The bill
ALERT Act
HR. 7613, 119th Congress — read as touching Aerospace (Commercial).
Sponsored by
Rep. Graves, Sam [R-MO-6]
ID: G000546
Follow the money
The bill
HR. 7613, 119th Congress — read as touching Aerospace (Commercial).
The sponsor
Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.
The money
28 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.
The alignment
This bill's text tracks the "Department of Transportation" section, p. 658-660 of the Mandate for Leadership.
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Received in the Senate and Read twice and referred to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation.
April 14, 2026
📍 Current Status
Next: Both chambers must agree on the same version of the bill.
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Another masterpiece of legislative theater, courtesy of the intellectually bankrupt and morally corrupt United States Congress. The ALERT Act, a bill so cleverly crafted to sound like it's actually doing something useful, while in reality, it's just another exercise in bureaucratic navel-gazing.
**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The ALERT Act claims to address aviation safety concerns, specifically collision prevention technology and air traffic control procedures. How noble. But let's not be fooled – this bill is a classic case of "legislative lupus," where the symptoms are treated, but the underlying disease remains unchecked. The real purpose? To create the illusion of action, while lining the pockets of special interest groups and perpetuating the status quo.
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill mandates the use of collision prevention technology in certain aircraft, updates air traffic control processes, and establishes various working groups and task forces. Oh, joy. Because what we really need is more bureaucracy and paperwork. The changes to existing law are merely cosmetic, designed to create a veneer of progress while maintaining the same old corrupt system.
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The usual suspects: aircraft manufacturers, airlines, pilots, air traffic controllers, and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). But let's not forget the real stakeholders – the lobbyists and special interest groups who will reap the benefits of this bill. The passengers and families affected by aviation accidents? Just pawns in the game of legislative politics.
**Potential Impact & Implications:** The ALERT Act will likely have a negligible impact on aviation safety, but it will certainly create new opportunities for corruption and cronyism. The bill's provisions will be watered down or ignored, while the real issues – lack of funding, inadequate oversight, and industry capture – remain unaddressed. The implications? More of the same: ineffective regulations, bureaucratic red tape, and a continued disregard for human life.
In conclusion, the ALERT Act is a textbook example of legislative malpractice. It's a bill that promises much but delivers little, designed to placate the masses while perpetuating the corrupt system that created the problems in the first place. So, let's give it the diagnosis it deserves: "Terminal Legislative Stupidity" – a disease for which there is no cure, only a never-ending cycle of bureaucratic incompetence and special interest manipulation.
Rep. Graves, Sam [R-MO-6]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
No PAC contributions found
No committee contributions found
This bill has 10 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.
ID: L000560
Top Contributors
36
ID: R000575
Top Contributors
25
ID: S000510
Top Contributors
32
ID: N000026
Top Contributors
21
ID: C001072
Top Contributors
22
ID: C001087
Top Contributors
20
ID: R000603
Top Contributors
20
ID: M000871
Top Contributors
22
ID: E000235
Top Contributors
29
ID: F000480
Top Contributors
21
Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Showing 36 nodes and 43 connections
Total contributions: $43
Showing top 22 donors by contribution amount
Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 2 helped, 1 harmed.
The bill mandates collision prevention technology upgrades for aircraft, including ACAS Xa and ACAS Xr systems, which will drive demand for avionics manufacturers and aerospace suppliers (e.g., GE Aerospace, Honeywell, Collins Aerospace) that produce these systems. Sections 102, 103, and 104 require rulemaking to equip selected aircraft with integrated collision prevention technology, creating a market for upgrades and new installations.
Title II requires Department of Defense aircraft to equip with collision prevention technology and ADS-B Out, creating contracts for defense contractors like Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, and Boeing's defense division to install these systems on military aircraft. Sections 201-207 mandate safety upgrades for DoD aviation, including risk assessments, transponder maintenance, and flight data monitoring improvements.
Sections 102, 103, and 104 impose costs on airlines to retrofit fleets with ACAS Xa/Xr and collision prevention technology by 2031-2033 deadlines. Section 111 may reduce operational rates at DCA through instrument flight rules allocation limits, potentially decreasing airline revenue. While safety improvements long-term benefit airlines, the immediate financial burden of mandated upgrades constitutes a clear cost.
For each industry this bill affects, here's what the sponsor (Rep. Graves, Sam [R-MO-6])received from donors associated with that industry during the 2022–present cycles. Donations are not proof of intent — they are a record of who funds the people writing the law.
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.
AI Analysis:
"Both the ALERT Act and the Project 2025 DOT section emphasize using technology to enhance transportation safety and advocate for a balanced spectrum allocation to support safety‑critical systems, though the ALERT Act focuses on aviation while the Project 2025 text centers on ground‑based automated vehicles and CAFE standards."
— 625 — Department of Transportation security, and privacy without hampering innovation. DOT can oversee the testing and deployment of a wide variety of new technologies, allowing communities and individuals to choose what best fits their needs. It is the role of the private sector, not the government, to pick winners and losers in technology development. If a technology underperforms, the private sector should be liable, not the government. The department should ensure a tech-neutral approach to addressing any emerging transportation technology while keeping safety as the number one priority. As part of this, it should work to facilitate the safe and full integration of automated vehicles into the national transportation system. Over time, these advanced technologies can save lives, transform personal mobility, and provide additional transportation opportunities—including for people with disabili- ties, aging populations, and communities where car ownership is expensive or impractical. NHTSA’s and FMCSA’s current regulations were written before the advent of automated vehicles and driving systems. Both operating administrations have issued Advance Notices of Proposed Rulemakings (ANPRMs) that begin the pro- cess of updating their regulations to reflect this new technology. However, these regulations have stalled under the Biden Administration, which has chosen to use the department’s tools to get people to take transit and drive electric vehicles instead of helping people to choose the transportation options that suit them best. l NHTSA should work to remove regulatory barriers by focusing on updating vehicle standards as well as publishing performance-based rules for the operations of automated vehicles (AVs). l FMCSA should work to clarify the regulations to align with DOT’s AV 3.0 guidance, which would allow the drivers to be safely removed from the operations of a commercial motor vehicle. From a nonregulatory point of view, DOT has pivoted from a successful focus on the voluntary sharing of data to improve safety outcomes to adoption of a more compulsory and antagonistic approach to mandating data collection and publica- tion through a Standing General Order related to automated vehicles. This needs to be reversed. Many of these new and innovative technologies rely on wireless communica- tions that depend on the availability and purchase of radio frequency spectrum, a trend that is consistent with what we see in connectivity in our everyday lives. There is a role for DOT in ensuring that in the fight over spectrum, transportation gets its fair share. For technologies to work in transportation, and in particular to work for transportation safety, they have to meet the unique needs of a transportation — 626 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise environment. They need to account for rapidly moving and out-of-line-of-sight vehicles as well as pedestrians, bicyclists, and other road users. They should account for the potential for radio interference, and they should address security. This is why in 1999, in response to a request from Congress, the Federal Com- munications Commission allocated the 5.9 GHz band of spectrum to traffic safety and intelligent transportation systems (ITS). In 2020, the FCC took away 45 MHz of the 75 MHz it had added, leaving only 30 MHz for transportation safety and ITS. DOT needs to represent the transportation community and make the case for needed spectrum to the public and Congress. CORPORATE AVERAGE FUEL ECONOMY (CAFE) STANDARDS One reason for the high numbers of injuries on American roadways is that national fuel economy standards raise the price of cars, disincentivizing people from purchasing newer, safer vehicles. Congress requires the Secretary of Transportation to set national fuel econ- omy standards for new motor vehicles sold in the United States. This mandate was established in the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975 (EPCA),6 a law passed in the wake of the Arab oil embargo to promote greater energy efficiency and lessen the national security threat of U.S. dependence on foreign oil. The stat- ute directs DOT to prescribe the “maximum feasible” mileage requirements for different categories of internal-combustion engine (ICE) automobiles for each model year. The standards must be achievable using available ICE technologies running on gasoline, diesel fuel, or similar combustible fuels and must not be set so high as to prevent automakers from profitably producing new vehicles at sufficient volume to meet consumer demand. Congress recognized that the ICE-powered automobile has been instrumen- tal to advancing the mobility and prosperity of the American people and that the domestic mass production of new ICE vehicles generates millions of jobs and remains critical to the overall health of the U.S. economy and the strength of the nation’s industrial base. Accordingly, Congress took care to ensure that the mileage requirements issued by DOT would not undermine the vitality of America’s auto industry or interfere with the market economics that drives consumer demand for new vehicles. This rulemaking authority, which has been delegated by the Secretary to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, is exclusive to DOT. EPCA expressly preempts states from adopting or enforcing any different requirement “related to fuel economy standards” for new motor vehicles. While the statute instructs DOT to consult with the Department of Energy and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in formulating its standards, no other federal agency, including EPA, has clear authority to set fuel economy requirements in place of NHTSA. The Clean Air Act7 gives EPA general authority to establish emissions
AI Analysis:
"The ALERT Act focuses on specific safety measures like collision prevention technology and helicopter route safety, but does not address the broader FAA reform, funding restructuring, workforce modernization, or adoption of digital/remote towers and DataComm emphasized in Project 2025."
— 632 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise not offer additional negotiations until the Chinese implement the agreements they have already signed. The current Administration’s policies in several areas that affect aviation and limit America’s future opportunities for growth are internally inconsistent. In addition to a New Entry Initiative, the new Administration should establish an interagency clearinghouse to drive consistent policies across the government on spectrum, drones, and advanced air mobility. FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION With a budget of $18.6 billion requested for FY 202311 and an international regulatory footprint, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is DOT’s most visible mode. It needs reform. Air traffic control (ATC) operations account for two-thirds of FAA’s budget, and the Air Traffic Organization (ATO) is far behind its counterparts in Australia, Canada, and Western Europe in implementing 21st century technology. The FAA’s primary mission is ATC; its two smaller functions are distributing federal airport grants and regulating all aspects of aviation safety. The FAA was once considered the world’s best government aviation agency. Those days are long past. In the more than five decades since 1958 when the Federal Aviation Agency (precursor to the Federal Aviation Administration) was formed, there have been notable developments in air traffic control technology, aircraft avionics, and engine reliability, but despite many well-intentioned attempts, there have been few changes in the FAA’s funding structure. The FAA is still improperly organized and financed, and the management reforms provided in the late 1990s remain largely unused. The FAA is 10 years older than DOT. It provides two separate and functionally different services: the world’s largest and most complex Air Navigation Service Provider (ANSP) and, at the same time, the world’s largest civil aviation regulatory and certificatory agency. The first is a 24/7/365 air traffic service provider. The second is an inherently governmental organization responsible for ensuring that aerospace operators, vehicles, airports, and ANSPs are properly certified and follow all FAA regulations. These two different organizations ought to run separately. The FAA is the only modern Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) in the world that does not assess fees for its services. Its funding structure, subject to the annual appropriations process, stifles efficiency and innovation—and the FAA does not innovate well. It spends too much time and money on research and development (R&D) and is not very good at either one. It should get out of the R&D business and focus on testing, evaluating, and certifying private-sector innovation much more quickly than it does today. The FAA workforce needs to modernize. The agency needs safety and certifi- cation experts, not professional airframe and powerplant mechanics (A&Ps). It — 633 — Department of Transportation needs to hire people trained to oversee mechanics, engineers, and pilots. It is time to consider promoting the FAA’s top executive team from within and requiring strict professional requirements for its top appointees. Organizations such as the FAA whose sole responsibility is public safety should be fully auditable and led by experts in their field or industry with oversight from DOT leadership. For 60 years, the FAA was the global leader in aerospace, from general aviation to commercial space, but the U.S. lead has vanished. The FAA’s overly bureaucratic, legalistic, byzantine, and more recently hyperpoliticized way of processing regu- lations, adopting innovation, publishing rules, and procuring new technologies has been eclipsed by foreign CAAs and ANSPs that are eagerly certifying drones and creating environments in which new technologies and new entrants, such as air taxis, can thrive. To regain America’s global leadership in aviation, the next Administration should: l Separate the FAA from DOT or, at a minimum, separate the ATO from the FAA. l Completely restructure the FAA’s funding system so that the nation’s aviation system is not held prisoner to annual appropriations or used as a political football to solve nonaviation problems. l Require the FAA to operate more like a business. The FAA has not made good use of the unique authority it has been given in areas like personnel and acquisition. In Europe, conventional control towers are being replaced by digital/remote towers with high-resolution cameras and other sensors on tall structures and at points adjoining runways. In Germany and Scandinavia, as many as 15 small air- ports can be controlled from one remote tower center. The FAA has yet to certify a single digital/remote tower. Text messaging between controllers and pilots is widespread over the oceans. The ATO began to implement what is now called DataComm in 2002 but sus- pended the project in 2003. This was restarted at airport control towers in 2016, but as of October 2022, it was available in only seven of the 20 high-altitude control centers. Current technology enables flights to be managed “anywhere from anywhere,” but the ATO resists consolidating its 20 aging centers into a much smaller number—and lacks the funds to consolidate them. The FAA as regulator and the ATO as traffic manager have no plans in place to handle millions of drones and other emerging technologies such as electric vertical take-off and landing (eVTOL) aircraft.
AI Analysis:
"The ALERT Act focuses on aviation safety measures, whereas the Project 2025 excerpt addresses railroad and maritime policies within the Department of Transportation; there is no substantive overlap in objectives or provisions."
— 637 — Department of Transportation to track brake inspections on rolling stock electronically instead of by using paper air brake slips, which would enable extending the interval between brake inspections for trains and eliminating restrictions on the ability to place/remove blocks of cars in trains. l FRA will be proposing certification requirements for dispatchers and signal employees despite the failure of the Railroad Safety Advisory Committee (RSAC) to identify any safety benefit. l FRA is planning to propose emergency escape breathing apparatus requirements for train crews even though FRA staff long ago concluded that the costs of these requirements would far outweigh their very minimal benefits. It is vital that the integrity of FRA’s research program be preserved. In 2022, FRA switched the management of the Transportation Technology Center (TTC) in Pueblo, Colorado, from a subsidiary of the Association of American Railroads (AAR) to Ensco, Inc. FRA seems determined to direct research to TTC, even when there are better choices with respect to the research in question, in an effort to support TTC financially and justify its decision to change management at TTC. This change in approach threatens the collaborative approach to research between FRA and the railroads that has existed for decades. FRA should make its decisions on where to spend its research dollars solely on the merits of improving the safety and efficiency of the railroad industry. MARITIME POLICY The Maritime Administration (MARAD) was established by President Harry Truman in 1950 and was transferred to DOT in 1981. A principal function is “main- tain[ing] the overall health of the U.S. Merchant Marine,”15 which is important both to national defense and to foreign and domestic commerce. MARAD is also in charge of the United States Merchant Marine Academy and operates ships and funding for the six state maritime academies. MARAD would be better served by being transferred from DOT to the Depart- ment of Homeland Security (DHS). MARAD is the only DOT modal administration that does not regulate the industry that it represents: The maritime industry is regulated by the U.S. Coast Guard (ships and personnel) and by the Federal Mari- time Commission (cargo rates and competitive practices). Furthermore, MARAD has responsibilities both in peacetime commerce and operationally in wartime/crisis sealift through its responsibility to manage the National Defense Reserve Fleet and 45-ship Ready Reserve Force for the U.S. Navy. These missions are unique to MARAD within DOT. As a result, MARAD’s missions — 638 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise and purpose, and therefore its funding priorities, are not well understood and his- torically have been minimalized in planning and budgeting. MARAD, including its subordinate Service Academy (the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy) should be transferred to the Department of Defense (if the Coast Guard is located there because DHS has been eliminated) or to the Department of Home- land Security. In this way, the two agencies charged with oversight and regulation of the Maritime sector—MARAD and the United States Coast Guard—would be aligned under the same department where operational efficiencies could be real- ized more easily. Serious consideration should be given to repealing or substantially reforming the Jones Act,16 which would require legislation. The economic costs of the Jones Act, which is notionally in place to promote a robust Merchant Marine, vastly exceed its effect on the supply of domestic ships. For instance, no liquified natural gas (LNG) can be shipped from Alaska to the lower 48 states because there are no U.S.-flagged ships that carry LNG. If there are genuine concerns about U.S. fleet capacity in the absence of the Jones Act, it would be possible to do so through an expansion of the Defense Reserve Fleet. Another DHS agency, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), is a frequent user of MARAD Ready Reserve Force shipping during disaster assistance missions. Transferring MARAD to DHS would make coordination and requisition of those vessels a smoother and more rapid process. DHS has responsibility for reviewing and approving Jones Act waivers. This process first requires a market survey of available shipping tonnage that is completed by MARAD. The processing of Jones Act waiver requests would be streamlined if both agencies were in the same department. Finally, DHS as a department is experienced in administering and budgeting for the operation of an existing federal service academy, the U.S. Coast Guard Academy, which is similar to the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy in size. There would be increased efficiencies and better alignment of the missions of these two institutions if they were under one single department that has equity in the industries served by these academies. CONCLUSION Americans need more abundant and affordable transportation. They need more affordable and safer cars as well as physical aspects of transportation such as roads, bridges, airports, ports, and rail lines. The Department of Transportation should be evaluating which aspects of transportation are contributing to the economic competitiveness of the United States and the well-being of Americans—and that therefore should continue to be funded. All too often, DOT’s mission is described as reducing the number of trips, using less fuel, and raising the costs of travel to Americans through increased use of
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.