I&A Mission Reorientation Act of 2026

Download PDF
Bill ID: 119/hr/7443
Last Updated: September 15, 2026

Sponsored by

Rep. Pfluger, August [R-TX-11]

ID: P000048

Follow the money

The bill

I&A Mission Reorientation Act of 2026

HR. 7443, 119th Congress — read as touching Cybersecurity.

The sponsor

Rep. Pfluger, August [R-TX-11]

Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.

The money

$101,135 raised

23 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.

The alignment

70% match to Project 2025

This bill's text tracks the "Department of Defense" section, p. 161-163 of the Mandate for Leadership.

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

Track this bill's progress through the legislative process

Latest Action

Placed on the Union Calendar, Calendar No. 727.

September 14, 2026

Introduced

📍 Current Status

Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.

🏛️

Committee Review

🗳️

Floor Action

✅

Passed House

🏛️

Senate Review

🎉

Passed Congress

🖊️

Presidential Action

⚖️

Became Law

📚 How does a bill become a law?

1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.

2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

**HR 7443: I&A Mission Reorientation Act of 2026** *Or: How to Pretend You’re Fixing a Broken Intelligence Apparatus While Ignoring the Real Tumor*

**1. Main Purpose & Objectives** The stated purpose of HR 7443 is to “realign the mission” of the Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) to better serve state, local, tribal, territorial (SLTT) governments and private sector partners. Congress claims I&A has drifted toward a one-way intelligence pipeline—sucking up data from the field while giving little back—and now seeks to enforce “two-way collaboration.” In reality, this bill is less a mission realignment and more a bureaucratic band-aid slapped over a hemorrhaging wound: the chronic failure of DHS intelligence to actually *protect* anyone beyond justifying its own budget. The objective? Make I&A look like it’s listening, without actually ceding power or reining in its creepy domestic surveillance tendencies.

**2. Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law** The bill amends Section 201(d) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 by adding a new paragraph (24) that formally prioritizes I&A’s support to SLTT and private entities over its service to the broader intelligence community. It mandates: - Forward-deployed intelligence capabilities (read: more agents in fusion centers, pretending they’re not just spying on protesters). - Two-way information sharing (a novel concept, given I&A’s history of hoarding intel like a dragon with a hard drive). - Sustained engagement with fusion centers (those well-intentioned but often dysfunctional local intel hubs that rarely stop terrorism but excel at monitoring Black Lives Matter marches). - A requirement that intelligence support to the Secretary of Homeland Security not “hinder or deprioritize” SLTT missions—essentially telling I&A: *Don’t let DHS leadership turn you into their personal opposition research shop.* Additionally, the Under Secretary for I&A must submit a report within 180 days detailing implementation steps, progress metrics, and any needed resource changes—because nothing says “reform” like another report nobody will read. Crucially, the bill explicitly states it does *not* alter I&A’s watchlisting functions—so yes, you can still be secretly flagged for buying too much fertilizer or attending the wrong mosque.

**3. Affected Parties & Stakeholders** - **I&A Personnel**: Now tasked with pretending to prioritize local partners while still answering to Washington’s intelligence appetites. Expect more PowerPoint slides on “collaboration” and fewer actual resources shifted. - **SLTT Governments & Fusion Centers**: May get slightly more access to DHS intel—if they promise not to use it to investigate right-wing militias. Don’t get your hopes up. - **Private Sector**: Big tech and critical infrastructure operators might get slightly better threat alerts—assuming they’re willing to trade data for dubious “actionable intelligence.” - **Civil Liberties Advocates**: Should be deeply suspicious. The bill leaves watchlisting untouched and does nothing to curb I&A’s history of overreach into First Amendment-protected activities. - **Taxpayers**: Footing the bill for yet another bureaucratic reshuffle that will likely result in zero measurable improvement in safety, but a nice boost to contractors who build fusion center dashboards.

**4. Potential Impact & Implications** This bill is legislative cosmetics. It assumes the problem with I&A is misplaced priorities, not systemic overreach, mission creep, or the inherent contradiction of an agency tasked with both protecting civil liberties and conducting domestic surveillance. By mandating “two-way sharing” without enforcing accountability or limiting data collection, it risks creating the illusion of reform while enabling more efficient data harvesting from the public under the guise of cooperation. The reporting requirement is a classic Congressional placebo: make them write a report, and suddenly it’s “fixed.” In reality, I&A will likely continue to prioritize whatever keeps the Director of National Intelligence happy—counterterrorism theater, immigration hysteria, or whatever threat du jour justifies

Related Topics

Government Operations & AccountabilityImmigration & Border SecurityMilitary & Veterans Affairs
Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (Dr. Haus personality)

💰 Campaign Finance Network

Rep. Pfluger, August [R-TX-11]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions
$101,135
16 donors
PACs
$0
Organizations
$7,600
Committees
$0
Individuals
$93,535

No PAC contributions found

1
SYCUAN BAND OF THE KUMEYAAY NATION
2 transactions
$6,600
2
ALABAMA-COUSHATTA TRIBE
1 transaction
$1,000

No committee contributions found

1
WILSON, CELIA R
4 transactions
$22,400
2
PUDWILL, JAMES
2 transactions
$13,200
3
GELBMAN, JOEL
2 transactions
$13,200
4
DIMEMMO, COLETTE
1 transaction
$6,600
5
AUSTIN, RUTH
2 transactions
$6,600
6
WILSON, WORD B
1 transaction
$5,000
7
O'BRIEN, JAMES
1 transaction
$3,435
8
WIDENER, BROCK
1 transaction
$3,300
9
POOL, VALRIE S
1 transaction
$3,300
10
KAMON, KENNETH
1 transaction
$3,300
11
ZALIK, DAVID
1 transaction
$3,300
12
JENNINGS, MICHAEL
1 transaction
$3,300
13
WALKER, TODD
1 transaction
$3,300
14
HIDUKE, MARK
1 transaction
$3,300

Cosponsors & Their Campaign Finance

This bill has 3 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.

Rep. Magaziner, Seth [D-RI-2]

ID: M001223

Top Contributors

27

1
FEDERATED INDIANS OF GRATON RANCHERIA
OrganizationROHNERT PARK, CA
$3,300
May 11, 2023
2
FEDERATED INDIANS OF GRATON RANCHERIA
OrganizationROHNERT PARK, CA
$3,300
May 11, 2023
3
FOREST COUNTY POTAWATOMI COMMUNITY
OrganizationCRANDON, WI
$2,500
Dec 14, 2023
4
SHAKOPEE MDEWAKANTON SIOUX COMMUNITY
OrganizationPRIOR LAKE, MN
$1,650
Jun 9, 2023
5
SHAKOPEE MDEWAKANTON SIOUX COMMUNITY
OrganizationPRIOR LAKE, MN
$1,650
Apr 30, 2024
6
THE CHICKASAW NATION
OrganizationADA, OK
$1,000
Jun 6, 2023
7
POARCH BANK OF CREEK INDIANS
OrganizationATMORE, AL
$1,000
Mar 21, 2024
8
SIPPRELLE, SUSAN M.
SELF-EMPLOYED • FILMMAKER
IndividualMIDDLETOWN, RI
$3,300
Nov 19, 2023
9
LAVINE, JONATHAN
BAIN CAPITAL • INVESTOR
IndividualBOSTON, MA
$3,300
Dec 20, 2023
10
LAVINE, JONATHAN
BAIN CAPITAL • INVESTOR
IndividualBOSTON, MA
$3,300
Dec 20, 2023

Rep. Fedorchak, Julie [R-ND-At Large]

ID: F000482

Top Contributors

21

1
THREE AFFILIATED TRIBES
OrganizationNEW TOWN, ND
$2,000
Jun 11, 2024
2
UTHUS, JACKIE
RETIRED • RETIRED
IndividualNAPLES, FL
$6,600
Mar 5, 2024
3
HOFFMAN, SHEILA
IndividualWILLISTON, ND
$6,600
Mar 19, 2024
4
HOFFMAN, DAVID
IndividualWILLISTON, ND
$6,600
Mar 20, 2024
5
ROMMESMO, OLE
TRUENORTH STEEL • CEO
IndividualFARGO, ND
$6,600
Apr 24, 2024
6
VESEY, PATRICK
SELF • REAL ESTATE
IndividualFARGO, ND
$6,600
May 8, 2024
7
FRANK, TENA
NOT EMPLOYED • NOT EMPLOYED
IndividualPARK CITY, UT
$6,600
Jun 5, 2024
8
MANDELBLATT, ERIC
SOROBAN CAPITAL PARTNERS LP • MANAGING PARTNER
IndividualASPEN, CO
$6,600
Jun 7, 2024
9
MCMAHON, LINDA
SELF • EXECUTIVE
IndividualGREENWICH, CT
$6,600
Jun 14, 2024
10
HUBBARD, STANLEY
HUBBARD BROADCASTING • CEO
IndividualSAINT PAUL, MN
$5,000
Sep 17, 2024

Rep. Pou, Nellie [D-NJ-9]

ID: P000621

Top Contributors

21

1
MATSIKOUDIS & FANCIULLO, LLC
OrganizationJERSEY CITY, NJ
$500
Oct 15, 2024
2
COOK, HAROLD P. III
RETIRED • RETIRED
IndividualNORTH HALEDON, NJ
$3,300
Oct 22, 2024
3
MUKHERJI, RAJ
STATE OF NEW JERSEY • SENATOR
IndividualJERSEY CITY, NJ
$3,300
Oct 27, 2024
4
KRAMER, LAWRENCE
V. PAULIUS & ASSOCIATES • ATTORNEY
IndividualGLEN ROCK, NJ
$3,300
Nov 8, 2024
5
CURITOMAI, NORBERTO
SPANISH TRANSPORTATION SVC • CEO
IndividualCLIFTON, NJ
$3,300
Oct 25, 2024
6
KIPIANI, CARLA TURCO
CARLA DEVELOPMENT GROUP • COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE
IndividualLYNDHURST, NJ
$3,300
Oct 22, 2024
7
CRISOSTOMO, YAMILKY
YNC TAX • CEO
IndividualCLIFTON, NJ
$3,300
Oct 20, 2024
8
AVILA, RENE A.
GI AUTO SALVAGE • PRESIDENT
IndividualPINE BROOK, NJ
$3,300
Oct 28, 2024
9
COLGAN, BILL
GP MANAGEMENT, LLC • PARTNER
IndividualBLOOMFIELD, NJ
$3,300
Oct 24, 2024
10
KIPIANI, PAUL
CARLA DEVELOPMENT GROUP • COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE
IndividualFRANKLIN LAKES, NJ
$3,300
Oct 22, 2024

Donor Network - Rep. Pfluger, August [R-TX-11]

PACs
Organizations
Individuals
Politicians

Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.

Loading...

Showing 40 nodes and 54 connections

Total contributions: $54

Top Donors - Rep. Pfluger, August [R-TX-11]

Showing top 16 donors by contribution amount

2 Orgs14 Individuals

Industry Impact

Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 2 helped.

  • +Cybersecurityconfidence 0.80

    Section 3(a) mentions 'identifying and addressing emerging threats through forward-deployed intelligence capabilities' which could imply an increased need for cybersecurity solutions, benefiting the industry.

  • Section 2(a)(2) notes the Office's foundational mission is to 'fuse law enforcement and intelligence information', potentially increasing demand for law enforcement and surveillance technology.

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.

Department of Defense

Moderate
Vector: 64%
Pages: 161-163AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill and the Project 2025 DoD section both emphasize enhancing intelligence support and information sharing with state, local, tribal, territorial governments and private sector entities, particularly through fusion centers and forward-deployed capabilities to address emerging threats. While the bill focuses on DHS/I&A and the Project 2025 excerpt centers on DoD policies, they share common goals of improving interagency collaboration and civil support."

Key themes:intelligence sharingsupport to civil authoritiesfusion centersemerging threatsinteragency collaboration

— 129 — Department of Defense 20. Staff Study, IC21: Intelligence Community in the 21st Century, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. House of Representatives, 104th Congress, 1996, p. 71, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA315088.pdf (accessed February 15, 2023). 21. Ronald O’Rourke, “Great Power Competition: Implications for Defense—Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service Report for Members and Committees of Congress No. R43838, updated November 8, 2022, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R43838/93 (accessed February 15, 2023). 22. U.S. Government Accountability Office, Defense Intelligence and Security: DOD Needs to Establish Oversight Expectations and to Develop Tools That Enhance Accountability, GAO-21-295, May 2021, https://www.gao.gov/ assets/gao-21-295.pdf (accessed February 15, 2023). 23. The U.S. military has a long history of providing support to civil authorities, particularly in response to disasters but for other purposes as well. The Defense Department currently defines defense support of civil authorities (DSCA) as “Support provided by U.S. Federal military forces, DoD civilians, DoD contract personnel, DoD Component assets, and National Guard forces (when the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Governors of the affected States, elects and requests to use those forces in Title 32, U.S.C., status) in response to requests for assistance from civil authorities for domestic emergencies, law enforcement support, and other domestic activities, or from qualifying entities for special events. Also known as civil support.” U.S. Department of Defense, Directive No. 3025.18, “Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA),” December 29, 2010, p. 16, https://www.dco.uscg.mil/Portals/9/CG-5R/nsarc/DoDD%203025.18%20Defense%20Support%20 of%20Civil%20Authorities.pdf (accessed February 15, 2023). 24. U.S. Army, “Who We Are: The Army’s Vision and Strategy,” https://www.army.mil/about/ (accessed February 17, 2023). 25. “[T]he Army’s internal assessment must be balanced against its own statements that unit training is focused on company-level operations [reflective of counterintelligence requirements] rather than battalion or brigade operations [much less division or corps to meet large-scale ground combat operations against a peer competitor such as Russia or China]. Consequently, how these ‘ready’ brigade combat teams would perform in combat operations is an open question.” “Executive Summary” in 2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength, ed. Dakota L. Wood (Washington: The Heritage Foundation, 2023), p. 16, http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws. com/2022/Military_Index/2023_IndexOfUSMilitaryStrength.pdf (accessed February 15, 2023). 26. For background on the USN’s fleet size, see Brent D. Sadler, “Rebuilding America’s Military: The United States Navy,” Heritage Foundation Special Report No. 242, February 18, 2021, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/ files/2021-02/SR242.pdf, and Ronald O’Rourke, “Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service Report for Members and Committees of Congress No. RL32665, December 21, 2022, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL32665 (accessed February 15, 2023). 27. The Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) is the process by which the services develop and the Joint Staff approves the requirements for major defense acquisitions. See Defense Acquisition University, “Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDA),” https://www.dau. edu/acquipedia/pages/articledetails.aspx#!371 (accessed February 15, 2023). 28. The board would seek to balance a mix of active military and civilians with expertise in and responsibility for major acquisitions and former military and civilians with experience in strategy and acquisitions. The proposed composition would include the Vice Chief of Naval Operations as Chairman, with three-star level membership from the Joint Staff, the Navy and Defense Acquisition Executives, and the Naval Sea Systems Command. In addition, there would be four-star retired naval officers/Navy civil servants as members, one each named by the Chairmen of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Secretary of Defense. Finally, there would be a member appointed by the Secretary of the Navy who had previous senior experience in the defense industry. 29. See James Mattis, Secretary of Defense, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge, U.S. Department of Defense, https:// dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf (accessed February 17, 2023), and U.S. Department of Defense, 2022 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America Including the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review and the 2022 Missile Defense Review, https://oldcc.gov/ resource/2022-national-defense-strategy (accessed February 17, 2023). — 130 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise 30. U.S. Air Force, “The Air Force We Need: 386 Operational Squadrons,” September 17, 2018, https://www. af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/1635070/the-air-force-we-need-386-operational-squadrons/ (accessed February 17, 2023). 31. General David H. Berger, Commandant of the Marine Corps, “Force Design 2030,” U.S. Department of the Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, March 2020, https://www.hqmc.marines.mil/Portals/142/Docs/CMC38%20Force%20 Design%202030%20Report%20Phase%20I%20and%20II.pdf?ver=2020-03-26-121328-460 (accessed February 17, 2023). 32. Department of the Navy, United States Marine Corps, “Force Design 2030,” March 2020, https://www.hqmc. marines.mil/Portals/142/Docs/CMC38%20Force%20Design%202030%20Report%20Phase%20I%20and%20II. pdf?ver=2020-03-26-121328-460 (accessed February 15, 2023). 33. Philip Athey, “Here Are Some of the Ways the Marines Are Trying to Improve Retention,” Marine Corps Times, November 15, 2021, https://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/your-marine-corps/2021/11/15/treat-people- like-human-beings-here-are-some-of-the-ways-the-marines-are-trying-to-improve-retention/ (accessed February 15, 2023). 34. Megan Eckstein, “Marines, Navy Near Agreement on Light Amphibious Warship Features,” Defense News, October 5, 2022, https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2022/10/05/marines-navy-near-agreement-on-light- amphibious-warship-features/ (accessed February 16, 2023). 35. Megan Eckstein, “Marines Explain Vision for Fewer Traditional Amphibious Warships,” Defense News, June 21, 2021, https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2021/06/21/marines-explain-vision-for-fewer-traditional- amphibious-warships-supplemented-by-new-light-amphib/ (accessed February 16, 2023). 36. See Sidney J. Freedberg Jr., “Trump Eases Cyber Ops, but Safeguards Remain: Joint Staff,” Breaking Defense, September 17, 2018, https://breakingdefense.com/2018/09/trump-eases-cyber-ops-but-safeguards-remain- joint-staff/ (accessed March 7, 2023); Dustin Volz, “White House Confirms It Has Relaxed Rules on U.S. Use of Cyberweapons,” The Wall Street Journal, September 20, 2018, https://www.wsj.com/articles/white-house- confirms-it-has-relaxed-rules-on-u-s-use-of-cyber-weapons-1537476729 (accessed March 7, 2023); and Federation of American Scientists, Intelligence Resource Program, “National Security Presidential Memoranda [NSPMs]: Donald J. Trump Administration,” updated March 7, 2022, https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/nspm/index. html (accessed March 7, 2023). 37. U.S. Government Accountability Office, DOD Cybersecurity: Enhanced Attention Needed to Ensure Cyber Incidents Are Appropriately Reported and Shared, GAO-23-105084, November 2022, p. 36, https://www.gao. gov/assets/gao-23-105084.pdf (accessed February 17, 2023). 38. See Paul Evancoe, “Special Operations and the Interagency Team,” U.S.Military.com, https://usmilitary. com/special-operations-and-the-interagency-team/#:~:text=Seldom%20considered%20are%20those%20 other%20government%20agency%20%28OGA%29,response%20and%20consequence%20management%20 to%20name%20a%20few (accessed February 17, 2023). 39. U.S. Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review, February 2018, pp. 54–55, https://media.defense. gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEAR-POSTURE-REVIEW-FINAL-REPORT.PDF (accessed February 17, 2023). 40. U.S. Department of Defense, 2022 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America Including the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review and the 2022 Missile Defense Review, pp. 3 and 20. 41. Patty-Jane Geller, “Missile Defense,” in 2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength, ed. Dakota L. Wood (Washington: The Heritage Foundation, 2023), pp. 507–508, http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2022/Military_ Index/2023_IndexOfUSMilitaryStrength.pdf. 42. Matthew R. Costlow, “The Folly of Limiting U.S. Missile Defenses for Nuclear Arms Control,” National Institute for Public Policy Information Series, Issue No. 505, October 18, 2021, https://nipp.org/wp-content/ uploads/2021/10/IS-505.pdf (accessed February 16, 2023). 43. Forum for American Leadership, “Don’t Hand North Korea a Win in the Missile Defense Review,” January 4, 2022, https://forumforamericanleadership.org/dprk-missile-threat (accessed February 16, 2023). 44. Patty-Jane Geller, “It’s Time to Get Homeland Missile Defense Right,” Defense News, January 4, 2021, https:// www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2021/01/04/its-time-to-get-homeland-missile-defense- right/#:~:text=Restoring%20our%20eroding%20edge%20when,advanced%20technology%20and%20 new%20capabilities.%E2%80%9D (accessed February 16, 2023).

Department of Defense

Moderate
Vector: 64%
Pages: 140-142AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill focuses on realigning DHS intelligence sharing with state, local, tribal, territorial, and private sector partners, which supports broader homeland security infrastructure protection—a goal that aligns with Project 2025’s emphasis on DOD-DHS coordination for critical infrastructure defense. However, the bill does not directly address DOD intelligence reform, accountability, or military readiness, which are central to the cited Project 2025 section."

Key themes:critical infrastructure protectioninformation sharingDOD-DHS coordinationintelligence effectivenesshomeland security

— 107 — Department of Defense 5. Establish true alignment between DOD and DHS both to improve the defense of critical U.S. infrastructure and national border integrity and to develop vital information that enables defense against foreign targeted disruptions.23 l Restore accountability and public trust. In recent years, public trust in Defense Intelligence has been eroded by, for example, flawed assumptions leading up to our Afghanistan withdrawal, flawed Russia–Ukraine assessments, divergences in relations with key Gulf allies, and voids being filled by Russia and China around the world. For trust to be restored and sustained, officials must be held accountable. 1. Restore DIE critical thinking. Establish mechanisms to restore analytic integrity and return to true intelligence-driven operations. The next Administration should eliminate the conflict of interest in the current customer-based model (in which the customer is always right) by enforcing time-tested procedures that guarantee independent analysis, even if it means challenging policymakers’ assumptions. The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security’s leadership role should be expanded to include providing analytic top-line views and improve DIE transparency by highlighting diverging views. 2. Elevate the DIE’s voice in national policy discussions, commensurate with the DIE’s 75 percent share of the IC budget. Present defense intelligence to senior policymakers, either independently to avoid all-source bias or in consensus products like the National Intelligence Estimates. l Eliminate peripheral intelligence obligations that do not advance military readiness. In 2019, following the catastrophic 2015 data breach at the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM), the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA) accepted transfer of the responsibility to conduct security clearance and suitability investigations for 95 percent of the U.S. government’s civilian workforce. This decision, which grew out of an intention to deconstruct OPM, was wrongheaded on many levels and made the federal bureaucracy dependent on a new overlay of DOD bureaucracy, in a sense instilling DOD control of civilian managers. This function should be returned to OPM except for military security clearance investigations. — 108 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise U.S. ARMY The U.S. Army’s mission is “[t]o deploy, fight and win our nation’s wars by pro- viding ready, prompt and sustained land dominance by Army forces across the full spectrum of conflict as part of the joint force.”24 Today, however, the Army cannot execute its land dominance mission.25 The U.S. Army is at an inflection point that is marked by more than a decade of steadily eroding budgets and diluted buying power, an appreciable degradation in readiness and training capacity, a near crisis in the recruiting and retention of critical personnel, and a bevy of aging weapons systems that no longer provide a qualitative edge over peer and near-peer com- petitors but will not be replaced in the near term. All of these challenges are set against the backdrop of a complex and dynamic global geopolitical environment that is exemplified and exacerbated by the triumph of our adversaries in Afghanistan after a 20-year struggle there as well as recent Russian outrages in the Ukraine and China’s bellicosity both on its borders and in surrounding disputed regions. In spite of these ever-increasing operational pulls, our Army is consistently being asked to do more with fewer resources. The status quo is further marked by a pervasive politically driven top-down focus on progressive social policies that emphasize matters like so-called diversity, equity, and inclusion and climate change, often to the detriment of the Army’s core warfighting mission. Needed Reforms l Rebuild the Army. The total Army budget has decreased by roughly 11 percent since 2018, perilously affecting the service’s readiness and ability to train and to procure new personnel and equipment. Declining budgets and decreased buying power have forced the Army to lower training standards and opportunities to train, propose reductions in end strength, slash military construction programs to historically low levels, and scale back essential modernization programs. 1. Increase the Army budget to remain the world’s preeminent land power. 2. Accelerate the development and procurement of the six current Army modernization priorities (long-range precision fires, the Next- Generation Combat Vehicle, Future Vertical Lift, the Army network, air and missile defense, and soldier lethality) to replace worn out and outdated combat systems and ensure ground combat dominance. 3. Increase funding to improve Army training and operational readiness. 4. Increase the Army force structure by 50,000 to handle two major regional contingencies simultaneously.

Department of Defense

Weak
Vector: 65%
Pages: 164-167AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill focuses on enhancing the Intelligence and Analysis office's mission within DHS, whereas Project 2025 advocates dismantling DHS and redistributing its components; both address DHS reform but pursue opposing directions."

Key themes:Department of Homeland Securityintelligence sharingreformmission focusstakeholder collaboration

— 133 — 5 DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY Ken Cuccinelli PRIMARY RECOMMENDATION Our primary recommendation is that the President pursue legislation to dis- mantle the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). After 20 years, it has not gelled into “One DHS.” Instead, its various components’ different missions have outweighed its decades-long attempt to function as one department, rendering the whole disjointed rather than cohesive. Breaking up the department along its mission lines would facilitate mission focus and provide opportunities to reduce overhead and achieve more limited government. In lieu of a status quo DHS, we recommend that: l U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) be combined with Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE); U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS); the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR); and the Department of Justice (DOJ) Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) and Office of Immigration Litigation (OIL) into a stand- alone border and immigration agency at the Cabinet level (more than 100,000 employees, making it the third largest department measured by manpower). l The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) be moved to the Department of Transportation. — 134 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise l The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) be moved to the Department of the Interior or, if combined with CISA, to the Department of Transportation. l The U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) be moved to DOJ and, in time of full-scale war (i.e., threatening the homeland), to the Department of Defense (DOD). Alternatively, USCG should be moved to DOD for all purposes. l The U.S. Secret Service (USSS) be divided in two, with the protective element moved to DOJ and the financial enforcement element moved to the Department of the Treasury. l The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) be privatized. l The Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) be moved to DOD and the Office of Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction be moved to the FBI. All of the remaining supporting components could be dismantled because their functions already exist in the moving components as well as the receiv- ing departments. Cutting these costs would save the American taxpayers significant sums. Unless and until this dismantling recommendation is pursued and achieved, however, DHS will statutorily continue to exist, and it needs many reforms. Accord- ingly, we now turn to recommended changes in DHS as it exists now. MISSION STATEMENT The Department of Homeland Security protects the American homeland from and prepares for terrorism and other hazards in both the physical and cyber realms, provides for secure and free movement of trade and travel, and enforces U.S. immi- gration laws impartially. OVERVIEW The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was created in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and subsequent mailings of anthrax spores. The Homeland Security Act of 2002,1 which created the department, states that DHS’s primary mission is to prevent terrorist attacks within the U.S.; reduce the nation’s vulnerability to terrorism; minimize the damage from and assist in the recovery from any terrorist attacks; prepare and respond to natural and manmade crises and emergencies; and monitor connections between illegal drug trafficking and terrorism, coordinate efforts to sever such connections, and interdict illegal drug trafficking.

Showing 3 of 5 policy matches

About These Correlations

Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.

Full Policy Text

Related Bills