The bill
MATCH Act
HR. 8170, 119th Congress — read as touching Semiconductors & Hardware.
Sponsored by
Rep. Baumgartner, Michael [R-WA-5]
ID: B001322
Follow the money
The bill
HR. 8170, 119th Congress — read as touching Semiconductors & Hardware.
The sponsor
Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.
The money
26 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.
The alignment
This bill's text tracks the "Department of Commerce" section, p. 705-707 of the Mandate for Leadership.
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Ordered to be Reported in the Nature of a Substitute (Amended) by the Yeas and Nays: 36 - 8.
April 21, 2026
📍 Current Status
Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Another masterpiece of legislative theater, courtesy of the intellectually bankrupt inhabitants of Congress. The MATCH Act, a bill so cleverly crafted to sound like it's about national security, but in reality, it's just another symptom of the disease that plagues our political system: corruption, greed, and a healthy dose of stupidity.
**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The main purpose of this bill is to restrict the export of certain semiconductor manufacturing equipment and components to countries deemed "adversaries" by the United States. Because, you know, those pesky Chinese companies might actually start producing advanced-node integrated circuits that could rival our own. The horror! The real objective, of course, is to protect the interests of American corporations that dominate the semiconductor industry, while pretending to care about national security.
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill requires the government to identify and restrict the export of covered semiconductor manufacturing equipment and components to countries like China. It also mandates diplomatic efforts to convince allied countries to adopt similar controls, because who needs international cooperation when you can just strong-arm your friends into doing your bidding? The bill also establishes a licensing policy of denial for exports to certain facilities, because why bother with due process when you can just deny everything?
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The affected parties include American corporations that produce semiconductor manufacturing equipment, Chinese companies like Huawei and SMIC, and allied countries that will be pressured into adopting similar controls. Oh, and let's not forget the poor souls who actually have to implement these restrictions – the bureaucrats who will have to navigate this Byzantine regulatory landscape.
**Potential Impact & Implications:** The potential impact of this bill is to further escalate the ongoing tech Cold War between the United States and China. It will likely lead to retaliatory measures from China, which could harm American businesses that rely on Chinese supply chains. But hey, who needs a functioning global economy when you can have a good old-fashioned trade war? The implications are clear: this bill is a recipe for disaster, a perfect storm of protectionism, nationalism, and bureaucratic incompetence.
In conclusion, the MATCH Act is a textbook example of how to write a bill that sounds good on paper but is actually a thinly veiled attempt to protect corporate interests while pretending to care about national security. It's a disease, really – a symptom of a broader illness that afflicts our political system. And we're all just along for the ride, watching as our elected officials engage in this farcical dance of legislative theater, completely oblivious to the fact that they're making fools of themselves and harming the very people they claim to represent. Bravo, Congress. Bravo.
Rep. Baumgartner, Michael [R-WA-5]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
No PAC contributions found
No committee contributions found
This bill has 10 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.
ID: M001194
Top Contributors
36
ID: M001218
Top Contributors
20
ID: M001231
Top Contributors
22
ID: G000592
Top Contributors
29
ID: H001058
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28
ID: S001229
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ID: L000599
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ID: R000622
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25
ID: G000604
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20
ID: S001230
Top Contributors
23
Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Showing 38 nodes and 50 connections
Total contributions: $50
Showing top 21 donors by contribution amount
Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 2 harmed.
Section 3(c)(3) establishes U.S. jurisdiction and applies countrywide controls to covered semiconductor manufacturing equipment exported from allied supplier countries, requiring licenses with a policy of denial for servicing and end-use controls, directly restricting the industry's ability to export equipment and components to countries of concern.
Section 2(2) notes that advanced computing applications like AI are transforming military affairs, and the bill's export controls on semiconductor manufacturing equipment (Section 3) indirectly hinder AI development by limiting access to advanced-node integrated circuits, which are foundational for AI hardware.
For each industry this bill affects, here's what the sponsor (Rep. Baumgartner, Michael [R-WA-5])received from donors associated with that industry during the 2022–present cycles. Donations are not proof of intent — they are a record of who funds the people writing the law.
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.
AI Analysis:
"The MATCH Act directly implements export restrictions on semiconductor manufacturing equipment—a foundational technology—to countries of concern, aligning with Project 2025’s goal of regulating emerging/foundational technologies to protect U.S. technological advantage and national security."
— 672 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise regulate exports of emerging and foundational technologies. Although the scope of such technologies is vast, to date BIS has only controlled just over 40 of these technologies. This does not meet the clear statutory intent of Congress that ECRA be leveraged to ensure that the United States maintains a technological advantage in technologies bearing upon national security interests. Currently, BIS self-identifies technologies that merit control under the EAR with minimal input from other federal agencies. This mechanism should be improved. BIS should create an open, transparent rulemaking process by which any industry participant, private entity, or branch of the government may, at any time, submit nominations for emerging/foundational technologies for control. Then, on a quarterly basis, BIS should make public such recommendations (while holding the identity of the submitter confidential) for public input, followed by an explanation about its ultimate decision to control or not control the items, its reasons, the level of controls applied (stringent or permissive), and the relevant Export Control Classification Number (ECCN) under the Commerce Control List. Commerce should also institute a mechanism whereby its decisions can be challenged, including on a confidential basis. Licensing Procedures: Adjudication and Transparency. Currently, if the Departments of Defense, State, Commerce, and Energy disagree on an export license decision, the disagreement may be escalated to the Operating Commit- tee—and subsequently to the Advisory Committee on Export Policy led by BIS’s Assistant Secretary for Export Administration. The Assistant Secretary does not need to lead the dispute resolution, and this process should be revised by giving lead authority to BIS’s Under Secretary, who is better able to account for diverging views. Moreover, BIS’s authority to overrule other agency votes should be changed. Each agency should have one equal vote and, if a licensing dispute remains unre- solved, the final decision should be elevated to the National Security Advisor and the Secretaries of Defense, State, Commerce, and Energy. Additionally, to improve congressional oversight of BIS’s license adjudication process, BIS should provide specific congressional committees with data from the Automated Export System on a quarterly basis. Electronic files should contain U.S. exporter by name; product description (e.g., harmonized system code and ECCN/U. S. Munitions List designation); end user and destination country; and when a license was required, whether the license was granted or denied. BIS cur- rently denies just 1.2 percent of export licenses. These data reporting requirements can help Congress better determine whether BIS is adequately protecting national security through appropriate use of export controls or whether additional direction from Congress is required. Improve End-Use Checks. The integrity of the export control system may be validated only through adequate end-use checks. BIS must deny export licenses to countries that do not permit adequate end-use checks (e.g., China/Russia) by U.S. authorities. BIS should also strengthen the forensic audit capabilities of its — 673 — Department of Commerce Export Enforcement officers through improved and frequent training so they are able to detect export-control violations. EAR Revisions. The U.S. Government needs a new export control moderniza- tion effort to tighten the EAR policies governing licenses to countries of concern, including China and Russia (specifically, revise and/or reverse the 2008 through 2016 policies). When authoritarian governments explain what they plan to do, believe them unless hard evidence demonstrates otherwise. Case in point: China’s and Russia’s stated civil–military fusion policies demand central government command-and-control style systems in which every private entity serves the interests of the state and is forced to provide technology, services, capacity, and data to the central govern- ment and the military. Through this structure, commercial activities are routinely weaponized by authoritarian regimes that repeatedly identify the U.S. as an enemy. Accordingly, U.S. export control policies must be updated to reflect these realities and the associated threats to national security. Key priorities for EAR modernization for countries of concern should be: l Eliminating the “specially designed” licensing loophole; l Redesignating China and Russia to more highly prohibitive export licensing groups (country groups D or E); l Eliminating license exceptions; l Broadening foreign direct product rules; l Reducing the de minimis threshold from 25 percent to 10 percent—or 0 percent for critical technologies; l Tightening the deemed export rules to prevent technology transfer to foreign nationals from countries of concern; l Tightening the definition of “fundamental research” to address exploitation of the open U.S. university system by authoritarian governments through funding, students and researchers, and recruitment; l Eliminating license exceptions for sharing technology with controlled entities/countries through standards-setting “activities” and bodies; and l Improving regulations regarding published information for technology transfers.
AI Analysis:
"The MATCH Act directly advances the Project 2025 goal of regulating exports of emerging/foundational technologies to protect national security, focusing on semiconductor manufacturing equipment and imposing strict controls on adversaries. While it shares the core objective of strengthening export controls, it does not address the specific procedural reforms (transparent rulemaking, licensing dispute resolution, congressional oversight) emphasized in the Policy."
— 672 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise regulate exports of emerging and foundational technologies. Although the scope of such technologies is vast, to date BIS has only controlled just over 40 of these technologies. This does not meet the clear statutory intent of Congress that ECRA be leveraged to ensure that the United States maintains a technological advantage in technologies bearing upon national security interests. Currently, BIS self-identifies technologies that merit control under the EAR with minimal input from other federal agencies. This mechanism should be improved. BIS should create an open, transparent rulemaking process by which any industry participant, private entity, or branch of the government may, at any time, submit nominations for emerging/foundational technologies for control. Then, on a quarterly basis, BIS should make public such recommendations (while holding the identity of the submitter confidential) for public input, followed by an explanation about its ultimate decision to control or not control the items, its reasons, the level of controls applied (stringent or permissive), and the relevant Export Control Classification Number (ECCN) under the Commerce Control List. Commerce should also institute a mechanism whereby its decisions can be challenged, including on a confidential basis. Licensing Procedures: Adjudication and Transparency. Currently, if the Departments of Defense, State, Commerce, and Energy disagree on an export license decision, the disagreement may be escalated to the Operating Commit- tee—and subsequently to the Advisory Committee on Export Policy led by BIS’s Assistant Secretary for Export Administration. The Assistant Secretary does not need to lead the dispute resolution, and this process should be revised by giving lead authority to BIS’s Under Secretary, who is better able to account for diverging views. Moreover, BIS’s authority to overrule other agency votes should be changed. Each agency should have one equal vote and, if a licensing dispute remains unre- solved, the final decision should be elevated to the National Security Advisor and the Secretaries of Defense, State, Commerce, and Energy. Additionally, to improve congressional oversight of BIS’s license adjudication process, BIS should provide specific congressional committees with data from the Automated Export System on a quarterly basis. Electronic files should contain U.S. exporter by name; product description (e.g., harmonized system code and ECCN/U. S. Munitions List designation); end user and destination country; and when a license was required, whether the license was granted or denied. BIS cur- rently denies just 1.2 percent of export licenses. These data reporting requirements can help Congress better determine whether BIS is adequately protecting national security through appropriate use of export controls or whether additional direction from Congress is required. Improve End-Use Checks. The integrity of the export control system may be validated only through adequate end-use checks. BIS must deny export licenses to countries that do not permit adequate end-use checks (e.g., China/Russia) by U.S. authorities. BIS should also strengthen the forensic audit capabilities of its
AI Analysis:
"Both the MATCH Act and the Project 2025 section emphasize using trade policy tools to protect U.S. economic and national security by countering unfair practices from China and safeguarding critical industries. They share a focus on strategic sectors (semiconductors/arsenal of democracy) and the need for reciprocal, defensive measures against adversarial economic threats."
— 768 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise has a quality of its own.” In World War II in particular, it was not just the brave soldiers, sailors, and pilots who beat the Nazis and Imperial Japan. It was America’s factories—its “arsenal of democracy”—that overwhelmed the Axis forces. In the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, almost certainly spawned in a CCP biological weapons lab in Wuhan, China,5 global supply chains have been under significant pressures from lockdown policies, energy price shocks, and other dis- ruptions, including labor market disruptions. At the height of the pandemic, the rising geopolitical risk associated with globalized supply chains was underscored when Communist China, which controls much of the world’s pharmaceutical pro- duction and supply chains, threatened to plunge America “into a mighty sea of coronavirus” through pharmaceutical export controls6 if American politicians dared to investigate what happened at the Wuhan lab. Add all this up, and America’s trade situation and massive trade imbalances pose not only a severe economic security threat, but also a national security threat. As President Donald Trump indicated in announcing his 2017 National Security Strategy, “economic security is national security.”7 CHALLENGE #1: UNFAIR AND NONRECIPROCAL TRADE INSTITUTIONALIZED IN WTO RULES Tonight, I am also asking you to pass the United States Reciprocal Trade Act, so that if another country places an unfair tariff on an American product, we can charge them the exact same tariff on the exact same product that they sell to us. President Donald J. Trump, 2019 State of the Union Address8 The World Trade Organization, with its 164 members, governs international trade rules. Under its most favored nation (MFN) rule, each WTO member must apply the lowest tariffs it applies to the products of any one country to the products of every other WTO country. Importantly, nothing in the MFN rule requires a WTO member to provide equal—that is, reciprocal or mirror—tariff rates to its trading partners. Rather, under MFN, WTO members can charge systematically higher tariffs to other countries to the extent negotiated in their WTO tariff schedules so long as they apply those same higher tariffs to all countries. As a poster child for the kind of nonreciprocal tariffs that American manufactur- ers often face, the MFN tariff for automobiles applied by the U.S. is only 2.5 percent. In contrast, the EU charges 10 percent, Communist China 15 percent, and Brazil 35 percent. Similarly, while the U.S. applies an MFN tariff rate of 6.2 percent on the rice it buys from Malaysia, Malaysia applies an ad-valorem equivalent tariff of 40 percent on rice from the U.S. Meanwhile, European milk producers are shielded — 769 — Trade TABLE 2 Nonreciprocal Tariff Rates Under “Most Favored Nation” Rule Foreign U.S. and Foreign Partner Applies U.S. Applies Partner Apply 132-Country Sample Higher Tariff Higher Tariff Same Tariff Number of HS6 Product Lines 467,015 141,736 87,319 Percent of HS6 Product Lines 67% 20% 13% Tariff Diff erential 12.3% 8.7% 0.0% NOTE: HS6—Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System. SOURCE: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, “Trade Analysis Information System,” https:// databank.worldbank.org/source/unctad-%5E-trade-analysis-information-system-(trains) (accessed March 21, 2023). A heritage.org by 67 percent tariffs while American milk producers benefit only from a 15 percent tariff on foreign imports.9 From the perspective of strategic game theory, the WTO’s MFN rule provides little or no incentive for higher-tariff countries to lower their tariffs. Rather, under these conditions, the dominant strategy of any relatively high-tariff country is simply to maintain those high tariffs while free riding off the lower-tariff countries. The U.S. is disproportionately harmed by the WTO’s nonreciprocal tariff regime. The countries that are hurt most by the WTO’s nonreciprocal tariff regime are those like the United States that charge the lowest tariffs on average. This point is illustrated in Table 2, which reports information on nonreciprocal tariffs that are applied under the MFN rule on product lines at the six-digit level of the Harmo- nized Commodity Description and Coding System (HS6).10 Table 2 presents results for a broad sample of 132 countries that account for more than 60 percent of total U.S. trade and 98 percent of U.S. trade that is not cov- ered by free trade agreements (FTAs). Within this broad sample of 132 countries, U.S. exporters face higher tariffs in 467,015 different cases compared to 141,736 cases in which the U.S. charges higher nonreciprocal rates. In other words, U.S. exporters face higher tariffs more than three times as often as the U.S. applies higher tariffs. Moreover, when American exporters face higher tariffs, the nonreciprocal tar- iffs are typically much higher. As row 4 of Table 2 indicates, in the 467,015 cases in which foreign partners charge higher tariffs, the average rate applied by the foreign partners is 12.3 percentage points above the rate applied by the U.S. In contrast,
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.
To make technical amendments to update statutory references to certain provisions which were formerly classified to chapters 14 and 19 of title 25, United States Code, and to correct related technical errors.
119/hr/4584
Expanding the Defense Industrial Base Sales Act
119/hr/8649
No Paydays for Hostage-Takers Act
119/hr/2619