The bill
IRAN Act
HR. 7380, 119th Congress — read as touching Telecommunications.
Sponsored by
Rep. Swalwell, Eric [D-CA-14]
ID: S001193
Follow the money
The bill
HR. 7380, 119th Congress — read as touching Telecommunications.
The sponsor
Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.
The money
23 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.
The alignment
This bill's text tracks the "Department of State" section, p. 217-219 of the Mandate for Leadership.
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
ASSUMING FIRST SPONSORSHIP - Ms. Tenney asked unanimous consent that she may hereafter be considered as the first sponsor of H.R. 7380, a bill originally introduced by Representative Swalwell of California, for the purpose of adding cosponsors and requesting reprintings pursuant to clause 7 of rule XII. Agreed to without objection.
April 19, 2026
📍 Current Status
Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Another masterpiece of legislative theater, courtesy of the geniuses in Congress. Let's dissect this farce, shall we?
**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The IRAN Act (because who doesn't love a good acronym?) claims to promote internet freedom and access to information in Iran. How noble. In reality, it's just another attempt to meddle in international affairs while pretending to care about human rights.
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill amends the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (because who remembers that one?) to:
* Require the Secretary of State to coordinate efforts to promote internet freedom in Iran (yawn) * Develop strategies for increasing access to virtual private networks (VPNs) and direct-to-cell satellite technologies (because the Iranian government won't just, you know, block them) * Ensure sanctions don't impede companies providing technology to Iranian civilians (wink-wink, nudge-nudge, say no more) * Review and update the strategy every 120 days (because bureaucratic busywork is the best kind of work)
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The usual suspects:
* The Iranian government (who will likely just laugh at these attempts to circumvent their internet controls) * Iranian civilians (who might actually benefit from this, but let's be real, it's not like the US government cares about them) * Satellite and DTC operators (who will have to navigate the thrilling world of international telecommunications regulations) * The Secretary of State (who gets to add "internet freedom coordinator" to their already impressive resume)
**Potential Impact & Implications:** Oh boy, where do I even start?
* This bill will likely have zero impact on the Iranian government's internet control measures. They'll just find ways to block or circumvent these efforts. * It might provide a minor boost to satellite and DTC operators, but let's not pretend this is anything more than a token gesture. * The real winners here are the politicians who get to grandstand about human rights while doing nothing meaningful to address the actual issues. * And of course, the Iranian people will continue to suffer under their oppressive government, but hey, at least they'll have slightly better internet access. Silver linings, right?
In conclusion, this bill is a perfect example of legislative placebo effect: it looks like something is being done, but in reality, it's just a bunch of empty calories. The IRAN Act is a symptom of a deeper disease – the chronic inability of politicians to address real problems while pretending to care about human rights. Now, if you'll excuse me, I have better things to do than watch this farce unfold.
Rep. Swalwell, Eric [D-CA-14]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
No PAC contributions found
No committee contributions found
This bill has 10 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.
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Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Showing 61 nodes and 38 connections (53 secondary connections hidden)
Total contributions: $173,965
Showing top 19 donors by contribution amount
Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 3 helped.
Section 4(a) requires FCC licensees to refrain from intentionally disabling, degrading, or geo-blocking satellite or DTC coverage over Iran, which benefits telecommunications companies by mandating service continuity and potentially expanding market access for satellite and DTC services.
Section 5 establishes programs to deliver cybersecurity training and furnish digital-safety tools (including VPN services and encrypted messaging) to civil society in Iran, directly benefiting cybersecurity firms that provide such tools and services.
Sections 3 and 5 promote deployment of VPNs, eSIM technology, and secure communications tools, which could increase demand for platforms and services provided by big tech companies that offer such technologies (e.g., Google, Apple, Meta).
For each industry this bill affects, here's what the sponsor (Rep. Swalwell, Eric [D-CA-14])received from donors associated with that industry during the 2022–present cycles. Donations are not proof of intent — they are a record of who funds the people writing the law.
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.
AI Analysis:
"The IRAN Act aligns with Project 2025's goal of supporting freedom-seeking Iranians and promoting human rights, specifically through enhancing internet freedom and access to information. However, it does not address the broader strategic objectives such as nuclear non‑proliferation, sanctions expansion, or regional security pacts emphasized in the Project 2025 policy."
— 185 — Department of State l First, the U.S. must prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear technology and delivery capabilities and more broadly block Iranian ambitions. This means, inter alia, reinstituting and expanding Trump Administration sanctions; providing security assistance for regional partners; supporting, through public diplomacy and otherwise, freedom-seeking Iranian people in their revolt against the mullahs; and ensuring Israel has both the military means and the political support and flexibility to take what it deems to be appropriate measures to defend itself against the Iranian regime and its regional proxies Hamas, Hezbollah, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. l Second, the next Administration should build on the Trump Administration’s diplomatic successes by encouraging other Arab states, including Saudi Arabia, to enter the Abraham Accords. Related policies should include reversing, as appropriate, the Biden Administration’s degradation of the long-standing partnership with Saudi Arabia. The Palestinian Authority should be defunded. A further key priority is keeping Türkiye in the Western fold and a NATO ally. This includes a vigorous outreach to Türkiye to dissuade it from “hedging” toward Russia or China, which is likely to require a rethinking of U.S. support for YPG/PKK [People’s Protection Units/Kurdistan Worker’s Party] Kurdish forces, which Ankara believes are an existential threat to its security. For the foreseeable future— and much longer than one new Administration—Middle Eastern oil will play a key role in the world economy. Therefore, the U.S. must continue to support its allies and compete with its economic adversaries, including China. Relations with Saudi Arabia should be strengthened in a way that seriously curtails Chinese influence in Riyadh. l Third, it is in the U.S. national interest to build a Middle East security pact that includes Israel, Egypt, the Gulf states, and potentially India, as a second “Quad” arrangement. Protecting freedom of navigation in the Gulf and in the Red Sea/Suez Canal is vital to the world economy and therefore to U.S. prosperity as well. In North Africa, security cooperation with European allies, especially France, will be vital to limit growing Islamist threats and the incursion of Russian influence through positionings of the Wagner Group. l The U.S. cannot neglect a concern for human rights and minority rights, which must be balanced with strategic and security considerations. Special attention must be paid to challenges of religious freedom, especially the status of Middle Eastern Christians and other religious minorities, as well as the human trafficking endemic to the region. — 186 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise Sub-Saharan Africa Africa’s importance to U.S. foreign policy and strategic interests is rising and will only continue to grow. Its explosive population growth, large reserves of industry-dependent minerals, proximity to key maritime shipping routes, and its collective diplomatic power ensure the continent’s global importance. Yet as Afri- ca’s strategic significance has grown, the U.S.’s relative influence there has declined. Terrorist activity on the continent has increased, while America’s competitors are making significant gains for their own national interests. The PRC’s companies dominate the African supply chain for certain minerals critical to emerging tech- nologies. African nations comprise major country-bloc elements that shield the PRC and Russia from international isolation for their human rights abuses—and African nations staunchly support PRC foreign policy goals on issues such as Hong Kong occupation, South China Seas dispute arbitration, and Taiwan. The new Administration can correct this strategic failing of existing policy by prioritizing Africa and by undertaking fundamental changes in how the United States works with African nations. At a bare minimum, the next Administration should: l Shift strategic focus from assistance to growth. Reorient the focus of U.S. overseas development assistance away from stand-alone humanitarian development aid and toward fostering free market systems in African countries by incentivizing and facilitating U.S. private sector engagement in these countries. Development aid alone does little to develop countries and can fuel corruption and violent conflict. While the United States should always be willing to offer emergency and humanitarian relief, both U.S. and African long-term interests are better served by a free market-based, private growth-focused strategy to Africa’s economic challenges. l Counter malign Chinese activity on the continent. This should include the development of powerful public diplomacy efforts to counter Chinese influence campaigns with commitments to freedom of speech and the free flow of information; the creation of a template “digital hygiene” program that African countries can access to sanitize and protect their sensitive communications networks from espionage by the PRC and other hostile actors; the recognition of Somaliland statehood as a hedge against the U.S.’s deteriorating position in Djibouti; and a focus on supporting American companies involved in industries important to U.S. national interests or that have a competitive advantage in Africa. l Counter the furtherance of terrorism. African country-based terrorist groups like Boko Haram may currently lack the capability to attack the
AI Analysis:
"The IRAN Act aligns with Project 2025's emphasis on telecommunications policy, spectrum utilization, and supporting U.S. leadership in communications technology, particularly through its focus on satellite and DTC technologies and FCC licensing conditions. However, the bill's primary focus on internet freedom in Iran diverges from Project 2025's domestic priorities like NTIS reform, broadband access, and holding big tech accountable for censorship."
— 687 — Department of Commerce that do not allow open access to their markets should not be setting the standards for markets that do allow open access. The incoming Administration should consider increased government-sponsored participation by private companies and government employees with relevant expertise. NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION SERVICE The independent National Telecommunications and Information Service (NTIS) is charged with ensuring that federally funded research and data are accessible to the public. NTIS operates through user fees but is largely obsolete due to modern usage of the internet by federal agencies and researchers. NTIS’s functions should be moved to NIST and consolidated with the Tech Transfer and ROI initiatives. NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION The National Telecommunications and Information Agency (NTIA) is the exec- utive branch’s statutory lead on telecommunications and information policy. It focuses on broadband access, spectrum utilization, and other issues that are crucial to the high-tech economy. For decades, NTIA has suffered from organizational malaise and will require strong and energetic leadership by political appointees to implement conservative policies. The next Administration will face the primary challenge of rapidly deploying 5G without compromising other priorities. Further recommendations include: l Support free speech and hold big tech accountable. Immediately conduct a thorough review of federal policy regarding free speech online and provide policy solutions to address big tech’s censorship of speech. l Utilize new tools to eliminate threats to national security. Fully implement the Trump Administration’s Information and Communications Technology and Services (ICTS) Executive Order authorities in a way that ensures long-term success and the legal viability of this new national security tool.9 l Expand utilization of federal spectrum. Begin short term, temporary leasing of government allocated spectrum to ensure optimum utilization while preserving federal agency use rights. l Support the commercial space industry. Advocate for licensing decisions at the Federal Communications Commission that continue to enable U.S. dominance in the commercial space industry.
AI Analysis:
"The IRAN Act focuses on promoting internet freedom in Iran through satellite and communication technologies, while the Project 2025 FCC policy emphasizes reining in Big Tech via Section 230 reform and transparency rules. Both involve FCC authority and internet governance, but their objectives and mechanisms are distinct."
— 847 — Federal Communications Commission The FCC has facilitated the transition from 3G to 4G and now 5G offerings in two ways. First, it has freed spectrum—the airwaves needed to deliver wireless ser- vices. Second, it has preempted state and local siting and permitting laws that could otherwise slow down the buildout of next-generation infrastructure. One of the FCC’s great success stories from 2017 to 2020 was securing U.S. leadership in 5G. The FCC also administers an approximately roughly $9 billion-a-year program called the Universal Service Fund (USF), which has been funded by a line-item charge that traditional telephone companies add to consumers’ monthly bills. Expenditures from this fund subsidize rural broadband networks and low-income programs as well as connections for schools, libraries, and rural health care facil- ities. Through various COVID-era laws, Congress has also provided the FCC with a one-time $24 billion appropriation for various low-income initiatives. POLICY PRIORITIES The FCC needs to change course and bring new urgency to achieving four main goals: l Reining in Big Tech, l Promoting national security, l Unleashing economic prosperity, and l Ensuring FCC accountability and good governance.15 Reining in Big Tech. The FCC has an important role to play in addressing the threats to individual liberty posed by corporations that are abusing dominant positions in the market. Nowhere is that clearer than when it comes to Big Tech and its attempts to drive diverse political viewpoints from the digital town square. Today, a handful of corporations can shape everything from the information we consume to the places we shop. These corporate behemoths are not merely exercising market power; they are abusing dominant positions. They are not simply prevailing in the free market; they are taking advantage of a landscape that has been skewed—in many cases by the government—to favor their business models over those of their competitors. It is hard to imagine another industry in which a greater gap exists between power and accountability. That is why a new Adminis- tration should support FCC action on several fronts. Specifically, the FFC should: l Eliminate immunities that courts added to Section 230. The FCC should issue an order that interprets Section 230 in a way that eliminates the expansive, non-textual immunities that courts have read into the statute. — 848 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise As one of the FCC’s previous General Counsels noted, the FCC has authority to take this action because Section 230 is codified in the Communications Act.16 The FCC’s Section 230 reforms should track the positions outlined in a July 2020 Petition for Rulemaking filed at the FCC near the end of the Trump Administration.17 Any new presidential Administration should consider filing a similar or new petition. As Justice Clarence Thomas has made clear, courts have construed Section 230 broadly to confer on some of the world’s largest companies a sweeping immunity that is found nowhere in the text of the statute.18 They have done so in a way that nullifies the limits Congress placed on the types of actions that Internet companies can take while continuing to benefit from Section 230. One way to start correcting this error is for the FCC to remind courts how the various portions of Section 230 operate. At the outset, the FCC can clarify that Section 230(c)(1) does not apply broadly to every decision that a platform makes. Rather, its protections apply only when a platform does not remove information provided by someone else. In contrast, the FCC should clarify that the more limited Section 230(c)(2) protections apply to any covered platform’s decision to restrict access to material provided by someone else. Combined, these actions will appropriately limit the number of cases in which a platform can censor with the benefit of Section 230’s protections. Such clarifications might also include drawing out the traditional legal distinction between distributor and publisher liability; Section 230 did not do away with the former, nor does it collapse into the latter. l Impose transparency rules on Big Tech. Today, Big Tech offers a black box. After Google manipulates search results, a small business can see its web traffic drop precipitously overnight for no apparent reason, potentially flipping its outlook from black to red. On Facebook, social media posts are left up or taken down, accounts suspended or permanently banned, without any apparent consistency. Out of the blue, YouTube can demonetize individuals who have risked their capital and invested their labor to build online businesses. At present, the FCC requires broadband providers to comply with a transparency rule that can provide a good baseline for Big Tech. Under the FCC’s rule, broadband providers must provide detailed disclosures about practices that would shape Internet traffic—from blocking to prioritizing or discriminating against content. The FCC could take a similar approach to
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.