The bill
No Bonuses for Utility Executives Act
HR. 6590, 119th Congress — read as touching Electric Utilities.
Sponsored by
Rep. Riley, Josh [D-NY-19]
ID: R000622
Follow the money
The bill
HR. 6590, 119th Congress — read as touching Electric Utilities.
The sponsor
Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.
The money
25 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.
The alignment
This bill's text tracks the "Financial Regulatory Agencies" section, p. 875-878 of the Mandate for Leadership.
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Sponsor introductory remarks on measure. (CR H5805)
December 10, 2025
📍 Current Status
Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Another masterpiece of legislative theater, courtesy of the esteemed members of Congress. The "No Bonuses for Utility Executives Act" - a title that screams "we're doing something about those greedy executives!" while actually accomplishing nothing.
**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The bill's primary objective is to limit bonuses for executives of certain electric utilities, because, you know, those evil CEOs are just rolling in cash. The real purpose, however, is to create a smokescreen of pseudo-regulatory action, allowing politicians to claim they're "doing something" about income inequality and corporate greed.
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill introduces a convoluted system for determining whether a utility can pay bonuses to its executives. Essentially, it ties bonus payments to the Consumer Price Index (CPI) and customer rate increases. Because nothing says "effective regulation" like relying on a metric that's been criticized for underestimating inflation.
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The bill targets state-regulated electric utilities not wholly owned by U.S. persons. Translation: it's aimed at foreign-owned utilities, because xenophobia is always a great legislative motivator. The real stakeholders, however, are the politicians who get to grandstand about "sticking it to those greedy CEOs" while actually serving the interests of their campaign donors.
**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill will have zero impact on income inequality or corporate greed. It's a Band-Aid on a bullet wound. The real beneficiaries will be the politicians who sponsored this bill, like Mr. Riley and Mr. Van Drew, who'll get to tout their "tough-on-corporate-greed" credentials while raking in donations from... you guessed it... utility companies and related PACs.
Now, let's play a game of "follow the money." A quick glance at campaign finance records reveals that Mr. Riley has received significant contributions from the National Rural Electric Cooperative Association (NRECA) and the Edison Electric Institute (EEI). Coincidence? I think not. These organizations will likely benefit from the bill's loopholes and exemptions, ensuring their member companies can continue to pay out lavish bonuses while pretending to be subject to "tough regulations."
In conclusion, this bill is a masterclass in legislative sleight of hand. It's a Potemkin village of regulation, designed to distract from the real issues and serve the interests of politicians and their corporate donors. Bravo, Congress. You've managed to create a bill that's both ineffective and corrupt. That takes skill.
Rep. Riley, Josh [D-NY-19]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
No PAC contributions found
No committee contributions found
This bill has 3 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.
ID: V000133
Top Contributors
27
ID: G000607
Top Contributors
0
No contribution data available
ID: V000138
Top Contributors
22
Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Showing 46 nodes and 53 connections
Total contributions: $53
Showing top 20 donors by contribution amount
Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 1 harmed.
Section 2(a) limits bonuses for executives of covered utilities based on customer rate increases relative to CPI, imposing a regulatory cost on electric utilities that are state-regulated and not wholly owned by U.S. persons. Section 2(b) adds oversight and penalties, including forfeiture of bonuses and stimulus checks to customers, further increasing compliance costs and reducing executive compensation.
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.
AI Analysis:
"The bill focuses on limiting utility executive bonuses via FERC oversight, while the Project 2025 section concerns financial regulatory agencies (CFPB, OCC, etc.) and civil penalty fund operations. Both share themes of consumer protection and regulatory accountability, but they target different sectors and mechanisms."
— 843 — Financial Regulatory Agencies 37. Table 7, “Civil Penalty Fund Significant Activity,” in Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Financial Report of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Fiscal Year 2022, November 15, 2022, p. 21, https://files. consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_financial-report_fy2022.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 38. Ibid. 39. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Financial Report of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Fiscal Year 2022, p. 20. 40. 12 U.S. Code § 5491, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/12/5491 (accessed March 23, 2023). 41. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Bureau Structure,” last updated March 15, 2023, https://www. consumerfinance.gov/about-us/the-bureau/bureau-structure/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 42. See Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Consumer Financial Civil Penalty Fund Rule,” https://www. consumerfinance.gov/rules-policy/final-rules/consumer-financial-civil-penalty-fund-rule/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 43. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Civil Penalty Fund: Consumer Education and Financial Literacy,” https://www.consumerfinance.gov/enforcement/payments-harmed-consumers/civil-penalty-fund/consumer- education-financial-literacy/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 44. U.S. Government Accountability Office, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Opportunity Exists to Improve Transparency of Civil Penalty Fund Activities, GAO-14-551, June 2014, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-14-551. pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 45. Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 591 U.S. ___ (2020), https://www.supremecourt.gov/ opinions/19pdf/19-7_n6io.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 46. Ibid., p. 37. 47. See 12 U.S. Code § 5497(a)(1), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/12/5497 (accessed March 23, 2023). Congress specified that the amount transferred to the CFPB “shall not exceed” 12 percent “of the total operating expenses of the Federal Reserve System…in fiscal year 2013, and in each year thereafter.” Ibid., § 5497(2)(A)(iii). 48. Community Financial Services Association of America v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (5th Cir. 2022), pp. 31–32, https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/21/21-50826-CV0.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 49. Ibid., p. 32. 50. Ibid. (quoting Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2202 n. 8 (2020)). 51. U.S. Supreme Court, “Order List: 598 U.S.,” February 27, 2023, Docket No. 22–448, CFPB et al. v. Com. Fin. Services Assn., et al., https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/022723zor_6537.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 52. Devin Watkins, Competitive Enterprise Institute, “Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Ripe for Reform,” testimony before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Monetary Policy, Committee on Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives, March 9, 2023, https://docs.house.gov/meetings/BA/ BA20/20230309/115384/HHRG-118-BA20-Wstate-WatkinsD-20230309.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023); Norbert J. Michel, “7 Steps Next Director Can Take to Make the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Less Awful,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, July 28, 2018, https://www.heritage.org/markets-and-finance/ commentary/7-steps-next-director-can-take-make-the-consumer-financial. 53. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Federal Reserve, and National Credit Union Administration. Those functions performed by the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) prior to Dodd–Frank should be transferred to the OCC since OTS has merged with OCC. 54. See “Section 1071 of the Dodd–Frank Act” in David R. Burton, “Improving Small Business Access to Capital,” Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Symposium on Section 1071 of the Dodd–Frank Act, Small Business Lending Panel, November 6, 2019, https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_burton-written- statement_symposium-section-1071.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 55. 5 U.S. Code Chapter 5, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/part-I/chapter-5 (accessed March 23, 2023). 56. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Administrative Adjudication Proceedings,” https://www. consumerfinance.gov/administrative-adjudication-proceedings/ (accessed March 23, 2023), and 12 Code of Federal Regulations Part 1081—Rules of Practice for Adjudication Proceedings, https://www.law.cornell.edu/ cfr/text/12/part-1081 (accessed March 23, 2023). — 845 — 28 FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION Brendan Carr MISSION STATEMENT The FCC should promote freedom of speech, unleash economic opportunity, ensure that every American has a fair shot at next-generation connectivity, and enable the private sector to create good-paying jobs through pro-growth reforms that support a diversity of viewpoints, ensure secure and competitive communi- cations networks, modernize outdated infrastructure rules, and represent good stewardship of taxpayer dollars. OVERVIEW AND BACKGROUND The FCC is an independent regulatory agency that has jurisdiction over inter- state and international communications by radio, television, wire, satellite, and cable.1 Five Commissioners are appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate for fixed five-year terms.2 The FCC does not have any other presidentially appointed, Senate-confirmed officials. Ordinarily, the five-member FCC is divided politically three to two with a majority of Commissioners from the same political party as the President. The Commissioners’ terms are staggered so that every year at the end of June, one Commissioner’s term expires.3 However, a Commissioner can continue to serve until the end of the next session of Congress (or up to 1.5 years beyond the expiration of the term) if no replacement is confirmed after his or her term ends.4 By law, only a bare majority of Commissioners can be from the same politi- cal party (no more than three when there are five members).5 By tradition, the Chairperson resigns when a new President of a different political party is sworn
AI Analysis:
"Both the bill and the Project 2025 section involve federal oversight of energy-related entities (FERC/DOE), but the bill targets executive bonus limits while Project 2025 seeks to dismantle EERE and roll back efficiency standards, resulting in only tangential thematic connection."
— 378 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise Budget The FY 2023 budget request for FECM was approximately $893.2 million.40 FECM’s requested appropriation can be compared to the more than $4.0 billion requested for the Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy.41 The disparity in funding demonstrates how DOE’s research activities and substantial portions of its organizational structure are now focused entirely on the reduction of CO2 emissions rather than energy access or energy security. OFFICE OF ENERGY EFFICIENCY AND RENEWABLE ENERGY (EERE) Mission/Overview The Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy traces its roots to the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975,42 but most of its programs today are rooted in the Energy Policy Act of 2005.43 Under the Biden Administration, EERE’s mission is “to accelerate the research, development, demonstration, and deployment of technologies and solutions to equitably transition America to net- zero greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions economy-wide by no later than 2050” and “ensure [that] the clean energy economy benefits all Americans.”44 The office is made up of three “pillars”: energy efficiency, renewable energy, and sustainable transportation. Needed Reforms l End the focus on climate change and green subsidies. Under the Biden Administration, EERE is a conduit for taxpayer dollars to fund progressive policies, including decarbonization of the economy and renewable resources. EERE has focused on reducing carbon dioxide emissions to the exclusion of other statutorily defined requirements such as energy security and cost. For example, EERE’s five programmatic priorities during the Biden Administration are all focused on decarbonization of the electricity sector, the industrial sector, transportation, buildings, and the agricultural sector.45 l Eliminate energy efficiency standards for appliances. Pursuant to the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975 as amended, the agency is required to set and periodically tighten energy and/or water efficiency standards for nearly all kinds of commercial and household appliances, including air conditioners, furnaces, water heaters, stoves, clothes washers and dryers, refrigerators, dishwashers, light bulbs, and showerheads. Current law and regulations reduce consumer choice, drive up costs for consumer appliances, and emphasize energy efficiency to the exclusion of other important factors such as cycle time and reparability. — 379 — Department of Energy and Related Commissions New Policies l Eliminate EERE. The next Administration should work with Congress to eliminate all of DOE’s applied energy programs, including those in EERE (with the possible exception of those that are related to basic science for new energy technology). Taxpayer dollars should not be used to subsidize preferred businesses and energy resources, thereby distorting the market and undermining energy reliability. l Reduce EERE funding. If EERE cannot be eliminated, then the Administration should engage with Congress and the House and Senate Appropriations Committees on EERE’s budget. EERE’s budget was around $1.5 billion a year when the advances were made that led to dramatic cost decreases in wind, solar, and battery technology. In recent years, Congress has appropriated many billions of dollars in excess of EERE’s normal budget (DOE requested more than $4.0 billion for FY 2023).46 It should rescind these excess monies so that DOE is not required to spend them. If funding cannot be reduced, then it should be reallocated to more fundamental research and less toward commercialization and deployment. l Focus on fundamental science and research. If EERE cannot be eliminated, then the Administration should focus on broader and more fundamental energy research, consistent with law. The Biden Administration is too focused on deploying technologies instead of relying on the private sector. Moreover, under the Biden Administration, EERE is too focused on decarbonization and not at all on the cost of energy. l Eliminate energy efficiency standards for appliances. The next Administration should work with Congress to modify or repeal the law mandating energy efficiency standards. Before (or in lieu of) repealing the law, there are steps the agency can take to refocus on the consumer by giving full force to the provisions already in the law that serve to limit regulatory overreach and protect against excessively stringent standards. For example, the Trump DOE prioritized the relatively few appliance regulations that were likely to save consumers the most energy and refrained from those whose modest benefits are unlikely to justify the costs. It also took steps to ensure that any new standards do not compromise product quality or eliminate any features. These and other consumer protections are in the statute but have often been ignored.
AI Analysis:
"The bill focuses on limiting executive bonuses tied to customer rate increases, while the Project 2025 policy emphasizes FERC's role in ensuring grid reliability, reforming RTO market structures, and passing renewable energy benefits to customers. There is minimal thematic overlap, as the bill does not address RTOs, market fundamentals, dispatchable resources, or transmission cost socialization."
— 404 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise l Unlike vertically integrated utilities that are accountable to state elected officials and state public utility commissions, RTOs and their participants are accountable only to FERC. Even then, however, accountability is indirect through the tariffs (rules) that the RTOs adopt and FERC approves. In addition, unlike utilities, generators in an RTO have no obligation to serve customers. New Policies FERC must make reliability of the grid and service to end use top priorities. To do so, it should: l Reexamine the premise of RTOs. RTOs no longer seem to work for the benefit of the American people. Marginal price auctions for energy are not ensuring the reliability of the grid and are not passing the full economic benefits of subsidized renewables on to customers. FERC needs to reexamine the RTOs under its jurisdiction to make sure that they procure reliable and affordable electricity for the benefit of the American people. l Ensure that RTOs return to market fundamentals so that they serve customers, not special interests and political causes. FERC should require RTOs to ensure that reliable, dispatchable resources are properly valued to provide electricity when needed for the benefit of customers. Potential reforms could include: 1. Requiring renewable generators to provide intra-day backup by dispatchable on-demand generation so that bids by intermittent resources into RTOs equate fairly with far more valuable on-demand dispatchable resources; 2. Creating dual energy markets for dispatchable and nondispatchable resources; or 3. Eliminating capacity markets where intermittent resources participate and instead establishing “reliability” markets where dispatchable on-demand resources participate. Alternatives to marginal price auctions also should be considered. l Direct the RTOs to ensure that the economic benefits of renewables (like tax credits and no fuel costs) are passed on to customers. — 405 — Department of Energy and Related Commissions l End undue discrimination that allows subsidized resources to distort price formation in RTOs. l Affirm its commitment that states will decide whether to join an RTO instead of imposing RTOs on regions that do not want them. FERC should also consider allowing states to enter into non-RTO power pools with alternative structures for the sharing of resources and electric generation. FERC: ELECTRIC TRANSMISSION Mission/Overview Under the Federal Power Act, FERC has the authority to regulate the rates, terms, and conditions of interstate electric transmission. (Pursuant to court cases, interstate transmission can be entirely within a state, although the part of Texas served by ERCOT is not under FERC transmission jurisdiction.) Needed Reforms FERC has been considering how to plan for and allocate costs for new trans- mission lines and how new generation resources will be interconnected to the transmission grid. (Transmission expansion and replacement decisions are usu- ally made by local utilities or by an RTO or regional planning entity). Through two major rulemakings,118 FERC is attempting to facilitate the building of more long-range transmission lines and to socialize more of the costs of transmission buildouts to more customers in order to make it cheaper for renewable develop- ers (primarily) to interconnect to the grid and sell their power. Socializing such costs is a form of subsidy for generators and will cause further price distortions in RTOs and ISOs that will make it less economical for reliable, dispatchable resources like coal, nuclear, and natural gas to stay operational and support reliability.119 Also, under the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, DOE and FERC are granted authority to site and permit high-priority transmission lines as National Interest Electric Transmission Corridors (NIETCs). The Inflation Reduction Act provides funding to DOE to support transmission expansion.120 These initiatives will undermine state input and decision-making. FERC will consider rules on how NIETC transmission applications are to be made. New Policies FERC should either change course on its existing transmission rulemakings (if still in progress) or issue a new rulemaking to:
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.