The bill
To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located at 117 West Lovett Street in Charlotte, Michigan, as the "Francis C. Flaherty Post Office Building".
HR. 9570, 119th Congress.
Sponsored by
Rep. Barrett, Tom [R-MI-7]
ID: B001321
Follow the money
The bill
HR. 9570, 119th Congress.
The sponsor
Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.
The money
21 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.
The alignment
This bill's text tracks the "Financial Regulatory Agencies" section, p. 879-881 of the Mandate for Leadership.
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Ordered to be Reported by Voice Vote.
July 21, 2026
📍 Current Status
Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
**HR 9570: The Francis C. Flaherty Post Office Building Designation Act of 2026** *Or: How Congress Wastes Time Naming Mailboxes While the Country Burns*
**1. Main Purpose & Objectives** The sole purpose of HR 9570 is to rename a single United States Postal Service facility in Charlotte, Michigan—currently just a building where mail gets sorted and occasionally lost—as the “Francis C. Flaherty Post Office Building.” That’s it. No reforms. No funding. No operational changes. Just a plaque swap and a ceremonial ribbon-cutting for a man who, based on the bill’s silence about him, was likely a local postal worker, veteran, or rotary club president deemed worthy of immortalizing in federal statute. The objective? To let thirteen members of Congress—spanning both parties and multiple Michigan districts—take credit for doing absolutely nothing of substance while pretending to honor a constituent. It’s legislative participation trophies for adults.
**2. Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law** The bill amends exactly nothing substantive. Section 1(a) mandates that the USPS facility at 117 West Lovett Street shall henceforth be known as the Francis C. Flaherty Post Office Building. Section 1(b) requires that all future references to this building in federal law, maps, regulations, or documents be deemed to refer to it by its new name. In other words: update the signage, change a few internal databases, and pretend this matters. There are no penalties for non-compliance, no budget authorization, no oversight mechanism—just a unfunded mandate to rename a post office. It’s the legislative equivalent of putting a new label on a jar of pickles and calling it innovation.
**3. Affected Parties & Stakeholders** - **Francis C. Flaherty (presumably deceased)**: Gets a building named after him. Congratulations, assuming he cared. - **USPS Employees in Charlotte, MI**: Must now answer the phone with the new name, update letterheads, and endure inevitable confusion from customers who still call it “the post office on Lovett Street.” - **Local Government & Residents**: Gain a symbolic honor they can brag about at town meetings, though it does nothing to fix potholes, fund schools, or restore mail delivery to six days a week. - **Thirteen Cosponsors**: Get a “win” they can tweet about, add to newsletters, and use to imply they’re “getting things done” while avoiding actual policy work. - **Taxpayers**: Fund the negligible administrative cost of this rename—probably less than the cost of one staffer’s lunch—but still forced to pretend this is governance. - **The American Public**: Continues to wonder why Congress spends time on this instead of, say, passing a budget, addressing the debt ceiling, or fixing the Postal Service’s impending insolvency.
**4. Potential Impact & Implications** Impact: Minimal. The building will have a new name. Mail will still arrive (eventually). Life will go on. Implications: This bill is a symptom of a deeper legislative malaise—Congress’s preference for low-risk, high-visibility symbolism over hard work. It’s the political equivalent of rearranging deck chairs on the Titanic while insisting the new feng shui will save the ship. By cosponsoring this, members signal to voters: *“Look how attentive I am to local trivia!”* while avoiding votes on anything controversial, costly, or actually impactful. It’s not governance—it’s legislative cosplay. And worse, it sets a precedent: every town with a beloved retiree or minor league coach will now expect a federal post office naming bill. Soon, we’ll need a Congressional Subcommittee on Postal Nomenclature just to keep up. In short: HR 9570 doesn’t just waste time—it insults the public’s intelligence by mistaking ceremony for accomplishment. The real disease isn’t the bill—it’s a Congress that thinks naming a mailbox is governing. Prognosis: terminal. Treatment: none, because they enjoy the symptoms.
Rep. Barrett, Tom [R-MI-7]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
No PAC contributions found
No committee contributions found
This bill has 10 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.
ID: B001301
Top Contributors
26
ID: D000624
Top Contributors
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ID: M001237
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ID: M001194
Top Contributors
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ID: W000798
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ID: H001058
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ID: T000481
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ID: S001215
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ID: T000488
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ID: S001221
Top Contributors
33
Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Showing 43 nodes and 51 connections
Total contributions: $51
Showing top 21 donors by contribution amount
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.
AI Analysis:
"The bill is a purely ceremonial designation of a post office building with no connection to financial regulation, the FCC, Big Tech, or any of the policy priorities outlined in the Project 2025 section on Financial Regulatory Agencies."
— 847 — Federal Communications Commission The FCC has facilitated the transition from 3G to 4G and now 5G offerings in two ways. First, it has freed spectrum—the airwaves needed to deliver wireless ser- vices. Second, it has preempted state and local siting and permitting laws that could otherwise slow down the buildout of next-generation infrastructure. One of the FCC’s great success stories from 2017 to 2020 was securing U.S. leadership in 5G. The FCC also administers an approximately roughly $9 billion-a-year program called the Universal Service Fund (USF), which has been funded by a line-item charge that traditional telephone companies add to consumers’ monthly bills. Expenditures from this fund subsidize rural broadband networks and low-income programs as well as connections for schools, libraries, and rural health care facil- ities. Through various COVID-era laws, Congress has also provided the FCC with a one-time $24 billion appropriation for various low-income initiatives. POLICY PRIORITIES The FCC needs to change course and bring new urgency to achieving four main goals: l Reining in Big Tech, l Promoting national security, l Unleashing economic prosperity, and l Ensuring FCC accountability and good governance.15 Reining in Big Tech. The FCC has an important role to play in addressing the threats to individual liberty posed by corporations that are abusing dominant positions in the market. Nowhere is that clearer than when it comes to Big Tech and its attempts to drive diverse political viewpoints from the digital town square. Today, a handful of corporations can shape everything from the information we consume to the places we shop. These corporate behemoths are not merely exercising market power; they are abusing dominant positions. They are not simply prevailing in the free market; they are taking advantage of a landscape that has been skewed—in many cases by the government—to favor their business models over those of their competitors. It is hard to imagine another industry in which a greater gap exists between power and accountability. That is why a new Adminis- tration should support FCC action on several fronts. Specifically, the FFC should: l Eliminate immunities that courts added to Section 230. The FCC should issue an order that interprets Section 230 in a way that eliminates the expansive, non-textual immunities that courts have read into the statute. — 848 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise As one of the FCC’s previous General Counsels noted, the FCC has authority to take this action because Section 230 is codified in the Communications Act.16 The FCC’s Section 230 reforms should track the positions outlined in a July 2020 Petition for Rulemaking filed at the FCC near the end of the Trump Administration.17 Any new presidential Administration should consider filing a similar or new petition. As Justice Clarence Thomas has made clear, courts have construed Section 230 broadly to confer on some of the world’s largest companies a sweeping immunity that is found nowhere in the text of the statute.18 They have done so in a way that nullifies the limits Congress placed on the types of actions that Internet companies can take while continuing to benefit from Section 230. One way to start correcting this error is for the FCC to remind courts how the various portions of Section 230 operate. At the outset, the FCC can clarify that Section 230(c)(1) does not apply broadly to every decision that a platform makes. Rather, its protections apply only when a platform does not remove information provided by someone else. In contrast, the FCC should clarify that the more limited Section 230(c)(2) protections apply to any covered platform’s decision to restrict access to material provided by someone else. Combined, these actions will appropriately limit the number of cases in which a platform can censor with the benefit of Section 230’s protections. Such clarifications might also include drawing out the traditional legal distinction between distributor and publisher liability; Section 230 did not do away with the former, nor does it collapse into the latter. l Impose transparency rules on Big Tech. Today, Big Tech offers a black box. After Google manipulates search results, a small business can see its web traffic drop precipitously overnight for no apparent reason, potentially flipping its outlook from black to red. On Facebook, social media posts are left up or taken down, accounts suspended or permanently banned, without any apparent consistency. Out of the blue, YouTube can demonetize individuals who have risked their capital and invested their labor to build online businesses. At present, the FCC requires broadband providers to comply with a transparency rule that can provide a good baseline for Big Tech. Under the FCC’s rule, broadband providers must provide detailed disclosures about practices that would shape Internet traffic—from blocking to prioritizing or discriminating against content. The FCC could take a similar approach to
AI Analysis:
"The bill is a purely ceremonial designation of a post office building with no connection to Department of Homeland Security operations, policy reforms, or any of the specific initiatives outlined in the Project 2025 DHS section, such as organizational restructuring, intelligence reform, or grant policy changes."
— 160 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise Officer’s procurement of innovative technology; and the facilities plan, including the consolidation into the St. Elizabeth’s campus. They should also be prepared to help implement any end to unionization of DHS components in response to an executive order pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 7103.15 Office of the Chief Financial Officer (OCFO). DHS responsibilities to work with Congress have been split between the Office of Legislative Affairs (OLA) and OCFO. OLA deals with the authorizing committees on policy issues, and OCFO works with the appropriations committees on budget planning, execution, and reprogramming. This split creates communication and visibility issues within DHS and inconsistency in answers to Congress. This is an issue not only within the HQ model, but also through- out the components. Either appropriations personnel should be moved to OLA and there should be a “dotted line” reporting structure to OCFO, or a policy that OLA per- sonnel must be included on communications to Congress should be implemented. To avoid “answer shopping” by congressional staff, particularly appropriations staff, all budget communications from the OCFO, including from the CFO him/ herself, should first be provided to the Director of OLA to ensure consistency of information, messaging, and answers. This may be deemed awkward given that the OCFO is a Senate-confirmed position, but it is necessary to avoid inaccuracies and inconsistencies in messaging. Federal Protective Service (FPS). FPS needs federal agents to develop, share, and receive operational information and maintain direct contact with the Secretary in the midst of heightened threats. Before the summer 2020 civil unrest, position- ing FPS under MGMT was justified, but given the current climate, they should not be reporting through MGMT. This may be especially problematic if a Management Directorate Under Secretary lacking law enforcement or military experience is in place when a situation like summer 2020 arises. FPS should report to the Secretary as other components (e.g., FLETC) do. This would add little to the Secretary’s current burden unless or until civil unrest arises, at which point reporting to the Secretary creates a direct line between the primary DHS decision-maker (S1 or S2) and the FPS Director. Regarding operational communication, there should be information-sharing mandates (MOAs)—which are applicable under specific circumstances where fed- eral facilities are involved—between FPS and the U.S. Marshals, U.S. Park Police, and FBI. Agreements with U.S. Capitol Police and Supreme Court Police should also be considered, but it is noteworthy that those entities are jurisdictionally out- side of the executive branch. OFFICE OF STRATEGY, POLICY, AND PLANS (PLCY) Department-Level Reforms. PLCY should perform a complete inventory, analysis, and reevaluation of the department’s domestic terrorism lines of effort to ensure that they are consistent with the President’s priorities, congressional authorization, and Americans’ constitutional rights. — 161 — Department of Homeland Security PLCY should likewise do a complete inventory, analysis, and evaluation of any of the department’s work, in coordination with social media outlets, to censor or otherwise change or affect Americans’ speech. PLCY should comprehensively report on and publish this history in full so that the American people can know the facts. The department should remove all personnel who participated in any of this activity. The department has significant authority and budget to provide grants for var- ious purposes. This effort is diffused across components and lacks central policy thought and coordination. PLCY should set a departmentwide policy that estab- lishes how granting choices are to be made and is consistent with the President’s priorities. PLCY should clear all granting decisions to ensure that they are con- sistent with the new policy. PLCY-Wide Reforms. PLCY should work with Congress to streamline the department’s reporting requirements. Because there has not been a departmen- tal reauthorization bill and these requirements have been added piecemeal over two decades, they significantly overlap and even conflict—wasting resources and distracting from the department’s mission. PLCY should seek the elimination of the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review. Issue-Area Reforms. PLCY should bolster its Immigration Statistics program and make it the one-stop shop for the timely production of all department immi- gration statistics and analysis. OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS (I&A) The Office of Intelligence and Analysis should be eliminated both because it has not added value and because it has been weaponized for domestic politi- cal purposes. The Intelligence Community (IC) already provides raw intelligence to DHS components. In addition, the FBI, National Counter Terrorism Center, and other agencies where necessary already provide holistic threat assessment products to federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial governments as well as to private-sector entities at both the classified and unclassified levels where appropriate. I&A’s work as an interlocuter between the IC and DHS components’ individual intelligence operations on the one hand and government and the private sector on the other, as well as between the IC and the components, is at best duplicative. At worst, it is used and discussed in the media as a political tool, resulting in more harm than good to the U.S. government and IC writ large. The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, which is not a member of the IC, should create cyber intelligence products in a collaborative fashion with the National Security Agency and U.S. Cyber Command. Such efforts would lead to timelier usable classified and unclassified products for stakeholders that exceed the quality and capability of I&A’s efforts. This same principle applies to other
AI Analysis:
"The bill is a purely ceremonial designation of a post office building with no connection to telecommunications, spectrum policy, FCC authority, or any substantive regulatory objectives outlined in the Project 2025 FCC section."
— 858 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise ENDNOTES 1. 47 U.S.C. § 151, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/47/151 (accessed January 23, 2023). 2. 47 U.S.C. § 154, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/47/154 (accessed January 23, 2023). 3. Ibid. 4. 47 U.S.C. § 154(c). 5. 47 U.S.C. § 154(b)(5). 6. 47 U.S.C. § 155(a), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/47/155 (accessed January 23, 2023). 7. Ibid. 8. Ibid. There are no limits on the President’s authority to designate a different Chairperson from among the existing Commissioners. Further, though it is an open question, it is generally believed that the judiciary would impose limits on the power of the President to remove a Commissioner during his or her five-year term. The question is not settled because Congress did not include an express “for cause” or similar protection against removal in the Communications Act itself. Scholars assume this is because Congress passed the Communications Act in the years between the Supreme Court’s decision in Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926) and Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935), when it was not entirely clear that Congress could impose a limit on the President’s removal power. However, the Communications Act was significantly amended in 1996, and Congress did not add “just cause” or other protections from removal at that time. Considering the high-profile contemporary debates about the appointment and removal of independent counsels under the Independent Counsel Act, one could reasonably assume that Congress was aware of removal powers and protections for presidentially appointed and Senate-confirmed officials. 9. Chart, “FTEs—Historical and Estimated, Fiscal Years 1986–2023,” in U.S. Federal Communications Commission, 2023 Budget Estimates to Congress, March 2022, p. 17, https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-381693A1. pdf (accessed January 23, 2023). 10. U.S. Federal Communications Commission, 2023 Budget Estimates to Congress, p. 7. 11. Roslyn Layton, “Spectrum Auctions Have Raised $230 Billion; The FCC’s Authority to Conduct Them Will Lapse Soon If Congress Doesn’t Act,” Forbes, April 29, 2022, https://www.forbes.com/sites/ roslynlayton/2022/04/29/spectrum-auctions-have-raised-230-billion-the-fccs-authority-to-conduct-them- will-lapse-soon-if-congress-doesnt-act/?sh=4d32066908eb (accessed January 23, 2023). 12. For a full listing of the FCC’s Bureaus and Offices, along with their functions and an organization chart, see U.S. Federal Communications Commission, “Organizational Charts of the FCC,” https://www.fcc.gov/about-fcc/ organizational-charts-fcc (accessed January 23, 2023). 13. 47 U.S.C. § 230, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/47/230 (accessed January 23, 2023). 14. Thomas M. Johnson Jr., “The FCC’s Authority to Interpret Section 230 of the Communications Act,” October 21, 2020, https://www.fcc.gov/news-events/blog/2020/10/21/fccs-authority-interpret-section-230- communications-act (accessed January 23, 2023). 15. This chapter does not purport to set forth a comprehensive agenda for the FCC. Rather, it focuses on a selected handful of issue areas that may quickly rise to the attention of a new Administration. Similarly, not every contributor to this chapter agrees with every policy idea included here; this document attempts to reflect a range of views and perspectives. 16. Johnson, “The FCC’s Authority to Interpret Section 230 of the Communications Act.” 17. U.S. Department of Commerce, National Telecommunications and Information Administration, “NTIA Petition for Rulemaking to Clarify Provisions of Section 230 of the Communications Act,” July 27, 2020, https:// ntia.gov/fcc-filing/ntia-petition-rulemaking-clarify-provisions-section-230-communications-act (accessed January 23, 2023). 18. Malwarebytes, Inc. v. Enigma Software, 592 U.S. ___ (2020) (Thomas, J., statement respecting the denial of certiorari), https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/20pdf/19-1284_869d.pdf (accessed January 23, 2023). 19. See 47 U.S.C. § 230; see also Ray Baum’s Act of 2018, Division P, Title IV, § 401 (codifying the Consolidated Reporting Act), in H.R. 1625, Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018, Public Law No. 115-141, 115th Congress, March 23, 2018, https://www.congress.gov/115/plaws/publ141/PLAW-115publ141.pdf (accessed January 23, 2023). 20. NetChoice, L.L.C. v. Paxton, 49 F.4th 439 (5th Cir. 2022), https://fingfx.thomsonreuters.com/gfx/legaldocs/ gdpzqyobyvw/alisonn%201.pdf (accessed January 23, 2023).
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.