Semiconductor Controls Effectiveness Act of 2026

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Bill ID: 119/hr/8287
Last Updated: September 13, 2026

Sponsored by

Rep. Stanton, Greg [D-AZ-4]

ID: S001211

Follow the money

The bill

Semiconductor Controls Effectiveness Act of 2026

HR. 8287, 119th Congress — read as touching Semiconductors & Hardware.

The sponsor

Rep. Stanton, Greg [D-AZ-4]

Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.

The money

$74,151 raised

30 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.

The alignment

85% match to Project 2025

This bill's text tracks the "Department of Commerce" section, p. 705-707 of the Mandate for Leadership.

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

Track this bill's progress through the legislative process

Latest Action

Ordered to be Reported (Amended) by the Yeas and Nays: 43 - 0.

April 21, 2026

Introduced

📍 Current Status

Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.

🏛️

Committee Review

🗳️

Floor Action

✅

Passed House

🏛️

Senate Review

🎉

Passed Congress

🖊️

Presidential Action

⚖️

Became Law

📚 How does a bill become a law?

1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.

2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

Another masterpiece of legislative theater, courtesy of the intellectually bankrupt members of Congress. Let's dissect this farce, shall we?

**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The Semiconductor Controls Effectiveness Act of 2026 is a thinly veiled attempt to justify the United States' export control policies on semiconductors and semiconductor manufacturing equipment to China. The bill's primary objective is to require the Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research to submit a comprehensive report on the impact and effectiveness of these controls. How quaint.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill demands a report that includes a laundry list of items, such as an inventory of all export controls concerning semiconductors and semiconductor manufacturing equipment destined for China, analysis of the control's intended goal, impact on China's military capabilities, and the effect on US companies' revenue and global market share. Oh, and let's not forget the obligatory "sense of Congress" section, which is just a euphemism for "we're trying to sound smart but have no idea what we're doing."

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The usual suspects are involved: the Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research, the Under Secretary of Commerce for Industry and Security, the Director of National Intelligence, and various private sector entities from the US semiconductor industry. Because, of course, the real stakeholders here are the corporations that stand to gain or lose from these export controls.

**Potential Impact & Implications:** The report required by this bill will likely be a masterpiece of bureaucratic obfuscation, designed to justify the status quo while pretending to provide meaningful analysis. The real impact will be on US companies' bottom lines and China's ability to acquire advanced technology. But let's not worry about that; after all, it's just a game of global technological dominance, and the American public is just a pawn to be used.

In conclusion, this bill is a symptom of a deeper disease: the chronic inability of Congress to address real issues, instead opting for shallow posturing and meaningless reports. It's a legislative placebo, designed to make everyone feel better while accomplishing nothing. And we're all just along for the ride, watching as our elected officials engage in this farcical dance, pretending to care about national security while lining their pockets with corporate donations. How delightful.

Related Topics

Federal Budget & AppropriationsCongressional Rules & Procedures
Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (Dr. Haus personality)

💰 Campaign Finance Network

Rep. Stanton, Greg [D-AZ-4]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions
$74,151
20 donors
PACs
$0
Organizations
$31,251
Committees
$0
Individuals
$42,900

No PAC contributions found

1
FEDERATED INDIANS OF GRATON RANCHERIA
2 transactions
$6,600
2
SALT RIVER PIMA MARICOPA INDIAN COMMUNITY
4 transactions
$5,000
3
AK-CHIN INDIAN COMMUNITY
2 transactions
$4,300
4
GILA RIVER INDIAN COMMUNITY
1 transaction
$3,300
5
TOONO 0'ODHAM NATION
1 transaction
$3,300
6
MORONGO BAND OF MISSION INDIANS
2 transactions
$3,000
7
ONEIDA NATION
2 transactions
$2,000
8
BARONA BAND OF MISSION INDIANS
1 transaction
$1,500
9
TOHONO O'ODHAM NATION
1 transaction
$1,000
10
COLORADO RIVER INDIAN TRIBES
1 transaction
$1,000
11
SODHI AND SODHI INVESTMENTS
1 transaction
$251

No committee contributions found

1
NAJAFI, CHERYL
2 transactions
$9,900
2
BRUN, LESLIE
2 transactions
$6,600
3
CUNNINGHAM, MATTHEW B.
2 transactions
$6,600
4
GRESSER, WILLIAM POWER JR
1 transaction
$3,300
5
LYTLE, HUGH
1 transaction
$3,300
6
MINER, CHRIS
1 transaction
$3,300
7
POMEROY, BRUCE
1 transaction
$3,300
8
SANDBERG, SHERYL
1 transaction
$3,300
9
VEDADI, JASON
1 transaction
$3,300

Cosponsors & Their Campaign Finance

This bill has 6 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.

Rep. Issa, Darrell [R-CA-48]

ID: I000056

Top Contributors

34

1
AGUA CALIENTE BAND OF CAHUILLA INDIANS
OrganizationPALM SPRINGS, CA
$3,300
Nov 1, 2024
2
MASHANTUCKET (WESTERN) PEQUOT TRIBE
OrganizationMASHANTUCKET, CT
$3,300
Oct 25, 2023
3
SHINGLE SPRINGS BAND MIVOK INDIANS
OrganizationSHINGLE SPRINGS, CA
$3,300
Oct 25, 2023
4
MORONGO BAND OF MISSION INDIANS
OrganizationBANNING, CA
$3,300
Mar 26, 2024
5
MORONGO BAND OF MISSION INDIANS
OrganizationBANNING, CA
$3,300
Jun 28, 2023
6
SYCUAN BAND OF THE KUMEYAAY NATION
OrganizationEL CAJON, CA
$3,300
Jun 29, 2023
7
POARCH BAND OF CREEK INDIANS
OrganizationATMORE, AL
$3,300
Jul 26, 2023
8
PECHANGA BAND OF LUISENO INDIANS
OrganizationTEMECULA, CA
$3,300
Sep 28, 2023
9
PECHANGA BAND OF LUISENO INDIANS
OrganizationTEMECULA, CA
$3,300
Aug 2, 2024
10
SHINGLE SPRINGS BAND MIWOK INDIANS
OrganizationSHINGLE SPRINGS, CA
$3,000
Oct 30, 2024

Rep. Meeks, Gregory W. [D-NY-5]

ID: M001137

Top Contributors

23

1
AGUA CALIENTE BAN OF CAHUILLA INDIANS
OrganizationPALM SPRINGS, CA
$3,300
Jul 19, 2023
2
AK-CHIN INDIAN COMMUNITY
OrganizationMARICOPA, AZ
$3,300
Mar 30, 2023
3
AK-CHIN INDIAN COMMUNITY
OrganizationMARICOPA, AZ
$2,500
Sep 30, 2024
4
CROWN, LESTER
N/A • RETIRED
IndividualCHICAGO, IL
$6,600
Jul 18, 2024
5
LIPPMAN, MARIE C.
IndividualMIAMI BEACH, FL
$5,000
Mar 7, 2023
6
CUKIERMAN, JORAM
CITADEL • FINANCE
IndividualSCARSDALE, NY
$3,300
Oct 28, 2024
7
SILVERMAN, DOUG
SENATOR INVESTMENT GROUP LP • MANAGING PARTNER
IndividualNEW YORK, NY
$3,300
Oct 22, 2024
8
SHAMAH, ALAN
FIT FOR LIFE LLC • BUSINESS EXECUTIVE
IndividualBROOKLYN, NY
$3,300
Oct 22, 2024
9
SHAMAH, JOSEPH
FIT FOR LIFE LLC • CO-FOUNDER & CEO
IndividualBROOKLYN, NY
$3,300
Oct 22, 2024
10
ARMSTRONG, BRIAN
COINBASE • CEO
IndividualSAN FRANCISCO, CA
$3,300
Aug 29, 2023

Rep. Lawler, Michael [R-NY-17]

ID: L000599

Top Contributors

21

1
MURTAGH, COSSU, VENDITTI & CASTRO-BLANCO, LLP
OrganizationWHITE PLAINS, NY
$1,000
Feb 24, 2024
2
BATMASIAN, JAMES
INVESTMENTS LIMITED • OWNER
IndividualBOCA RATON, FL
$6,600
Sep 27, 2023
3
BATMASIAN, JAMES
IndividualBOCA RATON, FL
$6,600
Sep 29, 2023
4
AUSTIN, ROBERT
UNAKA CO., INC. • BUSINESSMAN
IndividualDALLAS, TX
$6,600
Jul 18, 2024
5
SILVERMAN, JEFFREY
RETIRED • RETIRED
IndividualSURFSIDE, FL
$6,534
Feb 15, 2024
6
SILVERMAN, JEFFREY
IndividualSURFSIDE, FL
$6,534
Feb 22, 2024
7
SCALA, MARY ELLEN
RETIRED • RETIRED
IndividualPORT CHESTER, NY
$5,300
Aug 27, 2023
8
DEUTSCH, SHMULEY
SELF • PRESIDENT
IndividualSPRING VALLEY, NY
$3,900
Jun 24, 2024
9
DEUTSCH, SHMULEY
IndividualSPRING VALLEY, NY
$3,900
Jun 25, 2024
10
PERLMUTTER, RAFUEL
GOLDEN TASTE • CEO
IndividualSPRING VALLEY, NY
$3,400
Jun 24, 2024

Rep. Kamlager-Dove, Sydney [D-CA-37]

ID: K000400

Top Contributors

28

1
SANTA ROSA RANCHERIA
OrganizationLEMOORE, CA
$6,600
May 12, 2024
2
AK-CHIN INDIAN COMMUNITY
OrganizationMARICOPA, AZ
$3,300
Jan 16, 2024
3
AGUA CALIENTE BAND OF CAHUILLA INDIANS
OrganizationPALM SPRINGS, CA
$3,300
Jun 30, 2023
4
BARONA BAND OF MISSION INDIANS
OrganizationLAKESIDE, CA
$2,000
Jun 30, 2024
5
SHAKOPEE MDEWAKANTON SIOUX COMMUNITY
OrganizationPRIOR LAKE, MN
$1,650
Apr 29, 2024
6
SHAKOPEE MDEWAKANTON SIOUX COMMUNITY
OrganizationPRIOR LAKE, MN
$1,650
Jun 15, 2023
7
POARCH BAND OF CREEK INDIANS
OrganizationATMORE, AL
$1,000
Apr 23, 2024
8
CHEROKEE NATION
OrganizationTAHLEQUAH, OK
$1,000
Sep 30, 2024
9
BRUCE, CHERYL LYNN
SELF-EMPLOYED • ACTOR
IndividualCHICAGO, IL
$6,600
Jan 1, 2024
10
BRUCE, CHERYL LYNN
IndividualCHICAGO, IL
$6,600
Jan 14, 2024

Rep. Bera, Ami [D-CA-6]

ID: B001287

Top Contributors

23

1
AMERICAN ISRAEL PUBLIC AFFAIRS COMMITTEE POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEE
CONDUIT TOTAL LISTED IN AGG. FIELD
PACWASHINGTON, DC
$250
Nov 5, 2024
2
AMERICAN ISRAEL PUBLIC AFFAIRS COMMITTEE POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEE
CONDUIT TOTAL LISTED IN AGG. FIELD
PACWASHINGTON, DC
$250
Oct 31, 2024
3
SANTA YNEZ BAND OF MISSION INDIANS
OrganizationSANTA YNEZ, CA
$2,000
Jun 30, 2024
4
DOERR, JOHN L. III
NOT EMPLOYED • NOT EMPLOYED
IndividualSAN CARLOS, CA
$6,600
Sep 30, 2023
5
DOERR, JOHN L. III
NOT EMPLOYED • NOT EMPLOYED
IndividualSAN CARLOS, CA
$6,600
Sep 30, 2023
6
DOERR, JOHN L. III
IndividualSAN CARLOS, CA
$6,600
Sep 30, 2023
7
DOERR, JOHN L. III
IndividualSAN CARLOS, CA
$6,600
Sep 30, 2023
8
DOERR, ANN HOWLAND
NOT EMPLOYED • NOT EMPLOYED
IndividualSAN CARLOS, CA
$3,300
Sep 29, 2023
9
DOERR, ANN HOWLAND
NOT EMPLOYED • NOT EMPLOYED
IndividualSAN CARLOS, CA
$3,300
Sep 29, 2023
10
DOERR, JOHN L. III
NOT EMPLOYED • NOT EMPLOYED
IndividualSAN CARLOS, CA
$3,300
Sep 30, 2023

Rep. Sherman, Brad [D-CA-32]

ID: S000344

Top Contributors

26

1
MORONGO BAND OF MISSION INDIANS NATIVE AMERICAN RIGHTS FUND
OrganizationBANNING, CA
$2,000
Oct 30, 2023
2
MS BAND OF CHOCTAW INDIANS
OrganizationCHOCTAW, MS
$2,000
Oct 5, 2023
3
SANTA YNEZ BAND OF MISSION INDIANS
OrganizationSANTA YNEZ, CA
$2,000
Sep 30, 2024
4
SANTA YNEZ BAND OF MISSION INDIANS
OrganizationSANTA YNEZ, CA
$1,300
Oct 21, 2024
5
BARONA BAND OF MISSION INDIANS
OrganizationLAKESIDE, CA
$1,000
Oct 28, 2024
6
SANTA YNEZ BAND OF MISSION INDIANS
OrganizationSANTA YNEZ, CA
$700
Oct 21, 2024
7
AHMED, TAIMOOR
MARKHOR LOGISTICS • CEO
IndividualSACRAMENTO, CA
$3,300
Mar 30, 2023
8
GARHWAL, HARI
GARHWAL, CHAN & WILLIAMS • CPA
IndividualSAN FRANCISCO, CA
$3,300
Mar 23, 2023
9
GARHWAL, HARI
GARHWAL, CHAN & WILLIAMS • CPA
IndividualSAN FRANCISCO, CA
$3,300
Mar 23, 2023
10
GARHWAL, SANJEEV
WWMG • PHYSICIAN
IndividualSEATTLE, WA
$3,300
Mar 29, 2023

Donor Network - Rep. Stanton, Greg [D-AZ-4]

PACs
Organizations
Individuals
Politicians

Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.

Loading...

Showing 48 nodes and 71 connections

Total contributions: $71

Top Donors - Rep. Stanton, Greg [D-AZ-4]

Showing top 20 donors by contribution amount

11 Orgs9 Individuals

Industry Impact

Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 2 helped.

  • Section 2(1) states that U.S. export controls on semiconductor manufacturing equipment and advanced integrated circuits are critical for national security and the AI race with PRC, implying a benefit to U.S. semiconductor industry by protecting competitiveness. Section 3(b)(4)(F) requires analysis of impact on revenue and global market share of U.S. companies, suggesting the bill aims to assess and potentially strengthen controls that benefit domestic industry. Section 3(d)(2) mandates engagemen

  • Section 2(1) links export controls to the AI race with PRC, implying that maintaining controls supports U.S. AI and cloud infrastructure competitiveness. Section 3(b)(4)(E) requires analysis of impact on PRC AI capabilities, and Section 3(b)(4)(G) on U.S. long-term technology leadership and global competitiveness, which includes AI and cloud sectors. The bill's focus on assessing controls to protect national security in AI indirectly benefits U.S. AI and cloud industry by aiming to sustain techn

Who funds the sponsor on these industries

For each industry this bill affects, here's what the sponsor (Rep. Stanton, Greg [D-AZ-4])received from donors associated with that industry during the 2022–present cycles. Donations are not proof of intent — they are a record of who funds the people writing the law.

Industries this bill HELPS

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.

Department of Commerce

Strong
Vector: 68%
Pages: 705-707AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill mandates a detailed evaluation of U.S. semiconductor export controls' effectiveness against the PRC, directly supporting Project 2025's goal of assessing and tightening export controls on emerging/foundational technologies to protect national security and improve transparency."

Key themes:semiconductor export controlsChina/Russia focuseffectiveness assessmenttransparency and accountabilityEAR reform

— 672 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise regulate exports of emerging and foundational technologies. Although the scope of such technologies is vast, to date BIS has only controlled just over 40 of these technologies. This does not meet the clear statutory intent of Congress that ECRA be leveraged to ensure that the United States maintains a technological advantage in technologies bearing upon national security interests. Currently, BIS self-identifies technologies that merit control under the EAR with minimal input from other federal agencies. This mechanism should be improved. BIS should create an open, transparent rulemaking process by which any industry participant, private entity, or branch of the government may, at any time, submit nominations for emerging/foundational technologies for control. Then, on a quarterly basis, BIS should make public such recommendations (while holding the identity of the submitter confidential) for public input, followed by an explanation about its ultimate decision to control or not control the items, its reasons, the level of controls applied (stringent or permissive), and the relevant Export Control Classification Number (ECCN) under the Commerce Control List. Commerce should also institute a mechanism whereby its decisions can be challenged, including on a confidential basis. Licensing Procedures: Adjudication and Transparency. Currently, if the Departments of Defense, State, Commerce, and Energy disagree on an export license decision, the disagreement may be escalated to the Operating Commit- tee—and subsequently to the Advisory Committee on Export Policy led by BIS’s Assistant Secretary for Export Administration. The Assistant Secretary does not need to lead the dispute resolution, and this process should be revised by giving lead authority to BIS’s Under Secretary, who is better able to account for diverging views. Moreover, BIS’s authority to overrule other agency votes should be changed. Each agency should have one equal vote and, if a licensing dispute remains unre- solved, the final decision should be elevated to the National Security Advisor and the Secretaries of Defense, State, Commerce, and Energy. Additionally, to improve congressional oversight of BIS’s license adjudication process, BIS should provide specific congressional committees with data from the Automated Export System on a quarterly basis. Electronic files should contain U.S. exporter by name; product description (e.g., harmonized system code and ECCN/U. S. Munitions List designation); end user and destination country; and when a license was required, whether the license was granted or denied. BIS cur- rently denies just 1.2 percent of export licenses. These data reporting requirements can help Congress better determine whether BIS is adequately protecting national security through appropriate use of export controls or whether additional direction from Congress is required. Improve End-Use Checks. The integrity of the export control system may be validated only through adequate end-use checks. BIS must deny export licenses to countries that do not permit adequate end-use checks (e.g., China/Russia) by U.S. authorities. BIS should also strengthen the forensic audit capabilities of its — 673 — Department of Commerce Export Enforcement officers through improved and frequent training so they are able to detect export-control violations. EAR Revisions. The U.S. Government needs a new export control moderniza- tion effort to tighten the EAR policies governing licenses to countries of concern, including China and Russia (specifically, revise and/or reverse the 2008 through 2016 policies). When authoritarian governments explain what they plan to do, believe them unless hard evidence demonstrates otherwise. Case in point: China’s and Russia’s stated civil–military fusion policies demand central government command-and-control style systems in which every private entity serves the interests of the state and is forced to provide technology, services, capacity, and data to the central govern- ment and the military. Through this structure, commercial activities are routinely weaponized by authoritarian regimes that repeatedly identify the U.S. as an enemy. Accordingly, U.S. export control policies must be updated to reflect these realities and the associated threats to national security. Key priorities for EAR modernization for countries of concern should be: l Eliminating the “specially designed” licensing loophole; l Redesignating China and Russia to more highly prohibitive export licensing groups (country groups D or E); l Eliminating license exceptions; l Broadening foreign direct product rules; l Reducing the de minimis threshold from 25 percent to 10 percent—or 0 percent for critical technologies; l Tightening the deemed export rules to prevent technology transfer to foreign nationals from countries of concern; l Tightening the definition of “fundamental research” to address exploitation of the open U.S. university system by authoritarian governments through funding, students and researchers, and recruitment; l Eliminating license exceptions for sharing technology with controlled entities/countries through standards-setting “activities” and bodies; and l Improving regulations regarding published information for technology transfers.

Department of Commerce

Strong
Vector: 65%
Pages: 705-707AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill mandates a comprehensive review of semiconductor export controls to assess effectiveness and inform improvements, directly supporting Project 2025's goals of enhancing transparency, oversight, and the efficacy of the Bureau of Industry and Security's export control regime for emerging technologies."

Key themes:export controlssemiconductor technologytransparencycongressional oversightnational security

— 672 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise regulate exports of emerging and foundational technologies. Although the scope of such technologies is vast, to date BIS has only controlled just over 40 of these technologies. This does not meet the clear statutory intent of Congress that ECRA be leveraged to ensure that the United States maintains a technological advantage in technologies bearing upon national security interests. Currently, BIS self-identifies technologies that merit control under the EAR with minimal input from other federal agencies. This mechanism should be improved. BIS should create an open, transparent rulemaking process by which any industry participant, private entity, or branch of the government may, at any time, submit nominations for emerging/foundational technologies for control. Then, on a quarterly basis, BIS should make public such recommendations (while holding the identity of the submitter confidential) for public input, followed by an explanation about its ultimate decision to control or not control the items, its reasons, the level of controls applied (stringent or permissive), and the relevant Export Control Classification Number (ECCN) under the Commerce Control List. Commerce should also institute a mechanism whereby its decisions can be challenged, including on a confidential basis. Licensing Procedures: Adjudication and Transparency. Currently, if the Departments of Defense, State, Commerce, and Energy disagree on an export license decision, the disagreement may be escalated to the Operating Commit- tee—and subsequently to the Advisory Committee on Export Policy led by BIS’s Assistant Secretary for Export Administration. The Assistant Secretary does not need to lead the dispute resolution, and this process should be revised by giving lead authority to BIS’s Under Secretary, who is better able to account for diverging views. Moreover, BIS’s authority to overrule other agency votes should be changed. Each agency should have one equal vote and, if a licensing dispute remains unre- solved, the final decision should be elevated to the National Security Advisor and the Secretaries of Defense, State, Commerce, and Energy. Additionally, to improve congressional oversight of BIS’s license adjudication process, BIS should provide specific congressional committees with data from the Automated Export System on a quarterly basis. Electronic files should contain U.S. exporter by name; product description (e.g., harmonized system code and ECCN/U. S. Munitions List designation); end user and destination country; and when a license was required, whether the license was granted or denied. BIS cur- rently denies just 1.2 percent of export licenses. These data reporting requirements can help Congress better determine whether BIS is adequately protecting national security through appropriate use of export controls or whether additional direction from Congress is required. Improve End-Use Checks. The integrity of the export control system may be validated only through adequate end-use checks. BIS must deny export licenses to countries that do not permit adequate end-use checks (e.g., China/Russia) by U.S. authorities. BIS should also strengthen the forensic audit capabilities of its

Department of Commerce

Strong
Vector: 65%
Pages: 705-707AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill mandates a comprehensive evaluation of U.S. semiconductor export controls on China, directly supporting Project 2025's goal of modernizing and tightening the Export Administration Regulations to better counter authoritarian civil‑military fusion strategies. Both share a focus on strengthening controls, assessing effectiveness, and informing stricter enforcement policies."

Key themes:semiconductor export controlsChinaexport control effectivenessEAR modernizationnational security

— 673 — Department of Commerce Export Enforcement officers through improved and frequent training so they are able to detect export-control violations. EAR Revisions. The U.S. Government needs a new export control moderniza- tion effort to tighten the EAR policies governing licenses to countries of concern, including China and Russia (specifically, revise and/or reverse the 2008 through 2016 policies). When authoritarian governments explain what they plan to do, believe them unless hard evidence demonstrates otherwise. Case in point: China’s and Russia’s stated civil–military fusion policies demand central government command-and-control style systems in which every private entity serves the interests of the state and is forced to provide technology, services, capacity, and data to the central govern- ment and the military. Through this structure, commercial activities are routinely weaponized by authoritarian regimes that repeatedly identify the U.S. as an enemy. Accordingly, U.S. export control policies must be updated to reflect these realities and the associated threats to national security. Key priorities for EAR modernization for countries of concern should be: l Eliminating the “specially designed” licensing loophole; l Redesignating China and Russia to more highly prohibitive export licensing groups (country groups D or E); l Eliminating license exceptions; l Broadening foreign direct product rules; l Reducing the de minimis threshold from 25 percent to 10 percent—or 0 percent for critical technologies; l Tightening the deemed export rules to prevent technology transfer to foreign nationals from countries of concern; l Tightening the definition of “fundamental research” to address exploitation of the open U.S. university system by authoritarian governments through funding, students and researchers, and recruitment; l Eliminating license exceptions for sharing technology with controlled entities/countries through standards-setting “activities” and bodies; and l Improving regulations regarding published information for technology transfers. — 674 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise The next few years will prove or disprove the assertion that the U.S. stands on the precipice of a Cold War with China. Many believe that a Cold War has already begun; if so, then strategic decoupling from China is necessary and, fundamentally, any exports of goods, software, and technology to countries of concern, whether directly or indirectly, should be prohibited or controlled in the absence of good cause (e.g., humanitarian and medical aid, food aid). Entity List and Sanctions. There are currently just over 500 Chinese and over 500 Russian companies on the Department of Commerce’s Entity List, which reg- ulates exports of controlled and uncontrolled items to designated entities. Given China’s Civil–Military Fusion Strategy and Russia’s massive war efforts facili- tated by a broad range of the Russian economy, BIS must add more entities to the Entity List and apply a license review “policy of denial” that prohibits exports to these entities. Entity List parties that violate export controls should be placed on the BIS Denied Persons List (and thereby lose export privileges) and, if the violations are significant enough, they should also be sanctioned by the Department of Treasury. Data Transfer and Apps Used for Surveillance. Department of Commerce leadership should work across government agencies to address privacy and data concerns arising out of “big tech” from national security and export control per- spectives. In particular, they should draft and implement an executive order (EO) based on the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, which expands export control authority beyond ECRA’s scope (goods, software, technology) to regulate and restrict exports of U.S. persons’ data to countries of concern. The EO should establish a framework for the types of personal data subject to export controls and licensing policy by country, and the BIS should implement the EO through regulations. BIS should additionally designate app providers (such as WeChat and Byte Dance/TikTok) known for undermining U.S. national security through data collection, surveillance, and influence operations, to the Entity List. This listing would prevent app users from program updates, which would quickly make these apps non-operational in the United States. NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION Break Up NOAA. The single biggest Department of Commerce agency outside of decennial census years is the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, which houses the National Weather Service, National Marine Fisheries Service, and other components. NOAA garners $6.5 billion of the department’s $12 billion annual operational budget and accounts for more than half of the department’s personnel in non-decadal Census years (2021 figures). NOAA consists of six main offices: l The National Weather Service (NWS);

Showing 3 of 5 policy matches

About These Correlations

Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.

Full Policy Text

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