Travel Mask Mandate Repeal Act of 2025

— 635 — Department of Transportation commutes from urban buses to rideshare or electric scooter, the use of public transit decreases. A better definition for public transit (which also would require congressional legislation) would be transit provided for the public rather than transit provided by a public municipality. The COVID-19 pandemic caused a substantial decline in usage for all forms of transportation. Mass transit has been the slowest mode to recover, with October 2022 ridership reaching only 64 percent of the level seen in October 2019. The sustained increase in remote work has caused changes in commuting patterns. Since facilitating travel for workers is one of the core functions of mass transit systems, a permanent reduction in commuting raises questions about the viability of fixed-route mass transit, especially considering that transit systems required substantial subsidization before the pandemic. Regrettably, the 2021 Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act13 authorized tens of billions of dollars for the expansion of transit systems even as Americans were moving away from them and into personal vehicles. Lower revenue from reduced ridership is already driving transit agencies to a budgetary breaking point, and added operational costs from system expansions will make this problem worse. The Capital Investment Grants (CIG) program is another example of Washing- ton’s tendency to fund transit expansion rather than maintaining or improving current facilities. The CIG program, which began in 1991, funds only novel transit projects. These can include new rail lines (regardless of the demand for preexisting rail in the area) and costly operations such as streetcars. Because Americans have demonstrated a strong preference for alternative means of transportation, rather than throwing good money after bad by continuing federal subsidies for transit expansion, there should be a focus on reducing costs that make transit uneconomical. The Trump Administration urged Congress to eliminate the CIG program, but the program has strong support on Capitol Hill. At a minimum, a new conservative Administration should ensure that each CIG project meets sound economic standards and a rigorous cost-benefit analysis. The largest expense in transit operational budgets is labor. Compensation costs for transit workers exceed both regional and sector compensation averages. This is driven by generous pension and health benefits rather than by exorbitant wages. Since workers value wages more than they value fringe benefits, this has led to a perverse situation in which transit agencies have high compensation costs yet are struggling to attract workers. The next Administration can remove the largest obstacle to reforming labor costs. Section 10(c) of the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 196414 was initially intended to protect bargaining rights for workers in privately owned transit sys- tems that were being absorbed by government-operated agencies. The provision has mutated into a requirement that any transit agency receiving federal funds cannot reduce compensation, an interpretation that far exceeds the original statute. — 636 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise Returning to the original intent would allow transit agencies to adjust fringe ben- efits without fearing a federal lawsuit. It is also vital to move away from using the Highway Trust Fund to prop up mass transit. The fund was driven into insolvency (and repeated bailouts) through decades of transfers to transit without any increase in transit usage to show for it. With the federal government facing mounting debt, the best course of action would be to remove federal subsidies for transit spending, allowing states and localities to decide whether mass transit is a good investment for them. FEDERAL RAILROAD POLICY The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) is making decisions based on political considerations that are at variance with its safety mission. Instead of basing regulatory decisions on the costs and benefits of the available alterna- tives, FRA is promoting actions that favor the status quo and inhibit the use of technology to improve railroad safety. FRA should be making decisions based on objective evidence of the most cost-effective way to accomplish the agency’s safety goals. FRA’s singular focus on job preservation is contrary to FRA’s mission, and it has a deleterious effect on the morale of FRA’s professional staff, as shown by the annual employee surveys conducted by the Office of Personnel Management. FRA needs to communicate clearly to its career employees a new commitment to making decisions that are consistent with the agency’s safety mission. FRA’s procedures call for decisions on waivers to be made by its Safety Board. Appeals can be taken to the Administrator. However, FRA has deviated from these procedures as the Administrator has injected himself into Safety Board decisions. FRA needs to review its actions with respect to specific proceedings where the agency’s direction cannot be justified. For example: l FRA’s Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) on crew size is not based on safety considerations; it is designed to reduce flexibility by making it impossible for railroads to operate with crews of fewer than two in circumstances where there is no operational need for the second crew member. l Although FRA could adopt a modern inspection program that takes advantage of technological ways to inspect track, it is refusing to amend 50-year-old track inspection requirements, leaving customers with higher costs. l FRA is refusing to take final action on a rulemaking proceeding that would modernize brake inspection requirements by taking advantage of the ability

— 626 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise environment. They need to account for rapidly moving and out-of-line-of-sight vehicles as well as pedestrians, bicyclists, and other road users. They should account for the potential for radio interference, and they should address security. This is why in 1999, in response to a request from Congress, the Federal Com- munications Commission allocated the 5.9 GHz band of spectrum to traffic safety and intelligent transportation systems (ITS). In 2020, the FCC took away 45 MHz of the 75 MHz it had added, leaving only 30 MHz for transportation safety and ITS. DOT needs to represent the transportation community and make the case for needed spectrum to the public and Congress. CORPORATE AVERAGE FUEL ECONOMY (CAFE) STANDARDS One reason for the high numbers of injuries on American roadways is that national fuel economy standards raise the price of cars, disincentivizing people from purchasing newer, safer vehicles. Congress requires the Secretary of Transportation to set national fuel econ- omy standards for new motor vehicles sold in the United States. This mandate was established in the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975 (EPCA),6 a law passed in the wake of the Arab oil embargo to promote greater energy efficiency and lessen the national security threat of U.S. dependence on foreign oil. The stat- ute directs DOT to prescribe the “maximum feasible” mileage requirements for different categories of internal-combustion engine (ICE) automobiles for each model year. The standards must be achievable using available ICE technologies running on gasoline, diesel fuel, or similar combustible fuels and must not be set so high as to prevent automakers from profitably producing new vehicles at sufficient volume to meet consumer demand. Congress recognized that the ICE-powered automobile has been instrumen- tal to advancing the mobility and prosperity of the American people and that the domestic mass production of new ICE vehicles generates millions of jobs and remains critical to the overall health of the U.S. economy and the strength of the nation’s industrial base. Accordingly, Congress took care to ensure that the mileage requirements issued by DOT would not undermine the vitality of America’s auto industry or interfere with the market economics that drives consumer demand for new vehicles. This rulemaking authority, which has been delegated by the Secretary to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, is exclusive to DOT. EPCA expressly preempts states from adopting or enforcing any different requirement “related to fuel economy standards” for new motor vehicles. While the statute instructs DOT to consult with the Department of Energy and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in formulating its standards, no other federal agency, including EPA, has clear authority to set fuel economy requirements in place of NHTSA. The Clean Air Act7 gives EPA general authority to establish emissions — 627 — Department of Transportation limits for new motor vehicles for air pollutants that are found to pose a danger to humans. However, there is no reason to believe Congress ever contemplated that EPA’s authority to address automotive air pollution might be used to displace or supersede NHTSA’s fuel economy mandate under EPCA. Congress chose to assign the power to set fuel economy standards to DOT rather than EPA. This was not only because DOT understands the technologies and economics of the auto industry, but also because NHTSA is the nation’s leading motor vehicle safety regulator, and Congress sought to ensure that fuel economy requirements would not adversely affect highway safety. Unfortunately, the Biden Administration has flouted these statutory limitations in nearly every respect. The predictable result is higher expected transportation costs for Americans. l In pursuit of an anti–fossil fuel climate agenda never approved by Congress, the Biden Administration has raised fuel economy requirements to levels that cannot realistically be met by most categories of ICE vehicles. The purpose is to force the auto industry to transition away from traditional technologies to the production of electric vehicles (EVs) and compel Americans to accept costly EVs despite a clear and persistent consumer preference for ICE-powered vehicles. In further support of this agenda, federal regulators administer a scheme of generous fuel economy credits that subsidize EV producers such as Tesla at the expense of legacy automakers. l Moreover, and contrary to Congress’s design, the Biden EPA has been given preeminence in the regulation of fuel economy through the setting of carbon dioxide emissions limits for new motor vehicles under the Clean Air Act. Because carbon dioxide emissions levels correspond to mileage in automobiles powered by fossil fuels, these EPA rules are de facto fuel economy requirements that apply independently of NHTSA’s standards. l The Biden Administration has also granted California a special waiver under the Clean Air Act that permits the California Air Resources Board (CARB) to issue its own fuel economy directives, notwithstanding EPCA’s prohibition on state standards. Under this waiver, CARB has ordered automakers to phase out the sale of ICE-powered automobiles in California and transition to the production of zero-emission vehicles by 2035. The Clean Air Act allows other states to follow California’s requirements; thus, CARB is effectively determining fuel economy policies for the entire nation. As a result of these regulatory actions, automobiles will be significantly more expensive to produce, there will be fewer affordable new vehicle options for Amer- ican families, and fewer new vehicles will be sold in the U.S. That will do more than

— 452 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise Unaccountable bureaucrats like Anthony Fauci should never again have such broad, unchecked power to issue health “guidelines” that will certainly be the basis for federal and state mandates. Never again should public health bureaucrats be allowed to hide information, ignore information, or mislead the public concerning the efficacy or dangers associated with any recommended health interventions because they believe it may lead to hesitancy on the part of the public. The only way to restore public trust in HHS as an institution capable of acting responsibly during a health emergency is through the best of disinfectants—light. Goal #5: Instituting Greater Transparency, Accountability, and Over- sight. The next Administration should guard against the regulatory capture of our public health agencies by pharmaceutical companies, insurers, hospital conglomer- ates, and related economic interests that these agencies are meant to regulate. We must erect robust firewalls to mitigate these obvious financial conflicts of interest. All National Institutes of Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and Food and Drug Administration regulators should be entirely free from pri- vate biopharmaceutical funding. In this realm, “public–private partnerships” is a euphemism for agency capture, a thin veneer for corporatism. Funding for agencies and individual government researchers must come directly from the government with robust congressional oversight. We must shut and lock the revolving door between government and Big Pharma. Regulators should have a long “cooling off period” on their contracts (15 years would not be too long) that prevents them from working for companies they have regulated. Similarly, pharmaceutical company executives should be restricted from moving from industry into positions within regulatory agencies. Finally, HHS should adopt metrics across the agency that can objectively deter- mine the extent to which the agency’s policies and programs achieve desired health and welfare outcomes (not agency outputs). What is not measured is not achieved. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (CDC) COVID and Structural Reform. COVID-19 exposed the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) as perhaps the most incompetent and arrogant agency in the federal government. CDC continually misjudged COVID-19, from its lethality, transmissibility, and origins to treatments. We were told masks were not needed; then they were made mandatory. CDC botched the development of COVID tests when they were needed most. When it was too late, we were told to put our lives on hold for “two weeks to flatten the curve;” that turned into two years of interference and restrictions on the smallest details of our lives. Congress should ensure that CDC’s legal authorities are clearly defined and limited to prevent a recurrence of any such arbitrary and vacillating exercise of power. The CDC should be split into two separate entities housing its two distinct func- tions. On the one hand, the CDC is now responsible for collecting, synthesizing, — 453 — Department of Health and Human Services and publishing epidemiological data from the individual states—a scientific data-gathering function. This information is crucial for medical and public health researchers around the country. On the other hand, the CDC is also responsible for making public health recommendations and policies—an inescapably political function. At times, these two functions are in tension or clear conflict. In February 2022, for example, it was reported that “[t]wo full years into the pandemic, the agency leading the country’s response to the public health emergency has pub- lished only a tiny fraction of the data it has collected,” much of which “could [have helped] state and local health officials better target their efforts to bring the virus under control.” A CDC spokesman said that one of the reasons was “fear that the information might be misinterpreted.”4 These distinct functions should be separated into two entirely separate agen- cies with a firewall between them. We need a national epidemiological agency responsible only for publishing data and required by law to publish all of the data gathered from states and other sources. A separate agency should be responsible for public health with a severely confined ability to make policy recommendations. The CDC can and should make assessments as to the health costs and benefits of health interventions, but it has limited to no capacity to measure the social costs or benefits they may entail. For example, how much risk mitigation is worth the price of shutting down churches on the holiest day of the Christian calendar and far beyond as happened in 2020? What is the proper balance of lives saved versus souls saved? The CDC has no business making such inherently political (and often unconstitutional) assessments and should be required by law to stay in its lane. The CDC’s initial COVID-19 testing failures were largely the result of that agen- cy’s prioritizing its own development and production of tests using its internal staff and facilities. The private sector is much better positioned to tackle the chal- lenges inherent in developing and manufacturing novel products, as illustrated by the relative success of the alternative approach to facilitating the development of COVID-19 vaccines and therapeutics by private companies that was adopted by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). When it comes to testing, the CDC’s role should similarly be to facilitate rather than supplant the efforts of private test developers, academic laboratories, state public health laboratories, and clinical testing providers. When responding to a novel pathogen, the CDC should focus on gathering and disseminating information, including specimens needed for development of positive controls and reference panels, and ensuring that test developers can develop and validate diagnostic tests. These changes will require a shift in priorities and culture at the CDC—and throughout HHS more broadly.5 Most problematically, the CDC presented itself as a kind of “super-doctor” for the entire nation. The CDC is a public health institution, not a medical institution. According to its mission statement, the agency focuses on “disease prevention and