Research Security and Accountability in DHS Act

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Bill ID: 119/hr/901
Last Updated: July 18, 2026

Sponsored by

Rep. Strong, Dale W. [R-AL-5]

ID: S001220

Follow the money

The bill

Research Security and Accountability in DHS Act

HR. 901, 119th Congress — read as touching Cybersecurity.

The sponsor

Rep. Strong, Dale W. [R-AL-5]

Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.

The money

$89,900 raised

26 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.

The alignment

61% match to Project 2025

This bill's text tracks the "Introduction" section, p. 254-256 of the Mandate for Leadership.

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

Track this bill's progress through the legislative process

Latest Action

Received in the Senate and Read twice and referred to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs.

March 10, 2025

Introduced

Committee Review

Floor Action

Passed House

Senate Review

📍 Current Status

Next: Both chambers must agree on the same version of the bill.

🎉

Passed Congress

🖊️

Presidential Action

⚖️

Became Law

📚 How does a bill become a law?

1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.

2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

Another masterpiece of legislative theater, courtesy of the 119th Congress. Let's dissect this farce and expose the underlying disease.

**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The Research Security and Accountability in DHS Act (HR 901) claims to safeguard research and development from unauthorized access or disclosure of sensitive information within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). How noble. In reality, this bill is a Band-Aid on a bullet wound, attempting to address the symptoms rather than the root cause of the problem: government incompetence.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill amends Section 302 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 by adding a new paragraph (15), which requires the Under Secretary of the Science and Technology Directorate to develop a Department-wide policy and process for safeguarding research and development. Wow, what a groundbreaking idea! The government will now create more bureaucracy to "protect" sensitive information. Because that's exactly what we need: more red tape.

The bill also mandates a report from the Comptroller General within one year, which will undoubtedly be a thrilling read. I'm sure it'll reveal shocking insights into the DHS's compliance with National Security Presidential Memorandum-33 (NSPM-33) and its adoption of the National Science and Technology Council's 2022 implementation guidance. Yawn.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The usual suspects are involved:

* The Department of Homeland Security, which will get to create more policies and procedures to "protect" sensitive information. * The Comptroller General, who'll have to waste time writing a report that no one will read. * Researchers and developers within the DHS, who'll have to navigate even more bureaucratic hoops to do their jobs.

**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill is a classic case of "security theater." It creates the illusion of security while doing nothing to address the underlying issues. The real impact will be:

* More bureaucracy and red tape for researchers and developers. * A false sense of security among lawmakers and the public. * A potential increase in funding for "research security" initiatives, which will likely line the pockets of contractors and consultants.

In conclusion, HR 901 is a textbook example of legislative malpractice. It's a shallow attempt to address a complex problem, driven by politics rather than substance. The real disease here is government incompetence, and this bill is just another symptom of that deeper illness.

Related Topics

National Security & IntelligenceCybersecurity & Data PrivacyResearch & Innovation Policy
Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (Dr. Haus personality)

💰 Campaign Finance Network

Rep. Strong, Dale W. [R-AL-5]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions
$89,900
21 donors
PACs
$0
Organizations
$13,900
Committees
$0
Individuals
$76,000

No PAC contributions found

1
POARCH BAND OF CREEK INDIANS
2 transactions
$6,600
2
THE CHICKASAW NATION
2 transactions
$5,300
3
PECHANGA BAND OF INDIANS
1 transaction
$1,000
4
JOHN PLUNK ATTORNEY PC
1 transaction
$1,000

No committee contributions found

1
LEE, ARNOLD
1 transaction
$6,600
2
HINCHMAN, ROBERT
1 transaction
$6,600
3
STIERS, WILLIAM
2 transactions
$6,600
4
ALMODOVAR, ANGEL R.
2 transactions
$6,600
5
LUCKEY, PALMER
2 transactions
$6,600
6
LIPTON, LEE
1 transaction
$5,000
7
BENTLEY, PHILIP W. III
1 transaction
$5,000
8
GUERRERI, CARL N.
1 transaction
$3,300
9
REESE, MARK A.
1 transaction
$3,300
10
OZMEN, FATIH
1 transaction
$3,300
11
MCCARTER, ANGELA
1 transaction
$3,300
12
GILCHRIST, WADE
1 transaction
$3,300
13
SAYLOR, ANNIE
1 transaction
$3,300
14
KRETZSCHMAR, RICHARD
1 transaction
$3,300
15
BRAUN, JOHN
1 transaction
$3,300
16
BAILEY, WILLIAM C.
1 transaction
$3,300
17
BARON, ROBERT
1 transaction
$3,300

Cosponsors & Their Campaign Finance

This bill has 2 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.

Rep. Green, Mark E. [R-TN-7]

ID: G000590

Top Contributors

10

1
HAND, J.R.
HAND FAMILY COMPANIESCEO
IndividualCLARKSVILLE, TN
$6,600
May 20, 2024
2
SCARLETT, DOROTHY
RETIREDRETIRED
IndividualNASHVILLE, TN
$6,600
Jun 11, 2024
3
CRABBE, JENNELL
HOMEMAKERHOMEMAKER
IndividualCLARKSVILLE, TN
$6,600
Feb 9, 2023
4
CRABBE, JOHN
SELFCONSTRUCTION
IndividualCLARKSVILLE, TN
$6,600
Feb 9, 2023
5
EVANS, BARBARA
HOMEMAKERHOMEMAKER
IndividualHENDERSONVILLE, TN
$6,600
Mar 10, 2023
6
EVANS, JOHN
PRESIDENTPRESIDENT
IndividualHENDERSONVILLE, TN
$6,600
Mar 10, 2023
7
KEMMERER, KAREN
RETIREDRETIRED
IndividualJACKSON, WY
$6,600
May 16, 2023
8
GONTOWNIK, YONI
GICVICE PRESIDENT
IndividualENGLEWOOD, NJ
$6,600
Aug 1, 2024
9
SCARLETT, JOE
RETIREDRETIRED
IndividualNASHVILLE, TN
$6,600
Sep 9, 2024
10
UIHLEIN, RICHARD
ULINECHAIRMAN
IndividualLAKE FOREST, IL
$5,800
Jan 26, 2023

Rep. Evans, Gabe [R-CO-8]

ID: E000300

Top Contributors

10

1
WRIGHT, ELIZABETH
RETIREDRETIRED
IndividualENGLEWOOD, CO
$6,600
Jun 29, 2024
2
WOODWARD, JOHN
SPIERER WOODWARDATTORNEY
IndividualGREENWOOD VILLAGE, CO
$6,600
Sep 19, 2023
3
BERGSTROM, ROBERT
BT CONSTRUCTIONCONSTRUCTION
IndividualFORT LUPTON, CO
$6,600
Oct 13, 2024
4
ERICKSON, GARY
EXECUTIVE CUSTOM CONSTRUCTIONGENERAL CONTRACTOR
IndividualCOLORADO SPRINGS, CO
$6,600
Oct 15, 2024
5
HASELDEN, BYRON
HASELDEN CONSTRUCTIONCEO
IndividualCENTENNIAL, CO
$6,600
Oct 14, 2024
6
HASELDEN, EDDIE
HASELDEN CONSTRUCTIONCHAIRMAN
IndividualCENTENNIAL, CO
$6,600
Oct 14, 2024
7
HASELDEN, MIKE
HASELDEN CONSTRUCTIONCO-CHAIRMAN
IndividualENGLEWOOD, CO
$6,600
Oct 14, 2024
8
WAGNER, BRUCE
WAGNER EQUIPMENTPRES
IndividualLITTLETON, CO
$5,000
Sep 20, 2024
9
DUKE, D. A.
RETIREDRETIRED
IndividualENGLEWOOD, CO
$5,000
Oct 9, 2024
10
MCDONALD, BRUCE
MCDONALD INSURANCE GROUPOWNER
IndividualLITTLETON, CO
$3,868
Sep 30, 2024

Donor Network - Rep. Strong, Dale W. [R-AL-5]

PACs
Organizations
Individuals
Politicians

Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.

Loading...

Showing 55 nodes and 32 connections (57 secondary connections hidden)

Total contributions: $129,500

Top Donors - Rep. Strong, Dale W. [R-AL-5]

Showing top 21 donors by contribution amount

4 Orgs17 Individuals

Industry Impact

Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 3 helped.

  • +Cybersecurityconfidence 0.90

    Section 2(a)(3) adds paragraph (15) requiring the Under Secretary of the Science and Technology Directorate to develop a Department-wide policy and process to safeguard research and development from unauthorized access or disclosure of sensitive information in R&D acquisitions, which benefits cybersecurity firms that provide such safeguarding services.

  • +Defense Contractorsconfidence 0.85

    Section 2(b)(1) requires a GAO report on DHS compliance with NSPM-33 and NSTC guidance regarding federal research security, which may increase oversight and contracting opportunities for defense contractors involved in secure R&D.

  • Section 2(b)(2) addresses coordination with guidelines from NSF, NSTC, OSTP, and other agencies on federal research security, which may drive demand for secure AI and cloud infrastructure providers supporting DHS research.

Who funds the sponsor on these industries

For each industry this bill affects, here's what the sponsor (Rep. Strong, Dale W. [R-AL-5])received from donors associated with that industry during the 2022–present cycles. Donations are not proof of intent — they are a record of who funds the people writing the law.

Industries this bill HELPS

  • from 31 contributions
    • KING, DAVID A.$2,000
    • BELL, THOMAS$2,000
    • STEVENS, ROY$1,000
    • HULL, STEVE$1,000
    • PORTER, ELIZABETH$1,000

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.

Introduction

Moderate60.7%
Pages: 254-256

— 222 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise forward-leaning in sharing cyber threat intelligence with private-sector partners and the public, emphasizing that the protective nature of such information is of value only if put into the right hands at the right time. Since critical infrastructure and services are overwhelmingly owned, managed, and defended by the private sector in the United States, there has been an increasing emphasis on declassify- ing intelligence and sharing actionable information with private-sector partners, often through industry-specific Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs); regional meetings of government and private-sector experts called InfraGard, run by the FBI; direct public notification from the Department of Homeland Security, the FBI, and (increasingly) the NSA; and more discreet one-on-one engagements led by the collecting agencies. These programs properly recognize the private sector’s role in providing cyber- security for Americans; in practice, however, the intelligence shared by the U.S. government through these venues is too often already known or no longer relevant by the time it makes its way through the downgrade process for sharing. In addition, government-shared information often needs to take advantage of the opportunity to provide contexts, such as attribution, trends, and size of the observed cyber problem. As warranted, additional context should be provided to the private sector as a matter of routine. To continue improving the U.S. government’s ability to defend the country’s most vital networks, the IC must adopt an “obligation to share” policy process, including the capacity for “write to release” intelligence products whereby newly discovered technical indicators, targeting, and other intelligence relevant to cyber defense are automatically provided either to the public or to targeted entities within 48 hours of their collection—which is how counterterrorism intel- ligence has been managed for years when it comes to a “duty to warn.” Under this policy, agency heads should still have the flexibility to withhold intelligence for operational or counterintelligence reasons but would need to report regularly to Congress on the number of and justification for exceptions. This policy would make sharing intelligence and defending networks the default, as it already is in the rest of the cybersecurity community outside the IC, to improve the quantity, relevance, and timeliness of defensive information while ensuring accountability for top leaders when they must withhold this information. One of the most significant challenges within the IC is presented by the need to share information promptly among the 18 elements of the intelligence enterprise. The only long-term solution to the understandable tension between the need to share information and the need to protect intelligence sources and methods is a robust real-time auditing capability that electronically flags unauthorized access. Under an identity management system with real-time audit, even the most sensi- tive information acquired by America’s intelligence agencies can be shared, and the access to and use of that information are appropriately monitored. Establishing — 223 — Intelligence Community a real-time auditing capability is essential to decreasing the risk for the heads of intelligence agencies in meeting their statutory requirements to ensure that they protect sources and methods associated with the classified information their agen- cies collect. Overclassification. There is broad consensus across the U.S. government and among stakeholders that the system for classifying, declassifying, and otherwise marking and handling sensitive information is at a crossroads. Exorbitant amounts of classified data are created daily, and agency personnel often mistakenly choose classification as the default selection to ensure national security. At the same time, the effectiveness of downgraded and carefully declassified information to support foreign policy efforts has been borne out in, for example, alerting the broader world of Russia’s buildup and likely plans for its invasion of Ukraine. Two executive orders principally govern how the U.S. government handles clas- sified and sensitive information. l Executive Order 13526, “Classified National Security Information,” issued in 2009,38 prescribes the classification levels and procedures for declassification. l Executive Order 13556, “Controlled Unclassified Information,” issued in 2010,39 aimed to establish a uniform program for managing all unclassified information that requires safeguarding or dissemination controls. The current system for declassifying classified national security information (CNSI) is extraordinarily analog, requiring experts’ review of individual records. Declassification policies are based on human review of paper and need to con- template and handle the proliferation and volume of digital records created by agencies. The U.S. government will soon reach the point at which manual review is impossible. The declassification of CNSI should support key U.S. national security objectives, reflect mission priorities, and not serve solely as a necessary procedural function. Reforms should include: l Tighter definitions and greater specificity for categories of information requiring protection. l More stringent policies to effect significant reductions in the number of Original Classification Authorities (OCAs). l Stricter accountability measures at the OCA level and more detailed security classification guides.

Introduction

Moderate60.0%
Pages: 168-170

— 135 — Department of Homeland Security Unfortunately for our nation, the federal government’s newest department became like every other federal agency: bloated, bureaucratic, and expensive. It also lost sight of its mission priorities. DHS has also suffered from the Left’s wokeness and weaponization against Americans whom the Left perceives as its political opponents. To truly secure the homeland, a conservative Administration needs to return the department to the right mission, the right size, and the right budget. This would include reorganizing the department and shifting significant resources away from several supporting components to the essential operational components. Prior- itizing border security and immigration enforcement, including detention and deportation, is critical if we are to regain control of the border, repair the historic damage done by the Biden Administration, return to a lawful and orderly immi- gration system, and protect the homeland from terrorism and public safety threats. This also includes consolidating the pieces of the fragmented immigration system into one agency to fulfill the mission more efficiently. The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) is a DHS com- ponent that the Left has weaponized to censor speech and affect elections at the expense of securing the cyber domain and critical infrastructure, which are threat- ened daily.2 A conservative Administration should return CISA to its statutory and important but narrow mission. The bloated DHS bureaucracy and budget, along with the wrong priorities, provide real opportunities for a conservative Administration to cut billions in spending and limit government’s role in Americans’ lives. These opportunities include privatizing TSA screening and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) National Flood Insurance Program, reforming FEMA emergency spending to shift the majority of preparedness and response costs to states and localities instead of the federal government, eliminating most of DHS’s grant pro- grams, and removing all unions in the department for national security purposes. A successful DHS would: l Secure and control the border; l Thoroughly enforce immigration laws; l Correctly and efficiently adjudicate immigration benefit applications while rejecting fraudulent claims; l Secure the cyber domain and collaborate with critical infrastructure sectors to maintain their security; l Provide states and localities with a limited federal emergency response and preparedness; — 136 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise l Secure our coasts and economic zones; l Protect political leaders, their families, and visiting heads of state or government; and l Oversee transportation security. OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY (SEC) In the next Administration, the Office of the Secretary should take on the fol- lowing key issues and challenges to ensure the effective operation of DHS. Expansion of Dedicated Political Personnel. The Secretary of Homeland Security is a presidentially appointed and Senate-confirmed political appointee, but for budgetary reasons, he or she has historically been unable to fund a dedi- cated team of political appointees. A key first step for the Secretary to improve front-office functions is to have his or her own dedicated team of political appoin- tees selected and vetted by the Office of Presidential Personnel, which is not reliant on detailees from other parts of the department, to help ensure the completion of the next President’s agenda. An Aggressive Approach to Senate-Confirmed Leadership Positions. While Senate confirmation is a constitutionally necessary requirement for appointing agency leadership, the next Administration may need to take a novel approach to the confirmations process to ensure an adequate and rapid transition. For example, the next Administration arguably should place its nominees for key positions into similar positions as “actings” (for example, putting in a person to serve as the Senior Official Performing the Duties of the Commissioner of CBP while that person is going through the confirmation process to direct ICE or become the Secretary). This approach would both guarantee implementation of the Day One agenda and equip the department for potential emergency situations while still honoring the confirmation requirement. The department should also look to remove lower-level but nevertheless important positions that currently require Senate confirmation from the confirmation requirement, although this effort would require legislation (and might also be mooted in the event of legisla- tion that closes portions of the department that currently have Senate-confirmed leadership). Clearer, More Durable, and Political-Only Line of Succession. Based on previous experience, the department needs legislation to establish a more durable but politically oriented line of succession for agency decision-making purposes. The ideal sequence for line of succession is certainly debatable, except that in cir- cumstances where a career employee holds a leadership position in the department, that position should be deemed vacant for line-of-succession purposes and the next eligible political appointee in the sequence should assume acting authority. Further,

Introduction

Moderate60.0%
Pages: 168-170

— 135 — Department of Homeland Security Unfortunately for our nation, the federal government’s newest department became like every other federal agency: bloated, bureaucratic, and expensive. It also lost sight of its mission priorities. DHS has also suffered from the Left’s wokeness and weaponization against Americans whom the Left perceives as its political opponents. To truly secure the homeland, a conservative Administration needs to return the department to the right mission, the right size, and the right budget. This would include reorganizing the department and shifting significant resources away from several supporting components to the essential operational components. Prior- itizing border security and immigration enforcement, including detention and deportation, is critical if we are to regain control of the border, repair the historic damage done by the Biden Administration, return to a lawful and orderly immi- gration system, and protect the homeland from terrorism and public safety threats. This also includes consolidating the pieces of the fragmented immigration system into one agency to fulfill the mission more efficiently. The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) is a DHS com- ponent that the Left has weaponized to censor speech and affect elections at the expense of securing the cyber domain and critical infrastructure, which are threat- ened daily.2 A conservative Administration should return CISA to its statutory and important but narrow mission. The bloated DHS bureaucracy and budget, along with the wrong priorities, provide real opportunities for a conservative Administration to cut billions in spending and limit government’s role in Americans’ lives. These opportunities include privatizing TSA screening and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) National Flood Insurance Program, reforming FEMA emergency spending to shift the majority of preparedness and response costs to states and localities instead of the federal government, eliminating most of DHS’s grant pro- grams, and removing all unions in the department for national security purposes. A successful DHS would: l Secure and control the border; l Thoroughly enforce immigration laws; l Correctly and efficiently adjudicate immigration benefit applications while rejecting fraudulent claims; l Secure the cyber domain and collaborate with critical infrastructure sectors to maintain their security; l Provide states and localities with a limited federal emergency response and preparedness;

About These Correlations

Policy matches are calculated using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text. A score of 60% or higher indicates meaningful thematic overlap. This does not imply direct causation or intent, but highlights areas where legislation aligns with Project 2025 policy objectives.

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