BAINBRIDGE COMPANIES • EXECUTIVE
IndividualBOCA RATON, FL
$3,300
Nov 5, 2024
6
KING, KYLIE A.
HOMEMAKER • HOMEMAKER
IndividualSHELBYVILLE, IN
$3,300
Oct 20, 2024
7
SASSO, RICK C.
INDIANA SPINE GROUP • PHYSICIAN
IndividualCARMEL, IN
$3,300
Nov 5, 2024
8
SCHUMACHER, AMY MAE
THE HERITAGE GROUP • CEO
IndividualCARMEL, IN
$3,300
Oct 22, 2024
9
MCALLISTER, CHRIS
TARBERT PROPERTIES LP • PARTNER
IndividualINDIANAPOLIS, IN
$3,300
Nov 5, 2024
10
ZINK, JAMES C.
ZINK DISTRIBUTING • CHAIRMAN / CEO
IndividualINDIANAPOLIS, IN
$3,300
Nov 2, 2024

Rep. McCaul, Michael T. [R-TX-10]

ID: M001157

Top Contributors

10

1
SOUTH SPUR LP
OrganizationHOUSTON, TX
$3,300
Jan 31, 2024
2
TRACEY FOX KING & WALTERS
OrganizationHOUSTON, TX
$1,000
Feb 17, 2023
3
CHILDS, JOHN W.
JW CHILDS ASSOCIATES • OWNER
IndividualVERO BEACH, FL
$50,000
Dec 12, 2023
4
LANIER, BECKY MRS.
LANIER LAW FIRM • ATTORNEY
IndividualHOUSTON, TX
$50,000
Mar 4, 2024
5
LANIER, MARK W.
LANIER LAW FIRM • ATTORNEY
IndividualHOUSTON, TX
$50,000
Mar 4, 2024
6
CHILDS, JOHN W
IndividualVERO BEACH, FL
$38,400
Mar 15, 2024
7
CHILDS, JOHN W.
JW CHILDS ASSOCIATES • OWNER
IndividualVERO BEACH, FL
$38,400
May 7, 2024
8
CHILDS, JOHN W
IndividualVERO BEACH, FL
$33,400
Nov 14, 2024
9
CARLTON, C. CRAIG MR.
C.C. CARLTON INDUSTRIES • OWNER
IndividualAUSTIN, TX
$25,000
Feb 13, 2024
10
LUROS, HILARY
RETIRED • RETIRED
IndividualSUGAR LAND, TX
$25,000
Feb 27, 2024

Del. Moylan, James C. [R-GU-At Large]

ID: M001219

Top Contributors

10

1
EYE OF THE TIGER PAC
PACARLINGTON, VA
$5,000
Sep 20, 2024
2
JOHNSON FOR LOUISIANA
CCMMETARIE, LA
$2,000
Oct 18, 2024
3
ROBERT J. TORRES TRUST
OrganizationTAMUNING, GU
$250
Feb 19, 2024
4
MOYLAN, JUDITH A.
MOYLAN'S INSURANCE • PRESIDENT
IndividualBARRIGADA HEIGHTS, GU
$3,300
Oct 21, 2024
5
ANDERSON, KIM FELL
SECURITY TITLE • VICE PRESIDENT
IndividualTAMUNING, GU
$3,300
Sep 20, 2024
6
HABECK, TERRY W
AVIATION CONCEPTS INC. • CEO
IndividualBARRIGADA, GU
$3,300
Aug 20, 2024
7
YSRAEL, MICHAEL
YTANO TA PARTNERS • CEO
IndividualTUMON, GU
$3,300
Aug 20, 2024
8
YSRAEL, THERESA
Y TANO TA PARTNERS • VICE PRESIDENT
IndividualTAMUNING, GU
$3,300
Aug 20, 2024
9
FLORES, PHILIP J.
BANK PACIFIC • PRESIDENT
IndividualHAGATNA, GU
$3,000
Jun 13, 2024
10
SGRO, ANTHONY P
PARADISE FITNESS • PRESIDENT
IndividualHAGATNA, GU
$3,000
Jun 20, 2024

Donor Network - Rep. Miller, Max L. [R-OH-7]

PACs
Organizations
Individuals
Politicians

Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.

Loading...

Showing 67 nodes and 30 connections (50 secondary connections hidden)

Total contributions: $200,587

Top Donors - Rep. Miller, Max L. [R-OH-7]

Showing top 21 donors by contribution amount

1 Org20 Individuals

Industry Impact

Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 4 harmed.

  • −Defense Contractorsconfidence 0.90

    Section 2 modifies definitions under the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 to expand the scope of entities subject to export controls, including Chinese military companies and entities identified in BIS supplements, which could restrict defense contractors' ability to export certain technologies or components to those entities, imposing compliance costs and potential market contraction.

  • Section 2 expands the definition of covered entities to include subsidiaries/affiliates of Chinese military companies and BIS-listed entities, which could restrict semiconductor exports to those entities, impacting companies like Intel, AMD, TSMC, etc., through increased regulatory burden and potential loss of market access.

  • Section 2's expansion of export control definitions to include entities identified under BIS supplements and their subsidiaries could restrict AI chip and cloud technology exports to covered entities, affecting providers like AWS, Azure, Google Cloud, and AI labs that rely on global supply chains and markets.

  • −Telecommunicationsconfidence 0.75

    Section 2's broader definition of covered entities could restrict telecom equipment exports (e.g., 5G infrastructure) to listed Chinese entities and their affiliates, impacting vendors like Cisco, Juniper, and potentially affecting carriers' supply chains, though the direct impact on carriers is less clear.

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.

Department of Commerce

Strong
Vector: 66%
Pages: 705-707AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The ADVERSARIES Act directly expands the definition of 'foreign person' to capture Chinese military companies and their affiliates, which aligns with Project 2025's call for tighter export controls, broader Entity List inclusion, and addressing civil‑military fusion threats from China and Russia."

Key themes:export control modernizationChinese military entitiesEntity List expansiontightening definitionsnational security focus

— 673 — Department of Commerce Export Enforcement officers through improved and frequent training so they are able to detect export-control violations. EAR Revisions. The U.S. Government needs a new export control moderniza- tion effort to tighten the EAR policies governing licenses to countries of concern, including China and Russia (specifically, revise and/or reverse the 2008 through 2016 policies). When authoritarian governments explain what they plan to do, believe them unless hard evidence demonstrates otherwise. Case in point: China’s and Russia’s stated civil–military fusion policies demand central government command-and-control style systems in which every private entity serves the interests of the state and is forced to provide technology, services, capacity, and data to the central govern- ment and the military. Through this structure, commercial activities are routinely weaponized by authoritarian regimes that repeatedly identify the U.S. as an enemy. Accordingly, U.S. export control policies must be updated to reflect these realities and the associated threats to national security. Key priorities for EAR modernization for countries of concern should be: l Eliminating the “specially designed” licensing loophole; l Redesignating China and Russia to more highly prohibitive export licensing groups (country groups D or E); l Eliminating license exceptions; l Broadening foreign direct product rules; l Reducing the de minimis threshold from 25 percent to 10 percent—or 0 percent for critical technologies; l Tightening the deemed export rules to prevent technology transfer to foreign nationals from countries of concern; l Tightening the definition of “fundamental research” to address exploitation of the open U.S. university system by authoritarian governments through funding, students and researchers, and recruitment; l Eliminating license exceptions for sharing technology with controlled entities/countries through standards-setting “activities” and bodies; and l Improving regulations regarding published information for technology transfers. — 674 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise The next few years will prove or disprove the assertion that the U.S. stands on the precipice of a Cold War with China. Many believe that a Cold War has already begun; if so, then strategic decoupling from China is necessary and, fundamentally, any exports of goods, software, and technology to countries of concern, whether directly or indirectly, should be prohibited or controlled in the absence of good cause (e.g., humanitarian and medical aid, food aid). Entity List and Sanctions. There are currently just over 500 Chinese and over 500 Russian companies on the Department of Commerce’s Entity List, which reg- ulates exports of controlled and uncontrolled items to designated entities. Given China’s Civil–Military Fusion Strategy and Russia’s massive war efforts facili- tated by a broad range of the Russian economy, BIS must add more entities to the Entity List and apply a license review “policy of denial” that prohibits exports to these entities. Entity List parties that violate export controls should be placed on the BIS Denied Persons List (and thereby lose export privileges) and, if the violations are significant enough, they should also be sanctioned by the Department of Treasury. Data Transfer and Apps Used for Surveillance. Department of Commerce leadership should work across government agencies to address privacy and data concerns arising out of “big tech” from national security and export control per- spectives. In particular, they should draft and implement an executive order (EO) based on the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, which expands export control authority beyond ECRA’s scope (goods, software, technology) to regulate and restrict exports of U.S. persons’ data to countries of concern. The EO should establish a framework for the types of personal data subject to export controls and licensing policy by country, and the BIS should implement the EO through regulations. BIS should additionally designate app providers (such as WeChat and Byte Dance/TikTok) known for undermining U.S. national security through data collection, surveillance, and influence operations, to the Entity List. This listing would prevent app users from program updates, which would quickly make these apps non-operational in the United States. NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION Break Up NOAA. The single biggest Department of Commerce agency outside of decennial census years is the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, which houses the National Weather Service, National Marine Fisheries Service, and other components. NOAA garners $6.5 billion of the department’s $12 billion annual operational budget and accounts for more than half of the department’s personnel in non-decadal Census years (2021 figures). NOAA consists of six main offices: l The National Weather Service (NWS);

Department of Commerce

Strong
Vector: 63%
Pages: 705-707AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The ADVERSARIES Act directly expands the scope of entities subject to U.S. export controls to include Chinese military companies and their affiliates, aligning with Project 2025’s goal of tightening export controls on countries of concern like China and closing loopholes that enable technology transfer to adversarial regimes."

Key themes:export controlsChina military entitiesEAR tighteningnational securityforeign person definition

— 672 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise regulate exports of emerging and foundational technologies. Although the scope of such technologies is vast, to date BIS has only controlled just over 40 of these technologies. This does not meet the clear statutory intent of Congress that ECRA be leveraged to ensure that the United States maintains a technological advantage in technologies bearing upon national security interests. Currently, BIS self-identifies technologies that merit control under the EAR with minimal input from other federal agencies. This mechanism should be improved. BIS should create an open, transparent rulemaking process by which any industry participant, private entity, or branch of the government may, at any time, submit nominations for emerging/foundational technologies for control. Then, on a quarterly basis, BIS should make public such recommendations (while holding the identity of the submitter confidential) for public input, followed by an explanation about its ultimate decision to control or not control the items, its reasons, the level of controls applied (stringent or permissive), and the relevant Export Control Classification Number (ECCN) under the Commerce Control List. Commerce should also institute a mechanism whereby its decisions can be challenged, including on a confidential basis. Licensing Procedures: Adjudication and Transparency. Currently, if the Departments of Defense, State, Commerce, and Energy disagree on an export license decision, the disagreement may be escalated to the Operating Commit- tee—and subsequently to the Advisory Committee on Export Policy led by BIS’s Assistant Secretary for Export Administration. The Assistant Secretary does not need to lead the dispute resolution, and this process should be revised by giving lead authority to BIS’s Under Secretary, who is better able to account for diverging views. Moreover, BIS’s authority to overrule other agency votes should be changed. Each agency should have one equal vote and, if a licensing dispute remains unre- solved, the final decision should be elevated to the National Security Advisor and the Secretaries of Defense, State, Commerce, and Energy. Additionally, to improve congressional oversight of BIS’s license adjudication process, BIS should provide specific congressional committees with data from the Automated Export System on a quarterly basis. Electronic files should contain U.S. exporter by name; product description (e.g., harmonized system code and ECCN/U. S. Munitions List designation); end user and destination country; and when a license was required, whether the license was granted or denied. BIS cur- rently denies just 1.2 percent of export licenses. These data reporting requirements can help Congress better determine whether BIS is adequately protecting national security through appropriate use of export controls or whether additional direction from Congress is required. Improve End-Use Checks. The integrity of the export control system may be validated only through adequate end-use checks. BIS must deny export licenses to countries that do not permit adequate end-use checks (e.g., China/Russia) by U.S. authorities. BIS should also strengthen the forensic audit capabilities of its — 673 — Department of Commerce Export Enforcement officers through improved and frequent training so they are able to detect export-control violations. EAR Revisions. The U.S. Government needs a new export control moderniza- tion effort to tighten the EAR policies governing licenses to countries of concern, including China and Russia (specifically, revise and/or reverse the 2008 through 2016 policies). When authoritarian governments explain what they plan to do, believe them unless hard evidence demonstrates otherwise. Case in point: China’s and Russia’s stated civil–military fusion policies demand central government command-and-control style systems in which every private entity serves the interests of the state and is forced to provide technology, services, capacity, and data to the central govern- ment and the military. Through this structure, commercial activities are routinely weaponized by authoritarian regimes that repeatedly identify the U.S. as an enemy. Accordingly, U.S. export control policies must be updated to reflect these realities and the associated threats to national security. Key priorities for EAR modernization for countries of concern should be: l Eliminating the “specially designed” licensing loophole; l Redesignating China and Russia to more highly prohibitive export licensing groups (country groups D or E); l Eliminating license exceptions; l Broadening foreign direct product rules; l Reducing the de minimis threshold from 25 percent to 10 percent—or 0 percent for critical technologies; l Tightening the deemed export rules to prevent technology transfer to foreign nationals from countries of concern; l Tightening the definition of “fundamental research” to address exploitation of the open U.S. university system by authoritarian governments through funding, students and researchers, and recruitment; l Eliminating license exceptions for sharing technology with controlled entities/countries through standards-setting “activities” and bodies; and l Improving regulations regarding published information for technology transfers.

Trade

Strong
Vector: 61%
Pages: 816-818AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The ADVERSARIES Act expands export controls on Chinese military entities to curb technology transfers that bolster China's defense industrial base, directly addressing Project 2025's concern about Communist China's economic aggression and technology‑forcing policies."

Key themes:China economic aggressiontechnology transferexport controlsnational securitydefense industrial base

— 783 — Trade tariffs.17 A conservative Administration might do well to look at such a tax as part of its trade agenda. CHALLENGE #2: COMMUNIST CHINA’S ECONOMIC AGGRESSION AND QUEST FOR WORLD DOMINATION18 Among all of its bilateral trade relationships, America’s relationship with Com- munist China is the most fraught with difficulty. The problem is not just that the relentlessly mercantilist and protectionist trade policies that China has pursued ever since its accession to the WTO in 2001 have led to chronic, massive, and ever-expanding trade deficits. Communist China’s economic aggression in the traditional trade policy space is further facilitated by equally aggressive industrial policies and technology transfer–forcing policies that are designed to shift the world’s manufacturing and supply chains to Communist Chinese soil. The Chinese Communist Party’s policy goal is to propel the Chinese economy, but its broader goal is to strengthen Communist China’s defense industrial base and associated warfighting capabilities. That China unabashedly seeks to supplant America as the world’s dominant economic and military power is not in dispute. Rather, it is a prominent feature of Communist Chinese dictator Xi Jinping’s rhet- oric. Xi has promised that the deed will be done by 2049, the 100-year anniversary of the Communist takeover of the Mainland.19 In light of Communist China’s broader geopolitical and military agenda, the American President who takes office in January 2025 must view the U.S.–China trade relationship and associated policy reforms within the context of the broader existential threat posed by Communist China. The question is whether that next President should seek to decouple economically and financially from Communist China as America’s first best response to China’s unrelenting aggression or con- tinue efforts to negotiate with an authoritarian country and brutal dictatorship with a well-established reputation for failing to abide by any agreements it enters. Institutionalized Aggression. Table 5 depicts more than 50 types of policy aggression institutionalized by the CCP across six different categories of such aggression. Viewed as whole, the extent of Communist China’s aggression is breathtaking. At the trade policy level, Communist China relies heavily on a wide range of mercantilist and protectionist tools to protect its own markets and unfairly exploit foreign markets. These instruments of Communist Chinese trade aggression include high tariffs and nontariff barriers, currency manipulation, a heavy reli- ance on sweatshop labor and pollution havens, the dumping of unfairly subsidized exports, and widespread counterfeiting and piracy: Communist China is the world’s largest source of counterfeit and pirated products. In addition, Communist Chinese enterprises benefit from preferential policies that have burdened world markets with subsidized overcapacity. The resultant glut

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About These Correlations

Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.

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