The bill
ADVERSARIES Act
HR. 6331, 119th Congress — read as touching Defense Contractors.
Sponsored by
Rep. Miller, Max L. [R-OH-7]
ID: M001222
Follow the money
The bill
HR. 6331, 119th Congress — read as touching Defense Contractors.
The sponsor
Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.
The money
21 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.
The alignment
This bill's text tracks the "Introduction" section, p. 705-707 of the Mandate for Leadership.
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Ordered to be Reported in the Nature of a Substitute by the Yeas and Nays: 44 - 0.
April 21, 2026
📍 Current Status
Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Another masterpiece of legislative theater, courtesy of the geniuses in Congress. The ADVERSARIES Act, because who doesn't love a good acronym? Let's dissect this mess and uncover the real disease beneath the symptoms.
**Main Purpose & Objectives:** Ah, the stated purpose: to modify certain definitions under the Export Control Reform Act of 2018. How quaint. In reality, this bill is a thinly veiled attempt to pander to the China-hawks and defense contractors, while pretending to address "national security concerns." The actual objective? To further entrench the military-industrial complex and justify more bloated defense spending.
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill amends Section 1742 of the Export Control Reform Act, expanding the definition of "foreign person" to include various Chinese entities, their subsidiaries, and affiliates. Because, you know, the previous definitions were just too narrow and didn't sufficiently stoke the flames of Sinophobia. The changes are a laundry list of bureaucratic tweaks, designed to create the illusion of action while maintaining the status quo.
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The usual suspects: defense contractors, China-bashing politicians, and the clueless voters who swallow this nonsense whole. The bill's proponents will claim it's about protecting national security, but let's be real – it's about lining the pockets of Lockheed Martin, Boeing, and their ilk. The actual victims? American businesses and consumers, who'll face increased regulatory burdens and higher costs due to these "security" measures.
**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill is a classic case of legislative myopia. By further restricting exports and tightening screws on Chinese entities, the U.S. will only accelerate the decline of its own competitiveness in the global market. The real impact? More jobs lost, more innovation stifled, and more taxpayer dollars funneled into the abyss of defense spending. But hey, who needs a functioning economy when you can have a robust military-industrial complex?
In conclusion, the ADVERSARIES Act is a textbook example of legislative malpractice. It's a cynical ploy to exploit fears, pad the pockets of special interests, and perpetuate the cycle of militarism. The diagnosis? A bad case of "Patriot-itis" – a disease characterized by an inflated sense of national security, a severe lack of critical thinking, and a healthy dose of hypocrisy. Prognosis? More of the same: a never-ending cycle of bureaucratic bloat, crony capitalism, and legislative theater. Joy.
Rep. Miller, Max L. [R-OH-7]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
No PAC contributions found
No committee contributions found
This bill has 3 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.
ID: S001229
Top Contributors
10
ID: M001157
Top Contributors
10
ID: M001219
Top Contributors
10
Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Showing 67 nodes and 30 connections (50 secondary connections hidden)
Total contributions: $200,587
Showing top 21 donors by contribution amount
Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 4 harmed.
Section 2 modifies definitions under the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 to expand the scope of entities subject to export controls, including Chinese military companies and entities identified in BIS supplements, which could restrict defense contractors' ability to export certain technologies or components to those entities, imposing compliance costs and potential market contraction.
Section 2 expands the definition of covered entities to include subsidiaries/affiliates of Chinese military companies and BIS-listed entities, which could restrict semiconductor exports to those entities, impacting companies like Intel, AMD, TSMC, etc., through increased regulatory burden and potential loss of market access.
Section 2's expansion of export control definitions to include entities identified under BIS supplements and their subsidiaries could restrict AI chip and cloud technology exports to covered entities, affecting providers like AWS, Azure, Google Cloud, and AI labs that rely on global supply chains and markets.
Section 2's broader definition of covered entities could restrict telecom equipment exports (e.g., 5G infrastructure) to listed Chinese entities and their affiliates, impacting vendors like Cisco, Juniper, and potentially affecting carriers' supply chains, though the direct impact on carriers is less clear.
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.
— 673 — Department of Commerce Export Enforcement officers through improved and frequent training so they are able to detect export-control violations. EAR Revisions. The U.S. Government needs a new export control moderniza- tion effort to tighten the EAR policies governing licenses to countries of concern, including China and Russia (specifically, revise and/or reverse the 2008 through 2016 policies). When authoritarian governments explain what they plan to do, believe them unless hard evidence demonstrates otherwise. Case in point: China’s and Russia’s stated civil–military fusion policies demand central government command-and-control style systems in which every private entity serves the interests of the state and is forced to provide technology, services, capacity, and data to the central govern- ment and the military. Through this structure, commercial activities are routinely weaponized by authoritarian regimes that repeatedly identify the U.S. as an enemy. Accordingly, U.S. export control policies must be updated to reflect these realities and the associated threats to national security. Key priorities for EAR modernization for countries of concern should be: l Eliminating the “specially designed” licensing loophole; l Redesignating China and Russia to more highly prohibitive export licensing groups (country groups D or E); l Eliminating license exceptions; l Broadening foreign direct product rules; l Reducing the de minimis threshold from 25 percent to 10 percent—or 0 percent for critical technologies; l Tightening the deemed export rules to prevent technology transfer to foreign nationals from countries of concern; l Tightening the definition of “fundamental research” to address exploitation of the open U.S. university system by authoritarian governments through funding, students and researchers, and recruitment; l Eliminating license exceptions for sharing technology with controlled entities/countries through standards-setting “activities” and bodies; and l Improving regulations regarding published information for technology transfers. — 674 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise The next few years will prove or disprove the assertion that the U.S. stands on the precipice of a Cold War with China. Many believe that a Cold War has already begun; if so, then strategic decoupling from China is necessary and, fundamentally, any exports of goods, software, and technology to countries of concern, whether directly or indirectly, should be prohibited or controlled in the absence of good cause (e.g., humanitarian and medical aid, food aid). Entity List and Sanctions. There are currently just over 500 Chinese and over 500 Russian companies on the Department of Commerce’s Entity List, which reg- ulates exports of controlled and uncontrolled items to designated entities. Given China’s Civil–Military Fusion Strategy and Russia’s massive war efforts facili- tated by a broad range of the Russian economy, BIS must add more entities to the Entity List and apply a license review “policy of denial” that prohibits exports to these entities. Entity List parties that violate export controls should be placed on the BIS Denied Persons List (and thereby lose export privileges) and, if the violations are significant enough, they should also be sanctioned by the Department of Treasury. Data Transfer and Apps Used for Surveillance. Department of Commerce leadership should work across government agencies to address privacy and data concerns arising out of “big tech” from national security and export control per- spectives. In particular, they should draft and implement an executive order (EO) based on the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, which expands export control authority beyond ECRA’s scope (goods, software, technology) to regulate and restrict exports of U.S. persons’ data to countries of concern. The EO should establish a framework for the types of personal data subject to export controls and licensing policy by country, and the BIS should implement the EO through regulations. BIS should additionally designate app providers (such as WeChat and Byte Dance/TikTok) known for undermining U.S. national security through data collection, surveillance, and influence operations, to the Entity List. This listing would prevent app users from program updates, which would quickly make these apps non-operational in the United States. NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION Break Up NOAA. The single biggest Department of Commerce agency outside of decennial census years is the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, which houses the National Weather Service, National Marine Fisheries Service, and other components. NOAA garners $6.5 billion of the department’s $12 billion annual operational budget and accounts for more than half of the department’s personnel in non-decadal Census years (2021 figures). NOAA consists of six main offices: l The National Weather Service (NWS);
Policy matches are calculated using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text. A score of 60% or higher indicates meaningful thematic overlap. This does not imply direct causation or intent, but highlights areas where legislation aligns with Project 2025 policy objectives.