The bill
Taiwan Non-Discrimination Act of 2025
HR. 910, 119th Congress.
Sponsored by
Rep. Kim, Young [R-CA-40]
ID: K000397
Follow the money
The bill
HR. 910, 119th Congress.
The sponsor
Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.
The money
30 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.
The alignment
This bill's text tracks the "Department of the Treasury" section, p. 736-738 of the Mandate for Leadership.
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Received in the Senate. Read twice. Placed on Senate Legislative Calendar under General Orders. Calendar No. 103.
June 23, 2025
📍 Current Status
Next: Both chambers must agree on the same version of the bill.
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Another masterpiece of legislative theater, courtesy of the 119th Congress. Let's dissect this farce, shall we?
**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The Taiwan Non-Discrimination Act of 2025 is a thinly veiled attempt to strong-arm the International Monetary Fund (IMF) into accepting Taiwan as a member, despite its ambiguous status as a sovereign state. The bill's sponsors claim it's about promoting "equitable treatment" and "meaningful participation" for Taiwan in international organizations. Yeah, right. It's really about placating Taiwan's ego and appeasing the US arms industry.
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill requires the Secretary of the Treasury to pursue more equitable treatment of Taiwan at the IMF, which is a laughable notion given the IMF's own Articles of Agreement. The bill also cites various congressional resolutions and statements from US officials supporting Taiwan's membership in international organizations. How quaint.
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The usual suspects are involved:
* Taiwan: The wannabe sovereign state that can't get enough attention. * China: The elephant in the room, whose "One-China" policy is being deliberately ignored by this bill. * IMF: The poor organization that will be forced to deal with the fallout of this legislative posturing. * US Arms Industry: The real beneficiary of this bill, as it paves the way for more arms sales to Taiwan.
**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill has all the makings of a diplomatic disaster:
* It will further strain relations between the US and China, who are already engaged in a cold war. * It may prompt other countries to reevaluate their relationships with Taiwan, potentially leading to a diplomatic isolation of the island. * The IMF will be forced to navigate a minefield of conflicting interests, which could undermine its credibility as a neutral international organization.
In conclusion, this bill is a classic case of legislative myopia, where politicians prioritize short-term gains and ego-stroking over long-term consequences. It's a cynical ploy to appease special interest groups while ignoring the complexities of international diplomacy. But hey, what do I know? I'm just a cynical analyst with a scalpel-sharp mind.
Rep. Kim, Young [R-CA-40]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
No PAC contributions found
No committee contributions found
This bill has 3 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.
ID: G000553
Top Contributors
20
ID: L000599
Top Contributors
21
ID: L000582
Top Contributors
31
Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Showing 63 nodes and 72 connections
Total contributions: $72
Showing top 23 donors by contribution amount
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.
AI Analysis:
"The bill aligns with Project 2025's focus on countering China's geopolitical influence by advocating for Taiwan's greater inclusion in international financial institutions, which serves as a strategic counterweight to Chinese pressure. However, it does not directly address the specific Treasury-led CFIUS reforms or ownership leverage adjustments emphasized in the Project 2025 text."
— 703 — Department of the Treasury l The U.S. should also examine increasing or decreasing its ownership levels in these institutions in order to achieve maximum leverage. CHINA AND OTHER GEOPOLITICAL THREATS Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States. The interagency Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States should realign its priorities to meet the United States’ current foreign policy threats, especially from China. On October 20, 2022, the Treasury Department, which chairs CFIUS, adopted the first-ever CFIUS Enforcement and Penalty Guidelines50 on the committee’s national security risk mitigation requirements. However, there are no clear rules that guide CFIUS on mitigation monitoring, nor is there a published penalty sched- ule to standardize accountability when CFIUS pursues a civil money penalty for violators. In addition, Treasury—as chair of the committee—runs an opaque pro- cess that biases committee procedure toward corporate interests and away from national security interests. Finally, the committee’s jurisdiction does not extend over greenfield investments that Chinese state-owned enterprises have historically pursued in the United States, which leaves America vulnerable to an instrument of Chinese economic statecraft. Given these issues, the next steps for CFIUS should be to develop a more coherent—and transparent—mitigation monitoring program to complement the enforcement guidelines, give CFIUS agencies in charge of national security con- cerns an equal voice at the table, and petition Congress to amend the law to cover Chinese greenfield investments. CFIUS should publish a penalty schedule for violations of CFIUS reporting and mitigation requirements. Publishing a penalty schedule for CFIUS violations will reduce the discretion of the committee to waive penalties or impose mere “wrist slap” costs on violators of the law. Additionally, a standardized penalty schedule would likely increase the deterrence of CFIUS enforcement by reducing the per- ception among parties to covered transactions that they can avoid enforcement by the committee or secure special exceptions based on appeals to the commit- tee’s discretion. As a legal matter—and in application by CFIUS—mitigation monitoring has developed as the Wild West. There are no clear rules that guide the entire com- mittee on mitigation monitoring, nor is there the same level of oversight or accountability within and among the agencies as applies when CFIUS reviews a transaction or when it pursues a civil money penalty. Indeed, it is a credit to transaction parties and the professionalism of the governmental officials and con- tractors who conduct mitigation monitoring on behalf of the government that, by and large, mitigation monitoring has worked adequately during the last several decades. But dependency on the personality and capabilities of individuals creates unnecessary risk both for CFIUS and for transaction parties.
AI Analysis:
"The bill aligns with Project 2025's focus on Treasury leveraging international financial institutions to counter China and enhance U.S. strategic influence, though it does not address CFIUS reforms, greenfield investment scrutiny, or financial warfare initiatives outlined in the policy."
— 703 — Department of the Treasury l The U.S. should also examine increasing or decreasing its ownership levels in these institutions in order to achieve maximum leverage. CHINA AND OTHER GEOPOLITICAL THREATS Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States. The interagency Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States should realign its priorities to meet the United States’ current foreign policy threats, especially from China. On October 20, 2022, the Treasury Department, which chairs CFIUS, adopted the first-ever CFIUS Enforcement and Penalty Guidelines50 on the committee’s national security risk mitigation requirements. However, there are no clear rules that guide CFIUS on mitigation monitoring, nor is there a published penalty sched- ule to standardize accountability when CFIUS pursues a civil money penalty for violators. In addition, Treasury—as chair of the committee—runs an opaque pro- cess that biases committee procedure toward corporate interests and away from national security interests. Finally, the committee’s jurisdiction does not extend over greenfield investments that Chinese state-owned enterprises have historically pursued in the United States, which leaves America vulnerable to an instrument of Chinese economic statecraft. Given these issues, the next steps for CFIUS should be to develop a more coherent—and transparent—mitigation monitoring program to complement the enforcement guidelines, give CFIUS agencies in charge of national security con- cerns an equal voice at the table, and petition Congress to amend the law to cover Chinese greenfield investments. CFIUS should publish a penalty schedule for violations of CFIUS reporting and mitigation requirements. Publishing a penalty schedule for CFIUS violations will reduce the discretion of the committee to waive penalties or impose mere “wrist slap” costs on violators of the law. Additionally, a standardized penalty schedule would likely increase the deterrence of CFIUS enforcement by reducing the per- ception among parties to covered transactions that they can avoid enforcement by the committee or secure special exceptions based on appeals to the commit- tee’s discretion. As a legal matter—and in application by CFIUS—mitigation monitoring has developed as the Wild West. There are no clear rules that guide the entire com- mittee on mitigation monitoring, nor is there the same level of oversight or accountability within and among the agencies as applies when CFIUS reviews a transaction or when it pursues a civil money penalty. Indeed, it is a credit to transaction parties and the professionalism of the governmental officials and con- tractors who conduct mitigation monitoring on behalf of the government that, by and large, mitigation monitoring has worked adequately during the last several decades. But dependency on the personality and capabilities of individuals creates unnecessary risk both for CFIUS and for transaction parties. — 704 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise Congress should make the Department of Defense (DOD) a CFIUS co-chair with the Department of Treasury. Making DOD an official CFIUS co-chair along with Treasury will establish a balanced committee process by elevating national security interests to an equal stature. The committee is currently imbalanced toward the interests of corporate America because Treasury is the sole chair of CFIUS and, in practice, runs a process that is not fully transparent and which biases it from the national security interests represented by DOD and the Intelligence Community (IC). For example, Treasury representatives will consult with the Commerce Depart- ment and the United States Trade Representative—which tend to favor permitting covered transactions to occur with little to no mitigation requirements—and these representatives will then obscure the results and purposes of such sidebar meet- ings from DOD and IC representatives. This hampers DOD, IC, and sometimes even State Department representatives from full participation in the process or from advocating national security interests as well as they should. Greenfield Investments. Congress should close the loophole on greenfield investments and require CFIUS review of investments in U.S.-based greenfield assets by Chinese-controlled entities to assess any potential harm to U.S. national and economic security. In the 2018 Foreign Risk and Review Modernization Act (FIRRMA),51 one important category of foreign transactions left out of the bill was greenfield investments, particularly by Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Greenfield investments by Chinese SOEs pose a unique threat, and they should be met with the highest scrutiny by all levels of government. Greenfield investments result in the control of newly built facilities in the U.S., and they were not addressed in FIRRMA primarily because governors and state governments embrace them. That is understandable; they typically bring the promise of creating American jobs. However, the goal of such Chinese SOEs is to siphon assets, technological innovation, and influence away from U.S. businesses in order to expand the global presence of the Chinese Communist Party. While the Chinese government keeps its domestic markets largely insulated from foreign influence, it regularly invests in the U.S. and other countries under the “green- field” model. Firms fully owned by China’s Communist regime are increasingly buying land, building factories, and taking advantage of state and local tax breaks on American soil. Treasury should examine creating a school of financial warfare jointly with DOD. If the U.S. is to rely on financial weapons, tools, and strategies to prosecute international defensive and offensive objectives, it must create a specially trained group of experts dedicated to the study, training, testing, and preparedness of these deterrents. Recent experience has demonstrated that the U.S. cannot depend on the rapid development and deployment of untested, academically developed finan- cial actions, stratagems, and weapons on an ad hoc basis.
AI Analysis:
"The bill focuses on increasing Taiwan's participation in international financial institutions like the IMF, while Project 2025 advocates for the U.S. to withdraw from the IMF and World Bank entirely, opposing their influence and funding. This creates a fundamental divergence in approach, despite both addressing U.S. engagement with international financial institutions."
— 701 — Department of the Treasury administers these reporting programs, most of this expense is mandated by Con- gress, not the IRS. One of the primary reasons that Congress mandates ever-increasing infor- mation reporting is that the Treasury Department and the Joint Committee on Taxation staff almost always overestimate how much revenue will be gained from still more burdensome information reporting, and they do not estimate or report private compliance costs. Congress and the Treasury Department must undertake a serious review of the information reporting regime and reduce the burden on the public—especially small businesses. Small businesses suffer disproportionately from complexity and administrative burdens. Costs do not increase linearly with size, so elevated administrative costs have an adverse effect on the competitiveness of small firms. Budget. The operating budget of the IRS should be held constant in real terms. The resources allocated to the Office of the Taxpayer Advocate should be increased by at least 20 percent (about $44 million). The Office of Equity, Diversity, and Inclusion should be closed. Provided that IT management is changed; an effective, well-considered implementation plan is adopted; and serious oversight is put in place, additional resources dedicated solely to IT modernization may be warranted. INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS The Treasury Department should withdraw from Senate consideration the Protocol Amending the Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters.48 The protocol will lead to substantially more transnational identity theft, crime, industrial espionage, financial fraud, and suppression of political oppo- nents and religious or ethnic minorities by authoritarian and corrupt governments, including China, Colombia, Nigeria, and Russia. Unlike the original multilateral convention, the amended convention is open to all governments—including many that are either hostile to the United States, have serious corruption problems, or have inadequate privacy protections. The new Administration should also oppose the multilateral Competent Authority Agreement on Automatic Exchange of Financial Account Information.49 International organizations such as the OECD, the World Bank, and the Inter- national Monetary Fund espouse economic theories and policies that are inimical to American free market and limited government principles. The global elites who operate the IMF regularly advance higher taxes and big centralized government. The IMF has intervened in American policy debates—and has even recommended that the U.S. raise taxes. The IMF’s record of advancing global financial stability has been mixed at best. Its development assistance and lending programs in third- world countries have more often than not retarded growth rather than advancing it. The Treasury Department plays an important role in these international institutions and should force reforms and new policies. The U.S., however, should — 702 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise withdraw from both the World Bank and the IMF and terminate its financial con- tribution to both institutions. If the U.S. is to provide economic assistance or humanitarian aid to other nations, it should do so unilaterally—not through the pass-throughs of international aid orga- nizations, non-governmental organizations, or other nations. These organizations and countries simply create expensive middle-men, while U.S. funds are intercepted before being distributed to those in need. Also, these foreign entities have interests that do not coincide with American national security and economic interests. FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY Treasury should make balancing the federal budget a mission-critical objective. The federal budget absorbs enormous resources from the economy, both in money taken from taxpayers and in money borrowed. The budget should be balanced by driving down federal spending while maintaining a strong national defense and not raising taxes. To reduce interest payments on the debt, Treasury should lock in current rel- atively low interest rates by issuing longer duration bonds, and even consider creating a 50-year treasury bill. Most of the federal debt rolls over on average about every three to four years. But interest rates, even with the latest Federal Reserve rate increases, are still below the 5 percent historical average. Treasury would thus save taxpayers money during the next several decades by issuing fewer short-term notes that will probably have to be rolled over at higher rates in the future. To promote transparency of finances, each year Americans should receive a financial statement of the U.S. government alerting citizens of the revenues, expen- ditures, deficit, and debt for the preceding fiscal year. The statement should also include this individual family’s pro-rata share of the debt based on family size. INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS The Treasury must act more assertively in international financial institutions to protect and advance U.S. national interests—and oppose those that do not. It should employ a carrot-and-stick approach by increasing its activity and commitment to those financial institutions that are willing and able to adjust to this new approach and by zeroing out or potentially exiting those institutions that rely on U.S. capital while advancing agendas that run counter to U.S. interests. l A major emphasis of effecting this change must be the addition of a large new cadre of U.S. professionals and contractors at these international financial institutions. l The U.S. must insist on the hiring and support of this human capital as a condition to future funding.
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.