Export Control Enforcement and Enhancement Act

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Bill ID: 119/hr/8169
Last Updated: July 27, 2026

Sponsored by

Rep. Wagner, Ann [R-MO-2]

ID: W000812

Follow the money

The bill

Export Control Enforcement and Enhancement Act

HR. 8169, 119th Congress — read as touching Defense Contractors.

The sponsor

Rep. Wagner, Ann [R-MO-2]

Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.

The money

$230,109 raised

24 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.

The alignment

95% match to Project 2025

This bill's text tracks the "Department of Commerce" section, p. 705-707 of the Mandate for Leadership.

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

Track this bill's progress through the legislative process

Latest Action

Ordered to be Reported in the Nature of a Substitute by the Yeas and Nays: 44 - 0.

April 21, 2026

Introduced

📍 Current Status

Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.

🏛️

Committee Review

🗳️

Floor Action

✅

Passed House

🏛️

Senate Review

🎉

Passed Congress

🖊️

Presidential Action

⚖️

Became Law

📚 How does a bill become a law?

1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.

2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

Another masterpiece of legislative theater, courtesy of the geniuses in Congress. Let's dissect this farce, shall we?

**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The Export Control Enforcement and Enhancement Act (HR 8169) claims to aim at "expediting" consideration of proposals for additions to, removals from, or modifications to the Entity List. How noble. In reality, it's just a thinly veiled attempt to further entrench bureaucratic red tape and provide cover for politicians to grandstand on national security issues.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill amends the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 by introducing an "expedited consideration" process for proposals related to the Entity List. This means that any member of the End-User Review Committee can submit a proposal, which will then be voted on within 30 days (or 45 days if additional information is required). The bill also establishes a presumption of denial for license applications involving entities on the Entity List, unless the committee votes to override this policy. Because, you know, more bureaucracy and arbitrary decision-making are exactly what we need.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The usual suspects: politicians looking to score points on national security, bureaucrats seeking to expand their fiefdoms, and corporations trying to navigate the ever-shifting landscape of export regulations. Oh, and let's not forget the poor souls who will have to deal with the consequences of these "enhanced" export controls – namely, American businesses and workers.

**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill is a classic case of "legislative lupus" – it's a disease that will slowly devour the economy from within. By further complicating the export control process, HR 8169 will likely lead to increased regulatory burdens, decreased competitiveness for American companies, and a higher risk of unintended consequences (e.g., driving business underground or into the arms of foreign competitors). And, of course, it will provide ample opportunities for politicians to posture and pretend they're doing something meaningful about national security.

In conclusion, HR 8169 is a textbook example of how to create a legislative mess: take a complex issue, add a dash of bureaucratic jargon, stir in some national security buzzwords, and voilà! You get a bill that sounds impressive but will likely achieve nothing except to further enrich the lobbying class and perpetuate the cycle of regulatory absurdity. Bravo, Congress. You've done it again.

Related Topics

Federal Budget & AppropriationsElections & Voting RightsTrade & International Commerce
Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (Dr. Haus personality)

💰 Campaign Finance Network

Rep. Wagner, Ann [R-MO-2]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions
$230,109
22 donors
PACs
$0
Organizations
$5,809
Committees
$0
Individuals
$224,300

No PAC contributions found

1
OTOE MISSOURIA TRIBE
1 transaction
$3,300
2
DEMOCRACY ENGINE, INC., PAC
2 transactions
$2,500
3
WINRED
1 transaction
$9

No committee contributions found

1
SMITH, KENNETH
2 transactions
$26,400
2
WILHELM, MARK A MR.
1 transaction
$13,200
3
DRURY, TIM M.
1 transaction
$13,200
4
DANFORTH, JOHN C
1 transaction
$13,200
5
TRACY, RICHARD L. MR.
1 transaction
$13,200
6
RINEY, RODGER O. MR.
1 transaction
$13,200
7
O'CONNELL, JOHN T.
1 transaction
$13,200
8
GREWE, GARY
1 transaction
$13,200
9
HOLEKAMP, WILLIAM F
1 transaction
$13,200
10
NICHOLSON, PAM
1 transaction
$13,200
11
RATTS, VALERIE S
1 transaction
$13,200
12
HEBENSTREIT, JAMES B. MR.
1 transaction
$13,200
13
PFAUTCH, ROY MR.
1 transaction
$11,600
14
SCHULTE, STEVE
1 transaction
$7,900
15
SCHNUCK, CRAIG D
1 transaction
$6,800
16
BECKSTEAD, JOHN
1 transaction
$6,600
17
KAMPETER, MICHAEL
1 transaction
$6,600
18
QUALY, JOHN M.
1 transaction
$6,600
19
MURPHY, RICHARD
1 transaction
$6,600

Cosponsors & Their Campaign Finance

This bill has 1 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.

Rep. Lawler, Michael [R-NY-17]

ID: L000599

Top Contributors

21

1
MURTAGH, COSSU, VENDITTI & CASTRO-BLANCO, LLP
OrganizationWHITE PLAINS, NY
$1,000
Feb 24, 2024
2
BATMASIAN, JAMES
INVESTMENTS LIMITED • OWNER
IndividualBOCA RATON, FL
$6,600
Sep 27, 2023
3
BATMASIAN, JAMES
IndividualBOCA RATON, FL
$6,600
Sep 29, 2023
4
AUSTIN, ROBERT
UNAKA CO., INC. • BUSINESSMAN
IndividualDALLAS, TX
$6,600
Jul 18, 2024
5
SILVERMAN, JEFFREY
RETIRED • RETIRED
IndividualSURFSIDE, FL
$6,534
Feb 15, 2024
6
SILVERMAN, JEFFREY
IndividualSURFSIDE, FL
$6,534
Feb 22, 2024
7
SCALA, MARY ELLEN
RETIRED • RETIRED
IndividualPORT CHESTER, NY
$5,300
Aug 27, 2023
8
DEUTSCH, SHMULEY
SELF • PRESIDENT
IndividualSPRING VALLEY, NY
$3,900
Jun 24, 2024
9
DEUTSCH, SHMULEY
IndividualSPRING VALLEY, NY
$3,900
Jun 25, 2024
10
PERLMUTTER, RAFUEL
GOLDEN TASTE • CEO
IndividualSPRING VALLEY, NY
$3,400
Jun 24, 2024

Donor Network - Rep. Wagner, Ann [R-MO-2]

PACs
Organizations
Individuals
Politicians

Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.

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Showing 46 nodes and 51 connections

Total contributions: $51

Top Donors - Rep. Wagner, Ann [R-MO-2]

Showing top 22 donors by contribution amount

3 Orgs19 Individuals

Industry Impact

Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 3 helped.

  • +Defense Contractorsconfidence 0.90

    Section 2(g)(4)(B)(i) establishes a presumption of denial for export licenses to entities on the Entity List, which benefits defense contractors by restricting foreign competition and protecting domestic defense supply chains.

  • Section 2(g)(4)(B)(i) creates a presumption of denial for export licenses to Entity List entities, which helps semiconductor firms by limiting exports of advanced chips to adversarial nations and reducing foreign competition.

  • Section 2(g)(4)(B)(i) imposes a presumption of denial on exports to Entity List entities, which benefits AI and cloud providers by restricting access to advanced computing technologies by foreign adversaries and protecting domestic market share.

Who funds the sponsor on these industries

For each industry this bill affects, here's what the sponsor (Rep. Wagner, Ann [R-MO-2])received from donors associated with that industry during the 2022–present cycles. Donations are not proof of intent — they are a record of who funds the people writing the law.

Industries this bill HELPS

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.

Department of Commerce

Very Strong
Vector: 70%
Pages: 705-707AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"HR 8169 directly implements key Project 2025 objectives by expediting Entity List additions, enforcing a presumption of denial for exports to listed entities, and strengthening export controls against countries of concern like China and Russia, aligning with the call for tighter EAR policies and strategic decoupling."

Key themes:Entity List expansionpresumption of denialexport control modernizationChina and Russia focusnational security enforcement

— 673 — Department of Commerce Export Enforcement officers through improved and frequent training so they are able to detect export-control violations. EAR Revisions. The U.S. Government needs a new export control moderniza- tion effort to tighten the EAR policies governing licenses to countries of concern, including China and Russia (specifically, revise and/or reverse the 2008 through 2016 policies). When authoritarian governments explain what they plan to do, believe them unless hard evidence demonstrates otherwise. Case in point: China’s and Russia’s stated civil–military fusion policies demand central government command-and-control style systems in which every private entity serves the interests of the state and is forced to provide technology, services, capacity, and data to the central govern- ment and the military. Through this structure, commercial activities are routinely weaponized by authoritarian regimes that repeatedly identify the U.S. as an enemy. Accordingly, U.S. export control policies must be updated to reflect these realities and the associated threats to national security. Key priorities for EAR modernization for countries of concern should be: l Eliminating the “specially designed” licensing loophole; l Redesignating China and Russia to more highly prohibitive export licensing groups (country groups D or E); l Eliminating license exceptions; l Broadening foreign direct product rules; l Reducing the de minimis threshold from 25 percent to 10 percent—or 0 percent for critical technologies; l Tightening the deemed export rules to prevent technology transfer to foreign nationals from countries of concern; l Tightening the definition of “fundamental research” to address exploitation of the open U.S. university system by authoritarian governments through funding, students and researchers, and recruitment; l Eliminating license exceptions for sharing technology with controlled entities/countries through standards-setting “activities” and bodies; and l Improving regulations regarding published information for technology transfers. — 674 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise The next few years will prove or disprove the assertion that the U.S. stands on the precipice of a Cold War with China. Many believe that a Cold War has already begun; if so, then strategic decoupling from China is necessary and, fundamentally, any exports of goods, software, and technology to countries of concern, whether directly or indirectly, should be prohibited or controlled in the absence of good cause (e.g., humanitarian and medical aid, food aid). Entity List and Sanctions. There are currently just over 500 Chinese and over 500 Russian companies on the Department of Commerce’s Entity List, which reg- ulates exports of controlled and uncontrolled items to designated entities. Given China’s Civil–Military Fusion Strategy and Russia’s massive war efforts facili- tated by a broad range of the Russian economy, BIS must add more entities to the Entity List and apply a license review “policy of denial” that prohibits exports to these entities. Entity List parties that violate export controls should be placed on the BIS Denied Persons List (and thereby lose export privileges) and, if the violations are significant enough, they should also be sanctioned by the Department of Treasury. Data Transfer and Apps Used for Surveillance. Department of Commerce leadership should work across government agencies to address privacy and data concerns arising out of “big tech” from national security and export control per- spectives. In particular, they should draft and implement an executive order (EO) based on the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, which expands export control authority beyond ECRA’s scope (goods, software, technology) to regulate and restrict exports of U.S. persons’ data to countries of concern. The EO should establish a framework for the types of personal data subject to export controls and licensing policy by country, and the BIS should implement the EO through regulations. BIS should additionally designate app providers (such as WeChat and Byte Dance/TikTok) known for undermining U.S. national security through data collection, surveillance, and influence operations, to the Entity List. This listing would prevent app users from program updates, which would quickly make these apps non-operational in the United States. NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION Break Up NOAA. The single biggest Department of Commerce agency outside of decennial census years is the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, which houses the National Weather Service, National Marine Fisheries Service, and other components. NOAA garners $6.5 billion of the department’s $12 billion annual operational budget and accounts for more than half of the department’s personnel in non-decadal Census years (2021 figures). NOAA consists of six main offices: l The National Weather Service (NWS);

Department of Commerce

Strong
Vector: 67%
Pages: 705-707AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"HR 8169 aligns closely with Project 2025's goals by enhancing the speed and rigor of export controls on entities threatening national security, particularly through expedited Entity List modifications and presumption of denial licensing—both of which support tighter control of emerging and foundational technologies and improved enforcement against countries of concern like China and Russia."

Key themes:export controlsEntity List reformsnational securitylicensing stringencytechnology transfer prevention

— 672 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise regulate exports of emerging and foundational technologies. Although the scope of such technologies is vast, to date BIS has only controlled just over 40 of these technologies. This does not meet the clear statutory intent of Congress that ECRA be leveraged to ensure that the United States maintains a technological advantage in technologies bearing upon national security interests. Currently, BIS self-identifies technologies that merit control under the EAR with minimal input from other federal agencies. This mechanism should be improved. BIS should create an open, transparent rulemaking process by which any industry participant, private entity, or branch of the government may, at any time, submit nominations for emerging/foundational technologies for control. Then, on a quarterly basis, BIS should make public such recommendations (while holding the identity of the submitter confidential) for public input, followed by an explanation about its ultimate decision to control or not control the items, its reasons, the level of controls applied (stringent or permissive), and the relevant Export Control Classification Number (ECCN) under the Commerce Control List. Commerce should also institute a mechanism whereby its decisions can be challenged, including on a confidential basis. Licensing Procedures: Adjudication and Transparency. Currently, if the Departments of Defense, State, Commerce, and Energy disagree on an export license decision, the disagreement may be escalated to the Operating Commit- tee—and subsequently to the Advisory Committee on Export Policy led by BIS’s Assistant Secretary for Export Administration. The Assistant Secretary does not need to lead the dispute resolution, and this process should be revised by giving lead authority to BIS’s Under Secretary, who is better able to account for diverging views. Moreover, BIS’s authority to overrule other agency votes should be changed. Each agency should have one equal vote and, if a licensing dispute remains unre- solved, the final decision should be elevated to the National Security Advisor and the Secretaries of Defense, State, Commerce, and Energy. Additionally, to improve congressional oversight of BIS’s license adjudication process, BIS should provide specific congressional committees with data from the Automated Export System on a quarterly basis. Electronic files should contain U.S. exporter by name; product description (e.g., harmonized system code and ECCN/U. S. Munitions List designation); end user and destination country; and when a license was required, whether the license was granted or denied. BIS cur- rently denies just 1.2 percent of export licenses. These data reporting requirements can help Congress better determine whether BIS is adequately protecting national security through appropriate use of export controls or whether additional direction from Congress is required. Improve End-Use Checks. The integrity of the export control system may be validated only through adequate end-use checks. BIS must deny export licenses to countries that do not permit adequate end-use checks (e.g., China/Russia) by U.S. authorities. BIS should also strengthen the forensic audit capabilities of its — 673 — Department of Commerce Export Enforcement officers through improved and frequent training so they are able to detect export-control violations. EAR Revisions. The U.S. Government needs a new export control moderniza- tion effort to tighten the EAR policies governing licenses to countries of concern, including China and Russia (specifically, revise and/or reverse the 2008 through 2016 policies). When authoritarian governments explain what they plan to do, believe them unless hard evidence demonstrates otherwise. Case in point: China’s and Russia’s stated civil–military fusion policies demand central government command-and-control style systems in which every private entity serves the interests of the state and is forced to provide technology, services, capacity, and data to the central govern- ment and the military. Through this structure, commercial activities are routinely weaponized by authoritarian regimes that repeatedly identify the U.S. as an enemy. Accordingly, U.S. export control policies must be updated to reflect these realities and the associated threats to national security. Key priorities for EAR modernization for countries of concern should be: l Eliminating the “specially designed” licensing loophole; l Redesignating China and Russia to more highly prohibitive export licensing groups (country groups D or E); l Eliminating license exceptions; l Broadening foreign direct product rules; l Reducing the de minimis threshold from 25 percent to 10 percent—or 0 percent for critical technologies; l Tightening the deemed export rules to prevent technology transfer to foreign nationals from countries of concern; l Tightening the definition of “fundamental research” to address exploitation of the open U.S. university system by authoritarian governments through funding, students and researchers, and recruitment; l Eliminating license exceptions for sharing technology with controlled entities/countries through standards-setting “activities” and bodies; and l Improving regulations regarding published information for technology transfers.

Department of Commerce

Strong
Vector: 65%
Pages: 705-707AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"HR 8169 aligns closely with Project 2025's goal of strengthening export controls on emerging and foundational technologies by expediting the Entity List process, enhancing interagency coordination, and increasing transparency—key themes emphasized in the policy. The bill's focus on faster additions to the Entity List and presumption of denial supports BIS's role in safeguarding national security through tighter control of sensitive exports."

Key themes:export controlsEntity List reformnational securityinteragency coordinationlicensing transparency

— 672 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise regulate exports of emerging and foundational technologies. Although the scope of such technologies is vast, to date BIS has only controlled just over 40 of these technologies. This does not meet the clear statutory intent of Congress that ECRA be leveraged to ensure that the United States maintains a technological advantage in technologies bearing upon national security interests. Currently, BIS self-identifies technologies that merit control under the EAR with minimal input from other federal agencies. This mechanism should be improved. BIS should create an open, transparent rulemaking process by which any industry participant, private entity, or branch of the government may, at any time, submit nominations for emerging/foundational technologies for control. Then, on a quarterly basis, BIS should make public such recommendations (while holding the identity of the submitter confidential) for public input, followed by an explanation about its ultimate decision to control or not control the items, its reasons, the level of controls applied (stringent or permissive), and the relevant Export Control Classification Number (ECCN) under the Commerce Control List. Commerce should also institute a mechanism whereby its decisions can be challenged, including on a confidential basis. Licensing Procedures: Adjudication and Transparency. Currently, if the Departments of Defense, State, Commerce, and Energy disagree on an export license decision, the disagreement may be escalated to the Operating Commit- tee—and subsequently to the Advisory Committee on Export Policy led by BIS’s Assistant Secretary for Export Administration. The Assistant Secretary does not need to lead the dispute resolution, and this process should be revised by giving lead authority to BIS’s Under Secretary, who is better able to account for diverging views. Moreover, BIS’s authority to overrule other agency votes should be changed. Each agency should have one equal vote and, if a licensing dispute remains unre- solved, the final decision should be elevated to the National Security Advisor and the Secretaries of Defense, State, Commerce, and Energy. Additionally, to improve congressional oversight of BIS’s license adjudication process, BIS should provide specific congressional committees with data from the Automated Export System on a quarterly basis. Electronic files should contain U.S. exporter by name; product description (e.g., harmonized system code and ECCN/U. S. Munitions List designation); end user and destination country; and when a license was required, whether the license was granted or denied. BIS cur- rently denies just 1.2 percent of export licenses. These data reporting requirements can help Congress better determine whether BIS is adequately protecting national security through appropriate use of export controls or whether additional direction from Congress is required. Improve End-Use Checks. The integrity of the export control system may be validated only through adequate end-use checks. BIS must deny export licenses to countries that do not permit adequate end-use checks (e.g., China/Russia) by U.S. authorities. BIS should also strengthen the forensic audit capabilities of its

Showing 3 of 5 policy matches

About These Correlations

Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.

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